* test(infra): retry recursive temp-dir removal instead of failing a shard on ENOTEMPTY (#11966)
Two shards on release/v3.8.51 went red in one day with the same signature —
"ENOTEMPTY, Directory not empty: /tmp/omniroute-<test>-XXXXXX" — from
combo-same-provider-cascade (Unit Tests fast-path 4/4, on a PR that touches only
.github/) and auth-policy-embeddings-webfetch-7785 (the 20k-test TIA step). Both pass
alone and on re-run: the cleanup races something still writing into the directory
(SQLite WAL/-shm checkpoint, a worker, the backup) and under a loaded hosted runner
the window opens. 1154 test files do their own cleanup with
fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }); 57 already asked for retries.
One-shot codemod (scripts/ad-hoc/codemod-rm-maxretries.mjs, kept for the record):
every rm / rmSync / rmdirSync option object with `recursive: true` and no
`maxRetries` gains `maxRetries: 5, retryDelay: 100` — Node itself then retries
ENOTEMPTY/EBUSY/EPERM for up to ~0.5 s before giving up. 2243 call sites in 1292
files under tests/, the shared tests/_setup/isolateDataDir.ts exit hook included.
Only the option object changes: no call site, assertion or import is touched.
Validation: prettier and ESLint (with the frozen suppressions) clean on all 1292
files; a random 20-file sample runs green (quota-redis-store hangs identically on
the untouched tree — it needs a Redis on localhost, an environment matter). The
four unit shards on this PR are the full run.
* fix(quality): let check-forgotten-sibling-tests read a 1,000-file diff
The gate shells out to `git diff` through execFileSync with Node's default 1 MB
maxBuffer; the 1,292-file codemod in this PR is the first diff large enough to
overflow it, and the gate died with `spawnSync git ENOBUFS` before comparing
anything. 64 MB is far above any real PR and costs nothing when unused.
* fix(api): enforce image generation API key auth
* fix(api): align image route auth guard with clientApiPolicy
The route-level guard added for image generation was stricter than the
authz middleware that already fronts /api/v1/* (src/proxy.ts →
clientApiPolicy), so requests the pipeline admits were 401'd by the
handler:
- A cookie-authenticated dashboard session was rejected under
REQUIRE_API_KEY=true. The dashboard Media page
(dashboard/cache/media) and the Playground call these routes with a
session and no Bearer — the same mismatch already fixed for
/api/playground/presets.
- A presented invalid key was rejected even with REQUIRE_API_KEY=false,
where clientApiPolicy (#2257) and the sibling /v1/embeddings and
/v1/web/fetch routes degrade a stale CLI key to anonymous instead.
Extract the shared guard into shared/utils/clientApiRouteAuth so both
image routes (and future /v1 handlers) mirror the middleware contract
instead of re-deriving it, and drop the now-dead auth imports.
Also switch the call-log attribution fallback back to `||`: with `??`,
an empty-string apiKeyId/apiKeyName would be persisted verbatim and
would block the request-scoped context, which the previous
`entry.apiKeyId || null` never did.
Tests: cover the dashboard-session and keyless-mode-invalid-key
branches, and split the auth/attribution cases into
image-generation-route-auth.test.ts to stay under the 800-line
new-test-file cap.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: alexey.nazarov@softmg.ru <alexey.nazarov@softmg.ru>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
