/** * Compile-time deny-list: route prefixes whose handlers can spawn arbitrary local * subprocesses (npm install, node, MITM server, python CLIs) on behalf of the * caller. These MUST NEVER appear in the manage-scope bypass list — regardless of * DB state — because reaching them from non-loopback would re-introduce the * GHSA-fhh6-4qxv-rpqj surface that the LOCAL_ONLY tier exists to close. * * Enforced at two layers: * 1. zod schema (`settingsSchemas.ts`): rejects `PATCH /api/settings` with error * code `BYPASS_PREFIX_NOT_ALLOWED` if any entry in * `localOnlyManageScopeBypassPrefixes` falls inside this set. * 2. runtime (`isLocalOnlyBypassableByManageScope` in `routeGuard.ts`): even if a * malformed DB row claims a spawn-capable path is bypassable, the policy refuses. * * 🔒 This constant lives in `@/shared/constants` — a server-free leaf module — and * NOT in `@/server/authz/routeGuard`, on purpose. `settingsSchemas.ts` is reachable * from client components (dashboard onboarding wizard → validation barrel), and * importing it from `routeGuard.ts` dragged routeGuard's server runtime * (runtimeSettings → localDb → apiKeys → rateLimiter → ioredis) into the browser * bundle, breaking the Next CLI/client webpack build with * `Module not found: Can't resolve 'dns'/'net'`. Keeping the value here lets both the * client-safe schema and the server routeGuard import it with no server coupling. * Regression guard: `tests/unit/authz/spawn-capable-prefixes-client-safe.test.ts`. * Hard Rules #15 + #17. */ export const SPAWN_CAPABLE_PREFIXES: ReadonlyArray = [ "/api/cli-tools/runtime/", "/api/cli-tools/qwen-settings", // GET probes the Qwen Code binary; the route also mutates local ~/.qwen files "/api/services/", // T-10: can run npm install + spawn node processes "/api/tools/agent-bridge/", // start/stop MITM server + DNS edits (Hard Rules #15 + #17) "/api/tools/traffic-inspector/", // http-proxy listener + system proxy (Hard Rules #15 + #17) "/api/plugins/", // plugins: load/execute via worker_threads + child_process (Hard Rules #15 + #17) "/api/local/", // T-12: 1-click local service launchers (Redis today) — must never be whitelistable via manage-scope bypass (Hard Rules #15 + #17) "/api/skills/collect/", // Skill Collector CLI detection: GET .../detect spawns a child process per CLI_TOOL_IDS entry — must never be whitelistable via manage-scope bypass (Hard Rules #15 + #17, PR #6294 review) "/api/headroom/start", // spawns headroom-ai python CLI — must never be bypassable (Hard Rules #15 + #17) "/api/headroom/stop", // kills tracked PID — must never be bypassable (Hard Rules #15 + #17) "/api/vnc-session", // #7892: spawns Docker containers via child_process.spawn (src/lib/vncSession/service.ts) — must never be whitelistable via manage-scope bypass (Hard Rules #15 + #17) ]; /** * Regex-matched companion to `SPAWN_CAPABLE_PREFIXES`, for spawn-capable * routes whose spawn-capable segment sits AFTER a dynamic path parameter * (e.g. `/api/providers/{id}/refresh-cursor`) — a flat prefix would either * miss them entirely or require over-broadening the shared `/api/providers/` * prefix (used for legitimate remote provider CRUD). Mirrors the * `LOCAL_ONLY_API_PREFIXES`/`LOCAL_ONLY_API_PATTERNS` split already * established in `routeGuard.ts` for this exact shape. Checked against a * CONCRETE resolved request path — an exact regex match, no approximation. */ export const SPAWN_CAPABLE_PATTERNS: ReadonlyArray = [ /^\/api\/providers\/[^/]+\/login\/?$/, // pre-existing gap: in LOCAL_ONLY_API_PATTERNS today but never in a spawn-capable deny-list /^\/api\/providers\/[^/]+\/refresh-cursor\/?$/, // spawns cursor-agent via renewal.ts (Hard Rules #15 + #17) /^\/api\/providers\/cursor\/agent-availability\/?$/, // static path (no dynamic segment), but kept in this array alongside its /api/providers/ siblings rather than the flat SPAWN_CAPABLE_PREFIXES array — spawns cursor-agent status via checkCursorAgentAvailability()/getCachedCursorAgentAvailability() (Hard Rules #15 + #17) ]; /** * Companion to `SPAWN_CAPABLE_PATTERNS`, used ONLY by the zod-level candidate * bypass-prefix check (`settingsSchemas.ts`), which validates a candidate * BYPASS PREFIX STRING (not a concrete path) at `PATCH /api/settings` time — * general prefix-vs-regex reachability is undecidable, so this conservatively * treats the shared literal ancestor of the dynamic/static-segment patterns * as off-limits. Intentionally coarser than `SPAWN_CAPABLE_PATTERNS`'s exact * per-route match, but costs nothing security-wise: the runtime check in * `isLocalOnlyBypassableByManageScope` (Layer 2) is the actual enforcement * boundary and stays exact. `SPAWN_CAPABLE_PREFIXES` itself is untouched. */ export const SPAWN_CAPABLE_PATTERN_ANCESTORS: ReadonlyArray = ["/api/providers/"];