Files
3x-ui/docs/content/docs/en/config/amneziawg.mdx
T
Kirill Rudenko 8979072bd9 fix(amneziawg): bound S1-S3 by the receive buffer, reject overlapping H (#6642)
* fix(amneziawg): bound S1-S3 by the receive buffer, reject overlapping H

The native AmneziaWG validator, both Zod schemas, both forms and the docs now
follow the rules amneziawg-go actually enforces.

S1-S3. A padded handshake message is 148+S1, 92+S2 or 64+S3 bytes
(device/send.go). The peer reads each datagram into a [MaxMessageSize]byte
buffer, where MaxMessageSize = MaxSegmentSize (device/pools.go,
constants.go). MaxSegmentSize is 65535 on Linux/Android, 2016 on Windows and
1700 on iOS (device/queueconstants_*.go). The limits are therefore
S1 <= 1552, S2 <= 1608 and S3 <= 1636. Before, S1/S2 allowed 65535, which
iOS peers silently drop, and S3 was capped at 64, a number inherited from the
coinman-dev/3ax-ui port in #6105 with no stated reason. That cap blocked real
configs such as Amnezia Premium's S3=1045. RandomTrailers only tops a packet
up to 500 bytes (DefaultUdpWindow), so it never pushes a message past these
limits.

H1-H4. amneziawg-go refuses the whole device when the header ranges overlap
("headers must not overlap", device/uapi.go mergeWithDevice), and so does the
kernel module (src/netlink.c). The panel did not check this, so an inbound
with overlapping ranges saved and then failed to apply. A blank H is never
sent, so the engine keeps its default, WireGuard's own type 1-4; the check
treats blank fields that way. The docs said 1-4 "must not be used". They are
valid and are the engine default, only unobfuscated without a
HeaderProtectionKey. The docs also said amneziawg-go rejects S1+56 == S2. It
does not (IpcSet accepts it). The panel keeps that rule as a fingerprint
guard, and the docs now say so.

Tests: the new params_test cases and the Zod bounds fail on the old code.
TestValidatedObfuscationAlwaysApplies runs every accepted set through a real
amneziawg-go IpcSet and now covers overlap, blank-H defaults, H=1-4, the
exact S bounds and the full Amnezia Premium set. Before this fix it failed
with "headers must not overlap".

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(amneziawg): bound only inbound padding by the iOS receive buffer

The 1700-byte iOS buffer limits what an inbound's clients can receive,
but ValidateObfuscation also runs for outbounds, and the Xray template
save re-validates every AmneziaWG outbound. An outbound whose remote
server uses S1 above 1552 would have blocked every Xray settings save,
though its values come from that server and are received on Linux.

ValidateObfuscation keeps amneziawg-go's uint16 UAPI width for S1-S3;
ValidateServerObfuscation adds the receive-buffer bounds and is what
inbounds call. The outbound schema and form follow the same split.

---------

Co-authored-by: Kirill Rudenko <rudenko@npp-energy.ru>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Sanaei <ho3ein.sanaei@gmail.com>
2026-09-26 22:02:49 +02:00

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8.2 KiB
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---
title: AmneziaWG
description: Set up an AmneziaWG inbound in 3x-ui — obfuscation parameters, native IPv6, per-client port-forwarding, and routing client traffic through Xray.
icon: Lock
---
**AmneziaWG** is a WireGuard fork that adds traffic obfuscation (junk packets,
randomized padding, and rewritten protocol magic values) so the tunnel doesn't
look like WireGuard to deep-packet inspection. It's a popular choice where
plain WireGuard is blocked but a WireGuard-shaped tunnel with a different
fingerprint gets through.
<Callout type="info">
AmneziaWG runs **embedded in the panel process** — `amneziawg-go` over a
userspace (gVisor) network stack, not a kernel module. There is no DKMS
build, no Secure Boot conflict, and no host network/kernel access
requirement, so it works the same way inside a container as on bare
metal. Each peer's decapsulated traffic relays into its own loopback Xray
SOCKS5 inbound, so a peer's routing, sniffing, and per-client stats all
come from Xray's own machinery — the same as any other protocol's
inbound, not a separate code path.
</Callout>
## Key settings
### Server / interface
| Field | What it is |
| ------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| **Subnet** | The tunnel's IPv4 subnet (e.g. `10.8.1.0/24`); each client gets an address from it. |
| **MTU** | Interface MTU. Leave at the default unless you have a reason to change it. |
| **DNS (primary/secondary)** | Seeded into downloadable client configs; the server's own interface doesn't need one. |
| **External interface** | The host NIC a peer's IPv6 address gets aliased onto when IPv6 is enabled (see below). Leave blank to auto-detect. |
### Obfuscation (AmneziaWG 3.1)
The same values must match on both ends of the tunnel, so the server stores
them once and every client config inherits them. The panel generates a
randomized set for you (with a **regenerate** button) — a static, reused
value defeats the point, since DPI can fingerprint it over time.
| Field | What it is |
| ------------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| **Jc** | Number of junk packets sent before the handshake. |
| **Jmin/Jmax** | Size range (bytes) for those junk packets. `Jmin` must not exceed `Jmax`. |
| **S1/S2** | Padding added to the handshake init/response packets, `0`-`1552` / `0`-`1608`: the packets are `148 + S1` and `92 + S2` bytes and must fit the 1700-byte receive buffer amneziawg-go uses on iOS. The panel also rejects `S1 + 56 = S2`, which would give both packets the same size on the wire (amneziawg-go itself accepts it). An AmneziaWG outbound takes the remote server's values as they are, up to `65535`. |
| **S3** | Cookie-reply padding, `0`-`1636`: the reply is `64 + S3` bytes and must fit the 1700-byte receive buffer amneziawg-go uses on iOS. An outbound, as with S1/S2, takes the remote server's value up to `65535`. |
| **S4** | Transport (data) packet padding, `0`-`32`. |
| **H1-H4** | Header values that replace WireGuard's message-type field. Each is a single integer or a `low-high` range, and the four must not overlap — amneziawg-go and the kernel module refuse the whole device otherwise. `1`-`4` are WireGuard's own types and the engine default for a blank field: valid, but without a HeaderProtectionKey the type field then reads like plain WireGuard. |
| **I1-I5** | Optional signature packets — random bytes prepended before the handshake, e.g. `<r 148>`. Generated sets fill `I1` only, matching Amnezia's own generator. |
| **HeaderProtectionKey** | A base64 32-byte key for the 3.0 header-protection mechanism. Must match on every client config; blank disables it. |
| **ContentPaddingAddition** | A single integer or `low-high` byte range of extra padding on content packets. Kept `<= 64` by the generator so a 1420-MTU tunnel doesn't fragment. |
| **RekeyAfterTime / RekeyTimeout / RejectAfterTime / KeepaliveTimeout / MaxHandshakeAttempts** | Handshake-timing randomization: each is a `low-high` range (seconds; attempts for the last one) the peer samples from, so session timing stops being a WireGuard fingerprint. Every `RekeyAfterTime` value must stay below every `RejectAfterTime` value. Blank keeps the WireGuard default. |
| **RandomTrailers** | Appends a random number of bytes to the end of every packet. |
| **DisableCookies** | Never send cookie replies — removes a DPI-visible WireGuard message type, at the cost of WireGuard's handshake-flood mitigation. |
<Callout type="info">
If you enter obfuscation values by hand instead of using the generated
defaults, keep `H1`-`H4` **non-overlapping** and above `4`, and double-check
`S1 + 56 != S2` — a bad value here keeps the embedded interface from
coming up at all.
</Callout>
<Callout type="warn">
The 3.1 parameters need a **3.1-capable client**. Clients must run a
3.1-capable Amnezia app; blanking the 3.1 fields renders a config older
clients still understand. There is no host-side version requirement —
the panel ships its own pinned `amneziawg-go`, not whatever happens to be
installed on the system.
</Callout>
## Set it up in the panel
<Steps>
<Step>
### Add an inbound
Add a new inbound, choose protocol **AmneziaWG**, and set the port and tunnel
subnet.
</Step>
<Step>
### Leave obfuscation on defaults (or regenerate)
The panel fills in a randomized, kernel-valid obfuscation set automatically.
Use **Regenerate** if you want a fresh one; there's no need to hand-edit these
unless you have a specific reason to.
</Step>
<Step>
### Add a client
Each client gets its own keypair and tunnel address. Download the client's
`.conf` or copy its share link (`vpn://…`, importable by the official
AmneziaWG/AmneziaVPN apps) from the client list.
</Step>
<Step>
### Optional: enable IPv6
Turning on IPv6 allocates an IPv6 address alongside each client's IPv4 one
from the configured IPv6 subnet. The panel aliases that address onto the
external interface's host NIC so outbound connections carry the peer's own
distinct public IPv6 identity — no NAT66 needed.
</Step>
<Step>
### Optional: forward ports to a client
Set a client's forwarded ports (e.g. `80, 443, 8000-8100`) to open a real
listener on the host that relays that traffic straight to the client's
tunnel address — useful for a client that needs to expose a service through
the server.
</Step>
</Steps>
Every AmneziaWG inbound's traffic already goes through Xray — each peer
relays into its own loopback SOCKS5 inbound, tagged with the AmneziaWG
inbound's own tag, so it shows up as a normal source on the
[Routing](/docs/operations/outbounds-routing) page like any other protocol's
inbound. There is no separate toggle for this: unlike a kernel tunnel,
there's no other way for a peer's traffic to reach the internet once it's
decapsulated.
## What the configuration looks like
A client's downloadable `.conf` (also what the `vpn://` share link encodes,
base64url'd) looks like this:
```ini title="client .conf"
[Interface]
PrivateKey = <client private key>
Address = 10.8.1.2/32
DNS = 8.8.8.8, 8.8.4.4
Jc = 4
Jmin = 65
Jmax = 220
S1 = 87
S2 = 44
S3 = 21
S4 = 9
H1 = 463065432
H2 = 912345678
H3 = 1345678901
H4 = 1987654321
I1 = <r 148>
HeaderProtectionKey = 8Iu83eHDA3fMKKSGaEsVW9Ycd2lYYzc0MYlk1jJTvE4=
ContentPaddingAddition = 17-49
RekeyAfterTime = 111-139
RekeyTimeout = 4-7
RejectAfterTime = 187-251
KeepaliveTimeout = 9-14
MaxHandshakeAttempts = 19-36
RandomTrailers = on
DisableCookies = on
# my-client
[Peer]
PublicKey = <server public key>
AllowedIPs = 0.0.0.0/0, ::/0
Endpoint = your-server:443
PersistentKeepalive = 25
```
## Not yet covered
<Callout type="info">
- **Multi-node (sub-nodes)** and **Telegram bot** — AmneziaWG inbounds haven't
been exercised through those paths yet. They likely work (the reconciler
runs the same way regardless of how the panel itself is deployed), but
that's not the same as a confirmed, tested claim — treat it as unverified
rather than assume it either way until someone reports back.
</Callout>