Files
OmniRoute/tests/unit/mitm-cert-install-mode-9442.test.ts
backryun 79c5bdf681 fix(release): repair v3.8.50 base-red tail after latest root lift (#10964)
Merged after conflict triage: the six base-red repair files (vi.json, opencode.ts JSDoc, context-manager test, the three webhook dispatcher tests, the uncloseai orphan-test rename) were already drained on the tip by today's #11130/#11157/#11160/#11113 — those hunks resolved to the tip shape. What lands is the production-fix set: GLM transport-aware Anthropic headers, Claude Code-compatible model-listing rejection, combo live-test single-probe, zero-cost Auto-Combo interval normalization, recovery-clearing union handling, LLMLingua real-path compare, macOS netstat PID discovery, AI Horde R2 strict public-host validation. Sweep of every touched test file: 243/243 green; typecheck + file-size clean. (guide-settings-route's 4 reds reproduce on the pure tip — pre-existing drift from #11079, not from here.) Thank you @backryun!
2026-08-22 23:09:16 -03:00

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TypeScript

/**
* #9442 — Linux MITM CA install inherits umask leaving system cert unreadable.
*
* Root cause: `installCertLinux()` runs `sudo cp` to copy the cert into the
* system trust store but never sets the destination file mode. When the
* calling service has a restrictive umask (e.g. PM2 `UMask=0077`), the copied
* cert lands as `0600 root:root` instead of `0644`, so non-root TLS clients
* (curl, Rust's reqwest, uv, Python requests) scanning `/usr/lib/ssl/certs`
* emit repeated `Permission denied (os error 13)` warnings.
*
* Two gaps:
* 1. Install gap — `installCertLinux()` never calls `chmod 0644` after `cp`.
* 2. Repair gap — `installCert()` returns early when the cert fingerprint
* already matches, so a previously wrong-mode cert is never repaired.
*
* Methodology: real stub executables on PATH capture the argv of every spawned
* command (`cp`, `mkdir`, `chmod`, `update-ca-certificates`), with
* `process.platform` forced to `linux` before the module is imported and
* `OMNIROUTE_NO_SUDO=1` so `sudo -S` is stripped and the underlying commands
* run directly (same `resolveSudoSpawn` seam tested in
* `mitm-systemCommands-no-sudo.test.ts`). No `child_process` mocking.
*/
import test from "node:test";
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
import fs from "node:fs";
import os from "node:os";
import path from "node:path";
import crypto from "node:crypto";
import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process";
const originalPlatformDescriptor = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(process, "platform")!;
const originalPath = process.env.PATH;
const originalNoSudo = process.env.OMNIROUTE_NO_SUDO;
// The global test harness (tests/_setup/isolateDataDir.ts) sets
// OMNIROUTE_SKIP_SYSTEM_TRUST=1 so no test mutates the host trust store —
// which makes installCert() return before issuing any command, so this file
// captures nothing and its install-gap assert can never pass under `npm run
// test:unit` (it only passed when invoked directly, without the harness).
// Clearing it here is safe: every spawned command (cp/mkdir/chmod/update-ca-*)
// is a logging stub on PATH and OMNIROUTE_NO_SUDO=1 strips sudo, so nothing
// touches the real system. Restored in test.after below.
const originalSkipSystemTrust = process.env.OMNIROUTE_SKIP_SYSTEM_TRUST;
delete process.env.OMNIROUTE_SKIP_SYSTEM_TRUST;
const tmpRoot = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "omniroute-9442-"));
const binDir = path.join(tmpRoot, "bin");
fs.mkdirSync(binDir, { recursive: true });
const captureFile = path.join(tmpRoot, "argv.log");
function makeStub(name: string): string {
const p = path.join(binDir, name);
fs.writeFileSync(
p,
`#!/usr/bin/env node
const fs = require("fs");
fs.appendFileSync(${JSON.stringify(captureFile)}, ${JSON.stringify(name)} + "\\0" + process.argv.slice(2).join("\\0") + "\\n");
process.exit(0);
`,
{ mode: 0o755 }
);
return p;
}
for (const cmd of ["cp", "mkdir", "chmod", "update-ca-certificates", "update-ca-trust"]) {
makeStub(cmd);
}
Object.defineProperty(process, "platform", { value: "linux", configurable: true });
process.env.PATH = `${binDir}${path.delimiter}${originalPath}`;
process.env.OMNIROUTE_NO_SUDO = "1";
// Imported AFTER forcing linux + OMNIROUTE_NO_SUDO=1 so the module-level
// IS_WIN/IS_MAC consts see `linux` and resolveSudoSpawn strips `sudo -S`.
const { installCert, ensureSystemCertMode } = await import("../../src/mitm/cert/install.ts");
test.after(() => {
Object.defineProperty(process, "platform", originalPlatformDescriptor);
process.env.PATH = originalPath;
if (originalNoSudo === undefined) delete process.env.OMNIROUTE_NO_SUDO;
else process.env.OMNIROUTE_NO_SUDO = originalNoSudo;
if (originalSkipSystemTrust === undefined) delete process.env.OMNIROUTE_SKIP_SYSTEM_TRUST;
else process.env.OMNIROUTE_SKIP_SYSTEM_TRUST = originalSkipSystemTrust;
fs.rmSync(tmpRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
function resetCaptured(): void {
fs.writeFileSync(captureFile, "");
}
function readCaptured(): string[][] {
const raw = fs.readFileSync(captureFile, "utf8");
return raw
.split("\n")
.filter(Boolean)
.map((line) => line.split("\0"));
}
function fakeCertFile(seed: string): string {
const der = crypto.createHash("sha256").update(seed).digest();
const pem =
"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" +
der
.toString("base64")
.match(/.{1,64}/g)!
.join("\n") +
"\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
const certPath = path.join(tmpRoot, `${seed}.crt`);
fs.writeFileSync(certPath, pem);
return certPath;
}
test("installCert on linux issues `chmod 0644 <destFile>` after cp (install gap)", async () => {
resetCaptured();
const certPath = fakeCertFile("install-gap-9442");
await installCert("", certPath);
const cmds = readCaptured();
const chmodCalls = cmds.filter((argv) => argv[0] === "chmod");
assert.ok(chmodCalls.length > 0, "installCertLinux must call chmod after cp");
const chmod = chmodCalls[0];
assert.equal(chmod[1], "0644", "mode must be 0644 (world-readable)");
assert.ok(
chmod[2].endsWith("omniroute-mitm.crt"),
`chmod must target the system cert, got: ${chmod[2]}`
);
// cp must precede chmod (install order: mkdir → cp → chmod → update-ca-*).
const cpIdx = cmds.findIndex((a) => a[0] === "cp");
const chmodIdx = cmds.findIndex((a) => a[0] === "chmod");
assert.ok(cpIdx !== -1, "cp must be issued");
assert.ok(chmodIdx > cpIdx, "chmod must come after cp");
});
test("ensureSystemCertMode repairs a 0600 cert to 0644 (repair gap)", async () => {
resetCaptured();
const destFile = path.join(tmpRoot, "wrong-mode-9442.crt");
// Create the file with the restrictive mode that a umask 0077 cp produces.
fs.writeFileSync(destFile, "fake-cert", { mode: 0o600 });
assert.equal(fs.statSync(destFile).mode & 0o777, 0o600);
await ensureSystemCertMode(destFile, "");
const cmds = readCaptured();
const chmodCalls = cmds.filter((a) => a[0] === "chmod");
assert.ok(chmodCalls.length === 1, "must chmod exactly once when mode != 0644");
assert.deepEqual(chmodCalls[0], ["chmod", "0644", destFile]);
});
test("ensureSystemCertMode is a no-op when the cert is already 0644", async () => {
resetCaptured();
const destFile = path.join(tmpRoot, "correct-mode-9442.crt");
fs.writeFileSync(destFile, "fake-cert", { mode: 0o644 });
assert.equal(fs.statSync(destFile).mode & 0o777, 0o644);
await ensureSystemCertMode(destFile, "");
const cmds = readCaptured();
const chmodCalls = cmds.filter((a) => a[0] === "chmod");
assert.equal(chmodCalls.length, 0, "must not chmod when mode is already 0644");
});
test("filesystem proof: cp under umask 0077 creates mode 0600 (why the fix is needed)", () => {
const src = path.join(tmpRoot, "umask-src.crt");
const dst = path.join(tmpRoot, "umask-dst.crt");
fs.writeFileSync(src, "cert-body", { mode: 0o644 });
const oldUmask = process.umask(0o077);
try {
// Use the real `cp` (GNU/BSD coreutils) by absolute path — the exact command
// installCertLinux runs — so the umask actually applies. Node's
// fs.copyFileSync preserves the source mode, which would mask the bug, and
// the bare `cp` on PATH below is a logging stub from the install tests.
// macOS keeps coreutils at /bin/cp; Linux (GNU coreutils) at /usr/bin/cp.
const realCp = ["/usr/bin/cp", "/bin/cp"].find((p) => fs.existsSync(p));
assert.ok(realCp, "a real cp binary must exist for this filesystem proof");
execFileSync(realCp, [src, dst]);
const mode = fs.statSync(dst).mode & 0o777;
assert.equal(mode, 0o600, "cp under umask 0077 must produce 0600 — the bug this fix repairs");
} finally {
process.umask(oldUmask);
}
});