Files
3x-ui/internal/web/service/inbound_protocol.go
T
MHSanaei b04039c2bd feat(xray): add the MASQUE protocol and transport
xray-core v26.10.10 serves MASQUE: CONNECT-IP over HTTP/3 or HTTP/2,
always behind TLS, as an inbound and an outbound protocol riding a
dedicated "masque" transport. The panel could not create either.

Inbound: MASQUE is a multi-user protocol whose users log in with their
email and password over Basic auth. The panel keeps the client's
"password" like trojan and GenXrayInboundConfig hands it to the core as
"pass", so the full-config path, the live AddInbound path and node
pushes all emit what the core reads; one user with an empty pass makes
the core refuse the whole inbound. Live user adds build a masque.Account
from either key, client-only changes diff per user so a new client does
not drop every connected tunnel, and client creation, copy, validation
and edits key on the password. The address pool and MTU get form
fields, TLS is mandatory, and the port check follows the core's
listener choice: HTTP/2 on TCP when the ALPN offers h2, HTTP/3 on UDP
when it offers h3 or not h2. Nodes may host MASQUE from v3.9.1, the
first panel release that knows to rename the password.

MASQUE has no share-link format, so links and Clash skip it; the JSON
subscription builds the client's masque outbound with its email and
password, and the subscription allowlist now lets a subId see MASQUE
inbounds at all. The IP-limit job, client pages and traffic tracking
list the protocol.

Outbound: the form edits the server, remote DNS, and the transport's
host, path, Basic credentials, headers and WARP block (enrolled key,
endpoint public key, tunnel addresses), which xray-core refuses next to
user/pass. The outbound test probes it through the core, since its
default HTTP/3 dial is UDP.
2026-10-11 10:28:49 +02:00

175 lines
6.0 KiB
Go

package service
import (
"encoding/json"
"strings"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/database/model"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/util/common"
"github.com/mhsanaei/3x-ui/v3/internal/util/version"
"gorm.io/gorm"
)
// inboundShadowsocksMethod extracts settings.method for Shadowsocks inbounds so
// the client UI can generate a valid PSK (base64 of the method's key length)
// for Shadowsocks 2022 ciphers. Returns "" for non-Shadowsocks inbounds.
func inboundShadowsocksMethod(protocol, settings string) string {
if protocol != string(model.Shadowsocks) || settings == "" {
return ""
}
var s struct {
Method string `json:"method"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(settings), &s); err != nil {
return ""
}
return s.Method
}
// inboundCanEnableTlsFlow mirrors canEnableTlsFlow() from the frontend
// (frontend/src/lib/xray/protocol-capabilities.ts). XTLS Vision is valid for
// VLESS on TCP with tls or reality (classic), and on XHTTP when VLESS encryption
// (vlessenc / ML-KEM) is enabled — there the post-quantum, VLESS-level
// encryption stands in for the transport TLS that Vision relies on. settings is
// the inbound's raw settings JSON, which carries the encryption value
// (streamSettings does not).
func inboundCanEnableTlsFlow(protocol, streamSettings, settings string) bool {
if protocol != string(model.VLESS) {
return false
}
if streamSettings == "" {
return false
}
var stream struct {
Network string `json:"network"`
Security string `json:"security"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(streamSettings), &stream); err != nil {
return false
}
switch stream.Network {
case "tcp":
return stream.Security == "tls" || stream.Security == "reality"
case "xhttp":
return vlessEncryptionEnabled(settings)
default:
return false
}
}
// nodeEligibleProtocols mirrors the frontend's NODE_ELIGIBLE_PROTOCOLS. A sidecar
// protocol's row is local on the node it is pushed to, so that panel runs it.
var nodeEligibleProtocols = map[model.Protocol]bool{
model.VLESS: true,
model.VMESS: true,
model.Trojan: true,
model.Shadowsocks: true,
model.Hysteria: true,
model.WireGuard: true,
model.MTProto: true,
model.AmneziaWG: true,
model.TUIC: true,
model.MASQUE: true,
}
// nodeProtocolFirstRelease is the panel release that introduced each protocol
// newer than node support itself; an older node would hand it to Xray as-is.
var nodeProtocolFirstRelease = map[model.Protocol]string{
model.MTProto: "v3.5.0",
model.AmneziaWG: "v3.7.0",
model.TUIC: "v3.8.0",
model.MASQUE: "v3.9.1",
}
// checkNodeCanHostProtocol refuses assigning protocol to nodeID unless the
// protocol may live on a node and that node's panel is new enough to run it.
func checkNodeCanHostProtocol(db *gorm.DB, nodeID int, protocol model.Protocol) error {
if !nodeEligibleProtocols[protocol] {
return common.NewErrorf("%s inbounds cannot be assigned to a node", protocol)
}
firstRelease, ok := nodeProtocolFirstRelease[protocol]
if !ok {
return nil
}
var node model.Node
if err := db.Select("id", "name", "panel_version").First(&node, nodeID).Error; err != nil {
return err
}
if strings.TrimSpace(node.PanelVersion) == "" {
return common.NewErrorf("node %q has not reported its panel version yet; %s inbounds need %s or newer",
node.Name, protocol, firstRelease)
}
// A dev build reports "dev+<sha>": it tracks main, which carries every protocol.
if cmp, ok := version.Compare(node.PanelVersion, firstRelease); ok && cmp < 0 {
return common.NewErrorf("node %q runs panel %s; %s inbounds need %s or newer",
node.Name, node.PanelVersion, protocol, firstRelease)
}
return nil
}
// vlessEncryptionEnabled reports whether a VLESS inbound has VLESS-level
// encryption (vlessenc / ML-KEM) configured. When enabled these fields hold a
// generated dotted string (e.g. "mlkem768x25519plus.native.0rtt.<key>"); "none"
// or empty means off. The value is never the literal "vlessenc" — that is the
// name of the `xray vlessenc` CLI subcommand, not a stored value.
//
// Both fields are checked: decryption is the authoritative server-side value
// xray-core reads, while encryption is stored by the panel for link generation.
// The ML-KEM/X25519 buttons set both, but accepting either keeps the gate
// working for inbounds configured via the API or raw JSON.
func vlessEncryptionEnabled(settings string) bool {
if settings == "" {
return false
}
var s struct {
Encryption string `json:"encryption"`
Decryption string `json:"decryption"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(settings), &s); err != nil {
return false
}
return vlessEncValueSet(s.Encryption) || vlessEncValueSet(s.Decryption)
}
// vlessEncValueSet reports whether a VLESS encryption/decryption field holds a
// real (generated) value rather than the "none"/empty sentinel.
func vlessEncValueSet(v string) bool {
return v != "" && v != "none"
}
// inboundCanHostFallbacks gates the settings.fallbacks injection.
// Xray only honors fallbacks on VLESS and Trojan inbounds carried over
// TCP transport with TLS or Reality security. This is intentionally stricter
// than inboundCanEnableTlsFlow (which also accepts XHTTP+vlessenc): fallbacks
// are a raw-TCP-only feature.
func inboundCanHostFallbacks(ib *model.Inbound) bool {
if ib == nil {
return false
}
if ib.Protocol != model.VLESS && ib.Protocol != model.Trojan {
return false
}
return streamSupportsFallbacks(ib.StreamSettings)
}
// streamSupportsFallbacks reports whether the stream is raw TCP carried over
// TLS or REALITY — the only transport Xray honors inbound fallbacks on (and the
// classic requirement for XTLS Vision before vlessenc).
func streamSupportsFallbacks(streamSettings string) bool {
if streamSettings == "" {
return false
}
var stream struct {
Network string `json:"network"`
Security string `json:"security"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(streamSettings), &stream); err != nil {
return false
}
if stream.Network != "tcp" {
return false
}
return stream.Security == "tls" || stream.Security == "reality"
}