fix(sub): treat external subscription providers as untrusted input

A client's external subscription is fetched from a third party on every
subscriber refresh, and the fetcher trusted it more than its siblings:
- it dialled any address, redirects included; it now goes through the
  SSRF guard like the outbound subscription and remote routing fetchers;
- it forwarded any line containing "://"; it now keeps only server share
  links, so app deeplinks and plain URLs never reach the subscriber's app;
- it bounded the body but not the link count (now 1000) or the headers
  (now 64 KiB), and stored the raw error, URL included, on every row; the
  stored error is now host-only and at most 1 KiB.

The link parser also refuses links that nest JSON past 16 levels, since
the JSON subscription pretty-prints it at quadratic cost, and external
configs are marshalled compactly until the final, single indent pass.
This commit is contained in:
MHSanaei
2026-10-31 08:53:27 +00:00
parent 3cdb7e2b49
commit 534afe13ab
10 changed files with 203 additions and 21 deletions
+28
View File
@@ -131,9 +131,37 @@ func ParseLink(link string) (*ParseResult, error) {
return nil, err
}
dropHostLocalKeys(res.Outbound)
if !nestsWithin(map[string]any(res.Outbound), maxOutboundDepth) {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("link nests JSON deeper than %d levels", maxOutboundDepth)
}
return res, nil
}
// maxOutboundDepth bounds the JSON a link can nest into its outbound (the deepest real shape,
// an xhttp download stream's finalmask, is about 11): pretty-printing costs depth squared.
const maxOutboundDepth = 16
func nestsWithin(v any, depth int) bool {
if depth < 0 {
return false
}
switch v := v.(type) {
case map[string]any:
for _, child := range v {
if !nestsWithin(child, depth-1) {
return false
}
}
case []any:
for _, child := range v {
if !nestsWithin(child, depth-1) {
return false
}
}
}
return true
}
func parseLinkByScheme(link string) (*ParseResult, error) {
switch {
case strings.HasPrefix(link, "vmess://"):