Commit Graph

2 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
diegosouzapw
1cb833acc4 docs(mitm): clarify CONNECT handler scope + guard activeConnections double-count (R4 #5)
The round-3 C1 fix added `server.on("connect", ...)` to satisfy plan 11 §4.6's
text. R4 architectural review confirmed the handler is essentially dead code
on port 443: `https.Server` runs the HTTP parser ABOVE TLS, so a
`server.on("connect")` handler only fires for CONNECT-tunneled-inside-TLS
(HTTPS-proxy-tunneled-in-TLS), not for the "no config required" AgentBridge
DNS-spoof flow where the IDE opens TLS directly to 127.0.0.1:443. Passthrough
for unmapped hosts is structurally handled elsewhere (DNS scoping for default
mode; httpProxyServer.ts:8080 for System-wide proxy mode). Genuine on-wire
bypass-without-decrypt at :443 under direct TLS would require SNI sniffing on
the raw 'connection' event — intentionally out of scope for this release.

This commit:
 - adds a block comment above the CONNECT handler explaining the real scope
   so future contributors don't assume it covers the primary AgentBridge flow
 - guards the `connection` listener with `socket.__mitmCounted` so the
   CONNECT "target" branch's `server.emit("connection", clientSocket)`
   re-entry doesn't double-increment `stats.activeConnections`
 - adds 2 source-grep regression tests asserting both the doc comment and
   the guard remain in place

C2 (x-omniroute-source/agent headers) was already correct and is unchanged.
2026-05-28 21:06:47 -03:00
diegosouzapw
f6ed411c62 test(mitm): bypass matching + manager bypass-json writer
Cover the new CJS routing primitives and the bypass-JSON manager write
path so the C1/C2 contracts cannot regress silently.

- `mitm-server-connect.test.ts` (27 tests): exercises the
  `_internal/bypass.cjs` shim used by `server.cjs`:
    - DEFAULT_BYPASS_PATTERNS shape (≥4 regexes, all RegExp)
    - Default bank / gov / okta / auth0 → bypass
    - Bypass beats target match (precedence)
    - Known target hostname → target
    - Unknown hostname → passthrough
    - User glob pattern → bypass
    - Empty / undefined hostname → passthrough
    - Set-vs-Array shape for targetHosts
    - Case-insensitive hostname matching
    - bypassGlobMatch wildcard semantics + ReDoS-safe linear walk
    - parseBypassJson with valid / empty / malformed / wrong-shape inputs
    - Spec assertions on server.cjs source — header injection (C2),
      sanitizeErrorMessage wrapping (Hard Rule #12), and CONNECT handler
      registration (C1). These three guard against future regressions
      that would silently re-introduce the bugs the C1/C2 fixes closed.
- `mitm-manager-bypass-json.test.ts` (5 tests): exercises
  `writeBypassJson()`:
    - Creates the `mitm/` dir + valid JSON file shape
    - Empty array roundtrips as empty patterns
    - Falls back to `getUserBypassPatterns()` when no arg passed
    - Default patterns from the DB are NOT written to the file
    - Overwrites prior content
2026-05-28 16:48:44 -03:00