semgrep's post-tool-cli-scan flagged five concrete issues; each fix is
narrow and keeps existing behaviour for legitimate callers.
src/server/ws/liveServer.ts
WebSocket upgrades did not check the Origin header (CWE-1385: CSWSH).
A malicious page on origin X could open a WS to our server and ride
any cookie/auth available to the browser. Add an Origin allow-list
built from the loopback dashboard origins plus the new
LIVE_WS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS env var. Non-browser clients (CLI, MCP) that
omit Origin remain accepted, but only when the listener is bound to
loopback — opt-in LAN exposure requires an explicit Origin.
src/app/api/v1/relay/chat/completions/route.ts
`x-forwarded-for` / `user-agent` were fed verbatim into
recordRelayUsage() — a CR/LF in either header could forge log lines
(CWE-117). Add sanitizeForensicHeader() to strip control chars and
cap to 256 chars, plus migrate every error branch to buildErrorBody()
(Hard Rule #12).
src/app/api/copilot/chat/route.ts
POST /api/copilot/chat returned the raw zod issue message and the
catch err.message in the JSON body. Route both through
buildErrorBody() so sanitizeErrorMessage() strips stack traces and
absolute paths before serialization (Hard Rule #12).
src/server/authz/routeGuard.ts (+ tests/unit/authz/routeGuard.test.ts)
/api/copilot/* drives the Copilot LLM and runs without auth by
default. Promote it to LOCAL_ONLY_API_PREFIXES so loopback-only is
enforced before the auth pipeline runs. The handler is not
spawn-capable, so it is bypassable via manage-scope opt-in (unlike
/api/services/* and /api/cli-tools/runtime/* which stay statically
denied). Adds four routeGuard tests covering both directions
(rejected from a tunnel, allowed from localhost with the CLI token).
Also: docs/reference/ENVIRONMENT.md + .env.example pick up the two
new env vars (LIVE_WS_HOST + LIVE_WS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS) so the
strict env-doc-sync check keeps passing, and migration 070 fixes
the stale "Migration 068" comment to match its real version.
21f8dc4b3c