OmniRoute/docs/security/STEALTH_GUIDE.md

title, version, lastUpdated

title	version	lastUpdated
Stealth Guide	3.8.51	2026-09-02

Stealth Guide

Source of truth: open-sse/utils/tlsClient.ts, open-sse/services/{tlsClientBase,claudeTlsClient,perplexityTlsClient,grokTlsClient,notionTlsClient,lmarenaTlsClient,claudeCodeCCH,claudeCodeFingerprint,claudeCodeObfuscation,claudeCodeCompatible}.ts, open-sse/config/cliFingerprints.ts, src/mitm/ Last updated: 2026-09-02 — v3.8.51 Audience: Engineers maintaining provider-specific stealth integrations.

OmniRoute integrates with providers whose edges actively fingerprint non-official clients (TLS JA3/JA4, header ordering, JSON body shape, integrity tokens). This page documents the stealth surfaces OmniRoute exposes and where they are implemented.

Legal and Ethical Notice

Stealth features exist so OmniRoute can act as a compatibility layer between user-owned official accounts (Claude Code CLI, Codex, Antigravity, Cursor, etc.) and OmniRoute's unified API. They are not for evading fraud detection, sharing credentials, or violating provider Terms of Service. The maintainers expect operators to comply with the upstream ToS they signed when creating accounts.

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TLS Fingerprinting Layer

open-sse/utils/tlsClient.ts — wreq-js (Chrome 124)

Persistent wreq-js sessions are created lazily per account scope and resolved proxy. The process-wide TlsClient pools at most 128 sessions that impersonate Chrome 124 on macOS for upstreams behind Cloudflare. TlsClient.fetch() fails closed when the native runtime is unavailable; a caller may explicitly select a fallback outside this wrapper.

• Session profile: browser: "chrome_124", os: "macos"
• Proxy resolution (priority): HTTPS_PROXY → HTTP_PROXY → ALL_PROXY (also lower-case)
• Timeout: TLS_CLIENT_TIMEOUT_MS (inherits from FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS, default 600000)
• wreq-js Response is fetch-compatible (headers, text(), json(), clone(), body).

Web-cookie provider transport — wreq-js 3.2.0

open-sse/services/tlsClientBase.ts is the shared adapter for the five specialized web-cookie transports below. Each thin provider wrapper selects a browser/OS profile. The adapter uses the single wreq runtime loader and transport pool in open-sse/utils/tlsClient.ts, keyed by profile + OS + resolved proxy, while every request uses cookieMode: "ephemeral". Accounts and requests therefore share transport-level connections, but never a wreq session or cookie jar.

Provider	Profile	Emulated OS	Stream EOF policy
Claude	chrome_146	Linux	include [DONE]
Perplexity	firefox_148	macOS	include event: end_of_stream
Grok	chrome_146	Linux	exclude [DONE]
Notion	chrome_146	Windows	include [DONE]
LMArena	chrome_146	Windows	no sentinel; close on native EOF

• Streaming consumes the native response ReadableStream directly; no temp file or sidecar is created.
• Up to 256 initial bytes are inspected before exposing a stream. SSE providers buffer non-SSE errors; Grok/LMArena map Cloudflare challenges to 403 and HTML interstitials to 502.
• The native request timeout remains wrapped by an absolute JS hard deadline. A hang invalidates and closes only the affected profile/OS/proxy transport before the next request recreates it.
• Proxy resolution priority is per-call proxyUrl → request-scoped account/dashboard context → HTTPS_PROXY/HTTP_PROXY/ALL_PROXY (including lowercase variants). Resolution errors fail closed instead of leaking a direct connection. LMArena deliberately resolves against arena.ai.
• byteResponse returns a content-typed data: URL without UTF-8 corruption.
• Errors are TlsClientUnavailableError (package/addon unavailable), TlsClientHangError (deadline exceeded), and WreqTransportCapacityError (the shared session-capacity error code) when all 128 bounded profile/OS/proxy slots are active or closing.

The generic TlsClient session above remains specialized for persistent browser-backed cookie state. Both paths reuse one cached wreq module loader and process lifecycle hook; their pools remain separate because their cookie lifetimes are intentionally different.

The profiles are supported by the pinned package, but real WAF acceptance can change independently of local contract tests. Validate fingerprint changes against an explicitly authorized live account before claiming parity with an upstream browser.

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Claude Code Stealth Bundle

When cliCompatMode is on, OmniRoute reshapes outgoing Claude requests so they are indistinguishable from claude-cli traffic. Three modules collaborate:

claudeCodeFingerprint.ts

Computes the 3-char cc_version fingerprint embedded in the billing header:

SHA256(SALT + msg[4] + msg[7] + msg[20] + version)[:3]

• FINGERPRINT_SALT = "59cf53e54c78" (hardcoded; matches official client)
• Inputs: chars at index 4, 7, 20 of the first user message text + version string
• Output: 3-char hex prefix

claudeCodeCCH.ts (Client Content Hash)

Server-side integrity check the official Claude Code CLI computes via Bun/Zig. OmniRoute reimplements with xxhash-wasm:

1. Serialize body with cch=00000; placeholder
2. xxhash64(bytes, seed) & 0xFFFFF
3. Zero-padded 5-char lowercase hex
4. Replace cch=00000; with the computed token

Constants:

• Seed: 0x6e52736ac806831e
• Pattern: /\bcch=([0-9a-f]{5});/

claudeCodeObfuscation.ts

Inserts a Unicode zero-width joiner (U+200D) after the first character of "sensitive" client names so upstream filters cannot grep them. Default word list:

opencode, open-code, cline, roo-cline, roo_cline, cursor, windsurf,
aider, continue.dev, copilot, avante, codecompanion

Applied to: system blocks, all messages[].content, and tools[].description / tools[].function.description. Operator-overridable via setSensitiveWords().

claudeCodeCompatible.ts — anthropic-compatible-cc-* providers

For third-party Anthropic relays that only accept "real Claude Code" traffic:

• CLAUDE_CODE_COMPATIBLE_USER_AGENT = "claude-cli/2.1.220 (external, sdk-cli)"
• CLAUDE_CODE_COMPATIBLE_STAINLESS_PACKAGE_VERSION = "0.94.0"
• CLAUDE_CODE_COMPATIBLE_STAINLESS_RUNTIME_VERSION = "v26.3.0"
• anthropic-beta = "claude-code-20250219,interleaved-thinking-2025-05-14,effort-2025-11-24" by default
• The per-connection "Enable redact-thinking beta" toggle adds redact-thinking-2026-02-12 when a CC Compatible upstream specifically requires redacted thinking streams
• The per-connection "Enable summarized thinking display" toggle stores providerSpecificData.requestDefaults.summarizeThinking and adds display: "summarized" to CC Compatible thinking requests that did not already set a display mode
• CONTEXT_1M_BETA_HEADER = "context-1m-2025-08-07" (Opus/Sonnet 4.x family)
• Default path: /v1/messages?beta=true

Sister modules in the same bundle:

• claudeCodeConstraints.ts — temperature + cache-control rules
• claudeCodeToolRemapper.ts — tool-name remapping
• claudeCodeExtraRemap.ts — extra payload normalization

---

Antigravity Stealth

Antigravity requests preserve caller text byte-for-byte. OmniRoute does not insert zero-width characters into prompts or rename/inject tools to imitate an IDE client.

antigravityHeaderScrub.ts

Strips Stainless SDK markers (x-stainless-lang, x-stainless-package-version, x-stainless-os, x-stainless-arch, x-stainless-runtime, x-stainless-runtime-version, x-stainless-timeout, x-stainless-retry-count, x-stainless-helper-method) before forwarding.

⚠️ Risk: ANTIGRAVITY_CREDITS=always (account-ban hot spot)

ANTIGRAVITY_CREDITS=always (consumed by open-sse/executors/antigravity.ts) routes every request through Antigravity AI Credit Overages (paid Google credits) instead of letting Google's free-tier quota gate things. This is documented as a feature, but it is the single most common ToS-violation report we see — multiple Google Ultra accounts have been banned with 403 / "service disabled for ToS violation" / insufficient_quota after running for a few hours with =always.

The upstream enforcement is on Google's side, not anything OmniRoute can prevent. The env var name and the existing docs make it sound like a safe knob to flip; it isn't.

Why this draws abuse detection more aggressively than free-tier-only usage:

• Sustained automated spend on a single Google account flags differently than free-tier hits-quota-and-stops.
• Credit overages have no rate ceiling, so a misconfigured client can burn through several hundred USD in minutes and look like API-key resale or bot traffic.
• Multiple OmniRoute users hitting overage credits in parallel from the same external IP compounds the signal.

Recommended posture:

1. Keep the default ANTIGRAVITY_CREDITS=off unless the operator explicitly accepts paid-credit and account-enforcement risk. retry sends the normal request first and injects credits at most once after an eligible quota 429; always injects credits on the first request.
2. Spread load across providers via Auto-Combo (model: "auto" or kr/glm/etc-combo) instead of saturating a single Antigravity account.
3. Set per-connection RPM limits in the Antigravity provider's edit page (Dashboard → Providers → Antigravity → connection → rate limit). 30–60 RPM is a defensible upper bound for sustained use.
4. Use stable, operator-controlled upstream networking and avoid sharing one account across unrelated users or workloads.
5. If banned: appeal via support.google.com → "Restore Workspace/Account access" with the exact quota_exceeded / service disabled response body Google sent. Restoration is not guaranteed.

The environment reference documents the account and spend implications of each credits mode.

Touch points:

• open-sse/executors/antigravity.ts — reads process.env.ANTIGRAVITY_CREDITS
• src/lib/oauth/providers/antigravity.ts — credential plumbing
• Original incident report: Discussion #1183

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CLI Fingerprint Registry — open-sse/config/cliFingerprints.ts

Per-provider table that pins exact header ordering and JSON body field ordering captured from mitmproxy traces of the official CLIs. Currently registered: codex, claude, plus runtime-derived profiles in providerHeaderProfiles.ts for antigravity and github.

interface CliFingerprint {
  headerOrder: string[]; // case-sensitive
  bodyFieldOrder: string[]; // top-level JSON keys
  userAgent?: string | (() => string);
  extraHeaders?: Record<string, string>;
}

Toggle per provider via env (see below). When disabled, headers/body keys appear in whatever order Node/JSON gave them — easy to fingerprint.

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MITM Proxy (Antigravity, Linux/macOS/Windows)

For CLIs whose binaries cannot be redirected via OPENAI_BASE_URL, OmniRoute runs a local TLS-terminating proxy. Endpoints live under src/app/api/cli-tools/antigravity-mitm/.

Method	Endpoint	Purpose
GET	/api/cli-tools/antigravity-mitm	Status — running, pid, dnsConfigured, certExists
POST	/api/cli-tools/antigravity-mitm	Start MITM (requires apiKey + sudoPassword)
DELETE	/api/cli-tools/antigravity-mitm	Stop MITM
GET	/api/cli-tools/antigravity-mitm/alias	List model aliases
PUT	/api/cli-tools/antigravity-mitm/alias	Save model aliases for a tool

Target intercepted host: daily-cloudcode-pa.googleapis.com (Antigravity's upstream).

Start sequence (src/mitm/manager.ts::startMitm)

1. Generate self-signed cert via selfsigned (RSA-2048, SHA-256, 1y) — cert/generate.ts
2. Install cert to system trust store — cert/install.ts
3. Add hosts entry 127.0.0.1 daily-cloudcode-pa.googleapis.com — dns/dnsConfig.ts
4. Spawn src/mitm/server.cjs with ROUTER_API_KEY + MITM_LOCAL_PORT (default 443)
5. Persist PID to <DATA_DIR>/mitm/.mitm.pid

Linux dynamic trust-store detection — cert/install.ts

getLinuxCertConfig() walks a priority list and picks the first existing directory:

Distro family	Directory	Update command
Debian / Ubuntu	/usr/local/share/ca-certificates	update-ca-certificates
Arch / CachyOS / Manjaro	/etc/ca-certificates/trust-source/anchors	update-ca-trust
Fedora / RHEL / CentOS	/etc/pki/ca-trust/source/anchors	update-ca-trust
openSUSE	/etc/pki/trust/anchors	update-ca-certificates

Cert filename: omniroute-mitm.crt. Fingerprint match via getCertFingerprint() (SHA-1 of DER).

Additionally, updateNssDatabases() installs into per-user NSS DBs when certutil is available: ~/.pki/nssdb, ~/snap/chromium/.../nssdb, all Firefox profiles (including snap), under the nickname OmniRoute MITM Root CA.

macOS / Windows

• macOS: security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain
• Windows: elevated PowerShell → certutil -addstore Root

Auth

All MITM endpoints require management auth (requireCliToolsAuth). The sudo password is cached in module scope (never globalThis) and cleared on stopMitm().

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User-Agent Overrides — env vars (.env.example section 12)

Variable	Default
CLAUDE_USER_AGENT	claude-cli/2.1.220 (external, cli)
CODEX_USER_AGENT	codex-cli/0.149.0 (Windows 10.0.26200; x64)
GITHUB_USER_AGENT	GitHubCopilotChat/0.54.0
ANTIGRAVITY_USER_AGENT	antigravity/2.0.1 linux/arm64 google-api-nodejs-client/10.3.0
KIRO_USER_AGENT	AWS-SDK-JS/3.0.0 kiro-ide/1.0.0
QODER_USER_AGENT	Qoder-Cli
CURSOR_USER_AGENT	Cursor/3.4

Consumed by open-sse/executors/base.ts::buildHeaders() via dynamic lookup. Bump these when providers release new CLI versions — stale UA strings start getting rejected as outdated clients.

CLI Compatibility Mode Toggles (.env.example section 13)

Variable	Effect
CLI_COMPAT_CODEX=1	Codex fingerprint
CLI_COMPAT_CLAUDE=1	claude-cli fingerprint
CLI_COMPAT_GITHUB=1	GitHub Copilot Chat fingerprint
CLI_COMPAT_ANTIGRAVITY=1	Antigravity fingerprint
CLI_COMPAT_KIRO=1	Kiro
CLI_COMPAT_CURSOR=1	Cursor
CLI_COMPAT_KIMI_CODING=1	Kimi Coding
CLI_COMPAT_KILOCODE=1	KiloCode
CLI_COMPAT_CLINE=1	Cline
CLI_COMPAT_ALL=1	Enable all of the above

The provider IP is always preserved — the toggle only reshapes the request wire image, it does not switch IP egress.

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Inbound Header Sanitization

OmniRoute scrubs inbound client headers before forwarding so a request that arrives from Cursor doesn't leak User-Agent: Cursor/X.Y.Z to a Claude upstream. See src/shared/constants/upstreamHeaders.ts for the denylist, kept in lockstep with the Zod schemas and unit tests.

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Updating Fingerprints When a Provider Rotates

1. Capture official CLI traffic with mitmproxy (TLS interception + dump)
2. Extract JA3/JA4 and the literal header order
3. Update the relevant CLI_FINGERPRINTS[...] entry
4. Bump matching *_USER_AGENT default in .env.example
5. If the TLS handshake itself changed, update the relevant provider wrapper or the wreq-js browser: option
6. Run the provider-specific TLS tests and a manual canary against the live provider
7. Ship in a patch release; document in CHANGELOG.md

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Tests

• open-sse/services/__tests__/claudeTlsClient.test.ts — shared TLS wrapper behavior
• tests/unit/anthropic-cache-fingerprint.test.ts — fingerprint determinism
• tests/unit/chatgpt-web-source-retirement.test.ts — common ChatGPT Web stealth source remains absent while Codex Web stays present

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See Also

• RESILIENCE_GUIDE.md — what happens when a stealth path gets a 403
• TROUBLESHOOTING.md
• ENVIRONMENT.md — full env reference
• CLI-TOOLS.md — operator view of the MITM workflow