PR E of the #13679 insecure-defaults umbrella (items #6, #7; item #8 analyzed
as by-design, no change). The published Docker image and fly.toml shipped
without REQUIRE_API_KEY set, so a bare `docker run` (README/QUICK-START
one-liners, no --env-file) or a `fly deploy` combined "keyless" with
"world-reachable" for the anonymous /v1 LLM proxy. docker-compose.yml already
mitigates this via loopback-only binding (#12568) and correctly keeps
following the operator's own .env, so it is untouched. The npm/CLI
local-first REQUIRE_API_KEY=false default in featureFlagDefinitions.ts is
also untouched per the owner's decision.
/api/free-tier/summary ships an unconditional Access-Control-Allow-Origin: "*"
and always included the operator's own local usedThisMonth/remaining usage
regardless of auth — a low-severity info leak to any reachable origin. Both
fields are now withheld from unauthenticated callers while the intentionally
public catalog data stays served to everyone.
The gemini-SSE (openai-to-gemini-sse.ts) sub-finding needed no code change:
/v1beta/models/*:streamGenerateContent is already classified CLIENT_API and
fronted by clientApiPolicy through src/proxy.ts before the translator ever
runs, and its CORS-header echo was already hardened fail-closed by #12573.
REQUIRE_API_KEY=true (this PR's container/Fly default) closes the dependency
that finding cited. Added a locking regression test confirming this chain.
Regression tests:
- tests/unit/issue-13679-container-posture-require-api-key.test.ts
- tests/unit/issue-13679-free-tier-summary-usage-leak.test.ts
- tests/unit/issue-13679-gemini-sse-requires-api-key.test.ts (confirmation)
Refs #13679
