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https://github.com/MHSanaei/3x-ui.git
synced 2026-10-24 14:55:02 +03:00
fix(middleware): log rejected CSRF requests with the trusted client address (#6692)
A panel or API request rejected for a missing or wrong CSRF token got a bare 403 and left nothing in the log, so an operator chasing failed logins from a stale tab or a script had no trace. CSRFMiddleware now logs a warning with the method, path and client address. The address comes from getRemoteIp, which honours the trusted-proxy list, instead of gin's ClientIP, which trusts any peer's X-Forwarded-For.
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@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ func (a *APIController) initRouter(g *gin.RouterGroup) {
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// Decode + verify the node config envelope (zstd + X-Config-Sha256) and
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// advertise support, before CSRF/handlers read the body.
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api.Use(middleware.ConfigEnvelopeMiddleware())
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api.Use(middleware.CSRFMiddleware())
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api.Use(middleware.CSRFMiddleware(getRemoteIp))
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api.GET("/openapi.json", ServeOpenAPISpec)
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@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
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package controller
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import (
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"net/http"
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"net/http/httptest"
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"github.com/gin-contrib/sessions"
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"github.com/gin-contrib/sessions/cookie"
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"github.com/gin-gonic/gin"
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"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/logger"
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)
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func TestLoginCSRFRejectionLogsPeerIPNotForwardedHeader(t *testing.T) {
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gin.SetMode(gin.TestMode)
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engine := gin.New()
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engine.Use(sessions.Sessions("3x-ui", cookie.NewStore([]byte("csrf-log-test-secret"))))
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NewIndexController(engine.Group("/"))
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req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodPost, "/login", nil)
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req.RemoteAddr = "198.51.100.9:40000"
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req.Header.Set("X-Forwarded-For", "203.0.113.66")
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rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
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engine.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
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if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
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t.Fatalf("status = %d, want %d", rec.Code, http.StatusForbidden)
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}
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var line string
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for _, l := range logger.GetLogs(50, "WARNING") {
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if strings.Contains(l, "CSRF validation failed") {
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line = l
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break
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}
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}
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if !strings.Contains(line, "IP=198.51.100.9") || strings.Contains(line, "203.0.113.66") {
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t.Fatalf("CSRF rejection log = %q, want the untrusted peer 198.51.100.9 and not the forwarded header", line)
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}
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}
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@@ -47,9 +47,9 @@ func (a *IndexController) initRouter(g *gin.RouterGroup) {
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g.GET("/sponsors", a.sponsors)
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g.GET("/sponsors/logo/:name", a.sponsorLogo)
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g.POST("/login", middleware.CSRFMiddleware(), a.login)
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g.POST("/logout", middleware.CSRFMiddleware(), a.logout)
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g.POST("/getTwoFactorEnable", middleware.CSRFMiddleware(), a.getTwoFactorEnable)
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g.POST("/login", middleware.CSRFMiddleware(getRemoteIp), a.login)
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g.POST("/logout", middleware.CSRFMiddleware(getRemoteIp), a.logout)
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g.POST("/getTwoFactorEnable", middleware.CSRFMiddleware(getRemoteIp), a.getTwoFactorEnable)
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}
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// sponsors is public so the login page can render its slot; failures stay silent.
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@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ func NewXUIController(g *gin.RouterGroup) *XUIController {
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func (a *XUIController) initRouter(g *gin.RouterGroup) {
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g = g.Group("/panel")
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g.Use(a.checkLogin)
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g.Use(middleware.CSRFMiddleware())
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g.Use(middleware.CSRFMiddleware(getRemoteIp))
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g.GET("/", a.panelSPA)
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g.GET("/inbounds", a.panelSPA)
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