pjandro/OmniRoute
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/diegosouzapw/OmniRoute.git synced 2026-07-26 09:52:11 +03:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

docs(security): note CodeQL custom-sanitizer limitation as dismissal precedent

Browse Source 
CodeQL js/stack-trace-exposure does not recognize sanitizers reached
through a custom helper indirection — flagging callsites like
open-sse/utils/error.ts::errorResponse and
open-sse/executors/cursor.ts::buildErrorResponse even though both route
through sanitizeErrorMessage().

Record the dismissal precedent (alerts #224 and #231, May 2026):
- Add a "Known CodeQL limitation" section in
  docs/security/ERROR_SANITIZATION.md documenting how to handle future
  occurrences (verify callchain → verify test coverage → dismiss with
  reference, do NOT duplicate the pattern inline).
- Extend CLAUDE.md Hard Rule #14 with the precedent so the next
  engineer doesn't try to "fix" the false positive by weakening the
  shared sanitizer.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
diegosouzapw
2026-05-14 14:10:29 -03:00
parent bbf3ba0138
commit eff7de2284
4 changed files with 45 additions and 1 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

2
CLAUDE.md
View File

@@ -412,4 +412,4 @@ git push -u origin feat/your-feature
11. Never embed public upstream OAuth client_id/secret or Firebase Web keys as string literals — always go through `resolvePublicCred()` (`open-sse/utils/publicCreds.ts`). See `docs/security/PUBLIC_CREDS.md`.
12. Never return raw `err.stack` / `err.message` in HTTP / SSE / executor responses — always route through `buildErrorBody()` or `sanitizeErrorMessage()` (`open-sse/utils/error.ts`). See `docs/security/ERROR_SANITIZATION.md`.
13. Never string-interpolate external paths or runtime values into shell scripts passed to `exec()`/`spawn()` — pass via the `env` option instead. Reference: `src/mitm/cert/install.ts::updateNssDatabases`.
14. Never dismiss a CodeQL / Secret-Scanning alert without (a) first checking the pattern docs above to see if the helper applies, and (b) recording the technical justification in the dismissal comment.
14. Never dismiss a CodeQL / Secret-Scanning alert without (a) first checking the pattern docs above to see if the helper applies, and (b) recording the technical justification in the dismissal comment. Precedent: `js/stack-trace-exposure` raised on callsites that already route through `sanitizeErrorMessage()` is a known CodeQL limitation (custom sanitizers not recognized) — dismiss as `false positive` referencing `docs/security/ERROR_SANITIZATION.md`.