feat(xray): add the XDRIVE transport

xray-core v26.10.10 tunnels a stream through files in shared cloud
storage ("network": "xdrive"): Google Drive, a local folder, or any HTTP
storage API described by a template. The panel could not select it, and
the stream schema rejected a pasted xdrive stream outright.

The inbound and outbound forms now offer XDRIVE with one shared editor:
service, folder, the three Google Drive secrets in the order the core
reads them, a template JSON editor with its {secretN} values, the
optional domain front (the stream-level address/port the storage client
dials), and the core's tuning knobs with their defaults as placeholders.
Switching an inbound to XDRIVE resets security to none, because the
core would otherwise read the inbound's TLS/REALITY as the storage API's
client TLS.

XDRIVE has no share-link format, and a link carrying the storage
secrets would print them into every QR code, so both link generators
emit none for it; the JSON subscription already passes the stream
through intact, and Clash drops the unknown transport.
This commit is contained in:
MHSanaei
2026-10-11 08:21:08 +02:00
parent 73a028f52d
commit ca5983595b
34 changed files with 848 additions and 19 deletions
+21 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
title: Transports & Security
description: Every transport 3x-ui exposes — TCP, mKCP, WebSocket, gRPC, HTTPUpgrade, XHTTP, Hysteria — with their settings, plus FinalMask obfuscation, sockopt, TLS/REALITY, XTLS-Vision, and VLESS encryption.
description: Every transport 3x-ui exposes — TCP, mKCP, WebSocket, gRPC, HTTPUpgrade, XHTTP, Hysteria, XDRIVE — with their settings, plus FinalMask obfuscation, sockopt, TLS/REALITY, XTLS-Vision, and VLESS encryption.
icon: Network
---
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ network writes its own settings key on the wire (`tcpSettings`, `kcpSettings`,
| **HTTPUpgrade** | `httpupgradeSettings` | CDN-friendly HTTP/1.1 `Upgrade`; lighter than full WebSocket. |
| **XHTTP** | `xhttpSettings` | Modern stream-multiplexed HTTP transport; CDN-friendly and REALITY-capable. |
| **Hysteria** | `hysteriaSettings` | QUIC-based transport — only for the **Hysteria2** protocol. |
| **XDRIVE** | `xdriveSettings` | Tunnels the stream through files in shared cloud storage (Google Drive, a local folder or any HTTP storage API). |
<Callout type="info">
**WireGuard** and **Tunnel** (dokodemo-door) inbounds expose no transport
@@ -116,6 +117,25 @@ Only valid when the protocol is **Hysteria2**.
| `udpIdleTimeout` | `60` | Seconds (2–600) before idle UDP sessions are dropped. |
| `masquerade` | — | Disguise as an HTTP/3 server: `type` `proxy`/`file`/`string` with `url`/`dir`/`content`, plus `headers` and `statusCode`. |
### XDRIVE — `xdriveSettings`
XDRIVE carries the stream as files in a folder both ends can reach: the server polls
that folder instead of accepting connections on its port. Both sides must use the
**same** service, folder and secrets, so the JSON subscription ships them to every
client; XDRIVE inbounds get no share link or Clash entry.
| Field | Default | Meaning |
| -------------- | -------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| `service` | `Google Drive` | `Google Drive`, `local` (a folder on disk) or `template` (any HTTP storage API). |
| `remoteFolder` | — | Folder that holds the session files. |
| `secrets` | — | Google Drive: ClientID, ClientSecret, RefreshToken — exactly three, in that order. Template: values read as `{secret0}`, `{secret1}`, …. |
| `template` | — | Template service only: the storage API's `auth`, `put`, `get`, `list` and `delete` operations. |
| tuning | core defaults | `segmentBytes` (512 KiB), `flushIntervalMs` (20), `pollIntervalMs`/`maxPollIntervalMs` (50/500), `eagerWindowMs` (2000), `holeTimeoutMs` (30000), `sessionTtlSeconds` (300), `concurrency` (8). |
The optional **Front address/port** (the stream-level `address`/`port`) is a domain
front the storage API is dialed through; TLS still names the API host. XDRIVE has
no TLS/REALITY layer of its own — its traffic is the storage API's HTTPS.
## FinalMask — late-layer obfuscation
**FinalMask** wraps traffic **after** the transport and security layers, so it can