fix(panel): stop one poisoned DNS answer from blocking outbound tests

SanitizePublicHTTPURL rejected a hostname as soon as any single resolved
address was blocked, so a resolver returning a bogon AAAA for the test URL
host (e.g. 2001::1 for www.google.com, inside the Teredo range blocked
since b51f0976) failed the outbound Check button outright — including TCP
mode, which never uses the test URL. Mirror SSRFGuardedDialContext instead:
one usable address is enough, because the guarded dialer skips blocked
answers at connect time; a hostname with nothing usable is still refused.

Closes #6290
This commit is contained in:
Sanaei
2026-08-24 13:27:40 +02:00
parent d175050f2e
commit 2d30ab3ada
2 changed files with 45 additions and 3 deletions
+9 -3
View File
@@ -72,15 +72,21 @@ func rejectPrivateHost(ctx context.Context, hostname string) error {
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("cannot resolve host %s: %w", hostname, err)
}
return rejectAllBlockedIPs(hostname, ips)
}
// One usable address is enough — SSRFGuardedDialContext skips blocked ones at
// dial time, so a poisoned AAAA answer must not veto a healthy hostname.
func rejectAllBlockedIPs(hostname string, ips []net.IPAddr) error {
if len(ips) == 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("host %s has no IP addresses", hostname)
}
for _, ipAddr := range ips {
if isBlockedIP(ipAddr.IP) {
return fmt.Errorf("host %s resolves to blocked private/internal address %s", hostname, ipAddr.IP.String())
if !isBlockedIP(ipAddr.IP) {
return nil
}
}
return nil
return fmt.Errorf("host %s resolves to blocked private/internal address %s", hostname, ips[0].IP.String())
}
func isBlockedIP(ip net.IP) bool {