Files
3x-ui/internal/web/job/check_client_ip_job.go
T
MHSanaei b04039c2bd feat(xray): add the MASQUE protocol and transport
xray-core v26.10.10 serves MASQUE: CONNECT-IP over HTTP/3 or HTTP/2,
always behind TLS, as an inbound and an outbound protocol riding a
dedicated "masque" transport. The panel could not create either.

Inbound: MASQUE is a multi-user protocol whose users log in with their
email and password over Basic auth. The panel keeps the client's
"password" like trojan and GenXrayInboundConfig hands it to the core as
"pass", so the full-config path, the live AddInbound path and node
pushes all emit what the core reads; one user with an empty pass makes
the core refuse the whole inbound. Live user adds build a masque.Account
from either key, client-only changes diff per user so a new client does
not drop every connected tunnel, and client creation, copy, validation
and edits key on the password. The address pool and MTU get form
fields, TLS is mandatory, and the port check follows the core's
listener choice: HTTP/2 on TCP when the ALPN offers h2, HTTP/3 on UDP
when it offers h3 or not h2. Nodes may host MASQUE from v3.9.1, the
first panel release that knows to rename the password.

MASQUE has no share-link format, so links and Clash skip it; the JSON
subscription builds the client's masque outbound with its email and
password, and the subscription allowlist now lets a subId see MASQUE
inbounds at all. The IP-limit job, client pages and traffic tracking
list the protocol.

Outbound: the form edits the server, remote DNS, and the transport's
host, path, Basic credentials, headers and WARP block (enrolled key,
endpoint public key, tunnel addresses), which xray-core refuses next to
user/pass. The outbound test probes it through the core, since its
default HTTP/3 dial is UDP.
2026-10-11 10:28:49 +02:00

850 lines
28 KiB
Go

package job
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"io"
"os"
"os/exec"
"runtime"
"sort"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/database"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/database/model"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/logger"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/web/service"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/xray"
"gorm.io/gorm"
)
// IPWithTimestamp tracks an IP address with its last seen timestamp
type IPWithTimestamp struct {
IP string `json:"ip"`
Timestamp int64 `json:"timestamp"`
}
// CheckClientIpJob monitors client IP addresses and manages IP blocking based
// on configured limits. The per-client IPs come from the core's online-stats
// API; no access log is involved. On a core too old to expose that API the job
// simply skips the run (the bundled core always supports it).
type CheckClientIpJob struct {
bannedSeen map[string]int64
xrayService service.XrayService
allowlist ipLimitAllowlist
lastIpPrune int64
}
var job *CheckClientIpJob
const defaultXrayAPIPort = 62789
const ipStaleAfterSeconds = int64(30 * 60)
// pruneStaleIpRows cadence; the scan itself cannot prune offline clients' rows.
const ipPruneIntervalSeconds = int64(5 * 60)
// NewCheckClientIpJob creates a new client IP monitoring job instance.
func NewCheckClientIpJob() *CheckClientIpJob {
job = new(CheckClientIpJob)
return job
}
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) Run() {
j.pruneStaleIpRows()
observed, apiMode := j.collectFromOnlineAPI()
if !apiMode {
// xray is down or predates the online-stats API. There is no access-log
// fallback anymore, so there is nothing to do this run.
logger.Debug("[LimitIP] online-stats API unavailable this run; skipping")
return
}
if !isFail2BanEnabled() {
return
}
hasLimit := j.hasLimitIp()
f2bInstalled := false
if hasLimit {
f2bInstalled = j.checkFail2BanInstalled()
}
// Read only when the limit is actually applied: this runs every 10s and
// most panels carry no IP limit at all.
enforce := j.resolveEnforce(hasLimit, f2bInstalled)
if enforce {
j.allowlist = j.loadAllowlist()
}
j.processObserved(observed, enforce, true)
}
// resolveEnforce decides whether limits can actually be enforced this run.
// Without fail2ban on a platform that needs it the limit can't be applied, so
// enforcement is skipped (the panel resets these limits to 0 on upgrade and
// disables the field, so this is normally a no-op).
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) resolveEnforce(hasLimit, f2bInstalled bool) bool {
if hasLimit && runtime.GOOS != "windows" && !f2bInstalled {
return false
}
return hasLimit
}
// collectFromOnlineAPI builds per-email IP observations (email -> ip ->
// last-seen unix seconds) from the core's online-stats API. ok=false means the
// API is unavailable — xray not running, an older core, or a transient gRPC
// failure — and the caller skips the run (there is no access-log fallback).
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) collectFromOnlineAPI() (map[string]map[string]int64, bool) {
onlineUsers, ok, err := j.xrayService.GetOnlineUsers()
if err != nil {
logger.Debug("[LimitIP] online-stats API unavailable this run:", err)
return nil, false
}
if !ok {
return nil, false
}
now := time.Now().Unix()
observed := make(map[string]map[string]int64, len(onlineUsers))
for _, user := range onlineUsers {
for _, entry := range user.IPs {
// No localhost guard needed here: the core's OnlineMap.AddIP drops
// 127.0.0.1/[::1] itself, so they never reach this list.
ts := entry.LastSeen
if ts <= 0 {
ts = now
}
if _, exists := observed[user.Email]; !exists {
observed[user.Email] = make(map[string]int64)
}
if existing, seen := observed[user.Email][entry.IP]; !seen || ts > existing {
observed[user.Email][entry.IP] = ts
}
}
}
return observed, true
}
// hasLimitIp reports whether any client carries an IP limit. It probes the
// normalized clients table (limit_ip is synced there by SyncInbound and the
// legacy seeder), replacing the old `settings LIKE '%limitIp%'` scan that
// loaded and JSON-parsed every inbound's settings blob on each 10s run.
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) hasLimitIp() bool {
db := database.GetDB()
var probe int64
err := db.Model(&model.ClientRecord{}).Where("limit_ip > 0").Limit(1).Count(&probe).Error
return err == nil && probe > 0
}
// loadAllowlist reads the operator's trusted addresses once per scan; a bad
// read leaves the list empty, which enforces the limit as before rather than
// silently exempting everyone.
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) loadAllowlist() ipLimitAllowlist {
raw, err := (&service.SettingService{}).GetIpLimitAllowlist()
if err != nil {
logger.Warning("[LimitIP] could not read the allowlist, enforcing without it:", err)
return ipLimitAllowlist{}
}
return parseIpLimitAllowlist(raw)
}
const ipScanChunk = 400
func chunkEmails(s []string, size int) [][]string {
if len(s) == 0 {
return nil
}
chunks := make([][]string, 0, (len(s)+size-1)/size)
for size < len(s) {
s, chunks = s[size:], append(chunks, s[:size])
}
return append(chunks, s)
}
// loadClientLimits maps each observed email to its clients.limit_ip in a few
// chunked queries, replacing the per-email settings-JSON parse that previously
// resolved the limit.
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) loadClientLimits(emails []string) map[string]int {
db := database.GetDB()
out := make(map[string]int, len(emails))
for _, batch := range chunkEmails(emails, ipScanChunk) {
var rows []struct {
Email string
LimitIp int
}
if err := db.Model(&model.ClientRecord{}).
Select("email, limit_ip").
Where("email IN ?", batch).
Scan(&rows).Error; err != nil {
j.checkError(err)
continue
}
for _, r := range rows {
out[r.Email] = r.LimitIp
}
}
return out
}
// loadInboundsByEmails resolves each email's owning inbound through the
// clients/client_inbounds relation in chunked queries. Like the old per-email
// First() it keeps the lowest inbound id when a client spans several inbounds.
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) loadInboundsByEmails(emails []string) map[string]*model.Inbound {
db := database.GetDB()
minInboundByEmail := make(map[string]int, len(emails))
for _, batch := range chunkEmails(emails, ipScanChunk) {
var pairs []struct {
Email string
InboundId int
}
if err := db.Table("client_inbounds").
Select("clients.email AS email, client_inbounds.inbound_id AS inbound_id").
Joins("JOIN clients ON clients.id = client_inbounds.client_id").
Where("clients.email IN ?", batch).
Scan(&pairs).Error; err != nil {
j.checkError(err)
return nil
}
for _, p := range pairs {
if cur, ok := minInboundByEmail[p.Email]; !ok || p.InboundId < cur {
minInboundByEmail[p.Email] = p.InboundId
}
}
}
if len(minInboundByEmail) == 0 {
return nil
}
idSet := make(map[int]struct{}, len(minInboundByEmail))
ids := make([]int, 0, len(minInboundByEmail))
for _, id := range minInboundByEmail {
if _, seen := idSet[id]; !seen {
idSet[id] = struct{}{}
ids = append(ids, id)
}
}
sort.Ints(ids)
inboundsById := make(map[int]*model.Inbound, len(ids))
for lo := 0; lo < len(ids); lo += ipScanChunk {
hi := min(lo+ipScanChunk, len(ids))
var page []*model.Inbound
if err := db.Model(&model.Inbound{}).Where("id IN ?", ids[lo:hi]).Find(&page).Error; err != nil {
j.checkError(err)
return nil
}
for _, ib := range page {
inboundsById[ib.Id] = ib
}
}
out := make(map[string]*model.Inbound, len(minInboundByEmail))
for email, id := range minInboundByEmail {
if ib, ok := inboundsById[id]; ok {
out[email] = ib
}
}
return out
}
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) loadClientIpRows(emails []string) map[string]*model.InboundClientIps {
db := database.GetDB()
out := make(map[string]*model.InboundClientIps, len(emails))
for _, batch := range chunkEmails(emails, ipScanChunk) {
var rows []model.InboundClientIps
if err := db.Where("client_email IN ?", batch).Find(&rows).Error; err != nil {
j.checkError(err)
continue
}
for i := range rows {
out[rows[i].ClientEmail] = &rows[i]
}
}
return out
}
// processObserved runs collection + enforcement for one scan's observations
// (email -> ip -> last-seen unix seconds). observedAreLive marks the
// observations as live connections, which bypass the stale cutoff: a connection
// that opened hours ago is still live even though its timestamp is old. The
// online-stats API always reports live connections, so the job passes true.
// Lookups are batched up front and all inbound_client_ips writes share one
// transaction, so a scan costs a handful of queries and one fsync instead of
// several per observed email.
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) processObserved(observed map[string]map[string]int64, enforce, observedAreLive bool) bool {
shouldCleanLog := false
now := time.Now().Unix()
emails := make([]string, 0, len(observed))
for email := range observed {
emails = append(emails, email)
}
sort.Strings(emails)
limitByEmail := j.loadClientLimits(emails)
inboundByEmail := j.loadInboundsByEmails(emails)
ipRowByEmail := j.loadClientIpRows(emails)
// attribution accumulates this scan's local observations per email so they can
// be recorded under this panel's own guid for cross-node IP attribution.
attribution := make(map[string][]model.ClientIpEntry, len(observed))
var bans []pendingBan
db := database.GetDB()
tx := db.Begin()
if tx.Error != nil {
j.checkError(tx.Error)
return false
}
committed := false
defer func() {
if !committed {
tx.Rollback()
}
}()
for _, email := range emails {
ipTimestamps := observed[email]
// The observations can still reference a client that was just renamed
// or deleted; its email no longer matches any inbound. Skip it (and
// drop any orphaned tracking row) instead of recreating a row and
// logging an ERROR every run (#4963). The batch map resolves through
// the clients relation; the per-email fallback keeps its settings LIKE
// net for clients not yet present there.
inbound, ok := inboundByEmail[email]
if !ok {
var err error
inbound, err = j.getInboundByEmail(email)
if err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, gorm.ErrRecordNotFound) {
logger.Debugf("[LimitIP] skipping stale observed email %q (renamed or deleted)", email)
j.delInboundClientIps(tx, email)
} else {
j.checkError(err)
}
continue
}
}
// Convert to IPWithTimestamp slice
ipsWithTime := make([]IPWithTimestamp, 0, len(ipTimestamps))
attrEntries := make([]model.ClientIpEntry, 0, len(ipTimestamps))
for ip, timestamp := range ipTimestamps {
ipsWithTime = append(ipsWithTime, IPWithTimestamp{IP: ip, Timestamp: timestamp})
// Live API observations may carry an old lastSeen (connection start),
// so stamp attribution with now; otherwise the stale cutoff would evict
// an IP that is connected right now.
attrTs := timestamp
if observedAreLive {
attrTs = now
}
attrEntries = append(attrEntries, model.ClientIpEntry{IP: ip, Timestamp: attrTs})
}
if len(attrEntries) > 0 {
attribution[email] = attrEntries
}
clientIpsRecord, ok := ipRowByEmail[email]
if !ok {
jsonIps, err := json.Marshal(ipsWithTime)
if err != nil {
j.checkError(err)
continue
}
if err := tx.Save(&model.InboundClientIps{ClientEmail: email, Ips: string(jsonIps)}).Error; err != nil {
j.checkError(err)
}
continue
}
candidates, keptLive := j.updateInboundClientIps(tx, clientIpsRecord, inbound, email, limitByEmail[email], ipsWithTime, enforce, observedAreLive)
bans = append(bans, pendingBan{inbound: inbound, email: email, candidates: candidates, keptLive: keptLive})
}
if err := tx.Commit().Error; err != nil {
j.checkError(err)
return false
}
committed = true
published := j.publishBans(bans)
// Xray disconnects run after the commit so their network round-trips never
// extend the scan's write transaction (node syncs upsert the same table).
shouldCleanLog = shouldCleanLog || len(published) > 0
clientsCache := make(map[int][]model.Client)
for _, d := range published {
clients, cached := clientsCache[d.inbound.Id]
if !cached {
clients, _ = service.ParseInboundSettingsClients(d.inbound.Settings)
clientsCache[d.inbound.Id] = clients
}
j.disconnectClientTemporarily(d.inbound, d.email, clients)
}
j.recordLocalAttribution(attribution)
return shouldCleanLog
}
// recordLocalAttribution stores this scan's local observations under this panel's
// own guid so a parent panel can attribute each IP to the node it is on.
// Best-effort: attribution is advisory and must never block IP-limit enforcement.
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) recordLocalAttribution(attribution map[string][]model.ClientIpEntry) {
if len(attribution) == 0 {
return
}
guid, err := (&service.SettingService{}).GetPanelGuid()
if err != nil || guid == "" {
return
}
if err := (&service.InboundService{}).RecordLocalClientIps(guid, attribution); err != nil {
logger.Debug("[LimitIP] record local ip attribution failed:", err)
}
}
// mergeClientIps folds this scan's observations into the persisted set,
// dropping entries older than staleCutoff. newAlwaysLive exempts the new
// entries from that cutoff: an API-observed IP is a live connection by
// definition, even when its lastSeen (set at dispatch time) is hours old.
func mergeClientIps(old, new []IPWithTimestamp, staleCutoff int64, newAlwaysLive bool) map[string]int64 {
ipMap := make(map[string]int64, len(old)+len(new))
for _, ipTime := range old {
if ipTime.Timestamp < staleCutoff {
continue
}
ipMap[ipTime.IP] = ipTime.Timestamp
}
for _, ipTime := range new {
if !newAlwaysLive && ipTime.Timestamp < staleCutoff {
continue
}
if existingTime, ok := ipMap[ipTime.IP]; !ok || ipTime.Timestamp > existingTime {
ipMap[ipTime.IP] = ipTime.Timestamp
}
}
return ipMap
}
// selectIpsToBan splits the live IPs (sorted oldest-first by partitionLiveIps)
// into the newest `limit` entries to keep and the older remainder to ban.
func selectIpsToBan(live []IPWithTimestamp, limit int) (kept, banned []IPWithTimestamp) {
if limit <= 0 || len(live) <= limit {
return live, nil
}
cutoff := len(live) - limit
return live[cutoff:], live[:cutoff]
}
func partitionLiveIps(ipMap map[string]int64, observedThisScan map[string]bool) (live, historical []IPWithTimestamp) {
live = make([]IPWithTimestamp, 0, len(observedThisScan))
historical = make([]IPWithTimestamp, 0, len(ipMap))
now := time.Now().Unix()
for ip, ts := range ipMap {
entry := IPWithTimestamp{IP: ip, Timestamp: ts}
// Consider an IP "live" if it was seen locally in this scan, OR if its
// timestamp from the synced database is very recent (e.g. within 2 minutes).
// This ensures cluster-wide limits work even if the IP was seen on another node.
if observedThisScan[ip] || now-ts < 120 {
live = append(live, entry)
} else {
historical = append(historical, entry)
}
}
sort.Slice(live, func(i, j int) bool { return live[i].Timestamp < live[j].Timestamp })
sort.Slice(historical, func(i, j int) bool { return historical[i].Timestamp < historical[j].Timestamp })
return live, historical
}
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) checkFail2BanInstalled() bool {
if !isFail2BanEnabled() {
return false
}
cmd := "fail2ban-client"
args := []string{"-h"}
err := exec.CommandContext(context.Background(), cmd, args...).Run()
return err == nil
}
func isFail2BanEnabled() bool {
value, ok := os.LookupEnv("XUI_ENABLE_FAIL2BAN")
return !ok || value == "true"
}
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) checkError(e error) {
if e != nil {
logger.Warning("client ip job err:", e)
}
}
// delInboundClientIps drops the inbound_client_ips tracking row for an email
// that no longer maps to any inbound (a renamed or deleted client), so stale
// access-log entries don't keep a ghost row alive (#4963).
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) delInboundClientIps(tx *gorm.DB, clientEmail string) {
if err := tx.Where("client_email = ?", clientEmail).Delete(&model.InboundClientIps{}).Error; err != nil {
j.checkError(err)
}
}
// updateInboundClientIps merges one email's observed IPs into its tracking row
// and applies the IP limit. Ban candidates are returned, not written: the
// fail2ban log is the point of no return and must wait for the commit.
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) updateInboundClientIps(tx *gorm.DB, inboundClientIps *model.InboundClientIps, inbound *model.Inbound, clientEmail string, limitIp int, newIpsWithTime []IPWithTimestamp, enforce, observedAreLive bool) (banCandidates []IPWithTimestamp, keptLiveCount int) {
if inbound.Settings == "" {
logger.Debug("wrong data:", inbound)
return nil, 0
}
if !enforce || limitIp <= 0 || !inbound.Enable {
// Nothing to enforce (collection-only run, no limit on the clients row,
// or inbound disabled): record the observed IPs for the panel and return.
jsonIps, _ := json.Marshal(newIpsWithTime)
inboundClientIps.Ips = string(jsonIps)
if err := tx.Save(inboundClientIps).Error; err != nil {
logger.Error("failed to save inboundClientIps:", err)
}
return nil, 0
}
// only ips seen in this scan count toward the limit. see
// partitionLiveIps.
observedThisScan := make(map[string]bool, len(newIpsWithTime))
for _, ipTime := range newIpsWithTime {
observedThisScan[ipTime.IP] = true
}
staleCutoff := time.Now().Unix() - ipStaleAfterSeconds
// Node sync merges into the same blob (#6587): compare-and-set it, and on a
// miss re-read and re-merge so neither writer drops the other's IPs.
for range service.ClientIpCasRetries {
var oldIpsWithTime []IPWithTimestamp
if inboundClientIps.Ips != "" {
_ = json.Unmarshal([]byte(inboundClientIps.Ips), &oldIpsWithTime)
}
ipMap := mergeClientIps(oldIpsWithTime, newIpsWithTime, staleCutoff, observedAreLive)
liveIps, historicalIps := partitionLiveIps(ipMap, observedThisScan)
// historical db-only ips are excluded from this count on purpose.
limitedIps, allowedIps := j.allowlist.split(liveIps)
keptLive, bannedLive := selectIpsToBan(limitedIps, limitIp)
// Allowlisted addresses stay connected and out of the count: charging them
// against the limit would still cut the shared network the entry protects.
keptLive = append(keptLive, allowedIps...)
// keep kept-live + historical in the blob so the panel keeps showing recently
// seen ips; banned live ips reappear in the next scan if they reconnect.
dbIps := make([]IPWithTimestamp, 0, len(keptLive)+len(historicalIps))
dbIps = append(dbIps, keptLive...)
dbIps = append(dbIps, historicalIps...)
jsonIps, _ := json.Marshal(dbIps)
newIps := string(jsonIps)
if newIps == inboundClientIps.Ips {
return bannedLive, len(keptLive)
}
updated, err := service.CasUpdateInboundClientIps(tx, inboundClientIps.Id, inboundClientIps.Ips, newIps)
if err != nil {
logger.Error("failed to save inboundClientIps:", err)
return nil, 0
}
if updated {
inboundClientIps.Ips = newIps
return bannedLive, len(keptLive)
}
if err := tx.Where("id = ?", inboundClientIps.Id).First(inboundClientIps).Error; err != nil {
logger.Error("failed to re-read inboundClientIps after a concurrent write:", err)
return nil, 0
}
}
logger.Error("failed to save inboundClientIps: exhausted CAS retries")
return nil, 0
}
// pendingBan carries one client's enforcement outcome from inside the scan's
// transaction to the publication that may only follow a successful commit.
type pendingBan struct {
inbound *model.Inbound
email string
candidates []IPWithTimestamp
keptLive int
}
// publishBans returns the clients whose lines reached the log. bannedSeen
// advances only for those, so a failed write leaves the address retryable.
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) publishBans(bans []pendingBan) []pendingBan {
published := make([]pendingBan, 0, len(bans))
var logIpFile *os.File
defer func() {
if logIpFile == nil {
return
}
if err := logIpFile.Close(); err != nil {
logger.Errorf("failed to close IP limit log file: %s", err)
}
}()
for _, b := range bans {
actionable := j.selectAdvancedSinceLastBan(b.email, b.candidates)
if len(actionable) == 0 {
j.recordBannedSeen(b.email, b.candidates, nil)
continue
}
if logIpFile == nil {
f, err := os.OpenFile(xray.GetIPLimitLogPath(), os.O_CREATE|os.O_APPEND|os.O_WRONLY, 0o644)
if err != nil {
logger.Errorf("failed to open IP limit log file: %s", err)
return published
}
logIpFile = f
}
if err := writeBanLines(logIpFile, b.email, actionable); err != nil {
logger.Errorf("failed to write IP limit bans for %s: %s", b.email, err)
continue
}
j.recordBannedSeen(b.email, b.candidates, actionable)
logger.Infof("[LIMIT_IP] Client %s: Kept %d live IPs, queued %d old IPs for fail2ban", b.email, b.keptLive, len(actionable))
published = append(published, b)
}
return published
}
// writeBanLines emits one line per address; the wording is load-bearing, since
// x-ui.sh create_iplimit_jails builds filter.d/3x-ipl.conf failregex from it.
func writeBanLines(w io.Writer, clientEmail string, actionable []IPWithTimestamp) error {
stamp := time.Now().Format("2006/01/02 15:04:05")
for _, ipTime := range actionable {
if _, err := fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s [LIMIT_IP] Email = %s || Disconnecting OLD IP = %s || Timestamp = %d\n",
stamp, clientEmail, ipTime.IP, ipTime.Timestamp); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
// selectAdvancedSinceLastBan drops pairs with a frozen lastSeen: the core
// refreshes it only on a new dispatch, so those are unreaped dead connections.
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) selectAdvancedSinceLastBan(email string, banned []IPWithTimestamp) []IPWithTimestamp {
actionable := make([]IPWithTimestamp, 0, len(banned))
for _, ipTime := range banned {
if last, ok := j.bannedSeen[email+"|"+ipTime.IP]; ok && ipTime.Timestamp <= last {
continue
}
actionable = append(actionable, ipTime)
}
return actionable
}
// recordBannedSeen marks published pairs and forgets addresses this scan no
// longer bans; it runs for every enforced client, which is what prunes the map.
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) recordBannedSeen(email string, banned, published []IPWithTimestamp) {
if j.bannedSeen == nil {
j.bannedSeen = make(map[string]int64)
}
for _, ipTime := range published {
j.bannedSeen[email+"|"+ipTime.IP] = ipTime.Timestamp
}
current := make(map[string]struct{}, len(banned))
for _, ipTime := range banned {
current[email+"|"+ipTime.IP] = struct{}{}
}
prefix := email + "|"
for key := range j.bannedSeen {
if strings.HasPrefix(key, prefix) {
if _, still := current[key]; !still {
delete(j.bannedSeen, key)
}
}
}
}
// disconnectClientTemporarily drops a client's credential for a moment, so new
// handshakes are refused; the fail2ban ban is what ends live traffic.
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) disconnectClientTemporarily(inbound *model.Inbound, clientEmail string, clients []model.Client) {
var xrayAPI xray.XrayAPI
apiPort := j.resolveXrayAPIPort()
err := xrayAPI.Init(apiPort)
if err != nil {
logger.Warningf("[LIMIT_IP] Failed to init Xray API for disconnection: %v", err)
return
}
defer xrayAPI.Close()
// Find the client config
var clientConfig map[string]any
var reverseClient bool
for _, client := range clients {
if client.Email == clientEmail {
// Convert client to map for API
clientBytes, _ := json.Marshal(client)
_ = json.Unmarshal(clientBytes, &clientConfig)
reverseClient = client.Reverse != nil
break
}
}
if clientConfig == nil {
return
}
// Protocols XrayAPI can remove and re-add from a marshaled model.Client.
// wireguard stays out: keepAlive marshals as a number, AddUser wants a string.
protocol := string(inbound.Protocol)
switch protocol {
case "vmess", "vless", "trojan", "shadowsocks", "hysteria", "masque":
// supported protocols, continue
default:
logger.Warningf("[LIMIT_IP] Temporary disconnect is not supported for protocol %s on inbound %s", protocol, inbound.Tag)
return
}
// RemoveUser drops a reverse client's outbound handler and the re-add below
// cannot restore it, so its tunnel would stay down until Xray restarts.
if reverseClient {
logger.Warningf("[LIMIT_IP] Not disconnecting %s: its reverse proxy config does not survive a temporary removal", clientEmail)
return
}
// For Shadowsocks, ensure the required "cipher" field is present by
// reading it from the inbound settings (e.g., settings["method"]).
if string(inbound.Protocol) == "shadowsocks" {
var inboundSettings map[string]any
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(inbound.Settings), &inboundSettings); err != nil {
logger.Warningf("[LIMIT_IP] Failed to parse inbound settings for shadowsocks cipher: %v", err)
} else {
if method, ok := inboundSettings["method"].(string); ok && method != "" {
clientConfig["cipher"] = method
}
}
}
// The core's RemoveUser clears its validator: a session already up keeps
// running, except a reverse vless client, which is skipped above.
err = xrayAPI.RemoveUser(inbound.Tag, clientEmail)
if err != nil {
logger.Warningf("[LIMIT_IP] Failed to remove user %s: %v", clientEmail, err)
return
}
// Nothing is pending here: AlterInbound applies the removal inline, so this
// only widens the window in which new handshakes fail.
time.Sleep(100 * time.Millisecond)
// Re-add user to allow new connections
err = xrayAPI.AddUser(protocol, inbound.Tag, clientConfig)
if err != nil {
logger.Warningf("[LIMIT_IP] Failed to re-add user %s: %v", clientEmail, err)
}
}
// resolveXrayAPIPort returns the API inbound port from running config, then template config, then default.
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) resolveXrayAPIPort() int {
var configErr error
var templateErr error
if port, err := getAPIPortFromConfigPath(xray.GetConfigPath()); err == nil {
return port
} else {
configErr = err
}
db := database.GetDB()
var template model.Setting
if err := db.Where("key = ?", "xrayTemplateConfig").First(&template).Error; err == nil {
if port, parseErr := getAPIPortFromConfigData([]byte(template.Value)); parseErr == nil {
return port
} else {
templateErr = parseErr
}
} else {
templateErr = err
}
logger.Warningf(
"[LIMIT_IP] Could not determine Xray API port from config or template; falling back to default port %d (config error: %v, template error: %v)",
defaultXrayAPIPort,
configErr,
templateErr,
)
return defaultXrayAPIPort
}
func getAPIPortFromConfigPath(configPath string) (int, error) {
configData, err := os.ReadFile(configPath)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
return getAPIPortFromConfigData(configData)
}
func getAPIPortFromConfigData(configData []byte) (int, error) {
xrayConfig := &xray.Config{}
if err := json.Unmarshal(configData, xrayConfig); err != nil {
return 0, err
}
for _, inboundConfig := range xrayConfig.InboundConfigs {
if inboundConfig.Tag == "api" && inboundConfig.Port > 0 {
return inboundConfig.Port, nil
}
}
return 0, errors.New("api inbound port not found")
}
// getInboundByEmail resolves the inbound that owns a client email. It prefers
// the exact clients/client_inbounds relation; a substring "settings LIKE
// %email%" can match the wrong inbound (an email that is a substring of another,
// or text that merely appears elsewhere in the settings JSON). The LIKE + JSON
// scan stays only as a fallback for clients not yet present in the relation, so
// nothing regresses when the join finds no row.
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) getInboundByEmail(clientEmail string) (*model.Inbound, error) {
db := database.GetDB()
inbound := &model.Inbound{}
err := db.Model(&model.Inbound{}).
Joins("JOIN client_inbounds ON client_inbounds.inbound_id = inbounds.id").
Joins("JOIN clients ON clients.id = client_inbounds.client_id").
Where("clients.email = ?", clientEmail).
First(inbound).Error
if err == nil {
return inbound, nil
}
var candidates []model.Inbound
if listErr := db.Model(&model.Inbound{}).Where("settings LIKE ?", "%"+clientEmail+"%").Find(&candidates).Error; listErr != nil {
return nil, listErr
}
for i := range candidates {
clients, jsonErr := service.ParseInboundSettingsClients(candidates[i].Settings)
if jsonErr != nil {
continue
}
for _, client := range clients {
if client.Email == clientEmail {
return &candidates[i], nil
}
}
}
return nil, err
}
// Runs before the fail2ban/apiMode gates: retention must hold for stored rows
// even while nothing is being collected.
func (j *CheckClientIpJob) pruneStaleIpRows() {
now := time.Now().Unix()
if now-j.lastIpPrune < ipPruneIntervalSeconds {
return
}
j.lastIpPrune = now
if err := (&service.InboundService{}).PruneStaleClientIps(); err != nil {
logger.Warning("prune stale client ip rows failed:", err)
}
}