Replace the AgentBridge static server's single self-signed leaf cert
(scoped only to the 4 antigravity hosts) with a persisted local root CA
+ per-SNI leaf certs, reusing the CA/leaf crypto already proven for the
TPROXY capture mode (tproxy/dynamicCert.ts). server.cjs switches from a
static key/cert to an SNICallback so every host in MITM_TOOL_HOSTS gets
a matching leaf, not just antigravity.
- src/mitm/cert/rootCa.ts: load-or-generate-once CA persistence
(ca.key/ca.crt under <DATA_DIR>/mitm/), private key chmod 0o600.
- src/mitm/cert/migration.ts: pure migration gate — an already-trusted
legacy leaf install stays on the old leaf until the operator opts in
via MITM_ROOT_CA_ENABLED=true; a fresh install gets the CA model
automatically. A CA that can sign a leaf for any host is materially
more powerful than the old fixed-SAN leaf, so the switch is never
silent for an already-trusted install.
- src/mitm/cert/install.ts: installCaCert() — thin wrapper over the
existing cert-path-agnostic installCertResult(), same
omniroute-mitm.crt trust-store slot the old leaf used (supersedes it,
no dual-trust cleanup needed).
- src/mitm/manager.ts: wires the migration gate + CA load/install into
the bridge-start sequence, passes the resolved MITM_CERT_MODE to the
spawned server.cjs child so it can't drift from manager.ts's decision.
- src/mitm/server.cjs: async-bootstraps server creation behind the same
MITM_CERT_MODE gate; default ("legacy") reproduces the exact prior
synchronous behavior. The CJS/ESM boundary (server.cjs is spawned via
plain `node`, no TS loader) is crossed via a new
_internal/rootCaShim.cjs CJS twin of the CA/leaf crypto, matching the
established pattern of the sibling _internal/*.cjs shims in this file.
Validated: 14 new unit tests (CA generate-once, 0o600 key perms, CA
basicConstraints, leaf issuance across every MITM_TOOL_HOSTS host, SAN
match, chain validation against the CA, leaf caching, migration-gate
branches) plus a manual live smoke test spawning server.cjs in both
legacy and root-ca mode (confirmed a real TLS handshake with SNI
api.githubcopilot.com returns a CA-issued leaf for that host).
Deferred to VPS live validation (OS-trust-store mutation is not
unit-testable): actual OS trust-store install of the CA cert via
installCaCert() on Linux/macOS/Windows.
v3.8.40 cycle integration → main. All test gates green (Unit/Integration/Coverage/Node-compat/Quality-Ratchet). The only red check, 'PR Test Policy', is the test-masking heuristic firing on the cumulative ~57-commit release diff (legitimate assert consolidations already reviewed per-PR — Gemini CLI removal #5246, retired GPT models #5280, provider catalog refreshes); overridden with --admin per the documented release-PR convention. CodeQL/SonarQube advisory scans non-blocking; #5278's code already passed CodeQL on main. Homologated on VPS 192.168.0.15 (v3.8.40 healthy).
Release v3.8.31 — see CHANGELOG.md [3.8.31] for full notes and contributors.
Merged over known non-blocking reds (all correctness gates green): Integration Tests (2/2) is env/flaky (polls a real upstream batch that did not complete in the poll window); SonarQube/SonarCloud is the advisory server-side new-code quality gate. Unit (8 shards), Coverage, Node 22/24/26, Lint, PR Test Policy, Quality Ratchet, Docs-Strict, Quality-Extended and all 4 CodeQL analyses are green.
