Files
OmniRoute/tests/unit/provider-limits-sanitize-scope-3821.test.ts
Diego Rodrigues de Sa e Souza c315a2394c Release v3.8.21 (#3593)
* chore(release): open v3.8.21 development cycle

* fix: pass through valid max_tokens-truncated responses instead of fake 502 (#3572) (#3595)

* fix: /v1/completions returns legacy text-completion format, not chat (#3571) (#3596)

* fix: z.ai/GLM coding plan no longer shows Monthly 0% when no monthly cap (#3580) (#3597)

* docs: mark DISCOVERY_TOOL_DESIGN endpoints as Phase-2 not-yet-implemented (#3498) (#3599)

* fix(agent-bridge): add validate-only upstream-ca/test route (#3488) (#3600)

* fix(gamification): add level/badges/badges-earned profile routes (#3484)

* security(oauth): migrate 5 public client_ids to resolvePublicCred (#3493)

* fix(mcp): ship MCP server source closure in npm files + coverage gate (#3578)

* fix: add reasoning token buffer for combo routing (fixes #3587) (#3588)

Integrated into release/v3.8.21

* Refactor: Extract chatCore phases into modular files (#3598)

Integrated into release/v3.8.21 — chatCore phase modularization. Adjusted: re-derive idempotencyKey for the save path after the check moved into the module (co-authored). Thanks @oyi77!

* docs(changelog): credit #3598 (chatCore modularization) + #3588 (combo reasoning buffer)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(api): implement GET /api/guardrails + POST /api/guardrails/test, drop shadow/guardrails doc-fiction (#3496) (#3602)

Integrated into release/v3.8.21 — implements GET /api/guardrails + POST /api/guardrails/test, removes shadow/guardrails doc-fiction. TDD-validated (5/5) + check-docs-symbols/typecheck/eslint green.

* fix(gemini): isolate textual reasoning wrappers (#3605)

Split-out PR C from #3584. Isolates textual reasoning wrappers (<think>/<thinking>/<thought>/<internal_thought>, including malformed/open tags) into reasoning_content across both the non-streaming sanitizer and the Gemini streaming translator, with split-chunk buffering. Additive to the existing textual tool-call pipeline; does not touch the #3569 native functionResponse path. Integrated into release/v3.8.21. Thanks @dhaern!

* fix(antigravity): normalize Gemini 3.5 Flash tier IDs (#3603)

Split-out PR A from #3584. Normalizes the Antigravity/agy Gemini 3.5 Flash tier IDs to clean public names (gemini-3.5-flash-low/medium/high), maps them to the live upstream IDs at the executor boundary, and removes Antigravity from the global model resolver so the executor owns wire normalization. Maintainer follow-up: kept gemini-3.5-flash-preview as a hidden backward-compat alias routing to the High tier (so saved combos/configs keep working). Live-validated the tier set via the agy CLI catalog. Integrated into release/v3.8.21. Thanks @dhaern!

* fix(agent-bridge): surface real MITM startup-failure cause, not always port 443 (#3606) (#3608)

Integrated into release/v3.8.21 (#3606)

* fix(oauth): surface real Kiro import-token failure cause, not a bare 500 (#3589) (#3609)

Integrated into release/v3.8.21 (#3589)

* docs(opencode-provider): soft-deprecate in favor of @omniroute/opencode-plugin (#3419) (#3613)

Integrated into release/v3.8.21 (#3419)

* fix(usage): normalize Antigravity and agy provider quotas (#3604)

Split-out PR B from #3584. Normalizes Antigravity/agy provider quotas: prefers retrieveUserQuota for live consumption, falls back to fetchAvailableModels and local usage_history, sanitizes cached Provider Limits so retired upstream IDs are not re-exposed, and schedules a deduplicated post-usage refresh. Maintainer follow-up: decoupled the post-usage refresh via a lightweight usageEvents bus (usageHistory no longer dynamic-imports providerLimits) so it does not pull the executors/translator graph into the typecheck-core surface — typecheck:core stays at 0. Integrated into release/v3.8.21. Thanks @dhaern!

* feat(cli): add autostart on/off/toggle shorthand for headless serve mode (#3331) (#3614)

Integrated into release/v3.8.21 (#3331)

* docs(changelog): credit #3603 (Flash tier IDs) + #3604 (provider quotas) + #3605 (reasoning wrappers)

Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <diegosouza.pw@gmail.com>

* fix(review): resolve findings from /review-reviews battery (v3.8.21 hardening) (#3618)

Pre-release hardening from the /review-reviews battery — 15 findings resolved (L1-L13,L15) + L14 live-verified WONTFIX, convergence re-review clean. lint/typecheck:core/test:vitest(146)/build green; zero new test:unit failures vs baseline 797de433f.

* chore(release): v3.8.21 CHANGELOG + i18n + env-doc sync

---------

Co-authored-by: Hernan Javier Ardila Sanchez <hjasgr@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Paijo <14921983+oyi77@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Raxxoor <manker_lol@hotmail.com>
2026-06-11 04:01:24 -03:00

108 lines
4.5 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* LEDGER-2 (#3821-review) — getSanitizedCachedProviderLimitsMap is polled by the
* ProviderLimits dashboard on an auto-refresh interval. It used to run an
* unconditional `SELECT * FROM provider_connections` (decrypting every active
* connection's credentials) on every poll, even though quota-key sanitization only
* ever rewrites Antigravity/agy entries. The fix scopes the connection scan to
* antigravity/agy (and skips it entirely for an empty cache).
*
* These tests pin the BEHAVIOR the optimization must preserve:
* 1. empty cache → {} (no scan needed)
* 2. non-Antigravity entry → returned verbatim (a junk quota key survives), proving
* entries whose connection is no longer fetched are still passed through unchanged
* 3. Antigravity entry → still sanitized (a non-user-callable quota key is dropped),
* proving the scoped query still feeds the sanitizer
*
* (2) is the load-bearing case: with the old code the openai connection was fetched and
* present in the lookup; with the new code it is NOT fetched at all, yet the output must
* be identical — which it is, because sanitizeProviderLimitsCacheForConnection returns
* the entry unchanged when no matching connection is supplied.
*/
import test from "node:test";
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
import fs from "node:fs";
import os from "node:os";
import path from "node:path";
const TEST_DATA_DIR = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "omniroute-plimits-scope-"));
process.env.DATA_DIR = TEST_DATA_DIR;
process.env.API_KEY_SECRET = "test-plimits-scope-secret";
const core = await import("../../src/lib/db/core.ts");
const providersDb = await import("../../src/lib/db/providers.ts");
const providerLimitsDb = await import("../../src/lib/db/providerLimits.ts");
const providerLimits = await import("../../src/lib/usage/providerLimits.ts");
test.beforeEach(() => {
core.resetDbInstance();
fs.rmSync(TEST_DATA_DIR, { recursive: true, force: true });
fs.mkdirSync(TEST_DATA_DIR, { recursive: true });
});
test.after(() => {
core.resetDbInstance();
fs.rmSync(TEST_DATA_DIR, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
function cacheEntry(quotas: Record<string, unknown>) {
return {
quotas,
plan: null,
message: null,
fetchedAt: new Date(0).toISOString(),
source: null,
};
}
test("empty provider-limits cache returns {} without any connection scan", async () => {
const out = await providerLimits.getSanitizedCachedProviderLimitsMap();
assert.deepEqual(out, {});
});
test("non-Antigravity cache entry is returned verbatim (junk quota key survives)", async () => {
// An active openai connection whose credentials would be decrypted by the old
// unconditional scan. Under the fix it is never fetched — the entry must still pass
// through unchanged.
const conn = await providersDb.createProviderConnection({
provider: "openai",
authType: "api_key",
name: "OpenAI key",
apiKey: "sk-test-openai",
});
const quotas = { "definitely-not-a-real-model": { used: 1, limit: 10 } };
providerLimitsDb.setProviderLimitsCache((conn as { id: string }).id, cacheEntry(quotas));
const out = await providerLimits.getSanitizedCachedProviderLimitsMap();
const entry = out[(conn as { id: string }).id];
assert.ok(entry, "openai cache entry should be present");
// Sanitization is antigravity/agy-only → the junk key is NOT dropped for openai.
assert.deepEqual(entry.quotas, quotas);
});
test("Antigravity cache entry is still sanitized (non-user-callable quota key dropped)", async () => {
const conn = await providersDb.createProviderConnection({
provider: "antigravity",
authType: "oauth",
name: "Antigravity acct",
email: "antigravity@example.test",
accessToken: "ag-access",
refreshToken: "ag-refresh",
expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 3_600_000).toISOString(),
});
// `credits` is always allowed; the junk model id is not user-callable → dropped.
const quotas = {
credits: { used: 5, limit: 100 },
"definitely-not-a-real-model": { used: 1, limit: 10 },
};
providerLimitsDb.setProviderLimitsCache((conn as { id: string }).id, cacheEntry(quotas));
const out = await providerLimits.getSanitizedCachedProviderLimitsMap();
const entry = out[(conn as { id: string }).id];
assert.ok(entry?.quotas, "antigravity cache entry should be present");
assert.ok("credits" in (entry.quotas as Record<string, unknown>), "credits is kept");
assert.ok(
!("definitely-not-a-real-model" in (entry.quotas as Record<string, unknown>)),
"non-user-callable quota key is dropped for antigravity"
);
});