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fix(amneziawg): allow TPROXY-marked traffic through a default-deny INPUT chain
TPROXY never rewrites a packet's own destination address, only the routing decision. A default-deny firewall whose INPUT chain sanity-checks "is this destination actually local" (UFW's ufw-not-local, via addrtype --dst-type LOCAL, is a concrete example) silently drops the redirected packet before Xray's socket ever sees it -- RouteThroughXray looked fully configured (TPROXY rule present and counting, Xray listening with IP_TRANSPARENT set) yet every peer's traffic vanished with no trace on either side. Adds an idempotent, never-torn-down "iptables -I INPUT 1 -m mark --mark <fwmark> -j ACCEPT" alongside the existing shared policy route, so this works regardless of which firewall manager owns the rest of the INPUT chain.
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@@ -734,9 +734,27 @@ func defaultPostUpDown(inst Instance, ext string) (postUp, postDown string) {
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// re-runs on any client add/remove/re-IP — without the existence
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// check below, "ip rule show" would accumulate one duplicate entry
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// per bounce forever.
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//
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// TPROXY never rewrites the packet's own destination address — only
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// the routing decision changes, via the fwmark+table trick above — so
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// by the time this packet reaches the host's own INPUT chain, its
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// destination still looks like some remote address (e.g. 8.8.8.8),
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// never this host's own. A default-deny firewall whose INPUT chain
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// sanity-checks "is this destination actually local" (UFW's
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// ufw-not-local, using addrtype --dst-type LOCAL, is exactly this) can
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// never see it as legitimate and silently drops it before Xray's
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// socket ever sees a single byte — TPROXY's own counters keep
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// incrementing the whole time, making this look like a Xray-side bug
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// even though Xray never gets the chance to fail. The fix is the same
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// shape as the policy route above: an idempotent, never-torn-down,
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// system-wide accept for this fwmark, inserted at the very front of
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// the base INPUT chain so it runs before any such sanity check,
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// regardless of which firewall manager (ufw, firewalld, bare
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// iptables) owns the rest of that chain.
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up = append(up,
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fmt.Sprintf("ip rule list | grep -q 'fwmark %#x lookup %d' || ip rule add fwmark %#x lookup %d", EgressFwmark, EgressTable, EgressFwmark, EgressTable),
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fmt.Sprintf("ip route replace local 0.0.0.0/0 dev lo table %d", EgressTable),
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fmt.Sprintf("iptables -C INPUT -m mark --mark %#x -j ACCEPT 2>/dev/null || iptables -I INPUT 1 -m mark --mark %#x -j ACCEPT", EgressFwmark, EgressFwmark),
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)
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}
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}
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