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fix(ws): codex Responses-over-WebSocket upgrade — clean handshake + bridge-secret auth

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Two bugs made `wscat ws://host/v1/responses` fail with
"Transfer-Encoding can't be present with Content-Length":

1. authz/management policy 401'd the proxy's own internal authenticate/prepare
   loopback call to /api/internal/codex-responses-ws (MANAGEMENT-classified, the
   per-process bridge secret wasn't recognized one layer up). Added a tightly-scoped
   carve-out: isValidWsBridgeRequest() honors a timing-safe sha256 match of
   OMNIROUTE_WS_BRIDGE_SECRET (x-omniroute-ws-bridge-secret header) for that exact
   internal path; the route still re-validates the secret. → auth now succeeds → 101.

2. On auth failure the proxy spread the internal fetch's response headers onto the
   raw upgrade socket — a chunked Transfer-Encoding + Next CSP/route-class headers
   collided with writeHttpError's Content-Length framing (and duplicated Content-Type
   via a case-mismatched spread). writeHttpError now strips framing + pipeline/security
   headers (case-insensitive), and the auth-fail callsite no longer forwards them.

Regression test: tests/unit/responses-ws-proxy-headers.test.mjs (exports writeHttpError;
asserts no TE+CL, single Content-Type, no CSP/route-class leak, safe headers forwarded).
This commit is contained in:
diegosouzapw
2026-06-02 06:02:49 -03:00
parent 512e980a9e
commit 8086d2878b
3 changed files with 138 additions and 9 deletions
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46
scripts/dev/responses-ws-proxy.mjs
View File

@@ -150,16 +150,47 @@ export function decodeClientFrames(
};
}
function writeHttpError(socket, status, body, headers = {}) {
const WRITE_ERROR_RESERVED_HEADERS = new Set([
// Framing — must never collide with our Content-Length default.
"transfer-encoding",
"content-length",
"content-type",
"connection",
"keep-alive",
// Next pipeline / security headers are meaningless on a raw JSON error socket
// and must not leak from a forwarded internal-fetch response.
"content-security-policy",
"x-frame-options",
"x-content-type-options",
"referrer-policy",
"permissions-policy",
"strict-transport-security",
"x-omniroute-route-class",
"x-request-id",
"date",
]);
export function writeHttpError(socket, status, body, headers = {}) {
if (!socket.writable || socket.destroyed) return;
const bodyBuffer = Buffer.from(body || "", "utf8");
const statusText = STATUS_CODES[status] || "Error";
// Strip any caller-supplied framing / duplicate-prone headers (case-insensitive)
// so our Content-Length/Connection/Content-Type defaults always win. Forwarding
// an upstream fetch's chunked Transfer-Encoding here would collide with
// Content-Length ("Transfer-Encoding can't be present with Content-Length") and
// break the client's HTTP parser on a raw upgrade socket.
const safeHeaders = {};
for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(headers || {})) {
if (!WRITE_ERROR_RESERVED_HEADERS.has(String(name).toLowerCase())) {
safeHeaders[name] = value;
}
}
const responseHeaders = {
Connection: "close",
"Content-Length": String(bodyBuffer.length),
"Content-Type": "application/json; charset=utf-8",
...headers,
...safeHeaders,
};
const head = [
@@ -637,12 +668,11 @@ export function createResponsesWsProxy({
headers: getAuthHeaders(req.url || pathname, req.headers),
});
if (!auth.ok) {
writeHttpError(
socket,
auth.status,
auth.text || "{}",
Object.fromEntries(auth.headers.entries())
);
// Do NOT forward the internal fetch's response headers onto the raw
// upgrade socket — they carry chunked transfer-encoding + Next security
// headers that collide with writeHttpError's Content-Length framing.
// The sanitized JSON body alone is enough for the client.
writeHttpError(socket, auth.status, auth.text || "{}");
return true;
}