import test from "node:test"; import assert from "node:assert/strict"; import { sanitizeErrorMessage, sanitizeUpstreamDetails, } from "../../open-sse/utils/errorSanitization.ts"; test("sanitizeErrorMessage removes bearer credentials and image data URLs", () => { const raw = "upstream echoed Authorization: Bearer eyJ.secret.token and data:image/png;charset=utf-8;base64,iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAE="; const safe = sanitizeErrorMessage(raw); assert.doesNotMatch(safe, /eyJ\.secret\.token/); assert.doesNotMatch(safe, /iVBORw0KGgo/); assert.match(safe, /\[REDACTED\]/); // Authorization labels are fail-closed: once a credential label is seen, // the sanitizer may discard the remaining untrusted tail instead of // preserving a marker for each later secret. assert.equal(safe, "upstream echoed Authorization: [REDACTED]"); }); test("sanitizeErrorMessage redacts common JSON credential fields", () => { const safe = sanitizeErrorMessage( '{"api_key":"sk-sensitive","access_token":"oauth-sensitive","cookie":"session=sensitive; secondary=also-sensitive","authorization":"Basic dXNlcjpwYXNz"}' ); assert.doesNotMatch( safe, /sk-sensitive|oauth-sensitive|session=sensitive|also-sensitive|dXNlcjpwYXNz/ ); assert.match(safe, /\[REDACTED\]/); }); test("sanitizeErrorMessage redacts URL credentials while preserving safe URLs", () => { const safeUrl = "https://example.com/docs/error?lang=en#recovery"; const projected = sanitizeErrorMessage( "proxy failed https://svc-user:p4ss-opaque-9382@internal.example/v1 " + "then https://storage.example/blob?X-Amz-Credential=AKIAOPAQUE%2Fscope&" + "X-Amz-Signature=signature-secret&X-Amz-Expires=60 " + "and https://account.blob.core.windows.net/c?sv=2025-01-05&sig=sas-secret&se=soon " + "then https://vertex.example/predict?key=vertex-key-secret&mode=express " + "plus https://gateway.example/v1?api_key=query-api-secret&token=query-token-secret " + `see ${safeUrl}` ); assert.doesNotMatch( projected, /svc-user|p4ss-opaque|AKIAOPAQUE|signature-secret|sas-secret|vertex-key-secret|query-api-secret|query-token-secret/i ); assert.match(projected, /\[REDACTED\]/); assert.match(projected, /X-Amz-Expires=60/); assert.match(projected, /sv=2025-01-05/); assert.match(projected, /se=soon/); assert.match(projected, new RegExp(safeUrl.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, "\\$&"))); }); test("sanitizeErrorMessage redacts credentials hidden behind serialized whitespace", () => { const inputs = [ String.raw`api_key\t=opaque-tab-secret-9382746`, String.raw`api_key\u0009=opaque-unicode-tab-9382746`, String.raw`Bearer\topaque-bearer-secret-9382746`, String.raw`api_key\\t=opaque-double-tab-secret-9382746`, ]; for (const input of inputs) { const projected = sanitizeErrorMessage(input); assert.doesNotMatch(projected, /opaque-(?:tab|unicode-tab|bearer|double-tab)-secret/i); assert.match(projected, /\[REDACTED\]/); } }); test("sanitizeErrorMessage redacts CLI credential flag values", () => { const inputs = [ "spawn failed: helper --api-key opaque-cli-key-9382746 --mode check", 'spawn failed: helper --token "opaque cli token 9382746" --mode check', "spawn failed: helper --password 'opaque-cli-password-9382746' --mode check", ]; for (const input of inputs) { const projected = sanitizeErrorMessage(input); assert.doesNotMatch(projected, /opaque(?: cli|-cli)/i); assert.match(projected, /\[REDACTED\]/); } }); test("sanitizeErrorMessage covers the canonical credential pattern catalog", () => { const credentials = [ `AIza${"A".repeat(35)}`, `hf_${"A".repeat(34)}`, `r8_${"A".repeat(37)}`, `gho_${"A".repeat(36)}`, `ghu_${"A".repeat(36)}`, `ghs_${"A".repeat(36)}`, `ghr_${"A".repeat(36)}`, `lin_api_${"A".repeat(40)}`, `secret_${"A".repeat(43)}`, `npm_${"A".repeat(36)}`, `PMAK-1234abcd-${"a".repeat(32)}`, `rk_live_${"A".repeat(24)}`, `sq0atp-${"A".repeat(22)}`, `SK${"a".repeat(32)}`, `SG.${"A".repeat(22)}.${"B".repeat(43)}`, `key-${"a".repeat(32)}`, `M${"A".repeat(23)}.${"B".repeat(6)}.${"C".repeat(27)}`, "postgresql://db-user:db-password@db.internal.example/app", ]; for (const credential of credentials) { const projected = sanitizeErrorMessage(`upstream echoed ${credential}`); assert.equal(projected.includes(credential), false, credential.slice(0, 16)); assert.match(projected, /\[REDACTED(?::[^\]]+)?\]/); } }); test("sanitizeErrorMessage redacts credentials that cross the public length boundary", () => { const credential = `hf_${"A".repeat(34)}`; const projected = sanitizeErrorMessage(`${"x".repeat(4088)}${credential}`); const escapedPrefixProjected = sanitizeErrorMessage( `${String.raw`\t`}${"x".repeat(4088)}${credential}` ); for (const output of [projected, escapedPrefixProjected]) { assert.equal(output.includes("hf_"), false); assert.equal(output.includes(credential), false); assert.match(output, /\[REDACTED(?::[^\]]+)?\]$/); assert.ok(output.length <= 4096); } }); test("sanitizeErrorMessage redacts closed and unterminated PGP private-key armor", () => { const closed = sanitizeErrorMessage( "provider returned -----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----\n" + "Version: test\n\npgp-private-material\n" + "-----END PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK----- after" ); const unterminated = sanitizeErrorMessage( "provider returned -----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----\npgp-unterminated-material" ); // Public exception messages fail closed at the first physical line; the // post-block suffix is intentionally not recovered from a multiline secret. assert.equal(closed, "provider returned [REDACTED]"); assert.equal(unterminated, "provider returned [REDACTED]"); assert.doesNotMatch( `${closed} ${unterminated}`, /pgp-private-material|pgp-unterminated-material/ ); }); test("sanitizeUpstreamDetails drops credential headers and redacts data URLs", () => { const safe = sanitizeUpstreamDetails({ authorization: "Bearer sensitive", cookie: "session=sensitive; refresh=also-sensitive", "set-cookie": "session=sensitive", error: "failed for ", }) as Record; assert.equal("authorization" in safe, false); assert.equal("cookie" in safe, false); assert.equal("set-cookie" in safe, false); assert.equal(safe.error, "failed for [REDACTED_DATA_URL]"); });