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Chester Fishmans
b42a1c0ba1
* fix(systemd): harden shipped x-ui unit files The units ran the panel as root with no sandboxing: systemd-analyze security rates them 9.6 UNSAFE. Add NoNewPrivileges, ProtectSystem=full with ReadWritePaths for the default XUI_DB_FOLDER/XUI_BIN_FOLDER/XUI_LOG_FOLDER stores, kernel and clock protections, UMask=0077, RestrictAddressFamilies, a CapabilityBoundingSet with NET_ADMIN/NET_BIND_SERVICE/NET_RAW and SystemCallFilter=@system-service. PrivateTmp is deliberately omitted: the web updater hands a path inside the system temp directory to a systemd-run transient unit, which does not share the service's private tmpfs. ProtectHome stays read-only because installs keep TLS certificates under the root home directory. Fixes #6605 * fix(systemd): ship ReadWriteDirectories= alias for systemd < 231 ReadWritePaths= only exists since systemd 231; install.sh still supports CentOS 7 (systemd 219), where the directive is ignored and ProtectSystem=full would leave the panel state directory read-only, breaking its database. * fix(systemd): keep root's DAC bits and regenerate the write paths Two follow-ups to the hardening, both reported by review on #6718. CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE and CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH were dropped from the bounding set. Root holds them normally, and a bounding set is subtracted from root too: the panel could no longer read a private key it does not own (a Caddy-issued certificate under its own state dir, an acme.sh home, any 0600 file owned by another account). That fails quietly for TLS -- the panel listener logs the tls.LoadX509KeyPair error and keeps serving plain HTTP, and Xray inbounds using that key stop -- so both bits stay. ProtectSystem=full plus a hard-coded ReadWritePaths list broke installs whose XUI_DB_FOLDER/XUI_LOG_FOLDER/XUI_BIN_FOLDER live outside the defaults, and the workaround of editing the unit did not survive an update, because install.sh and update.sh reinstall the unit from the release tarball. The folders actually in use are now resolved from the same env file the unit passes to the panel and regenerated into x-ui.service.d/10-xui-write-paths.conf on every install and update, so a relocated store stays writable and the list is not reset. The unit keeps the plain-install defaults plus XUI_SERVICE, which the in-panel updater needs when systemd-run is unavailable and it falls back to a child process that inherits this sandbox while update.sh lands the unit again. Uninstall removes the drop-in with the unit. * fix(systemd): keep the seccomp whitelist off old systemd, tighten the rest Review of the previous head found that SystemCallFilter=@system-service plus SystemCallErrorNumber=EPERM is a hard regression on the platforms this PR means to keep working. @-named filter groups exist from systemd 239 on, and older systemd does not ignore an unknown group name: on <231 the name fails to resolve and the filter stays the built-in whitelist of execve/exit/exit_group/ rt_sigreturn/sigreturn, on 231..238 it degrades to @default. Either way the panel then gets EPERM on read/openat/mmap/clone and cannot start -- a CentOS 7 or Ubuntu 18.04 install would come up dead after this update. The two directives now live in the generated drop-in and are written only when "systemctl --version" reports 239 or newer, so old hosts keep the rest of the hardening and simply go without seccomp. The same review listed three more items, all addressed here: - a comment claiming ProtectSystem=full "keeps everything outside /var, /run and the listed ReadWritePaths read-only" -- that is `strict`; `full` locks down /usr, /boot, /efi and /etc; - /etc/systemd/system was granted writable for the in-panel updater's fallback, but that fallback cannot work under this sandbox at all: update.sh also stages the release archive beside the main folder, replaces /usr/bin/x-ui and calls the package manager. The entry is gone and update.sh now stops up front with one clear message when the directories it needs are read-only, instead of failing halfway with "Failed to download x-ui"; - CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH is redundant next to CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, so the bounding set keeps just the latter. Relocating a store by editing the env file alone is documented in the unit and in the generated drop-in: the drop-in is only written by install/update, so one of those has to be re-run afterwards. Verified with a local harness (9 checks: plain defaults, relocated store read from the env file, the same list produced by update.sh, duplicate collapse, seccomp present at systemd 249 and absent at 238, read-only guard) and bash -n on install.sh, update.sh, x-ui.sh. systemd-analyze is not available here, so the unit files themselves are unverified by a parser. * fix(systemd): actually wire the read-only guard, drop the superseded drop-in Re-review of the previous head caught two leftovers from that commit: - require_writable_update_paths was defined but never called, so the guard the unit comments, the commit message and the PR comment promise did not exist at all. It is now called at the top level, before install_base, i.e. before anything with a side effect: a sandboxed fallback run stops with one clear message instead of failing halfway, which on a relocated main folder meant the old install removed and the service folder rewritten before dying on /usr/bin. - the drop-in this branch replaced (10-xui-write-paths.conf) is no longer written or referenced, but nothing removed it either. Whoever installed the build that wrote it keeps its wider list, including the writable service folder, until it is deleted by hand. Both generators now remove it. Harness extended to 11 checks: the superseded file is gone after a run, the guard is actually called, plus the previous nine (defaults, env-file relocation, same list from update.sh, dedupe, seccomp at 249 / absent at 238, read-only guard) and bash -n on the three scripts. * fix(systemd): correct two comments and keep spaces out of the path list Second-opinion review of the previous head (two models, both asked to state platforms and versions) produced three actionable items: a wrong comment kept from the earlier commits, a wrong generalisation about the filter groups, and a path-list case that would leave the panel unable to start. - the ProtectSystem= comment claimed strict leaves /var and /run writable. It does not: strict mounts the whole hierarchy read-only and only the kernel API filesystems stay as they are. The sentence was already wrong before this branch and moving it to ProtectSystem=full did not fix it. - "the @-named filter groups need systemd >= 239" is the wrong generalisation: named groups exist since 231, it is @system-service that arrived in 239. The unit files, both script comments and the drop-in body now name the group. - a folder containing whitespace (XUI_DB_FOLDER="/srv/panel data") was written into ReadWritePaths= verbatim. That directive is a whitespace-separated list, so the entry splits into "-/srv/panel" and "data", and systemd rejects the whole drop-in: the panel then does not start at all. Such folders are left out and reported to the operator instead; the other paths are still written. Harness extended with three checks for the whitespace case (folder left out, remaining paths intact, warning emitted) and the duplicate-store case now reads its own env file instead of the previous one, so it tests what it claims. 14 checks plus bash -n on the three scripts, all passing. * fix(systemd): act on the independent review of the drop-in generator A read-only review of the branch head (another model, given the diff and the sources, asked to cite only verified lines) confirmed the earlier work and turned up four items that are fixed here: - a folder name carrying a literal % went into ReadWritePaths= as it was, and systemd expands %-specifiers in unit files: with XUI_DB_FOLDER=/srv/x%-ui the entry no longer named the directory the panel writes to and the panel could not write its database. The path is now emitted as %%; the duplicate check keeps comparing the unescaped value. - systemd older than 229/242/244 does not know NoNewPrivileges, ProtectClock, ProtectHostname and ProtectKernelLogs. It logs them and carries on, so CentOS 7 (systemd 219, which install.sh explicitly supports) runs with less hardening than the unit lists. install.sh and update.sh now print which protections need a newer systemd, which ones still apply, and that upgrading systemd is what changes it. - the updater's writability guard asked [[ -w ]] about the parent directories. It creates and removes a probe file instead, so an immutable attribute or a full filesystem is caught as well (a read-only mount was already caught). - the generator's comment claimed to resolve the folders the service actually uses, while the shipped unit hard-codes WorkingDirectory= and ExecStart= under /usr/local/x-ui. The comment now states what XUI_MAIN_FOLDER really feeds -- the location install.sh/update.sh install into and the base for a relative XUI_BIN_FOLDER -- and that a relocated main folder needs the unit edited too. Rejected from the same review, with the evidence: that [[ -w ]] cannot see a read-only mount (access(W_OK)/faccessat consults __mnt_is_readonly before the mode bits), and that the /etc ReadWritePaths entry is an exception granted for /etc rather than a default store already in the list. Harness extended: 19 checks (escaped %, the old-systemd note, whitespace and duplicate folders, seccomp gating, the read-only guard) plus bash -n on the three scripts, all passing. * fix(systemd): name the hardening old systemd really ignores The old-systemd note fired only below 239 and listed wrong versions: RHEL 8 (239) and Debian 10 (241) silently lose ProtectHostname and RestrictSUIDSGID (242), ProtectKernelLogs (244) and ProtectClock (245) with no note, while CentOS 7 was told NoNewPrivileges (187) and ProtectHome=read-only (214) were not applied although both are. The note is now built from a directive/version table taken from systemd.exec(5) and lists only what the running systemd lacks. Also drop the removal of 10-xui-write-paths.conf: only an intermediate commit of this branch wrote that file, no release ever shipped it. --------- Co-authored-by: Кот <kot@zeroclaw.local> Co-authored-by: Sanaei <ho3ein.sanaei@gmail.com>
96 lines
4.7 KiB
Plaintext
96 lines
4.7 KiB
Plaintext
[Unit]
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Description=x-ui Service
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After=network.target
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Wants=network.target
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StartLimitIntervalSec=180
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StartLimitBurst=10
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[Service]
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EnvironmentFile=-/etc/conf.d/x-ui
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Environment="XRAY_VMESS_AEAD_FORCED=false"
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Type=simple
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WorkingDirectory=/usr/local/x-ui/
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ExecStart=/usr/local/x-ui/x-ui
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ExecReload=/bin/kill -USR1 $MAINPID
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Restart=on-failure
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RestartSec=5s
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# The panel intentionally stays root: it supervises the Xray child processes,
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# edits netfilter state and reads TLS private keys. These settings only bound
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# what a panel-level flaw can reach.
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#
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# PrivateTmp=yes is deliberately absent: the web updater writes its script into
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# /tmp and hands the absolute path to a "systemd-run" transient unit, which
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# does not share this service's private /tmp (the download would vanish).
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NoNewPrivileges=yes
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ProtectSystem=full
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# Default stores: DB/update status/node-token in XUI_DB_FOLDER (/etc/x-ui),
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# xray binary/config/geo in XUI_BIN_FOLDER under /usr/local/x-ui, logs in
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# XUI_LOG_FOLDER (/var/log/x-ui). These are the plain-install defaults and the
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# floor, not the whole list: install.sh and update.sh regenerate a drop-in
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# (x-ui.service.d/10-xui-sandbox.conf) with the folders resolved from the XUI_*
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# variables, so a relocated XUI_DB_FOLDER or XUI_LOG_FOLDER stays writable and
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# the list survives an update instead of being reset to these defaults. Changing
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# one of those variables in the env file is not enough by itself: the drop-in has
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# to be refreshed as well, i.e. install or update the panel again.
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# Add local extras in your own drop-in (e.g. 20-local.conf).
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# The leading '-' keeps the unit startable if a path does not exist yet.
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# What ProtectSystem=full covers, precisely: /usr, /boot, /efi and /etc become
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# read-only, everything else stays writable. So this list matters for stores
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# under those trees -- the default main folder under /usr/local is one.
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#
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# The in-panel updater is expected to leave this sandbox: it runs update.sh
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# through a transient systemd-run unit, which does not inherit these settings.
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# Its plain-child fallback (taken when systemd-run is unavailable) cannot work
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# here -- update.sh stages the release archive beside the main folder, replaces
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# /usr/bin/x-ui and calls the package manager -- so it stops with one clear
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# message instead of failing halfway, and the sandbox deliberately does not
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# grant /usr or /etc to accommodate it.
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# ReadWritePaths= requires systemd >= 231; ReadWriteDirectories= is the deprecated
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# alias for older systemd, needed so ProtectSystem=full keeps /etc/x-ui writable.
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ReadWritePaths=-/etc/x-ui -/usr/local/x-ui -/var/log/x-ui
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ReadWriteDirectories=-/etc/x-ui -/usr/local/x-ui -/var/log/x-ui
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ProtectKernelTunables=yes
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ProtectKernelModules=yes
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ProtectKernelLogs=yes
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ProtectClock=yes
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ProtectHostname=yes
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# read-only rather than yes: installs keep TLS certs under /root/cert, and the
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# panel must still be able to read them.
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ProtectHome=read-only
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LockPersonality=yes
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RestrictRealtime=yes
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RestrictSUIDSGID=yes
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RestrictNamespaces=yes
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UMask=0077
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# AF_NETLINK for interface/route lookups and the ip(8) child used by the
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# AmneziaWG IPv6-alias feature.
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RestrictAddressFamilies=AF_INET AF_INET6 AF_UNIX AF_NETLINK
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# NET_ADMIN for ip(8)/tproxy, NET_BIND_SERVICE for ports below 1024, NET_RAW
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# for raw sockets and SO_BINDTODEVICE.
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#
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# DAC_OVERRIDE has to stay. The panel runs as root, but a bounding set is
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# subtracted from root's own privileges too: without it root can only read a
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# file when the owner/group/other bits let uid 0 through, and any TLS private
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# key belonging to another account becomes unreadable -- a certificate issued to
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# Caddy, an acme.sh home, any 0600 file that root does not own. TLS then fails
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# quietly: the panel listener catches the tls.LoadX509KeyPair error, logs it and
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# keeps serving plain HTTP, and every Xray inbound using that key stops. Those
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# reads worked before the sandbox because the panel is root.
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# DAC_READ_SEARCH is deliberately absent: directory search is already covered by
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# DAC_OVERRIDE, so it would only widen the set without adding anything.
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CapabilityBoundingSet=CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE CAP_NET_ADMIN CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE CAP_NET_RAW
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SystemCallArchitectures=native
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# No seccomp whitelist here on purpose. @system-service needs systemd >= 239
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# (other @-named groups exist since 231), and older systemd does not ignore an
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# unknown group name gracefully: on
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# <231 the name fails to resolve and the filter stays the built-in whitelist of
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# execve/exit/exit_group/rt_sigreturn/sigreturn, on 231..238 it degrades to
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# @default -- either way the panel then gets EPERM on read/openat/mmap/clone and
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# cannot start. install.sh and update.sh add SystemCallFilter=@system-service and
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# SystemCallErrorNumber=EPERM to the generated drop-in, but only when
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# "systemctl --version" reports 239 or newer.
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[Install]
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WantedBy=multi-user.target
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