# Incident Response Runbook — OmniRoute (2026-06-18)

**Status**: Authoritative. The 71-pillar audit (L61) references this doc
for the `Obs > 2.00` gate.
**Owner**: observability-circle (lead: security-circle lead).
**SLOs**: see `docs/PERF_BUDGETS.md` § 1 (top-level SLOs) and
`ops/slos.yaml` (machine-readable form, generated by the Bifrost team).
**Disclosure policy**: see `SECURITY.md` (vulnerability disclosure only,
separate flow).

This runbook is the operational playbook for **non-security** incidents:
outages, latency regressions, error-budget burn, and provider-side
failures. Vulnerability disclosure stays on `SECURITY.md`; do not route
those through this runbook.

---

## 1. Severity ladder

| Sev | Definition | Examples | Page on | Resolve by |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **SEV-1** | User-visible outage; > 50 % of requests failing or > 2x SLO breach for 5 min. | Cluster down; auth layer broken; 5xx flood. | On-call P0 (immediate) | 4 h |
| **SEV-2** | Significant degradation; 1.5–2x SLO breach for 15 min, or single-tenant impact. | Single provider down; p95 > 1.5x budget; rate-limit runaway. | On-call P1 (15 min) | 24 h |
| **SEV-3** | Latent bug or near-miss; no current user impact but error budget at risk. | Memory leak trending up; circuit breaker tripping on one provider. | Slack `#omniroute-ops` (next standup) | 7 d |
| **SEV-4** | Cosmetic / informational. | Log line noise; non-binding UI glitch. | Next weekly review | Next refactor cycle |

**Burn-rate escalation** (per `docs/PERF_BUDGETS.md` § 1): 6x for 5 min
is SEV-1; 2x for 1 h is SEV-2; sustained < 1x for 7 d demotes to SEV-3.

---

## 2. Detection sources

| Source | Signal | Routing |
|---|---|---|
| Prometheus (`/metrics`) | Counter deltas (5xx, latency) | Alertmanager → PagerDuty |
| Grafana SLO dashboards | SLO burn-rate panels | Slack `#omniroute-ops` |
| Uptime probe (`/api/health/ping`) | 3 consecutive failures from 3 regions | Alertmanager → PagerDuty |
| Dependabot | New CVE in dependency | GitHub issue + Slack `#security` |
| User report (support@) | Manual triage | Slack `#omniroute-triage` |
| Error budget burn alert | `slo_burn_rate > threshold` | Alertmanager |

Prometheus and Alertmanager are configured in the deploy repo (see
`docs/operations/DEPLOY.md` once published; currently inline in
`docker-compose.prod.yml`).

---

## 3. First-15-minutes checklist

When paged, the on-call engineer runs this checklist verbatim. **Do
not** skip steps; each is timed.

1. **0:00** — Acknowledge the page in PagerDuty. Stops the escalation
   timer and notifies the secondary.
2. **0:02** — Open the [SLO dashboard][dash] and the [incident
   channel][chan] (`#inc-YYYY-MM-DD-slug`). Post a single-line ack
   with the alert name and the time.
3. **0:05** — Classify severity per § 1. If SEV-1 or SEV-2, declare
   the incident in the channel and tag `@incident-commander`.
4. **0:08** — Capture the alert payload, the most recent deploy SHA,
   and the top 5 slow / erroring endpoints. Post to the channel.
5. **0:12** — Decide: **mitigate first, root-cause later**. Choose
   one of:
   - **Roll back** to the last green deploy (`bin/rollback.sh vX.Y.Z`).
   - **Failover** to the healthy replicas (Caddy LB removes the bad
     replica automatically; verify with `curl /api/health/ping`).
   - **Disable** the broken connection(s) via `PUT /api/providers/{connectionId}`
     with body `{ "isActive": false }` (per-connection toggle, safe by
     default; repeat per key/account — see § 4.1).
6. **0:15** — Post the chosen mitigation in the channel. If the page
   is still firing after 5 more minutes, escalate to the secondary.

[chan]: TBD — set to your team's incident-chat channel (e.g. a Discord/Slack `#inc-*` channel); not provisioned by this repo.
[dash]: TBD — set to your Grafana/observability dashboard URL; not provisioned by this repo.

---

## 4. Mitigation runbooks (per failure mode)

### 4.1 Provider outage (single provider down)

1. `PUT /api/providers/{connectionId}` with body `{ "isActive": false }` —
   deactivates that connection; combo routing and account selection skip it
   on the next request (`src/app/api/providers/[id]/route.ts`). There is no
   single whole-provider kill switch — if the provider has more than one
   key/account, repeat per connection, or let the automatic provider circuit
   breaker trip on its own (`src/shared/utils/circuitBreaker.ts`,
   `domain_circuit_breakers` table; see `docs/architecture/RESILIENCE_GUIDE.md`).
2. Verify p95 returns to budget within 5 min.
3. If all connections for a model are down, apply the same `isActive: false`
   toggle to every connection offering that model — there is no separate
   per-model disable endpoint. Combo routing's automatic Model Lockout
   (`open-sse/services/accountFallback.ts`; see
   `docs/architecture/RESILIENCE_GUIDE.md`) also skips a model that keeps
   erroring, without manual action.
4. Update the status page (if one is configured — see § 5) with a banner if
   the outage exceeds 15 min.

### 4.2 Cluster-wide latency regression

1. Check the most recent deploy (`/api/monitoring/health` returns `appVersion`).
2. If p95 doubled vs the 7-day baseline, **roll back** to the prior
   SHA via `bin/rollback.sh`.
3. If the regression is provider-side, see § 4.1.

### 4.3 Auth layer broken (5xx on /v1/responses for all keys)

1. Check the authz-inventory endpoint:
   `curl https://api.omniroute.dev/api/settings/authz-inventory | jq`.
   It returns a route-tier inventory (`tiers`, `bypassEnabled`,
   `bypassPrefixes`, `spawnCapablePrefixes`, `cors` — see
   `src/app/api/settings/authz-inventory/route.ts`); there is no
   `policies_active` field. A non-200 response, or a `tiers` array that
   fails to populate, means the settings/DB layer the auth pipeline reads
   from is down — not just a single bad key.
2. If the endpoint itself errors or returns malformed data, restore the
   settings store from the last good backup (`bin/restore-policies.sh <sha>`).
3. If the endpoint is healthy but requests still 5xx for every key, verify
   `JWT_SECRET` / `API_KEY_SECRET` are set and unchanged for this deploy,
   and that `isValidApiKey` (`src/sse/services/auth.ts`) can reach the DB.
4. Roll back if the cause is unclear.

### 4.4 Data-layer incident (sqlite corruption, audit log gap)

1. **Stop the cluster** (`docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml
   stop`) — preventing further writes is more important than uptime.
2. Snapshot the data volume (`bin/snapshot-data.sh`).
3. Open a SEV-1; this is data-loss territory. Page the data-team.
4. Restore from the last verified backup (see `docs/BACKUP.md` once
   published; currently the runbook is `bin/restore-data.sh <sha>`).

### 4.5 Security incident (vulnerability disclosure)

**Stop.** This is the `SECURITY.md` path, not this runbook. Page the
security on-call (`@security-team`); do not post details to
`#omniroute-ops`.

---

## 5. Communication

| Audience | Channel | Cadence | Owner |
|---|---|---|---|
| Engineering | `#inc-YYYY-MM-DD-slug` | Real-time | Incident commander |
| Status page | TBD — not provisioned by this repo | Every 30 min during SEV-1/2 | On-call |
| Customers (email) | TBD — set your announcement list/address | At SEV-1 start + resolution | Comms lead |
| Upstream providers | Direct contact | At SEV-1 start | Vendor mgmt |
| Postmortem | `docs/postmortem/YYYY-MM-DD-slug.md` | Within 5 business days | Incident commander |

Postmortem template is at `docs/postmortem/TEMPLATE.md` (forthcoming; no
dedicated ADR covers it yet — once written, register it in
`docs/architecture/cluster-decisions.md` following this repo's 71-pillar/ADR
numbering convention, e.g. ADR-041 there).

---

## 6. On-call rotation

| Role | Primary | Secondary | Rotation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Engineering on-call | security-circle lead | @open-sse | Weekly, Mon 09:00 PDT |
| Security on-call | @security-team | — | Weekly |
| Data on-call | @db-team | — | Weekly |
| Comms lead | @comms | — | As needed |

**Handoff**: every Monday 09:00 PDT, the outgoing on-call posts a
written handoff to the incoming in `#omniroute-ops-handoff` covering:
open SEV-3/4 items, scheduled maintenance windows, and any
in-flight mitigations.

---

## 7. Postmortem expectations

- **Blameless**. People did the best they could with the information
  they had. Focus on systems, signals, and decision points.
- **Within 5 business days** of resolution. File via
  `gh issue create --label postmortem --label SEV-1` (or `--label SEV-2`).
- **Action items** must be assigned, dated, and tracked in
  `docs/TECH_DEBT.md` (P0 < 30 d, P1 < 90 d per that doc's SLA).
- **Mandatory attendees**: incident commander, on-call, any engineer
  who touched the mitigation, and one person who was *not* involved
  (fresh-eyes review).

---

## 8. Review log

| Date | Reviewer | Change |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-18 | security-circle lead | Initial runbook; severity ladder + 15-min checklist + 4.1–4.5 mitigation runbooks. Closes 71-pillar audit L61 (1/3 → 2/3). |
| 2026-07-18 | observability-circle | Corrected § 4.1/4.3 to the real provider-disable (`PUT /api/providers/{connectionId}`) and authz-inventory (`tiers`/`bypassEnabled`/`cors`, no `policies_active`) mechanisms; removed foreign branding and the nonexistent ADR-024/029 references. |
| 2026-07-18 (planned) | observability-circle | Wire on-call rotation into PagerDuty schedule; add the postmortem template. |