fix(security): close 3 advisories — search baseUrl exfil, sk- in the error sanitizer, bifrost relay header leak (#12620)

Validado em worktree combinada sobre o tip de release/v3.8.51: os dois boardaram sem conflito, typecheck:core limpo, check-file-size sem violação nova (as duas restantes — codex.ts e stream.ts — são drift anterior) e 51/51 nos 5 arquivos de teste que os PRs trazem.

tests/unit/bifrost-relay-response-leak-9m72.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+/**
+ * GHSA-9m72-44hg-w32g — the standalone bifrost relay route copied ALL upstream
+ * response headers (`new Headers(upstream.headers)`) and returned non-2xx bodies
+ * verbatim, while its TypeScript sibling routed non-2xx through
+ * parseUpstreamError + buildErrorBody + stripStaleEncodingHeaders.
+ *
+ * The relay sends `Authorization: Bearer ${BIFROST_API_KEY}` to the sidecar, so
+ * anything the sidecar (or a further upstream) echoes back — that header, its own
+ * `set-cookie`, an `x-api-key` — reached the relay-token holder untouched.
+ *
+ * Both relay routes copy upstream headers, so the strip is a shared helper used
+ * by both rather than a fix in one and a second copy waiting to drift (the
+ * failure mode of GHSA-v7g9 and GHSA-qv45).
+ *
+ * Run with:
+ *   node --import tsx/esm --test tests/unit/bifrost-relay-response-leak-9m72.test.ts
+ */
+
+import { describe, it } from "node:test";
+import assert from "node:assert/strict";
+import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
+import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
+
+import { stripSensitiveResponseHeaders } from "../../open-sse/utils/upstreamResponseHeaders.ts";
+
+const read = (rel: string) =>
+  readFileSync(fileURLToPath(new URL(`../../${rel}`, import.meta.url)), "utf8");
+
+const BIFROST_ROUTE = "src/app/api/v1/relay/chat/completions/bifrost/route.ts";
+const TS_ROUTE = "src/app/api/v1/relay/chat/completions/route.ts";
+
+describe("stripSensitiveResponseHeaders", () => {
+  it("drops credentials and cookies the upstream echoed back", () => {
+    const upstream = new Headers([
+      ["authorization", "Bearer sidecar-secret"],
+      ["x-api-key", "op-key"],
+      ["x-goog-api-key", "goog-key"],
+      ["api-key", "azure-key"],
+      ["cookie", "session=abc"],
+      ["set-cookie", "session=abc; HttpOnly"],
+      ["proxy-authorization", "Basic zzz"],
+      ["content-type", "application/json"],
+      ["x-request-id", "keep-me"],
+    ]);
+    const out = stripSensitiveResponseHeaders(upstream);
+    for (const gone of [
+      "authorization",
+      "x-api-key",
+      "x-goog-api-key",
+      "api-key",
+      "cookie",
+      "set-cookie",
+      "proxy-authorization",
+    ]) {
+      assert.equal(out.get(gone), null, `${gone} survived`);
+    }
+    assert.equal(out.get("content-type"), "application/json");
+    assert.equal(out.get("x-request-id"), "keep-me");
+  });
+
+  it("also drops the stale framing headers", () => {
+    const out = stripSensitiveResponseHeaders(
+      new Headers([
+        ["content-encoding", "gzip"],
+        ["content-length", "123"],
+        ["transfer-encoding", "chunked"],
+        ["x-keep", "yes"],
+      ])
+    );
+    assert.equal(out.get("content-encoding"), null);
+    assert.equal(out.get("content-length"), null);
+    assert.equal(out.get("transfer-encoding"), null);
+    assert.equal(out.get("x-keep"), "yes");
+  });
+
+  it("does not mutate the input Headers", () => {
+    const input = new Headers([["authorization", "Bearer x"]]);
+    stripSensitiveResponseHeaders(input);
+    assert.equal(input.get("authorization"), "Bearer x");
+  });
+});
+
+describe("both relay routes use the shared strip (GHSA-9m72-44hg-w32g)", () => {
+  for (const route of [BIFROST_ROUTE, TS_ROUTE]) {
+    it(`${route} strips sensitive upstream response headers`, () => {
+      const src = read(route);
+      assert.ok(
+        src.includes("stripSensitiveResponseHeaders"),
+        `${route} relays upstream headers verbatim — a sidecar-echoed credential reaches the caller`
+      );
+      assert.ok(
+        !/new Headers\(upstream\.headers\)/.test(src),
+        `${route} still copies upstream headers wholesale`
+      );
+    });
+  }
+
+  it("the bifrost route normalizes non-2xx through the error sanitizer", () => {
+    const src = read(BIFROST_ROUTE);
+    assert.ok(src.includes("buildErrorBody"), "bifrost non-2xx must not be relayed verbatim");
+    assert.ok(src.includes("sanitizeErrorMessage"), "bifrost non-2xx must be sanitized (HR#12)");
+  });
+});

tests/unit/error-sanitizer-sk-key-qv45.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+/**
+ * GHSA-qv45-56jc-4wmj — two copies of one redaction rule, and only one got the
+ * `sk-` pattern.
+ *
+ * `upstreamErrorPassthrough.ts`'s CREDENTIAL_LEAK_RE matches `\bsk-[…]{8,}` and
+ * REFUSES verbatim passthrough when an upstream 4xx echoes a key — correctly
+ * treating it as a leak. The body then falls through to `buildErrorBody` →
+ * `sanitizeErrorMessage` → `redactSensitiveErrorText`, which had no `sk-`
+ * pattern at all. So the layer that recognized the credential handed it to a
+ * layer that did not, and OpenAI-style `Incorrect API key provided: sk-proj-…`
+ * bodies were returned to the caller verbatim.
+ *
+ * The passthrough file's own comment says it "mirrors the vocabulary of
+ * redactSensitiveErrorText" — the mirror had diverged. This suite pins both
+ * directions so it cannot diverge again.
+ *
+ * Run with:
+ *   node --import tsx/esm --test tests/unit/error-sanitizer-sk-key-qv45.test.ts
+ */
+
+import { describe, it } from "node:test";
+import assert from "node:assert/strict";
+
+import { redactSensitiveErrorText, sanitizeErrorMessage } from "../../open-sse/utils/error.ts";
+
+const LEAKY_BODIES = [
+  "Incorrect API key provided: sk-proj-AbCdEfGhIjKlMnOpQrStUv. You can find your API key at …",
+  "401 Unauthorized: sk-ant-api03-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz-1234567890",
+  "invalid key sk_live_51H8xKzAbCdEfGhIjKlMn",
+  "Bad credentials for AIzaSyA1B2C3D4E5F6G7H8I9J0KaLbMcNdOeP",
+  "token rejected: eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIn0.dozjgNryP4J3jVmNHl0w5N_XgL0n3I9PlFUP0THsR8U",
+];
+
+describe("redactSensitiveErrorText — raw credential patterns (GHSA-qv45-56jc-4wmj)", () => {
+  for (const body of LEAKY_BODIES) {
+    it(`redacts the raw credential in: ${body.slice(0, 42)}…`, () => {
+      const out = redactSensitiveErrorText(body);
+      assert.ok(!/\bsk[-_][A-Za-z0-9._-]{8,}/.test(out), `sk- survived: ${out}`);
+      assert.ok(!/\bAIza[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}/.test(out), `Google key survived: ${out}`);
+      assert.ok(!/\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\./.test(out), `JWT survived: ${out}`);
+      assert.ok(out.includes("[REDACTED"), `nothing was redacted: ${out}`);
+    });
+  }
+
+  it("redacts through sanitizeErrorMessage, the path buildErrorBody actually uses", () => {
+    const out = sanitizeErrorMessage("Incorrect API key provided: sk-proj-AbCdEfGhIjKlMnOpQr.");
+    assert.ok(!out.includes("sk-proj-AbCdEfGhIjKlMnOpQr"), out);
+  });
+
+  it("keeps the pre-existing redactions working", () => {
+    assert.match(redactSensitiveErrorText("401: Bearer abc123def456"), /Bearer \[REDACTED\]/);
+    assert.match(
+      redactSensitiveErrorText('{"api_key":"secret-value","detail":"bad"}'),
+      /\[REDACTED\]/
+    );
+    assert.match(
+      redactSensitiveErrorText(""),
+      /\[REDACTED_DATA_URL\]/
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("does not maul ordinary error prose that merely contains 'sk'", () => {
+    for (const benign of [
+      "Model gpt-5 is not available on this plan",
+      "risk score too high",
+      "task sk failed", // short, no credential shape
+      "Rate limit reached for requests",
+    ]) {
+      assert.equal(redactSensitiveErrorText(benign), benign);
+    }
+  });
+});
+
+describe("the two redaction layers stay in step", () => {
+  it("every credential shape the passthrough layer refuses is also redacted here", async () => {
+    // If passthrough REFUSES a body as leaky, the fallback sanitizer is the only
+    // thing standing between that body and the caller. Anything the first layer
+    // calls a credential, the second must scrub.
+    const { shouldPassthroughUpstreamError } =
+      await import("../../open-sse/utils/upstreamErrorPassthrough.ts");
+    for (const body of LEAKY_BODIES) {
+      const payload = { error: { message: body } };
+      const relayedVerbatim = shouldPassthroughUpstreamError(401, payload);
+      if (relayedVerbatim) continue; // not classified as a leak — nothing to assert
+      const scrubbed = redactSensitiveErrorText(body);
+      assert.notEqual(
+        scrubbed,
+        body,
+        `passthrough refused this body as leaky but the sanitizer left it untouched: ${body}`
+      );
+    }
+  });
+});

tests/unit/search-baseurl-client-override-3f8g.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+/**
+ * GHSA-3f8g-pfh9-j687 — a tenant-supplied `provider_options.baseUrl` redirected
+ * the SaaS search builders, so the OPERATOR's search-provider API key was sent
+ * to a tenant-chosen host (query string for google-pse/searchapi, header for
+ * you.com/linkup/nimble/ollama).
+ *
+ * This is the same override the GHSA-j7j4-g9qc-q69c fix hardened — and that fix
+ * only added a block-metadata check, which does nothing here: the attacker
+ * points at their own PUBLIC host and collects the key. The j7j4 regression test
+ * missed it because its fixture was `searxng-search`, the one keyless provider
+ * where redirecting the base URL leaks no credential.
+ *
+ * The two override sources have different trust:
+ *   - `providerSpecificData` comes from the stored provider connection
+ *     (`credentials?.providerSpecificData`, search.ts:1510) — OPERATOR config.
+ *     This is how an operator points at their self-hosted searxng, so it keeps
+ *     working on loopback/LAN under the block-metadata policy.
+ *   - `providerOptions` comes straight off the request body
+ *     (`body.provider_options`, v1/search/route.ts:366) — TENANT input. It is
+ *     refused outright: no provider needs a per-request caller-chosen fetch
+ *     target, and honoring one is credential exfiltration for keyed providers
+ *     and SSRF-with-readback for every provider.
+ *
+ * Run with:
+ *   node --import tsx/esm --test tests/unit/search-baseurl-client-override-3f8g.test.ts
+ */
+
+import { describe, it } from "node:test";
+import assert from "node:assert/strict";
+
+import { resolveSearchBaseUrl } from "../../open-sse/handlers/search.ts";
+import type { SearchProviderConfig } from "../../open-sse/config/searchRegistry.ts";
+import { SEARCH_PROVIDERS } from "../../open-sse/config/searchRegistry.ts";
+
+const base = { query: "test", searchType: "web", maxResults: 5 };
+
+/** Every provider whose builder attaches an operator-held key. */
+const KEYED_PROVIDER_IDS = Object.values(SEARCH_PROVIDERS)
+  .filter((p) => p.authType === "apikey")
+  .map((p) => p.id);
+
+describe("resolveSearchBaseUrl — tenant-supplied baseUrl (GHSA-3f8g-pfh9-j687)", () => {
+  it("covers every keyed provider in the registry, not one hand-picked fixture", () => {
+    // The j7j4 test only exercised searxng. Assert the registry actually has
+    // keyed providers so this suite cannot silently degrade to zero coverage.
+    assert.ok(
+      KEYED_PROVIDER_IDS.length >= 5,
+      `expected keyed providers, got ${KEYED_PROVIDER_IDS.length}`
+    );
+  });
+
+  for (const id of KEYED_PROVIDER_IDS) {
+    it(`refuses a tenant baseUrl for the keyed provider ${id}`, () => {
+      const config = SEARCH_PROVIDERS[id];
+      assert.throws(
+        () =>
+          resolveSearchBaseUrl(config, {
+            ...base,
+            providerOptions: { baseUrl: "https://attacker.example" },
+          }),
+        `${id} honored a tenant baseUrl — the operator key would be sent there`
+      );
+    });
+  }
+
+  it("the opt-in flag is NEVER set on a provider that carries an operator key", () => {
+    // The whole invariant in one assertion: if this ever pairs with authType
+    // "apikey", a caller can redirect the operator's key again.
+    for (const p of Object.values(SEARCH_PROVIDERS)) {
+      if (p.allowClientBaseUrlOverride) {
+        assert.equal(p.authType, "none", `${p.id} opts into a caller baseUrl while holding a key`);
+      }
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("refuses a caller baseUrl for keyless providers that did NOT opt in", () => {
+    for (const id of ["context7", "duckduckgo-free"]) {
+      const config = SEARCH_PROVIDERS[id];
+      if (!config || config.allowClientBaseUrlOverride) continue;
+      assert.throws(
+        () =>
+          resolveSearchBaseUrl(config, {
+            ...base,
+            providerOptions: { baseUrl: "https://attacker.example" },
+          }),
+        `${id} honored a caller baseUrl without opting in`
+      );
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("SearXNG keeps its documented self-hosted caller override, IMDS still blocked", () => {
+    // Opted in: keyless, so no operator credential travels with the request.
+    // Loopback/LAN is the point of a self-hosted instance (search-route.test.ts
+    // covers the route-level flow); cloud metadata stays rejected.
+    const config = SEARCH_PROVIDERS["searxng-search"];
+    assert.equal(config.allowClientBaseUrlOverride, true);
+    assert.equal(
+      resolveSearchBaseUrl(config, {
+        ...base,
+        providerOptions: { baseUrl: "http://127.0.0.1:8888/search" },
+      }),
+      "http://127.0.0.1:8888/search"
+    );
+    assert.throws(() =>
+      resolveSearchBaseUrl(config, {
+        ...base,
+        providerOptions: { baseUrl: "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/" },
+      })
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("keeps the operator-configured override working, including loopback/LAN", () => {
+    const config = SEARCH_PROVIDERS["searxng-search"];
+    assert.equal(
+      resolveSearchBaseUrl(config, {
+        ...base,
+        providerSpecificData: { baseUrl: "http://127.0.0.1:8888/search" },
+      }),
+      "http://127.0.0.1:8888/search"
+    );
+    assert.equal(
+      resolveSearchBaseUrl(config, {
+        ...base,
+        providerSpecificData: { baseUrl: "http://10.0.0.5:8888" },
+      }),
+      "http://10.0.0.5:8888"
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("still blocks cloud metadata from the operator source (j7j4 must not regress)", () => {
+    const config = SEARCH_PROVIDERS["searxng-search"];
+    assert.throws(() =>
+      resolveSearchBaseUrl(config, {
+        ...base,
+        providerSpecificData: { baseUrl: "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/" },
+      })
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("the operator source wins over a tenant one instead of the tenant shadowing it", () => {
+    const config = SEARCH_PROVIDERS["searxng-search"];
+    assert.equal(
+      resolveSearchBaseUrl(config, {
+        ...base,
+        providerOptions: { baseUrl: "https://attacker.example" },
+        providerSpecificData: { baseUrl: "http://127.0.0.1:8888" },
+      }),
+      "http://127.0.0.1:8888"
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("falls back to the catalog baseUrl when neither source supplies one", () => {
+    const config: SearchProviderConfig = {
+      ...SEARCH_PROVIDERS["searxng-search"],
+      baseUrl: "http://localhost:8888/search",
+    };
+    assert.equal(resolveSearchBaseUrl(config, base), "http://localhost:8888/search");
+  });
+});

tests/unit/search-baseurl-ssrf-guard.test.ts

@@ -58,18 +58,26 @@ describe("resolveSearchBaseUrl — SSRF guard on client-controlled baseUrl (GHSA
     });
   }
 
-  it("still allows a self-hosted loopback/LAN override (block-metadata, not public-only)", () => {
+  // CORRECTED for GHSA-3f8g-pfh9-j687. This case originally asserted the
+  // loopback/LAN override via `providerOptions` — i.e. via TENANT input — which
+  // is the SSRF-with-readback half of that advisory. The self-hosted use case
+  // this test was written to protect is operator configuration, and it arrives
+  // on `providerSpecificData` (search.ts reads it from the stored connection's
+  // `credentials?.providerSpecificData`), so that is where it is asserted now.
+  // Tenant-supplied overrides are refused outright — see
+  // search-baseurl-client-override-3f8g.test.ts.
+  it("still allows a self-hosted loopback/LAN override from OPERATOR config", () => {
     assert.equal(
       resolveSearchBaseUrl(config, {
         ...base,
-        providerOptions: { baseUrl: "http://127.0.0.1:9999" },
+        providerSpecificData: { baseUrl: "http://127.0.0.1:9999" },
       }),
       "http://127.0.0.1:9999"
     );
     assert.equal(
       resolveSearchBaseUrl(config, {
         ...base,
-        providerOptions: { baseUrl: "http://10.0.0.5:8080" },
+        providerSpecificData: { baseUrl: "http://10.0.0.5:8080" },
       }),
       "http://10.0.0.5:8080"
     );