Adversarial review of the peer-IP fix surfaced: (1) CRITICAL — cliTokenAuth.ts
still derived loopback from new URL(request.url).hostname (the same spoofable
Host class), letting a remote caller with a stolen CLI token reach management
APIs via Host: 127.0.0.1; now it trusts the middleware-stamped locality verdict
(AUTHZ_HEADER_PEER_LOCALITY, a client-stripped trusted header). (2) HIGH —
isLoopbackHost mangled bare IPv6 (::1, ::ffff:127.0.0.1) via split(":")[0],
a fail-closed DoS on IPv6 deploys. (3) HIGH — the Docker entrypoint ran bare
server.js (no peer stamp); run-standalone.mjs now prefers server-ws.mjs.
Adiciona testes de isLoopback (aceita loopback, rejeita IPs públicos), verificação
de hash por máquina e DISABLE flag; testes de detectRestrictedEnvironment para
Codespaces/WSL/CI/Gitpod; e docs/security/CLI_TOKEN_AUTH.md com threat model.
- 8.2: update-notifier em omniroute.mjs (cache 24h, stderr-only, respeita CI/quiet/json/opt-out)
- 8.12: cliToken.mjs (sha256 de machineId + salt) injetado automaticamente em apiFetch
- 8.12: middleware cliTokenAuth.ts valida token apenas em loopback, timing-safe compare
- 8.12: requireManagementAuth aceita CLI token como bypass local
- env-doc-sync: OMNIROUTE_DISABLE_CLI_TOKEN e OMNIROUTE_NO_UPDATE_NOTIFIER no allowlist
