From 8e5e25099ef583d9c1c7bf925532e2ec6b30a971 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Diego Rodrigues de Sa e Souza
 <8016841+diegosouzapw@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Jun 2026 16:00:41 -0300
Subject: [PATCH] feat(mitm): loop-guard self-check + verbosity control in
 server.cjs (Gaps 14+15) (#4101)
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Integrated into release/v3.8.28 (rebased onto release — dropped the already-squash-merged #4084 commits; only the Gaps 14+15 loop-guard/verbosity delta remains)
---
 src/mitm/_internal/bypass.cjs             | 43 +++++++++++++++++++
 src/mitm/server.cjs                       | 40 ++++++++++++++----
 tests/unit/mitm-server-loop-guard.test.ts | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 124 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 tests/unit/mitm-server-loop-guard.test.ts

diff --git a/src/mitm/_internal/bypass.cjs b/src/mitm/_internal/bypass.cjs
index 0f0312da65..10526658c6 100644
--- a/src/mitm/_internal/bypass.cjs
+++ b/src/mitm/_internal/bypass.cjs
@@ -119,9 +119,52 @@ function parseBypassJson(raw) {
   }
 }
 
+/**
+ * True if `ip` is an IPv4 or IPv6 loopback address. (Gap 14 helper.)
+ * @param {string} ip
+ * @returns {boolean}
+ */
+function isLoopbackIp(ip) {
+  if (typeof ip !== "string") return false;
+  if (ip === "::1" || ip === "::ffff:127.0.0.1") return true;
+  return /^127\./.test(ip);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Defense-in-depth loop guard (Gap 14). The primary guard is the
+ * x-omniroute-source header; this is a structural backstop. If a forwarded
+ * request's resolved upstream is a loopback address on the MITM server's own
+ * listen port, dialing it would re-enter this same server — an infinite loop /
+ * fd storm. Callers should refuse instead of dialing themselves.
+ *
+ * @param {string} targetIp - resolved upstream IP
+ * @param {number} destPort - the port we would dial upstream
+ * @param {number} localPort - this MITM server's own listen port
+ * @returns {boolean}
+ */
+function isSelfLoopDestination(targetIp, destPort, localPort) {
+  return isLoopbackIp(targetIp) && Number(destPort) === Number(localPort);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Parse the MITM_VERBOSE env var into a routing-decision log level (Gap 15).
+ * Default 1 (log decisions) preserves existing behavior; 0 silences; higher
+ * levels are reserved for finer detail. Garbage falls back to the default.
+ *
+ * @param {string|undefined} envValue
+ * @returns {number}
+ */
+function parseVerboseLevel(envValue) {
+  const n = Number.parseInt(envValue, 10);
+  return Number.isInteger(n) && n >= 0 ? n : 1;
+}
+
 module.exports = {
   DEFAULT_BYPASS_PATTERNS,
   bypassGlobMatch,
   routeBypass,
   parseBypassJson,
+  isLoopbackIp,
+  isSelfLoopDestination,
+  parseVerboseLevel,
 };
diff --git a/src/mitm/server.cjs b/src/mitm/server.cjs
index 55a9aaf821..5c2f6a37e3 100644
--- a/src/mitm/server.cjs
+++ b/src/mitm/server.cjs
@@ -135,6 +135,13 @@ function sanitizeErrorMessage(message) {
 
 const bypassShim = require("./_internal/bypass.cjs");
 
+// Routing-decision log verbosity (Gap 15). MITM_VERBOSE=0 silences the
+// per-request decision lines; default 1 preserves the previous behavior.
+const VERBOSE = bypassShim.parseVerboseLevel(process.env.MITM_VERBOSE);
+function vlog(level, msg) {
+  if (VERBOSE >= level) console.log(msg);
+}
+
 const BYPASS_JSON_FILE = path.join(DATA_DIR, "mitm", "bypass.json");
 let _userBypassPatterns = []; // array of glob strings, lowercased
 
@@ -337,6 +344,19 @@ async function passthrough(req, res, bodyBuffer) {
   const targetHost = getTargetHost(req);
   const targetIP = await resolveTargetIP(targetHost);
 
+  // Defense-in-depth loop guard (Gap 14). The x-omniroute-source header is the
+  // primary guard; this is a structural backstop for when it is stripped: if
+  // the upstream resolves to ourselves (loopback on our own listen port),
+  // forwarding would re-enter this server forever. Refuse instead of looping.
+  if (bypassShim.isSelfLoopDestination(targetIP, 443, LOCAL_PORT)) {
+    console.error(
+      `❌ Loop guard: ${targetHost} resolves to self (${targetIP}:${LOCAL_PORT}) — refusing to forward`
+    );
+    if (!res.headersSent) res.writeHead(508);
+    res.end("Loop Detected");
+    return;
+  }
+
   // TLS validation is enabled by default. Set MITM_DISABLE_TLS_VERIFY=1 only
   // in controlled local environments where the target uses a self-signed cert.
   const rejectUnauthorized = process.env.MITM_DISABLE_TLS_VERIFY !== "1";
@@ -439,31 +459,31 @@ const server = https.createServer(sslOptions, async (req, res) => {
   const host = String(req.headers.host || "").split(":")[0].toLowerCase();
   const model = bodyBuffer.length > 0 ? extractModel(bodyBuffer) : null;
 
-  console.log(`[MITM] ${req.method} ${host}${req.url} | body: ${bodyBuffer.length}B | model: ${model || "N/A"}`);
+  vlog(1, `[MITM] ${req.method} ${host}${req.url} | body: ${bodyBuffer.length}B | model: ${model || "N/A"}`);
 
   if (bodyBuffer.length > 0) saveRequestLog(req.url, bodyBuffer);
 
   if (req.headers["x-omniroute-source"] === "omniroute") {
-    console.log(`[MITM] → PASSTHROUGH (OmniRoute source loop)`);
+    vlog(1, `[MITM] → PASSTHROUGH (OmniRoute source loop)`);
     return passthrough(req, res, bodyBuffer);
   }
 
   if (!TARGET_HOSTS.has(host)) {
-    console.log(`[MITM] → PASSTHROUGH (host ${host} not in target list)`);
+    vlog(1, `[MITM] → PASSTHROUGH (host ${host} not in target list)`);
     return passthrough(req, res, bodyBuffer);
   }
 
   const isChatRequest = CHAT_URL_PATTERNS.some((p) => req.url.includes(p));
 
   if (!isChatRequest) {
-    console.log(`[MITM] → PASSTHROUGH (URL ${req.url} does not match chat patterns)`);
+    vlog(1, `[MITM] → PASSTHROUGH (URL ${req.url} does not match chat patterns)`);
     return passthrough(req, res, bodyBuffer);
   }
 
   const mappedModel = getMappedModel(model);
 
   if (!mappedModel) {
-    console.log(`[MITM] → PASSTHROUGH (model "${model}" has no MITM alias mapping)`);
+    vlog(1, `[MITM] → PASSTHROUGH (model "${model}" has no MITM alias mapping)`);
     return passthrough(req, res, bodyBuffer);
   }
 
@@ -471,7 +491,7 @@ const server = https.createServer(sslOptions, async (req, res) => {
   stats.lastInterceptAt = new Date().toISOString();
   writeStats();
 
-  console.log(`[MITM] INTERCEPTED ${model} → ${mappedModel}`);
+  vlog(1, `[MITM] INTERCEPTED ${model} → ${mappedModel}`);
   return intercept(req, res, bodyBuffer, mappedModel);
 });
 
@@ -585,7 +605,7 @@ server.on("connect", (req, clientSocket, head) => {
   if (decision === "bypass") {
     // Privacy: bypass hosts are never logged with body/headers and never
     // TLS-decrypted. Only the hostname appears in console output.
-    console.log(`[MITM] CONNECT ${connectHost}:${connectPort} → BYPASS (TCP tunnel)`);
+    vlog(1, `[MITM] CONNECT ${connectHost}:${connectPort} → BYPASS (TCP tunnel)`);
     rawTcpForward(clientSocket, head, connectHost, connectPort, "bypass");
     return;
   }
@@ -595,7 +615,8 @@ server.on("connect", (req, clientSocket, head) => {
     // https.createServer request handler can decrypt and route. We write the
     // 200 response ourselves and then `emit("connection")` so the TLS layer
     // picks the socket up.
-    console.log(
+    vlog(
+      1,
       `[MITM] CONNECT ${connectHost}:${connectPort} → TARGET (TLS terminate locally)`
     );
     clientSocket.write("HTTP/1.1 200 Connection Established\r\n\r\n");
@@ -605,7 +626,8 @@ server.on("connect", (req, clientSocket, head) => {
   }
 
   // decision === "passthrough"
-  console.log(
+  vlog(
+    1,
     `[MITM] CONNECT ${connectHost}:${connectPort} → PASSTHROUGH (TCP tunnel)`
   );
   rawTcpForward(clientSocket, head, connectHost, connectPort, "passthrough");
diff --git a/tests/unit/mitm-server-loop-guard.test.ts b/tests/unit/mitm-server-loop-guard.test.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8b8cbd74fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/unit/mitm-server-loop-guard.test.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+/**
+ * Gap 14 + Gap 15: structural loop guard + verbosity level, both living in the
+ * testable `_internal/bypass.cjs` shim that server.cjs consumes.
+ *
+ * Gap 14 — the primary loop guard is the x-omniroute-source header; this is a
+ * defense-in-depth backstop: if a forwarded request's resolved upstream is a
+ * loopback address on the MITM's own listen port, dialing it re-enters this
+ * server (infinite loop / fd storm). Detect and refuse.
+ *
+ * Gap 15 — MITM_VERBOSE controls how chatty the routing-decision log is.
+ */
+import test from "node:test";
+import assert from "node:assert/strict";
+import { createRequire } from "node:module";
+
+const requireCjs = createRequire(import.meta.url);
+const shim = requireCjs("../../src/mitm/_internal/bypass.cjs") as {
+  isSelfLoopDestination: (ip: string, destPort: number, localPort: number) => boolean;
+  parseVerboseLevel: (env: string | undefined) => number;
+};
+
+test("isSelfLoopDestination — loopback IPv4 on the listen port loops", () => {
+  assert.equal(shim.isSelfLoopDestination("127.0.0.1", 443, 443), true);
+});
+
+test("isSelfLoopDestination — any 127.x.x.x on the listen port loops", () => {
+  assert.equal(shim.isSelfLoopDestination("127.0.0.53", 443, 443), true);
+});
+
+test("isSelfLoopDestination — IPv6 loopback on the listen port loops", () => {
+  assert.equal(shim.isSelfLoopDestination("::1", 443, 443), true);
+});
+
+test("isSelfLoopDestination — a real public IP never loops", () => {
+  assert.equal(shim.isSelfLoopDestination("1.2.3.4", 443, 443), false);
+});
+
+test("isSelfLoopDestination — loopback on a DIFFERENT port does not loop", () => {
+  assert.equal(shim.isSelfLoopDestination("127.0.0.1", 8080, 443), false);
+});
+
+test("parseVerboseLevel — defaults to 1 (log decisions) when unset/garbage", () => {
+  assert.equal(shim.parseVerboseLevel(undefined), 1);
+  assert.equal(shim.parseVerboseLevel("not-a-number"), 1);
+});
+
+test("parseVerboseLevel — honors explicit levels including 0 (silent)", () => {
+  assert.equal(shim.parseVerboseLevel("0"), 0);
+  assert.equal(shim.parseVerboseLevel("2"), 2);
+});