mirror of
https://github.com/diegosouzapw/OmniRoute.git
synced 2026-07-31 04:12:10 +03:00
0a09fa5a11
The middleware runtime exposes no socket, so a prior fix derived LOCAL_ONLY locality from the Host header — letting a remote caller send Host: 127.0.0.1 and reach spawn-capable routes (RCE class). The custom Node servers now stamp the real socket.remoteAddress into a token-signed internal header; the policy trusts only a stamp whose token matches this process's secret, and fails closed otherwise. Preserves the owner-authorized loopback + private-LAN access without trusting any client-controlled header.
54 lines
2.3 KiB
JavaScript
54 lines
2.3 KiB
JavaScript
import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
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/**
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* Trusted peer-IP stamping for the custom Node HTTP servers.
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*
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* The Next.js middleware runtime (proxy.ts → runAuthzPipeline) exposes NO socket
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* or peer IP — only request headers, ALL of which are client-controlled. The
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* LOCAL_ONLY route guard (spawn-capable routes) must decide locality from the
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* real TCP peer, never from the spoofable Host header.
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*
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* Our custom servers DO have the real `req.socket.remoteAddress`. They stamp it
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* into PEER_IP_HEADER as `<token>|<ip>`, where <token> is a per-process secret
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* (OMNIROUTE_PEER_STAMP_TOKEN). Any client-supplied value of PEER_IP_HEADER is
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* deleted first, so a remote caller cannot pre-populate it. The middleware
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* (src/server/authz/policies/management.ts → resolveStampedPeer) trusts the IP
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* ONLY when the token matches this process's secret; otherwise it fails closed.
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*
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* Keep PEER_IP_HEADER in sync with PEER_IP_HEADER in
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* src/server/authz/headers.ts (the TS side cannot import this .mjs).
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*/
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export const PEER_IP_HEADER = "x-omniroute-peer-ip";
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/** Generate (once) and return the per-process stamp token, persisting it in env
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* so the middleware running in the same process reads the identical value. */
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export function ensurePeerStampToken() {
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process.env.OMNIROUTE_PEER_STAMP_TOKEN ||= randomUUID();
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return process.env.OMNIROUTE_PEER_STAMP_TOKEN;
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}
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/** Strip any client-supplied PEER_IP_HEADER and stamp the real TCP peer IP,
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* token-prefixed. Never throws — a stamping failure must not block a request
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* (it degrades to "locality unknown" → fail closed in the middleware). */
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export function stampPeerIp(req) {
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try {
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if (!req || !req.headers) return;
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// Node lowercases incoming header names; delete kills any client value.
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delete req.headers[PEER_IP_HEADER];
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const ip = req.socket && req.socket.remoteAddress;
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if (ip) {
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req.headers[PEER_IP_HEADER] = `${ensurePeerStampToken()}|${ip}`;
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}
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} catch {
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/* never block a request on peer stamping */
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}
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}
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/** Wrap a Node request listener so every request is peer-stamped first. */
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export function wrapRequestListenerWithPeerStamp(listener) {
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return function peerStampingRequestHandler(req, res) {
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stampPeerIp(req);
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return listener.call(this, req, res);
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};
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}
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