Files
OmniRoute/src/lib/logPayloads.ts
Armin Anton” ∴ 10276821cd Integration: security tier + self-hosted operator blockers (rebased onto v3.8.51) (#10952)
Validated on the resolved merge against the current tip (527da656 + the post-#11281 rebaseline): the single conflict was a comment-only collision in providers/[id]/models/route.ts (kept the tip's #10828-ordering note). Focused suites 125/125 across all 13 touched test files (build-sqlite-stub, cc-compatible, copilot-claude-messages, copilot-gemini-route, executor-github, ghe-copilot, github-copilot-discovery-token, github-copilot-model-discovery, noauth-sibling-7620, provider-header-profiles, provider-models-config, request-log-payloads, upstream-error-passthrough), typecheck:core clean, file-size/changelog-integrity OK. Merged --admin over the inherited 2026-08-23 base-red cluster (#9985) — the reds are proven tip failures (CLI catalog cluster + @testing-library allowlist, being drained by #11280), not from this diff. Note: the rebase means several items the body listed (relay x-relay-path SSRF, /v1/search blocked-providers, #10736 rotation fence, #10903, #10865, #10899, #10916) already landed upstream and are NOT in this delta — the delta is: better-sqlite3 build guard + build heap/worker caps + telemetry-off (#10060 re-derived), credential-echo passthrough refusal + OCR/moderation redaction + call-log key redaction, Copilot CLI 1.0.81-6 wire identity + Claude→/v1/messages name-matched routing + discovery token fix, CC model_not_found 400, compat overrides for no-auth aliases (#7620-pinned). The Copilot wire-identity change is the one to watch in production. Thank you @arminanton — and the ported-author credits in the commit history (@rqzbeh, yidecode, the #10899/#10916 authors) are preserved. Your config-posture finding (REQUIRE_API_KEY default vs 0.0.0.0) is noted for a maintainer decision, as you scoped it.
2026-08-23 16:51:25 -03:00

193 lines
6.4 KiB
TypeScript

import { sanitizePII } from "./piiSanitizer";
const SENSITIVE_KEYS = new Set([
"api_key",
"apiKey",
"api-key",
"authorization",
"Authorization",
"x-api-key",
"X-Api-Key",
"x-goog-api-key",
"access_token",
"accessToken",
"refresh_token",
"refreshToken",
"password",
"secret",
"token",
// secret-leak hardening: session cookies + browser-storage credentials that
// some web-impersonation providers (Meta AI ecto_1_sess, chatgpt-web
// storageState / runtimeKey) can surface into a request/response BODY field
// rather than a header. Header-borne values are already masked by
// maskSensitiveHeaders; this covers the body path into the on-disk call-log
// artifact. Scoped to the actual credential field names only — the generic
// word "capability" was intentionally NOT included: it is a common non-secret
// field (model catalogs' `capabilities`, degradation/provider-discovery
// `capability` strings, MCP tool schemas) and matching it here would broadly
// redact useful diagnostics from call-log artifacts. The real Meta AI secret
// is the ecto_1_sess cookie / ecto1: WS token, already covered by
// cookie/authorization/storageState above.
"cookie",
"Cookie",
"storageState",
"storage-state",
"runtimeKey",
]);
type JsonRecord = Record<string, unknown>;
const ENCRYPTED_REASONING_KEY = "encrypted_content";
function encryptedReasoningOmissionMarker(length?: number): string {
return length === undefined
? "[omitted: encrypted reasoning]"
: `[omitted: encrypted reasoning, ${length} chars]`;
}
// Matches a JSON string field in captured SSE text. Alternatives inside the value are disjoint,
// keeping the scan linear even for large encrypted blobs.
const SERIALIZED_ENCRYPTED_REASONING_RE = /(\"encrypted_content\"\s*:\s*\")((?:\\.|[^\"\\])*)\"/g;
const STREAM_CHUNK_TIMESTAMP_RE = /^\[\d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}\.\d{3}\] /;
export function omitEncryptedReasoningFromLogChunks(chunks: string[]): string[] {
const combined = chunks.map((chunk) => chunk.replace(STREAM_CHUNK_TIMESTAMP_RE, "")).join("");
let found = false;
const omitted = combined.replace(SERIALIZED_ENCRYPTED_REASONING_RE, (_match, prefix: string) => {
found = true;
return `${prefix}${encryptedReasoningOmissionMarker()}\"`;
});
return found ? [omitted] : chunks;
}
/**
* True for any binary/opaque byte view (Uint8Array, Buffer, DataView, other
* typed arrays). `Array.isArray()` returns false for these, so callers that
* branch on it before recursing would otherwise fall into the generic-object
* branch and enumerate one JS property key per decoded byte (#7297).
*/
function isOpaqueBinary(value: unknown): value is ArrayBufferView {
return ArrayBuffer.isView(value);
}
function describeOpaqueBinary(value: ArrayBufferView): string {
const byteLength = value.byteLength;
return `[binary ${byteLength} bytes]`;
}
export function cloneLogPayload<T>(value: T): T {
if (value === null || value === undefined) return value;
if (typeof globalThis.structuredClone === "function") {
return globalThis.structuredClone(value);
}
return JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(value)) as T;
}
export function normalizePayloadForLog(payload: unknown): unknown {
if (typeof payload !== "string") return payload;
const trimmed = payload.trim();
if (!trimmed) return "";
try {
return JSON.parse(trimmed);
} catch {
return { _rawText: payload };
}
}
/**
* Remove opaque encrypted reasoning from log copies. The value is replayable by clients but
* provides no useful diagnostics, so retaining its size is sufficient for observability.
*/
export function omitEncryptedReasoningForLog(payload: unknown): unknown {
if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object") return payload;
if (isOpaqueBinary(payload)) return describeOpaqueBinary(payload);
if (Array.isArray(payload)) return payload.map(omitEncryptedReasoningForLog);
const omitted: JsonRecord = {};
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(payload)) {
if (key === ENCRYPTED_REASONING_KEY && typeof value === "string" && value.length > 0) {
omitted[key] = encryptedReasoningOmissionMarker(value.length);
} else if (typeof value === "object" && value !== null) {
omitted[key] = omitEncryptedReasoningForLog(value);
} else {
omitted[key] = value;
}
}
return omitted;
}
export function redactPayload(payload: unknown): unknown {
if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object") return payload;
if (isOpaqueBinary(payload)) return describeOpaqueBinary(payload);
if (Array.isArray(payload)) return payload.map(redactPayload);
const redacted: JsonRecord = {};
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(payload)) {
if (SENSITIVE_KEYS.has(key)) {
redacted[key] = "[REDACTED]";
} else if (typeof value === "string" && value.startsWith("Bearer ")) {
redacted[key] = "Bearer [REDACTED]";
} else if (typeof value === "object" && value !== null) {
redacted[key] = redactPayload(value);
} else {
redacted[key] = value;
}
}
return redacted;
}
export function sanitizePayloadPII(payload: unknown): unknown {
if (typeof payload === "string") {
return sanitizePII(payload).text;
}
if (!payload || typeof payload !== "object") {
return payload;
}
if (isOpaqueBinary(payload)) {
return describeOpaqueBinary(payload);
}
if (Array.isArray(payload)) {
return payload.map(sanitizePayloadPII);
}
const sanitized: JsonRecord = {};
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(payload)) {
sanitized[key] = sanitizePayloadPII(value);
}
return sanitized;
}
export function protectPayloadForLog(payload: unknown): unknown {
if (payload === null || payload === undefined) return null;
const normalized = normalizePayloadForLog(payload);
const reasoningOmitted = omitEncryptedReasoningForLog(normalized);
const piiSanitized = sanitizePayloadPII(reasoningOmitted);
return redactPayload(piiSanitized);
}
export function serializePayloadForStorage(payload: unknown, maxLength = 65536): string | null {
if (payload === null || payload === undefined) return null;
const exact = JSON.stringify(payload);
if (exact.length <= maxLength) {
return exact;
}
return JSON.stringify({
_truncated: true,
_originalSize: exact.length,
_preview: exact.slice(0, maxLength),
});
}
export function parseStoredPayload(value: unknown): unknown | null {
if (typeof value !== "string" || value.trim().length === 0) return null;
try {
return JSON.parse(value);
} catch {
return { _rawText: value };
}
}