/**
 * Pure combo predicates + tuning constants extracted from combo.ts.
 *
 * Side-effect-free helpers and the combo-loop tuning constants moved out of the
 * combo.ts god-file (Quality Gate v2 / Fase 9). Logic unchanged; the public
 * predicates are re-exported from combo.ts for backward compatibility.
 */

import { EXECUTOR_CONTRACT_VIOLATION_CODE } from "../../config/constants.ts";
import { errorResponse } from "../../utils/error.ts";
import { parseModel } from "../model.ts";
import { isSelfInflictedUpstreamTimeout } from "../../handlers/chatCore/cooldownClassification.ts";
import { isLocalStreamLifecycleError } from "@/shared/utils/circuitBreaker";
import { CONTEXT_OVERFLOW_PATTERNS, MODEL_ACCESS_DENIED_PATTERNS } from "../accountFallback.ts";
import { isResourceNotFoundResponse } from "../errorClassifier.ts";
import { getTrustedLocalRateLimitResponse } from "../rateLimitManager/errors.ts";
import type { ResolvedComboTarget } from "./types.ts";

// Status codes that should mark round-robin target semaphores as cooling down.
export const TRANSIENT_FOR_SEMAPHORE = [429, 502, 503, 504];
// G1 (silent-stop fix): hard ceiling for the combo target loop when the operator
// left comboTimeoutMs at 0 ("unlimited"). Without this, a hung upstream (per-model
// timeout disabled) would freeze the request forever with no response. 10 minutes
// is a generous bound for legitimate long-running fallback cascades.
export const COMBO_LOOP_SAFETY_TIMEOUT_MS = 10 * 60 * 1000;
// G1: after the safety timer fires, wait this long for in-flight targets to land
// their per-model errors into comboErrors (so the 504 carries the same "tried:"
// summary as the regular timeout path) before returning the safety response.
export const COMBO_SAFETY_DRAIN_MS = 2000;
// Patterns that signal all accounts for a provider are rate-limited / exhausted.
// Used to detect 503 responses from handleNoCredentials so combo can fallback.
export const ALL_ACCOUNTS_RATE_LIMITED_PATTERNS = [
  /unavailable/i,
  /service temporarily unavailable/i,
];

export function isAllAccountsRateLimitedResponse(
  status: number,
  contentType: string | null,
  errorText: string
): boolean {
  if (status !== 503) return false;
  if (!contentType?.includes("application/json")) return false;
  return ALL_ACCOUNTS_RATE_LIMITED_PATTERNS.some((p) => p.test(errorText));
}

// #1731v2 guard: a provider circuit-breaker-open response (503 + `X-OmniRoute-Provider-Breaker`
// header / `provider_circuit_open` error code, see providerCircuitOpenResponse) is an OmniRoute
// resilience signal, NOT a per-connection upstream failure. It must keep being treated as an
// ordinary target failure (try the next target, including same-provider ones) — so it must NOT
// poison exhaustedConnections/exhaustedProviders, otherwise remaining same-provider targets get
// wrongly skipped while the breaker is open.
export function isProviderCircuitOpenResult(
  result: { headers?: Headers | null; status?: number },
  errorText: string
): boolean {
  const breakerHeader = result.headers?.get?.("x-omniroute-provider-breaker");
  if (typeof breakerHeader === "string" && breakerHeader.toLowerCase() === "open") return true;
  return /provider_circuit_open/i.test(errorText);
}

/**
 * Skip reason for a combo target already known-exhausted THIS request, or null if it is not.
 *
 * De-duplicates the byte-identical #1731 / #1731v2 pre-dispatch skip checks that BOTH combo
 * dispatchers run per target (handleComboChat's speculative loop and handleRoundRobinCombo's
 * rotation): a target whose `provider:connectionId` pair already had a connection-level error
 * (`exhaustedConnections`), or whose provider already signaled full quota exhaustion
 * (`exhaustedProviders`), is skipped for the rest of the request. Returns the log message the
 * caller emits with its OWN tag ("COMBO" / "COMBO-RR"); each caller keeps its own control flow
 * (return null vs continue) and its own fallbackCount bookkeeping.
 */
export function getExhaustedTargetSkipReason(
  target: ResolvedComboTarget,
  exhaustedProviders: ReadonlySet<string>,
  exhaustedConnections: ReadonlySet<string>
): string | null {
  const { provider, modelStr, connectionId } = target;
  // #1731v2: skip targets whose provider:connection pair had a connection-level error.
  if (provider && connectionId) {
    if (exhaustedConnections.has(`${provider}:${connectionId}`)) {
      return `Skipping ${modelStr} — connection ${connectionId} for provider ${provider} had connection error (#1731v2)`;
    }
  }
  // #1731: skip targets from a provider that already signaled full quota exhaustion this request.
  if (provider && exhaustedProviders.has(provider)) {
    return `Skipping ${modelStr} — provider ${provider} marked exhausted this request (#1731)`;
  }
  return null;
}

export const MAX_COMBO_DEPTH = 3;
// Absolute safety ceiling for operator-configured nesting depth. config.maxComboDepth
// can raise the default (3) up to this cap, or lower it, but never above — runaway
// nested-combo expansion is a real DoS/perf risk.
export const MAX_COMBO_DEPTH_HARD_CAP = 10;
export const MAX_FALLBACK_WAIT_MS = 5000;
export const MAX_GLOBAL_ATTEMPTS = 30;
// Absolute safety ceiling for the operator-configured shared attempt budget
// (#11134). config.maxGlobalAttempts can raise the default (30) or lower it,
// but never above this cap — an unbounded attempt budget is the same runaway
// background-request DoS risk that motivated MAX_COMBO_DEPTH_HARD_CAP.
export const MAX_GLOBAL_ATTEMPTS_HARD_CAP = 200;

/**
 * Clamp an operator-configured combo nesting depth (config.maxComboDepth) to a
 * safe integer in [1, MAX_COMBO_DEPTH_HARD_CAP]. Anything non-numeric, < 1, or
 * NaN falls back to the default MAX_COMBO_DEPTH so a bad config never disables
 * nesting or blows past the safety ceiling.
 */
export function clampComboDepth(value: unknown): number {
  const n = Math.floor(Number(value));
  if (!Number.isFinite(n) || n < 1) return MAX_COMBO_DEPTH;
  return Math.min(n, MAX_COMBO_DEPTH_HARD_CAP);
}

/**
 * Clamp an operator-configured shared per-request attempt budget
 * (config.maxGlobalAttempts) to a safe integer in
 * [1, MAX_GLOBAL_ATTEMPTS_HARD_CAP] (#11134). Mirrors clampComboDepth: anything
 * non-numeric, < 1, NaN or Infinity falls back to the default
 * MAX_GLOBAL_ATTEMPTS so a bad config can never disable the budget (runaway
 * retries against a dead pool) nor blow past the safety ceiling.
 */
export function clampGlobalAttempts(value: unknown): number {
  const n = Math.floor(Number(value));
  if (!Number.isFinite(n) || n < 1) return MAX_GLOBAL_ATTEMPTS;
  return Math.min(n, MAX_GLOBAL_ATTEMPTS_HARD_CAP);
}

/** Minimum recorded requests before the predictive-TTFT breaker trusts the average. */
export const PREDICTIVE_TTFT_MIN_SAMPLES = 5;

/**
 * Predictive-TTFT circuit-breaker decision: skip a target whose recent average
 * latency — measured over a statistically meaningful sample — exceeds the
 * configured ceiling, so the combo fails over before paying a slow first byte.
 * Returns false when disabled (ceiling <= 0), when there is no metric, or when
 * the sample is too small to trust.
 */
export function shouldSkipForPredictedTtft(
  metric: { requests?: number; avgLatencyMs?: number } | null | undefined,
  predictiveTtftMs: number
): boolean {
  if (!metric || !(predictiveTtftMs > 0)) return false;
  return (
    (metric.requests ?? 0) >= PREDICTIVE_TTFT_MIN_SAMPLES &&
    (metric.avgLatencyMs ?? 0) > predictiveTtftMs
  );
}

/**
 * Whole-provider circuit-breaker failure statuses for the combo path. Kept byte-identical
 * to the single-model path's `PROVIDER_BREAKER_FAILURE_STATUSES` (src/sse/handlers/chat.ts:206)
 * — the source of truth. 429 is deliberately EXCLUDED: a plain rate-limit must not open the
 * whole-provider breaker (it's connection-cooldown / model-lockout scope). Defined locally
 * rather than imported to avoid a cross-layer (open-sse → src/sse) import cycle.
 */
const PROVIDER_BREAKER_FAILURE_STATUSES = new Set([408, 500, 502, 503, 504]);

/**
 * Decide whether a failed combo target should record a whole-provider circuit-breaker
 * failure (#1731 / #2743 gap-d). This is the consumer side of `skipProviderBreaker`:
 *
 * - Stream-readiness failures (pre-flight zombie/ping probes) never count as provider
 *   failures — they are a connection-readiness signal, not an upstream outage. EXCEPT a
 *   STREAM_EARLY_EOF (`isStreamEarlyEof`): there the upstream returned HTTP 200, opened the
 *   SSE stream and then hung up without a single non-ping event, which is a genuine upstream
 *   failure. Excluding it made a provider-wide outage invisible to the breaker — see the
 *   STREAM_EARLY_EOF section of RESILIENCE_GUIDE.md.
 * - Only whole-provider failure statuses (408/500/502/503/504) count. A plain rate-limit
 *   429 is deliberately EXCLUDED — it belongs to connection cooldown / model lockout scope
 *   (a genuine quota/token-limit 429 is handled there), NOT the whole-provider breaker. This
 *   mirrors the single-model path's `PROVIDER_BREAKER_FAILURE_STATUSES` (src/sse/handlers/
 *   chat.ts:206) — the source of truth — and the documented RESILIENCE_GUIDE policy. NOTE:
 *   this intentionally differs from `isProviderFailureCode` (accountFallback.ts), which
 *   INCLUDES 429 for connection-cooldown purposes and must not be changed here.
 * - When the next combo target is on the SAME provider, don't trip the provider breaker:
 *   a different model on that provider may still succeed. #8376: EXCEPT when the failure
 *   itself is a transport-level "proxy unreachable" event (`isProxyUnreachable`) — a dead
 *   upstream proxy poisons every account on that provider identically, so a different
 *   model on the same provider will fail the exact same way. Without this override a
 *   homogeneous same-provider combo pool never trips the breaker and instead burns every
 *   attempt against the same dead proxy until it hits the 503 max-retry limit.
 * - G-02 / #2743: when the fallback result carries `skipProviderBreaker` (an embedded
 *   service supervisor outage signalled via `X-Omni-Fallback-Hint: connection_cooldown`)
 *   apply connection cooldown ONLY — never trip the whole-provider breaker.
 *
 * #7907/#7908: also skip the breaker trip when the failure is a local stream lifecycle
 * event (client-side abort — `request_signal_aborted`, "Client disconnected: ...", or an
 * AbortError with no upstream status, which defaults to 502). Otherwise a client abort mid
 * combo-target-loop still trips the whole-provider breaker exactly like a genuine upstream
 * failure would, undermining the same #4602 policy `shouldSkipConnDisable()` already applies
 * to connection-level cooldown.
 *
 * Pure predicate so the breaker decision is unit-testable without the full combo harness.
 */
export function shouldRecordProviderBreakerFailure(args: {
  isStreamReadinessFailure: boolean;
  /** True when the failure is specifically a STREAM_EARLY_EOF (upstream hung up after
   * HTTP 200). Overrides the `isStreamReadinessFailure` exemption only; every other
   * AND-term below still gates the trip. */
  isStreamEarlyEof?: boolean;
  status: number;
  sameProviderNext: boolean;
  skipProviderBreaker?: boolean;
  requestScopedFailure?: boolean;
  error?: unknown;
  /** #8376: transport-level "proxy unreachable" signal — overrides the `sameProviderNext`
   * exemption only; every other AND-term still gates the trip. */
  isProxyUnreachable?: boolean;
}): boolean {
  return (
    (!args.isStreamReadinessFailure || args.isStreamEarlyEof === true) &&
    PROVIDER_BREAKER_FAILURE_STATUSES.has(args.status) &&
    (!args.sameProviderNext || args.isProxyUnreachable === true) &&
    !args.skipProviderBreaker &&
    !args.requestScopedFailure &&
    !isLocalStreamLifecycleError(args.error)
  );
}

const REQUEST_SCOPED_UPSTREAM_ERROR_CODES: Record<string, true> = {
  context_length_exceeded: true,
  upstream_empty_response: true,
  upstream_response_failed: true,
  // Local combo per-target timer (targetTimeoutRunner) — not a connection health signal.
  combo_target_timeout: true,
  // Local limiter queue-capacity codes — not a provider/connection health signal.
  rate_limit_queue_timeout: true,
  rate_limit_queue_full: true,
  rate_limit_queue_wedged: true,
  // #10360: our own executor-result contract violation. An internal defect, not
  // a provider/account fault — it must never cool a connection or trip a breaker.
  [EXECUTOR_CONTRACT_VIOLATION_CODE]: true,
};

/** Request/model-specific failures must not poison provider-wide resilience state. */
export function isRequestScopedUpstreamFailure(error?: {
  code?: string | null;
  type?: string | null;
}): boolean {
  const code = typeof error?.code === "string" ? error.code.toLowerCase() : "";
  const type = typeof error?.type === "string" ? error.type.toLowerCase() : "";
  return (
    REQUEST_SCOPED_UPSTREAM_ERROR_CODES[code] === true ||
    type === "context_length_exceeded" ||
    type === "local_queue_capacity"
  );
}

/** Request-scoped classification that also has access to the HTTP body. */
export function isComboRequestScopedFailure(
  response: Response,
  errorText: string,
  error?: { code?: string | null; type?: string | null }
): boolean {
  return (
    getTrustedLocalRateLimitResponse(response) !== null ||
    isRequestScopedUpstreamFailure(error) ||
    (response.status === 404 && isResourceNotFoundResponse(errorText))
  );
}

const INPUT_BOUND_ERROR_CODES = new Set(["context_length_exceeded", "context_window_exceeded"]);

/**
 * #8375: Whether an upstream error is input-bound — i.e. determined solely by the
 * request content, not by the provider/account state. A context_length_exceeded
 * for a 159K-token input will fail on every account of that same model, so the
 * combo loop should propagate the error immediately instead of retrying.
 */
export function isInputBoundRequestFailure(error?: {
  code?: string | null;
  type?: string | null;
}): boolean {
  const code = typeof error?.code === "string" ? error.code.toLowerCase() : "";
  const type = typeof error?.type === "string" ? error.type.toLowerCase() : "";
  return INPUT_BOUND_ERROR_CODES.has(code) || type === "context_length_exceeded";
}

/**
 * #7177: whether handleSingleModelChat should skip the connection-level cooldown
 * (markAccountUnavailable) for a failed attempt — client disconnects, a 401 when the
 * connection has extra keys to rotate through, a known request-scoped upstream failure
 * (e.g. context overflow — not a connection health signal), a plugin refusing the
 * request (our own policy, not a provider fault — see below), or our own
 * self-inflicted timeout all mean the connection itself is healthy and should not be
 * cooled down.
 *
 * A plugin block (`plugin_block`) is our own policy decision, not the provider
 * rejecting us. Banning the account here would let a working security plugin destroy
 * the connection it protects — one block would ban the provider for every later
 * request, valid ones included — and would trigger a pointless retry loop across other
 * accounts the plugin would refuse identically.
 */
export function shouldSkipConnDisable(
  result: {
    status: number;
    response?: Response;
    errorCode?: string | null;
    errorType?: string | null;
    error?: unknown;
  },
  is401: boolean,
  hasExtraKeys: boolean,
  provider: string
): boolean {
  return (
    result.status === 499 ||
    result.errorCode === "client_disconnected" ||
    result.errorType === "client_disconnected" ||
    // Client abort surfaced as a bare error (no statusCode → defaults to 502):
    // a local lifecycle event, not a provider failure (#4602 policy).
    isLocalStreamLifecycleError(result.error) ||
    (result.response ? getTrustedLocalRateLimitResponse(result.response) !== null : false) ||
    result.errorCode === "plugin_block" ||
    result.errorType === "plugin_block" ||
    (is401 && hasExtraKeys) ||
    isRequestScopedUpstreamFailure({ code: result.errorCode, type: result.errorType }) ||
    isSelfInflictedUpstreamTimeout(result.status, result.errorType, provider)
  );
}

export function resolveDelayMs(value: unknown, fallback: number): number {
  const numericValue = Number(value);
  if (!Number.isFinite(numericValue) || numericValue < 0) return fallback;
  return numericValue;
}

/**
 * Resolve the effective semaphore `maxConcurrency` for a round-robin combo
 * target from its connection's per-account concurrency cap.
 *
 * `cap` is the connection's `maxConcurrent` (provider_connections.max_concurrent).
 * A positive cap is honored (floored to a whole slot count); null / undefined /
 * <= 0 / non-finite all mean "no per-connection limit" and fall back to the
 * combo-level concurrency. This keeps subscription accounts with a tiny
 * concurrency ceiling (e.g. GLM/MiniMax ≈ 1) from being flooded.
 */
export function effectiveMaxConcurrency(cap: number | null | undefined, fallback: number): number {
  if (typeof cap === "number" && Number.isFinite(cap) && cap > 0) {
    return Math.floor(cap);
  }
  return fallback;
}

export function comboModelNotFoundResponse(message: string) {
  return errorResponse(404, message);
}

export function getTargetProvider(modelStr: string, providerId?: string | null): string {
  const parsed = parseModel(modelStr);
  return providerId || parsed.provider || parsed.providerAlias || "unknown";
}

export function isStreamReadinessFailureErrorBody(errorBody: unknown): boolean {
  if (!errorBody || typeof errorBody !== "object") return false;
  const error = (errorBody as Record<string, unknown>).error;
  if (!error || typeof error !== "object") return false;
  const code = (error as Record<string, unknown>).code;
  return code === "STREAM_READINESS_TIMEOUT" || code === "STREAM_EARLY_EOF";
}

/**
 * A STREAM_EARLY_EOF specifically: the upstream accepted the request (HTTP 200), opened the
 * SSE stream, then closed it before emitting a single non-ping event.
 *
 * This is deliberately NOT the same signal as STREAM_READINESS_TIMEOUT. The readiness probe
 * is a pre-flight liveness check on a connection we have not committed to yet, so failing it
 * says "this connection looks stale", not "this provider is failing". An early EOF is the
 * opposite: the provider took the request and then failed to serve it, which is an upstream
 * failure by any reasonable definition.
 *
 * `isStreamReadinessFailureErrorBody` still covers both codes because the transient-retry and
 * semaphore-cooldown paths in combo.ts want identical treatment for both. Only the
 * whole-provider circuit breaker needs to tell them apart — see
 * `shouldRecordProviderBreakerFailure`.
 */
export function isStreamEarlyEofErrorBody(errorBody: unknown): boolean {
  if (!errorBody || typeof errorBody !== "object") return false;
  const error = (errorBody as Record<string, unknown>).error;
  if (!error || typeof error !== "object") return false;
  return (error as Record<string, unknown>).code === "STREAM_EARLY_EOF";
}

/**
 * A local per-API-key token-limit breach surfaces as a 429 tagged with
 * errorCode "TOKEN_LIMIT_EXCEEDED" (see chatCore.ts Tier 2 early return). This
 * is NOT an upstream rate limit, so the combo loop must not cool the shared
 * account/provider, must not add it to transientRateLimitedProviders, and must
 * not retry it transiently — it propagates to the client as a terminal 429.
 */
export function isTokenLimitBreachErrorBody(errorBody: unknown): boolean {
  if (!errorBody || typeof errorBody !== "object") return false;
  const error = (errorBody as Record<string, unknown>).error;
  if (!error || typeof error !== "object") return false;
  return (error as Record<string, unknown>).code === "TOKEN_LIMIT_EXCEEDED";
}

/** Local limiter capacity is not an upstream/provider failure and must not cascade. */
export function isLocalQueueCapacityErrorBody(errorBody: unknown): boolean {
  if (!errorBody || typeof errorBody !== "object") return false;
  const error = (errorBody as Record<string, unknown>).error;
  if (!error || typeof error !== "object") return false;
  const code = String((error as Record<string, unknown>).code || "").toUpperCase();
  const type = String((error as Record<string, unknown>).type || "").toLowerCase();
  return (
    code === "RATE_LIMIT_QUEUE_TIMEOUT" ||
    code === "RATE_LIMIT_QUEUE_FULL" ||
    code === "RATE_LIMIT_QUEUE_WEDGED" ||
    type === "local_queue_capacity"
  );
}

export function toRecordedTarget(target: ResolvedComboTarget) {
  return {
    executionKey: target.executionKey,
    stepId: target.stepId,
    provider: target.provider,
    providerId: target.providerId,
    connectionId: target.connectionId,
    label: target.label,
  };
}

export function clampPercent(value: number): number {
  if (!Number.isFinite(value)) return 100;
  return Math.max(0, Math.min(100, value));
}

export function quotaRemainingPercentFromQuota(quota: unknown): number {
  if (!quota || typeof quota !== "object") return 100;
  const record = quota as Record<string, unknown>;
  if (record.limitReached === true) return 0;

  const windows = record.windows;
  if (windows && typeof windows === "object" && !Array.isArray(windows)) {
    let minRemaining: number | null = null;
    for (const windowInfo of Object.values(windows as Record<string, unknown>)) {
      if (!windowInfo || typeof windowInfo !== "object") continue;
      const percentUsed = Number((windowInfo as Record<string, unknown>).percentUsed);
      if (!Number.isFinite(percentUsed)) continue;
      const remaining = clampPercent((1 - percentUsed) * 100);
      minRemaining = minRemaining === null ? remaining : Math.min(minRemaining, remaining);
    }
    if (minRemaining !== null) return minRemaining;
  }

  const percentUsed = Number(record.percentUsed);
  if (Number.isFinite(percentUsed)) return clampPercent((1 - percentUsed) * 100);
  return 100;
}

export const QUOTA_BLOCKING_CONNECTION_STATUSES = new Set([
  "banned",
  "credits_exhausted",
  "deactivated",
  "expired",
  "rate_limited",
]);

export function normalizeConnectionStatus(value: unknown): string {
  return typeof value === "string" ? value.trim().toLowerCase() : "";
}

export function hasFutureRateLimitUntil(value: unknown): boolean {
  if (value == null || value === "") return false;
  const time = new Date(String(value)).getTime();
  return Number.isFinite(time) && time > Date.now();
}

export function getConnectionStatusQuotaCutoffReason(
  connection: Record<string, unknown> | undefined
): string | undefined {
  if (!connection) return undefined;
  const status = normalizeConnectionStatus(connection.testStatus);
  if (QUOTA_BLOCKING_CONNECTION_STATUSES.has(status)) return status;
  if (status === "unavailable" && hasFutureRateLimitUntil(connection.rateLimitedUntil)) {
    return "rate_limited";
  }
  return undefined;
}

/**
 * Pre-dispatch skip for a combo target whose connection is already on a
 * persisted cooldown. Combo previously only learned that from AUTH after a
 * real upstream call, so a burst could burn max_concurrent slots against a
 * connection that SQLite already marked unavailable until a future reset.
 *
 * Honours a future rateLimitedUntil regardless of testStatus, the terminal
 * statuses that must never be dispatched, and a bare `unavailable` status even
 * when no timestamp was written alongside it.
 */
export function getPersistedConnectionCooldownSkipReason(
  target: { modelStr: string; connectionId?: string | null },
  connection: Record<string, unknown> | null | undefined,
  allowRateLimitedConnection = false
): string | null {
  if (allowRateLimitedConnection) return null;
  if (!target.connectionId || !connection) return null;
  if (hasFutureRateLimitUntil(connection.rateLimitedUntil)) {
    return `Skipping ${target.modelStr} — connection ${target.connectionId} has persisted cooldown until ${String(connection.rateLimitedUntil)}`;
  }
  const status = normalizeConnectionStatus(connection.testStatus);
  if (QUOTA_BLOCKING_CONNECTION_STATUSES.has(status)) {
    return `Skipping ${target.modelStr} — connection ${target.connectionId} status=${status}`;
  }
  // `unavailable` with no (or an already-expired) rateLimitedUntil still means AUTH
  // took this connection out of rotation — markAccountUnavailable() writes the status
  // before, and sometimes without, a timestamp ("Using zai account …" then a real
  // upstream 429). Without this branch the pre-skip only fired once the timestamp had
  // landed, so a burst still dispatched against a connection AUTH had already retired.
  // Lazy recovery is unaffected: clearAccountError() resets the status on first success.
  if (status === "unavailable") {
    return `Skipping ${target.modelStr} — connection ${target.connectionId} status=unavailable`;
  }
  return null;
}

/**
 * Async wrapper around `getPersistedConnectionCooldownSkipReason` for the combo
 * dispatchers, which must re-check the persisted cooldown before EVERY upstream
 * attempt — not just once before the retry loop.
 *
 * The retry path is exactly where the stale-read risk lives: a sibling request in
 * the same burst can write `rate_limited_until` while this attempt is sleeping out
 * its retry delay, so the caller passes a cache-bypassing fetcher for retry > 0
 * (the readCache TTL is 5s, long enough to serve a "no cooldown" snapshot written
 * before the 429 landed).
 *
 * Kept dependency-free — the fetcher is injected, so this module stays pure and
 * unit-testable without a DB.
 */
export async function resolvePersistedConnectionCooldownSkipReason(
  target: { modelStr: string; connectionId?: string | null },
  fetchConnection: (id: string) => Promise<Record<string, unknown> | null | undefined>,
  allowRateLimitedConnection = false
): Promise<string | null> {
  if (allowRateLimitedConnection) return null;
  if (!target.connectionId) return null;
  let connection: Record<string, unknown> | null | undefined;
  try {
    connection = await fetchConnection(target.connectionId);
  } catch {
    // A DB read failure must never block dispatch — fall through to the upstream call.
    return null;
  }
  return getPersistedConnectionCooldownSkipReason(target, connection, allowRateLimitedConnection);
}

/** @param {string} errorText */
export function isContextOverflow400(errorText: string | null | undefined): boolean {
  const text = String(errorText || "");
  if (!text) return false;
  return (
    /\bcontext.*(?:length_exceeded|too long|overflow|exceeded|window|limit)\b/i.test(text) ||
    /exceeds.*context/i.test(text) ||
    /your input exceeds/i.test(text) ||
    CONTEXT_OVERFLOW_PATTERNS.some((p) => p.test(text))
  );
}

/** @param {string} errorText */
export function isParamValidation400(errorText: string | null | undefined): boolean {
  const text = String(errorText || "");
  if (!text) return false;
  return (
    /\bmax_tokens\b.*(?:illegal|must|range|invalid)/i.test(text) ||
    /\bparameter is illegal\b/i.test(text) ||
    /\bis illegal.*range\b/i.test(text)
  );
}

/**
 * #5249 / #2101: model-scoped 400s must NEVER stop the combo.
 */
export function isModelScoped400(errorText: string | null | undefined): boolean {
  const text = String(errorText || "");
  if (!text) return false;
  if (MODEL_ACCESS_DENIED_PATTERNS.some((p) => p.test(text))) return true;
  return (
    /\bmodel\b[\s\S]{0,80}?\b(?:not\s+supported|unsupported|unknown|unavailable)\b/i.test(text) ||
    /\b(?:not\s+supported|unsupported|unknown)\b[\s\S]{0,80}?\bmodel\b/i.test(text) ||
    /\bunsupported_api_for_model\b/i.test(text) ||
    /\bdoes\s+not\s+support\s+(?:the\s+)?responses\s+api\b/i.test(text)
  );
}