Files
3x-ui/internal/web/service/inbound_protocol.go
T
MHSanaei ed31ee432c feat(inbounds): deploy AmneziaWG, TUIC and MTProto inbounds to nodes
The node gate assumed a node-assigned sidecar row would never converge,
because the master's reconcile loops only read node_id IS NULL rows. But
a pushed row is local on the node's own panel, whose AmneziaWG, TUIC and
mtg loops run it like any other; node-adopted rows of these protocols
already worked. Only creating or cloning them from the master was blocked.

Open the three protocols on both lists and fix what assumed the master's
host for a node row:
- A node older than the release that introduced the protocol (MTProto
  v3.5.0, AmneziaWG v3.7.0, TUIC v3.8.0) would hand it to Xray as-is, so
  add and protocol-changing update refuse it, and a node that has not
  reported its version yet. Dev builds ("dev+<sha>") track main and pass.
- MTProto's routeXrayPort is a loopback port on the host running mtg.
  The master no longer allocates one, nor forwards a cloned source's, for
  a node row; the node allocates its own and node sync adopts it back.
- AmneziaWG forwardedPorts were checked against the master's inbounds,
  web port and id-derived relay ports. A node row is now checked against
  its own node's inbounds; the node re-checks what only it knows.
  UpdateInbound restores the stored nodeId before that check.

Verified on a docker master+node pair: AWG, routed MTProto and TUIC
created and cloned from the master start on the node (interface, mtg,
tuic-server); an AWG client added and an MTProto client edited on the
master apply on the node; the node-chosen egress port survives edits.

Closes #6306
2026-10-03 00:26:46 +02:00

173 lines
5.9 KiB
Go

package service
import (
"encoding/json"
"strings"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/database/model"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/util/common"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/util/version"
"gorm.io/gorm"
)
// inboundShadowsocksMethod extracts settings.method for Shadowsocks inbounds so
// the client UI can generate a valid PSK (base64 of the method's key length)
// for Shadowsocks 2022 ciphers. Returns "" for non-Shadowsocks inbounds.
func inboundShadowsocksMethod(protocol, settings string) string {
if protocol != string(model.Shadowsocks) || settings == "" {
return ""
}
var s struct {
Method string `json:"method"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(settings), &s); err != nil {
return ""
}
return s.Method
}
// inboundCanEnableTlsFlow mirrors canEnableTlsFlow() from the frontend
// (frontend/src/lib/xray/protocol-capabilities.ts). XTLS Vision is valid for
// VLESS on TCP with tls or reality (classic), and on XHTTP when VLESS encryption
// (vlessenc / ML-KEM) is enabled — there the post-quantum, VLESS-level
// encryption stands in for the transport TLS that Vision relies on. settings is
// the inbound's raw settings JSON, which carries the encryption value
// (streamSettings does not).
func inboundCanEnableTlsFlow(protocol, streamSettings, settings string) bool {
if protocol != string(model.VLESS) {
return false
}
if streamSettings == "" {
return false
}
var stream struct {
Network string `json:"network"`
Security string `json:"security"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(streamSettings), &stream); err != nil {
return false
}
switch stream.Network {
case "tcp":
return stream.Security == "tls" || stream.Security == "reality"
case "xhttp":
return vlessEncryptionEnabled(settings)
default:
return false
}
}
// nodeEligibleProtocols mirrors the frontend's NODE_ELIGIBLE_PROTOCOLS. A sidecar
// protocol's row is local on the node it is pushed to, so that panel runs it.
var nodeEligibleProtocols = map[model.Protocol]bool{
model.VLESS: true,
model.VMESS: true,
model.Trojan: true,
model.Shadowsocks: true,
model.Hysteria: true,
model.WireGuard: true,
model.MTProto: true,
model.AmneziaWG: true,
model.TUIC: true,
}
// nodeProtocolFirstRelease is the panel release that introduced each protocol
// newer than node support itself; an older node would hand it to Xray as-is.
var nodeProtocolFirstRelease = map[model.Protocol]string{
model.MTProto: "v3.5.0",
model.AmneziaWG: "v3.7.0",
model.TUIC: "v3.8.0",
}
// checkNodeCanHostProtocol refuses assigning protocol to nodeID unless the
// protocol may live on a node and that node's panel is new enough to run it.
func checkNodeCanHostProtocol(db *gorm.DB, nodeID int, protocol model.Protocol) error {
if !nodeEligibleProtocols[protocol] {
return common.NewErrorf("%s inbounds cannot be assigned to a node", protocol)
}
firstRelease, ok := nodeProtocolFirstRelease[protocol]
if !ok {
return nil
}
var node model.Node
if err := db.Select("id", "name", "panel_version").First(&node, nodeID).Error; err != nil {
return err
}
if strings.TrimSpace(node.PanelVersion) == "" {
return common.NewErrorf("node %q has not reported its panel version yet; %s inbounds need %s or newer",
node.Name, protocol, firstRelease)
}
// A dev build reports "dev+<sha>": it tracks main, which carries every protocol.
if cmp, ok := version.Compare(node.PanelVersion, firstRelease); ok && cmp < 0 {
return common.NewErrorf("node %q runs panel %s; %s inbounds need %s or newer",
node.Name, node.PanelVersion, protocol, firstRelease)
}
return nil
}
// vlessEncryptionEnabled reports whether a VLESS inbound has VLESS-level
// encryption (vlessenc / ML-KEM) configured. When enabled these fields hold a
// generated dotted string (e.g. "mlkem768x25519plus.native.0rtt.<key>"); "none"
// or empty means off. The value is never the literal "vlessenc" — that is the
// name of the `xray vlessenc` CLI subcommand, not a stored value.
//
// Both fields are checked: decryption is the authoritative server-side value
// xray-core reads, while encryption is stored by the panel for link generation.
// The ML-KEM/X25519 buttons set both, but accepting either keeps the gate
// working for inbounds configured via the API or raw JSON.
func vlessEncryptionEnabled(settings string) bool {
if settings == "" {
return false
}
var s struct {
Encryption string `json:"encryption"`
Decryption string `json:"decryption"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(settings), &s); err != nil {
return false
}
return vlessEncValueSet(s.Encryption) || vlessEncValueSet(s.Decryption)
}
// vlessEncValueSet reports whether a VLESS encryption/decryption field holds a
// real (generated) value rather than the "none"/empty sentinel.
func vlessEncValueSet(v string) bool {
return v != "" && v != "none"
}
// inboundCanHostFallbacks gates the settings.fallbacks injection.
// Xray only honors fallbacks on VLESS and Trojan inbounds carried over
// TCP transport with TLS or Reality security. This is intentionally stricter
// than inboundCanEnableTlsFlow (which also accepts XHTTP+vlessenc): fallbacks
// are a raw-TCP-only feature.
func inboundCanHostFallbacks(ib *model.Inbound) bool {
if ib == nil {
return false
}
if ib.Protocol != model.VLESS && ib.Protocol != model.Trojan {
return false
}
return streamSupportsFallbacks(ib.StreamSettings)
}
// streamSupportsFallbacks reports whether the stream is raw TCP carried over
// TLS or REALITY — the only transport Xray honors inbound fallbacks on (and the
// classic requirement for XTLS Vision before vlessenc).
func streamSupportsFallbacks(streamSettings string) bool {
if streamSettings == "" {
return false
}
var stream struct {
Network string `json:"network"`
Security string `json:"security"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(streamSettings), &stream); err != nil {
return false
}
if stream.Network != "tcp" {
return false
}
return stream.Security == "tls" || stream.Security == "reality"
}