mirror of
https://github.com/diegosouzapw/OmniRoute.git
synced 2026-07-26 09:52:11 +03:00
fix(security): address code-review findings — timing-safe token, OMNIROUTE_CLI_SALT, tray PNG, preservePatterns defaults, missing docs
- management.ts: replace === with timingSafeEqual for CLI token comparison - machineToken.ts: salt upgraded to omniroute-cli-auth-v1; OMNIROUTE_CLI_SALT env var honoured for rotation; full 64-char SHA-256 hex token - tray.ps1: accept .png via GDI+ Bitmap->Icon handle; Windows tray works without .ico - tray.ts: getIconPath() tries icon.ico then icon.png on Windows - compression/types.ts: DEFAULT_CAVEMAN_CONFIG.preservePatterns filled with six defaults (fenced code, inline code, URLs, paths, error lines, stack traces) - CLAUDE.md: Hard Rule #15 — spawn-capable routes must use isLocalOnlyPath() - .env.example + docs/reference/ENVIRONMENT.md: document OMNIROUTE_CLI_SALT - docs/security/CLI_TOKEN.md: new (was referenced in changelog but missing) - docs/security/ROUTE_GUARD_TIERS.md: new (was referenced in changelog but missing) - tests/unit/lib/machineToken.test.ts: updated for 64-char token; added OMNIROUTE_CLI_SALT env-var rotation test
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diegosouzapw
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docs/security/CLI_TOKEN.md
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docs/security/CLI_TOKEN.md
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# CLI Machine-ID Token
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## Overview
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OmniRoute CLI commands authenticate against the local management API using a
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`HMAC-SHA256(machine-id, salt)` token sent via the `x-omniroute-cli-token`
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request header.
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This allows CLI subcommands (`omniroute status`, `omniroute providers`, etc.)
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to call management endpoints without requiring the user to supply a JWT or
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password on every invocation.
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## How it works
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1. `getMachineTokenSync()` reads the hardware machine ID via `node-machine-id`
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(falls back to an empty string on failure, disabling CLI auth).
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2. It computes `HMAC-SHA256(machine_id, salt)` and returns the full 64-char
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hex digest — a deterministic, non-reversible token tied to this machine.
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3. The CLI sends the token as `x-omniroute-cli-token` on every request to
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`http://localhost:<port>/api/...`.
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4. The server (`src/server/authz/policies/management.ts`) recomputes the
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expected token with the same salt and compares via `timingSafeEqual` to
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prevent timing-based extraction.
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## Security properties
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| Property | Detail |
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| -------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| **Loopback-only** | Accepted only when `Host` is `localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, or `::1`. |
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| **Constant-time compare** | `crypto.timingSafeEqual` prevents timing attacks. |
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| **Non-reversible** | HMAC output cannot recover the machine-id. |
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| **No `always`-protected bypass** | `isAlwaysProtectedPath()` is evaluated before the CLI token check. `/api/shutdown` and `/api/settings/database` always require JWT. |
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| **Non-exportable** | Token is never written to disk or logged. |
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## Salt rotation
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Set `OMNIROUTE_CLI_SALT` to rotate the derived token without code changes.
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After rotation, all CLI processes on this machine will use the new token
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automatically. Useful after a process-list leak that may have exposed the
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previous derived value.
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```bash
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# Persistent rotation (add to shell profile)
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export OMNIROUTE_CLI_SALT="my-secret-salt-2026"
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# Verify new token is in use
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omniroute status
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```
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Default salt: `omniroute-cli-auth-v1`
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## Files
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| File | Purpose |
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| ----------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------- |
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| `src/lib/machineToken.ts` | Token derivation (`getMachineTokenSync`) |
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| `src/server/authz/headers.ts` | `CLI_TOKEN_HEADER` constant |
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| `src/server/authz/policies/management.ts` | Server-side verification |
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| `src/server/authz/routeGuard.ts` | Loopback host check (`isLoopbackHost`) |
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## See also
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- `docs/security/ROUTE_GUARD_TIERS.md` — route protection tiers
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- `docs/architecture/AUTHZ_GUIDE.md` — full authorization pipeline
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docs/security/ROUTE_GUARD_TIERS.md
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docs/security/ROUTE_GUARD_TIERS.md
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# Route Guard Tiers
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## Overview
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All OmniRoute management API routes are classified into one of three protection
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tiers. Classification is static, defined in `src/server/authz/routeGuard.ts`,
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and evaluated unconditionally on every request before any auth logic runs.
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## Tiers
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### Tier 1 — LOCAL_ONLY
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**Enforced by:** `isLocalOnlyPath(path)` → loopback host check
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**Bypass:** None — not overridable by JWT, CLI token, or `requireLogin=false`
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These routes spawn child processes or execute runtime code. Exposing them to
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non-loopback traffic would allow an attacker who obtained a valid JWT (e.g.,
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via a Cloudflared/Ngrok tunnel) to trigger process spawning — a known CVE
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class (GHSA-fhh6-4qxv-rpqj).
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| Prefix | Reason |
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| ------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------- |
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| `/api/mcp/` | MCP server — spawns stdio bridges and SSE handlers |
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| `/api/cli-tools/runtime/` | CLI tool runtime — executes plugin code |
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**Response on violation:** `403 LOCAL_ONLY`
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### Tier 2 — ALWAYS_PROTECTED
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**Enforced by:** `isAlwaysProtectedPath(path)` → skip `requireLogin=false` bypass
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**Bypass:** None when `requireLogin=false`; JWT always required
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These routes are destructive or irreversible. Allowing them in a "no-password"
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install would mean anyone on the same LAN could wipe the database or kill the
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server process.
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| Path | Reason |
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| ------------------------ | --------------------------------- |
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| `/api/shutdown` | Terminates the server process |
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| `/api/settings/database` | Database export, import, and wipe |
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**Response on violation:** `401 Authentication required`
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### Tier 3 — MANAGEMENT (default)
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All other management routes. Auth required unless `requireLogin=false` is
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configured. CLI tokens can authenticate these routes (loopback + valid HMAC).
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## Evaluation order
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```
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managementPolicy.evaluate(ctx)
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1. isLocalOnlyPath(path)?
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→ not loopback → reject 403 LOCAL_ONLY
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2. isInternalModelSyncRequest(ctx)?
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→ allow (system)
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3. hasValidCliToken(headers)?
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→ allow (cli) [loopback + timingSafeEqual HMAC check]
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4. isAlwaysProtectedPath(path) or requireLogin=true?
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→ isDashboardSessionAuthenticated?
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→ allow (dashboard_session)
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→ reject 401/403
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5. requireLogin=false?
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→ allow (anonymous)
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```
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## Adding a new spawn-capable route
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1. Add the path prefix to `LOCAL_ONLY_API_PREFIXES` in
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`src/server/authz/routeGuard.ts`
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2. Add a test in `tests/unit/authz/routeGuard.test.ts` asserting that
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`isLocalOnlyPath()` returns true for the new prefix
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3. **Never skip this step** — see Hard Rule #15 in `CLAUDE.md`
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## Files
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| File | Purpose |
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| ----------------------------------------- | ------------------------------ |
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| `src/server/authz/routeGuard.ts` | Constants and helper functions |
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| `src/server/authz/policies/management.ts` | Evaluation logic |
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| `tests/unit/authz/routeGuard.test.ts` | Unit tests |
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## See also
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- `docs/security/CLI_TOKEN.md` — CLI machine-ID token
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- `docs/architecture/AUTHZ_GUIDE.md` — full authorization pipeline
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