captureCurrentProviderRequest mirrors every Bedrock Converse request into the
pending-request log tracker right after openAIToBedrockConverse() builds it,
including the decoded image.source.bytes Uint8Array. sanitizePayloadPII() and
redactPayload() in src/lib/logPayloads.ts both gate their recursive walk on
Array.isArray(), which is false for typed arrays, so each image fell into the
generic-object branch and got enumerated one JS key per decoded byte (twice,
once per function) before any truncation bound applied. For 3x ~1MB images
this took ~4s of synchronous, event-loop-blocking work, matching the
reporter's "1-2 images OK, 3+ fails" threshold and their --stack-size
observation (data-width pressure, not call-depth).
Add an opaque-binary short-circuit (ArrayBuffer.isView) ahead of the
Array.isArray branch in both functions, returning a fixed-size placeholder
instead of recursing. Apply the same guard to cloneBoundedForLog() in
open-sse/utils/requestLogger.ts for defense-in-depth (same blind spot, only
accidentally safe today via its own key-count slice).
Regression test reproduces the exact reporter shape (3x 1MB images) through
the real openAIToBedrockConverse() converter and protectPayloadForLog(),
asserting completion well under the previous ~4s and that binary bytes are
never expanded into per-byte object keys.
