diff --git a/CHANGELOG.md b/CHANGELOG.md
index fe9debd383..1317176276 100644
--- a/CHANGELOG.md
+++ b/CHANGELOG.md
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ Thanks to everyone whose work landed in v3.8.12:
 - **sse/groq:** non-reasoning Groq models (`llama-3.3-70b-versatile`, `llama-4-scout`) are now flagged `supportsReasoning: false`, so `reasoning_effort` / `output_config.effort` / `thinking` are stripped before dispatch instead of being forwarded and rejected with HTTP 400 — fixes the Claude Code → Groq regression of #764 ([#3258](https://github.com/diegosouzapw/OmniRoute/issues/3258))
 - **api/images:** `POST /v1/images/edits` to a custom OpenAI-compatible provider no longer forwards an empty `model`. The multipart body is now built as a `Buffer` with an explicit boundary instead of a global `FormData` — the patched undici `fetch` serialized a native `FormData` as the literal string `[object FormData]` (text/plain), dropping every field including `model` ([#3273](https://github.com/diegosouzapw/OmniRoute/issues/3273))
 - **api/webhooks:** webhook URLs may now target a private/internal address (e.g. `192.168.x`, a docker-internal host) when `OMNIROUTE_ALLOW_PRIVATE_PROVIDER_URLS=true` — the webhook guard reuses the same explicit opt-in as private provider URLs (default OFF; protocol and embedded-credential checks stay unconditional). Cloud-metadata / link-local endpoints (`169.254.169.254`, `metadata.google.internal`, `100.100.100.200`, `169.254.0.0/16`) are blocked **unconditionally** even with the opt-in on, and the webhook test endpoint redacts the upstream response body for private targets (no SSRF→IAM-credential pivot, no content exfiltration) ([#3269](https://github.com/diegosouzapw/OmniRoute/issues/3269))
+- **sse/qoder:** a valid Qoder Personal Access Token is no longer wrongly reported as "expired" when the Cosy validation endpoint returns a generic `Internal Server Error` (HTTP 500). A Cosy 500 only marks the PAT invalid when its body carries an explicit auth signal; a generic server fault now falls back to the #1391 valid-bypass rule ([#3247](https://github.com/diegosouzapw/OmniRoute/issues/3247))
 
 ---
 
diff --git a/open-sse/services/qoderCli.ts b/open-sse/services/qoderCli.ts
index 09c052097b..f2481cac38 100644
--- a/open-sse/services/qoderCli.ts
+++ b/open-sse/services/qoderCli.ts
@@ -503,18 +503,24 @@ export async function validateQoderCliPat({
       return { valid: true, error: null, unsupported: false };
     }
 
-    // Treat 5xx as valid bypass to prevent false negatives from legacy Qoder APIs (issue #1391)
+    // Treat 5xx as a valid bypass to prevent false negatives from legacy Qoder APIs (#1391).
+    // A Cosy `{"success":false}` 500 is ambiguous: it can be a genuine auth rejection OR a
+    // transient/generic upstream "Internal Server Error". Only mark the PAT invalid when the
+    // body carries an EXPLICIT auth signal — a generic 500 is a server fault, not an auth
+    // verdict, so a working PAT must not be reported as expired (#3247, narrowing #2860).
     if (res.status >= 500) {
-      const isCosyAppError =
-        /"success"\s*:\s*false/.test(errorDetail) &&
-        (/"msgCode"\s*:\s*500/.test(errorDetail) || /internal\s*server\s*error/i.test(errorDetail));
+      const isCosyResponse = /"success"\s*:\s*false/.test(errorDetail);
+      const hasAuthSignal =
+        /(unauthorized|forbidden|expired|revoked|not\s*authorized|permission\s*denied|access\s*denied|invalid\s*(?:token|credential|api[\s_-]*key)|token\s*(?:invalid|expired|revoked))/i.test(
+          errorDetail
+        );
 
-      if (isCosyAppError) {
+      if (isCosyResponse && hasAuthSignal) {
         return {
           valid: false,
           error:
-            `Authentication failed (HTTP ${res.status}). The Qoder Cosy server returned an Internal Server Error. ` +
-            "This typically indicates that your Personal Access Token is invalid, expired, or not authorized. " +
+            `Authentication failed (HTTP ${res.status}). The Qoder Cosy server rejected the token ` +
+            "as invalid, expired, or not authorized. " +
             "Please check your token at https://qoder.com/account/integrations." +
             (errorDetail ? ` Server response: ${errorDetail}` : ""),
           unsupported: false,
diff --git a/tests/unit/qoder-cli.test.ts b/tests/unit/qoder-cli.test.ts
index c4a45cb01c..0928d72527 100644
--- a/tests/unit/qoder-cli.test.ts
+++ b/tests/unit/qoder-cli.test.ts
@@ -365,37 +365,59 @@ test("validateQoderCliPat treats 5xx HTTP failures as valid bypass", async () =>
   }
 });
 
-test("validateQoderCliPat rejects 500 HTTP failures if response is Cosy app-level auth error", async () => {
+// #3247: a generic Cosy 500 (`{"success":false,...,"msgCode":500,"message":"Internal
+// Server Error"}`) is a SERVER fault, not a reliable auth verdict — a PAT that works in
+// the Qoder CLI was being wrongly marked "expired". Per the older #1391 rule, a generic
+// 5xx is now a valid bypass; only an explicit auth signal in the body marks it invalid.
+test("validateQoderCliPat treats a generic Cosy 500 (no auth signal) as a valid bypass (#3247)", async () => {
   const originalFetch = globalThis.fetch;
   globalThis.fetch = async (url) => {
     if (String(url).includes("/ping")) return new Response("pong", { status: 200 });
     return new Response(
-      ' { "success"  :  false, "traceId": "a4e5de61929400b9243b4f6e49756906", "msgCode"  :  500 } ',
+      '{"success":false,"traceId":"a4e5de61929400b9243b4f6e49756906","msgCode":500,"msgInfo":"Internal Server Error","message":"Internal Server Error"}',
       { status: 500 }
     );
   };
 
   try {
-    const result = await qoderCli.validateQoderCliPat({ apiKey: "invalid-pat" });
-    assert.equal(result.valid, false);
-    assert.match(result.error!, /Authentication failed \(HTTP 500\)/);
+    const result = await qoderCli.validateQoderCliPat({ apiKey: "pt-valid-token" });
+    assert.equal(result.valid, true);
+    assert.match(result.error!, /treating PAT as valid/);
   } finally {
     globalThis.fetch = originalFetch;
   }
 });
 
-test("validateQoderCliPat rejects 500 HTTP failures using regex for Internal Server Error with whitespace", async () => {
+test("validateQoderCliPat treats a generic 'Internal Server Error' 500 as a valid bypass (#3247)", async () => {
+  const originalFetch = globalThis.fetch;
+  globalThis.fetch = async (url) => {
+    if (String(url).includes("/ping")) return new Response("pong", { status: 200 });
+    return new Response(' { "success"  :  false, "error": "Internal   Server    Error" } ', {
+      status: 500,
+    });
+  };
+
+  try {
+    const result = await qoderCli.validateQoderCliPat({ apiKey: "pt-valid-token" });
+    assert.equal(result.valid, true);
+    assert.match(result.error!, /treating PAT as valid/);
+  } finally {
+    globalThis.fetch = originalFetch;
+  }
+});
+
+test("validateQoderCliPat still rejects a Cosy 500 that carries an explicit auth signal (#2860)", async () => {
   const originalFetch = globalThis.fetch;
   globalThis.fetch = async (url) => {
     if (String(url).includes("/ping")) return new Response("pong", { status: 200 });
     return new Response(
-      ' { "success"  :  false, "error": "Internal   Server    Error" } ',
+      '{"success":false,"msgCode":500,"message":"token invalid or unauthorized"}',
       { status: 500 }
     );
   };
 
   try {
-    const result = await qoderCli.validateQoderCliPat({ apiKey: "invalid-pat" });
+    const result = await qoderCli.validateQoderCliPat({ apiKey: "pt-bad-token" });
     assert.equal(result.valid, false);
     assert.match(result.error!, /Authentication failed \(HTTP 500\)/);
   } finally {