/** * #7274: session affinity ("sticky session") was hardcoded to work for the * `codex` provider only — `resolveSessionAffinityTtlMs()` bailed to 0 for * every other provider even though the underlying pin mechanism * (`selectSessionAffinityConnection`) and header extraction * (`extractSessionAffinityKey`) were already provider-agnostic. This test * proves: * * 1. A non-Codex provider with the (renamed, generic) TTL set > 0 now * persists and reuses a pin across two `getProviderCredentials` calls for * the same session key — this must FAIL before the fix (provider !== * "codex" early-return) and PASS after. * 2. Existing operators who only ever configured the old * `codexSessionAffinityTtlMs` key keep working unmodified — proven both at * the settings-resolution layer (`resolveSessionAffinityTtlMs` falls back * to the legacy key) and at the raw-SQL layer (migration * 124_generic_session_affinity_ttl.sql copies the old key's persisted * value into the new key, additively and idempotently). * 3. None of the three session-affinity headers (`x-codex-session-id`, * `x-session-id`, `x-omniroute-session`) are forwarded upstream by * providers that use custom executors with no client-header passthrough. * `x-codex-session-id` and `x-omniroute-session` are never forwarded by * ANY executor (grep-verified, asserted here for the generic DefaultExecutor * path). `x-session-id` is a known, pre-existing exception: DefaultExecutor * (used by most providers without a bespoke executor) forwards it upstream * as an agent-metadata tracking header per 9router#2413 — this predates * #7274, is unrelated to the TTL generalization, and is asserted here as a * documented characterization (not silently claimed safe) rather than * changed, since fixing it is a separate, wider-blast-radius decision * outside this issue's declared scope. */ import test from "node:test"; import assert from "node:assert/strict"; import fs from "node:fs"; import os from "node:os"; import path from "node:path"; import Database from "better-sqlite3"; // NOTE: every module that transitively touches src/lib/db/core.ts (which // resolves DATA_DIR at MODULE-LOAD time, not lazily) must be imported // dynamically AFTER process.env.DATA_DIR is set below — a static top-level // `import` is hoisted and would run before the override, resolving against // the real ~/.omniroute data dir instead of this test's isolated tmp dir. const TEST_DATA_DIR = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "omniroute-session-affinity-7274-")); process.env.DATA_DIR = TEST_DATA_DIR; process.env.API_KEY_SECRET = process.env.API_KEY_SECRET || "session-affinity-7274-test-secret"; const core = await import("../../src/lib/db/core.ts"); const providersDb = await import("../../src/lib/db/providers.ts"); const settingsDb = await import("../../src/lib/db/settings.ts"); const apiKeysDb = await import("../../src/lib/db/apiKeys.ts"); const affinityDb = await import("../../src/lib/db/sessionAccountAffinity.ts"); const auth = await import("../../src/sse/services/auth.ts"); const { resolveSessionAffinityTtlMs } = await import("../../src/sse/services/sessionAffinityPin.ts"); const { DefaultExecutor } = await import("../../open-sse/executors/default.ts"); async function resetStorage() { core.resetDbInstance(); apiKeysDb.resetApiKeyState(); fs.rmSync(TEST_DATA_DIR, { recursive: true, force: true }); fs.mkdirSync(TEST_DATA_DIR, { recursive: true }); } async function seedConnection(provider: string, overrides: Record = {}) { return providersDb.createProviderConnection({ provider, authType: (overrides.authType as string) || "api_key", name: (overrides.name as string) || `${provider}-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2, 8)}`, accessToken: (overrides.accessToken as string) || `at-${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2, 10)}`, isActive: (overrides.isActive as boolean) ?? true, testStatus: (overrides.testStatus as string) || "active", providerSpecificData: (overrides.providerSpecificData as Record) || {}, }); } test.beforeEach(async () => { await resetStorage(); }); test.after(async () => { core.resetDbInstance(); apiKeysDb.resetApiKeyState(); fs.rmSync(TEST_DATA_DIR, { recursive: true, force: true }); }); // ── 1. generic (non-Codex) provider now honors the TTL ────────────────────── test("#7274 a non-Codex provider with sessionAffinityTtlMs > 0 persists and reuses a pin", async () => { await settingsDb.updateSettings({ sessionAffinityTtlMs: 60_000 }); const connectionA = await seedConnection("glm", { name: "glm-affinity-a" }); const connectionB = await seedConnection("glm", { name: "glm-affinity-b" }); const request1 = await auth.getProviderCredentials("glm", null, null, "glm-4.6", { sessionKey: "session-generic", forcedConnectionId: connectionA.id, }); assert.equal(request1?.connectionId, connectionA.id, "first request pins to the forced connection"); assert.equal( affinityDb.getSessionAccountAffinity("session-generic", "glm", 60_000)?.connectionId, connectionA.id, "an affinity pin must now be created for a non-Codex provider (previously impossible)" ); // Same session, a different forcedConnectionId (as combo re-scoring would // produce) — the existing pin must win, exactly like the Codex-only #5903 // behavior, but now for a generic provider. const request2 = await auth.getProviderCredentials("glm", null, null, "glm-4.6", { sessionKey: "session-generic", forcedConnectionId: connectionB.id, }); assert.equal( request2?.connectionId, connectionA.id, "second request must reuse the pinned connection A, not the freshly forced B" ); }); test("#7274 a non-Codex provider stays unpinned when sessionAffinityTtlMs is 0 (disabled by default)", async () => { await settingsDb.updateSettings({ sessionAffinityTtlMs: 0 }); const connectionA = await seedConnection("anthropic", { name: "anthropic-no-affinity-a" }); const connectionB = await seedConnection("anthropic", { name: "anthropic-no-affinity-b" }); const request1 = await auth.getProviderCredentials("anthropic", null, null, "claude-opus-4-8", { sessionKey: "session-disabled", forcedConnectionId: connectionA.id, }); assert.equal(request1?.connectionId, connectionA.id); const request2 = await auth.getProviderCredentials("anthropic", null, null, "claude-opus-4-8", { sessionKey: "session-disabled", forcedConnectionId: connectionB.id, }); assert.equal( request2?.connectionId, connectionB.id, "with the TTL at 0, every request must honor the fresh forcedConnectionId" ); }); // ── 2a. settings-resolution layer: legacy key fallback ────────────────────── test("#7274 resolveSessionAffinityTtlMs falls back to the legacy codexSessionAffinityTtlMs key", () => { const ttl = resolveSessionAffinityTtlMs( "codex", {}, { codexSessionAffinityTtlMs: 60_000 } // pre-migration shape: no generic key present ); assert.equal(ttl, 60_000, "an operator who only ever set the old key must keep their TTL"); }); test("#7274 resolveSessionAffinityTtlMs prefers the new generic key over the legacy one", () => { const ttl = resolveSessionAffinityTtlMs( "codex", {}, { sessionAffinityTtlMs: 90_000, codexSessionAffinityTtlMs: 60_000 } ); assert.equal(ttl, 90_000, "the generic key must win once it has been persisted"); }); test("#7274 resolveSessionAffinityTtlMs now applies to any provider, not just codex", () => { const ttl = resolveSessionAffinityTtlMs("openai", {}, { sessionAffinityTtlMs: 45_000 }); assert.equal(ttl, 45_000, "the provider !== \"codex\" early-return must be gone"); }); // ── 2b. raw-SQL migration: additive, idempotent carry-over ────────────────── test("#7274 migration 124 carries codexSessionAffinityTtlMs over to sessionAffinityTtlMs, additively and idempotently", () => { const migrationSql = fs.readFileSync( path.join(process.cwd(), "src/lib/db/migrations/124_generic_session_affinity_ttl.sql"), "utf8" ); const db = new Database(":memory:"); try { db.exec( `CREATE TABLE key_value ( namespace TEXT NOT NULL, key TEXT NOT NULL, value TEXT, PRIMARY KEY (namespace, key) );` ); db.prepare( "INSERT INTO key_value (namespace, key, value) VALUES ('settings', 'codexSessionAffinityTtlMs', '60000')" ).run(); db.exec(migrationSql); const row = db .prepare("SELECT value FROM key_value WHERE namespace = 'settings' AND key = 'sessionAffinityTtlMs'") .get() as { value: string } | undefined; assert.equal(row?.value, "60000", "the generic key must carry the old value over"); const oldRow = db .prepare( "SELECT value FROM key_value WHERE namespace = 'settings' AND key = 'codexSessionAffinityTtlMs'" ) .get() as { value: string } | undefined; assert.equal(oldRow?.value, "60000", "the migration is additive — the old key/row is not deleted"); // Idempotency: re-running the migration (as the runner would on a replay) // must not throw and must not change the already-carried-over value. assert.doesNotThrow(() => db.exec(migrationSql)); const rowAfterReplay = db .prepare("SELECT value FROM key_value WHERE namespace = 'settings' AND key = 'sessionAffinityTtlMs'") .get() as { value: string } | undefined; assert.equal(rowAfterReplay?.value, "60000"); } finally { db.close(); } }); test("#7274 migration 124 is a no-op when the operator never configured the legacy key (fresh install)", () => { const migrationSql = fs.readFileSync( path.join(process.cwd(), "src/lib/db/migrations/124_generic_session_affinity_ttl.sql"), "utf8" ); const db = new Database(":memory:"); try { db.exec( `CREATE TABLE key_value ( namespace TEXT NOT NULL, key TEXT NOT NULL, value TEXT, PRIMARY KEY (namespace, key) );` ); assert.doesNotThrow(() => db.exec(migrationSql)); const row = db .prepare("SELECT value FROM key_value WHERE namespace = 'settings' AND key = 'sessionAffinityTtlMs'") .get(); assert.equal(row, undefined, "no row should be created when there was nothing to carry over"); } finally { db.close(); } }); // ── 3. header-leak guard (data-leak-adjacent — Rule from the plan's Risks) ── test("#7274 x-codex-session-id and x-omniroute-session are never forwarded upstream by DefaultExecutor", () => { const executor = new DefaultExecutor("glm"); const headers = executor.buildHeaders({ accessToken: "test-key" }, true, { "x-codex-session-id": "internal-correlation-id-should-not-leak", "x-omniroute-session": "another-internal-correlation-id", }) as Record; const lowerKeys = Object.keys(headers).map((k) => k.toLowerCase()); assert.ok( !lowerKeys.includes("x-codex-session-id"), "x-codex-session-id must never reach the upstream request" ); assert.ok( !lowerKeys.includes("x-omniroute-session"), "x-omniroute-session must never reach the upstream request" ); }); test("#7274 CHARACTERIZATION: x-session-id IS forwarded upstream by DefaultExecutor (pre-existing 9router#2413 behavior, out of this issue's scope)", () => { const executor = new DefaultExecutor("glm"); const headers = executor.buildHeaders({ accessToken: "test-key" }, true, { "x-session-id": "internal-correlation-id", }) as Record; // This is documented, intentional agent-tracking-metadata forwarding // (open-sse/utils/opencodeHeaders.ts::AGENT_METADATA_HEADER_KEYS, 9router#2413) // that predates #7274 and is unrelated to the session-affinity TTL fix. It // is captured here as a verified characterization — not silently assumed // safe — per the plan's Risks section. Changing this forwarding behavior is // a separate, wider-blast-radius decision (it affects every provider on // DefaultExecutor) tracked as a follow-up, not fixed in this PR. assert.equal( headers["x-session-id"], "internal-correlation-id", "documents current behavior: x-session-id is forwarded, unlike the other two session headers" ); });