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https://github.com/diegosouzapw/OmniRoute.git
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36932b62a7
Follow-up to the #3269 private-webhook opt-in. With the opt-in on, the private-host check was bypassed entirely, leaving cloud-metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254, metadata.google.internal, 100.100.100.200, link-local 169.254.0.0/16) reachable — the classic SSRF -> IAM-credential pivot — and the webhook test endpoint returned the upstream body, making it a content-exfiltration primitive against internal services. - outboundUrlGuard: add isCloudMetadataHost(); parseAndValidateWebhookUrl blocks those hosts UNCONDITIONALLY, even when private targets are opted in. - webhooks/[id]/test: redact responseBody for private targets (status + latency only). Regression test: tests/unit/webhook-metadata-guard-3269.test.ts (RED before, GREEN after); existing webhook SSRF/opt-in suites stay green (34/34).
78 lines
2.6 KiB
TypeScript
78 lines
2.6 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Security hardening for #3269: even when private webhook targets are opted in via
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* OMNIROUTE_ALLOW_PRIVATE_PROVIDER_URLS, cloud-metadata / link-local endpoints
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* (169.254.169.254, metadata.google.internal, 100.100.100.200, 169.254.0.0/16) must be
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* blocked UNCONDITIONALLY — they are the classic SSRF→IAM-credential pivot and have no
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* legitimate webhook use case.
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*/
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import { describe, it, after } from "node:test";
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import assert from "node:assert/strict";
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import fs from "node:fs";
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import os from "node:os";
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import path from "node:path";
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process.env.DATA_DIR = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "omni-wh-meta-3269-"));
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const { parseAndValidateWebhookUrl, isCloudMetadataHost, OutboundUrlGuardError } = await import(
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"../../src/shared/network/outboundUrlGuard.ts"
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);
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const { resetDbInstance } = await import("../../src/lib/db/core.ts");
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const FLAG = "OMNIROUTE_ALLOW_PRIVATE_PROVIDER_URLS";
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const METADATA_TARGETS = [
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"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/",
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"http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/",
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"http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/",
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"http://169.254.1.2/anything",
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];
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describe("webhook guard blocks cloud-metadata unconditionally (#3269 hardening)", () => {
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it("isCloudMetadataHost flags the known metadata + link-local hosts", () => {
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assert.equal(isCloudMetadataHost("169.254.169.254"), true);
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assert.equal(isCloudMetadataHost("metadata.google.internal"), true);
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assert.equal(isCloudMetadataHost("100.100.100.200"), true);
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assert.equal(isCloudMetadataHost("169.254.55.66"), true);
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assert.equal(isCloudMetadataHost("10.0.0.5"), false);
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assert.equal(isCloudMetadataHost("hooks.example.com"), false);
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});
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it("blocks metadata targets even when the private opt-in is ON", () => {
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process.env[FLAG] = "true";
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try {
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for (const target of METADATA_TARGETS) {
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assert.throws(
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() => parseAndValidateWebhookUrl(target),
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OutboundUrlGuardError,
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`expected ${target} to be blocked`
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);
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}
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} finally {
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delete process.env[FLAG];
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}
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});
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it("still allows a normal private LAN host when opted in (not metadata)", () => {
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process.env[FLAG] = "true";
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try {
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const url = parseAndValidateWebhookUrl("http://192.168.0.10/hook");
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assert.equal(url.hostname, "192.168.0.10");
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} finally {
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delete process.env[FLAG];
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}
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});
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});
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after(() => {
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try {
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resetDbInstance();
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} catch {
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/* ignore */
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}
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try {
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fs.rmSync(process.env.DATA_DIR as string, { recursive: true, force: true });
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} catch {
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/* ignore */
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}
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});
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