OmniRoute/docs/security/GUARDRAILS.md

title, version, lastUpdated

title	version	lastUpdated
Guardrails	3.8.40	2026-06-28

Guardrails

Source of truth: src/lib/guardrails/ Last updated: 2026-06-28 — v3.8.40 (injection-guard coverage + 16 KB scan bound + red-team)

Guardrails enforce safety, policy, and content transformations at the boundary between OmniRoute and upstream providers. Each guardrail can inspect (and optionally reject, transform, or annotate) request payloads (preCall) and upstream responses (postCall).

The system is fail-open: if a guardrail throws while executing, the registry records the error and continues with the next guardrail rather than failing the request. Blocking is an explicit decision (block: true), never an accident.

Built-in Guardrails

The registry auto-loads three guardrails in priority order on import (see registry.ts → registerDefaultGuardrails()):

Priority	Name	Stage(s)	File
5	vision-bridge	preCall	visionBridge.ts
10	pii-masker	pre + post	piiMasker.ts
20	prompt-injection	preCall	promptInjection.ts

Lower priority numbers run first.

Vision Bridge (visionBridge.ts)

Intercepts image-bearing requests aimed at non-vision models and replaces the image parts with text descriptions produced by a configurable vision model before the upstream call. This lets text-only providers transparently handle multimodal payloads.

Flow:

1. Skip if the target model already supports vision (unless it appears in the forced-bridge list isVisionBridgeForcedModel).
2. Extract image parts via extractImageParts(messages). Skip if none.
3. Load runtime config from getSettings() (visionBridgeEnabled, visionBridgeModel, visionBridgePrompt, visionBridgeTimeout, visionBridgeMaxImages).
4. Cap images at maxImages, call the vision model in parallel (Promise.allSettled), and inject [Image N]: <description> text parts in their place — failed images become [Image N]: (unavailable).
5. Return modifiedPayload + meta (imagesProcessed, processingTimeMs, visionModel).

Defaults live in src/shared/constants/visionBridgeDefaults.ts. The guardrail exposes a deps constructor option so tests can inject fake getSettings and callVisionModel implementations.

PII Masker (piiMasker.ts)

Runs on both stages.

• preCall clones the payload, walks system, messages, and input arrays, and applies processPII() (from @/shared/utils/inputSanitizer) to string content/text fields. When PII_REDACTION_ENABLED=true and INPUT_SANITIZER_MODE=redact, detected PII is stripped/redacted in the outbound payload. Otherwise the call records detection counts without rewriting content.
• postCall deep-clones the response, runs sanitizePIIResponse() plus the Responses-API-shape masker (maskResponsesOutput — covers output_text and output[].content[].text). If any redaction occurs, the modified response replaces the original.

The guardrail never blocks; it only annotates (meta.detections, meta.redacted) or rewrites.

Prompt Injection (promptInjection.ts)

Detects adversarial structures in user-supplied content and enforces the configured policy. Behavior is driven by environment variables and constructor options:

Setting	Env var	Default	Effect
Enabled	INPUT_SANITIZER_ENABLED	true	When false, guardrail short-circuits.
Mode	INJECTION_GUARD_MODE / INPUT_SANITIZER_MODE	warn	block, warn, or log.
Block threshold	blockThreshold option	high	Minimum severity required to block.

Mode precedence (getMode): caller options.mode → INJECTION_GUARD_MODE DB feature-flag override (Dashboard → Settings → Feature Flags) → INJECTION_GUARD_MODE env → INPUT_SANITIZER_MODE env → warn. A dashboard override therefore wins over the env vars, so the Feature Flags UI controls the running guard live (no restart). The DB read is fail-safe: if it errors, the guard falls back to the env-based behavior, and when no override is set behavior is identical to env-only resolution.

Detection sources:

1. sanitizeRequest() from @/shared/utils/inputSanitizer (shared detector set used elsewhere in the pipeline).
2. Built-in DEFAULT_GUARD_PATTERNS (currently system_override_inline and markdown_system_block, both high severity).
3. Optional customPatterns passed via constructor options (strings, regex, or { name, pattern, severity } records).

When mode === "block" and at least one detection meets the severity threshold, preCall returns { block: true, message: "Request rejected: suspicious content detected" }. In warn/log modes the guardrail logs but allows the call. The shared helper evaluatePromptInjection() is also exported for callers that need to evaluate prompts without going through the registry.

Scan bound (v3.8.20): the detector only inspects the first 16 KB of joined prompt text — MAX_INJECTION_SCAN_BYTES = 16 * 1024 (16 384 bytes) in src/shared/utils/inputSanitizer.ts. Both detectInjection() and evaluatePromptInjection() slice(0, MAX_INJECTION_SCAN_BYTES) before running the pattern loop. Injection directives sit near the top of an input, so this caps regex CPU/GC on multi-hundred-KB payloads without weakening detection (cf. #3932, #4041).

Base Contract (base.ts)

class BaseGuardrail {
  enabled: boolean;
  name: string;
  priority: number;

  constructor(name: string, options?: { enabled?: boolean; priority?: number });

  async preCall(payload: unknown, context: GuardrailContext): Promise<GuardrailResult | void>;

  async postCall(response: unknown, context: GuardrailContext): Promise<GuardrailResult | void>;
}

interface GuardrailResult<TValue = unknown> {
  block?: boolean; // true short-circuits the chain
  message?: string; // surfaced when blocking
  meta?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
  modifiedPayload?: TValue; // returned by preCall to rewrite the request
  modifiedResponse?: TValue; // returned by postCall to rewrite the response
}

interface GuardrailContext {
  apiKeyInfo?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
  disabledGuardrails?: string[] | null;
  endpoint?: string | null;
  headers?: Headers | Record<string, unknown> | null;
  log?: GuardrailLog | Console | null;
  method?: string | null;
  model?: string | null;
  provider?: string | null;
  sourceFormat?: string | null;
  stream?: boolean;
  targetFormat?: string | null;
}

A guardrail signals "no change" by returning either void, {}, or { block: false }. Returning a modifiedPayload/modifiedResponse replaces the value flowing through the chain for downstream guardrails.

Registry (registry.ts)

The singleton guardrailRegistry exposes:

• register(guardrail) — adds (or replaces by normalized name) a guardrail and re-sorts by ascending priority.
• clear() / list() — administrative helpers.
• runPreCallHooks(payload, context) — iterates active guardrails, threads the payload through modifiedPayload, and stops on the first block: true.
• runPostCallHooks(response, context) — same flow on the response side.
• resetGuardrailsForTests({ registerDefaults }) — clears state and optionally re-registers the defaults for clean test isolation.

Both runners return { blocked, payload|response, results, guardrail?, message? } where results is an array of GuardrailExecutionResult records that include per-guardrail blocked, skipped, modified, error, and meta fields, useful for tracing.

Disabling Guardrails Per-Request

resolveDisabledGuardrails({ apiKeyInfo, body, headers }) aggregates a de-duplicated list of guardrail names that should be skipped for the current request. Sources (all optional, all merged):

• apiKeyInfo.disabledGuardrails
• Request body disabledGuardrails (top-level)
• Request body metadata.disabledGuardrails
• Header x-omniroute-disabled-guardrails (or legacy x-disabled-guardrails)

Values may be arrays of strings or a comma-separated string; names are normalized to lowercase kebab-case (pii_masker → pii-masker). The result is passed through context.disabledGuardrails to the registry, which skips matching guardrails (skipped: true in results).

Execution Order

For each request flowing through src/sse/handlers/chat.ts and open-sse/handlers/chatCore.ts:

1. resolveDisabledGuardrails(...) builds the skip list from API key, body, and headers.
2. guardrailRegistry.runPreCallHooks(body, ctx) runs guardrails in ascending priority order:
   • Disabled guardrails are recorded as skipped.
   • Each guardrail's preCall may rewrite the payload via modifiedPayload.
   • The first block: true short-circuits the chain and the handler returns a guardrail rejection response.
3. The (potentially rewritten) payload flows into combo routing and upstream dispatch.
4. After the response is assembled, guardrailRegistry.runPostCallHooks(...) runs the same chain on the response. block: true here drops the upstream response.

Guardrails that throw are recorded with error: <message> and logged via logger.warn, but the chain continues — fail-open by design.

Configuration

Environment variables read by the built-in guardrails:

Variable	Used by	Effect
INPUT_SANITIZER_ENABLED	prompt-injection	Set false to disable detection entirely.
INPUT_SANITIZER_MODE	prompt-injection, pii-masker	Shared mode: warn, block, log, or redact.
INJECTION_GUARD_MODE	prompt-injection	Mode for the injection guard; also a DB feature flag that overrides the env vars (DB > ENV).
PII_REDACTION_ENABLED	pii-masker	When true + mode redact, request PII is stripped.
PII_RESPONSE_SANITIZATION / _MODE	pii-masker (downstream)	Controls response-side masker behavior.

The Vision Bridge reads runtime config from the DB-backed settings store (getSettings()), not env vars: visionBridgeEnabled, visionBridgeModel, visionBridgePrompt, visionBridgeTimeout, visionBridgeMaxImages. Defaults live in src/shared/constants/visionBridgeDefaults.ts.

Custom Guardrails

import { BaseGuardrail, guardrailRegistry } from "@/lib/guardrails";

class BudgetGuardrail extends BaseGuardrail {
  constructor() {
    super("budget", { priority: 50 });
  }

  async preCall(payload, ctx) {
    if (ctx.apiKeyInfo?.budgetExceeded) {
      return { block: true, message: "Daily budget exceeded" };
    }
    return { block: false };
  }
}

guardrailRegistry.register(new BudgetGuardrail());

Steps:

1. Create src/lib/guardrails/myGuardrail.ts extending BaseGuardrail.
2. Implement preCall and/or postCall.
3. Either register at import time (push from registerDefaultGuardrails) or call guardrailRegistry.register(...) at runtime — the registry replaces any prior guardrail with the same normalized name.
4. Add tests under tests/unit/ (existing examples: tests/unit/guardrails-registry.test.ts, tests/unit/prompt-injection-guard.test.ts, tests/unit/guardrails/visionBridge.test.ts).

Testing

Use resetGuardrailsForTests() between tests to start from a known state. Pass { registerDefaults: false } to start with an empty registry and register only the guardrails under test. The Vision Bridge guardrail accepts dependency injection (deps.getSettings, deps.callVisionModel) so tests can exercise the full flow without DB or network access.

See Also

• src/lib/guardrails/ — implementation
• src/shared/utils/inputSanitizer.ts — shared detector that powers prompt-injection and PII masking
• src/shared/constants/visionBridgeDefaults.ts — Vision Bridge defaults and forced-bridge model list
• docs/architecture/RESILIENCE_GUIDE.md — orthogonal layer (circuit breaker, cooldowns)
• docs/reference/ENVIRONMENT.md — full env var reference

Injection-guard route coverage & red-team (Fase 8 · Bloco D)

O injection-guard (createInjectionGuard / withInjectionGuard) cobre todas as rotas que aceitam prompt do usuário. Respeita INJECTION_GUARD_MODE (default warn = só loga; block = retorna HTTP 400 SECURITY_001).

Tipo	Rotas	Modo default
Texto (já existente)	/v1/chat/completions, /v1/completions, /v1/relay/chat/completions	warn
Generativas	/v1/messages, /v1/responses, /v1/images/generations, /v1/images/edits, /v1/videos/generations, /v1/music/generations, /v1/audio/speech	warn
Dados	/v1/embeddings, /v1/rerank, /v1/search, /v1/moderations	warn

A extração de texto (extractMessageContents) cobre messages/input/prompt/query+documents/instructions/system.

Red-team (nightly, nightly-llm-security.yml): promptfoo valida que cada rota bloqueia o corpus OWASP-LLM em INJECTION_GUARD_MODE=block; garak roda probes (skip sem secret). moderations é incluída por consistência — operadores em block-mode podem isentá-la via resolveDisabledGuardrails.

The nightly workflow (.github/workflows/nightly-llm-security.yml, cron + manual dispatch) has two jobs:

• promptfoo-guard (blocking) — runs promptfoo eval -c promptfooconfig.yaml with INJECTION_GUARD_MODE=block. Each adversarial case (e.g. "ignore all previous instructions…", DAN-style jailbreaks) asserts the response carries error.code === "SECURITY_001", i.e. the guard actually rejected the request.
• garak (advisory) — runs garak --probes promptinject,dan,leakreplay against a local OmniRoute instance (http://localhost:20128/v1). Gated on a provider secret (PROMPTFOO_PROVIDER_KEY); skips gracefully and is suffixed || true, so it reports without failing CI.

Coverage of the guard helper (createInjectionGuard / withInjectionGuard) spans every prompt-bearing /v1 route; prompt text is pulled from messages/input/prompt/query+documents/instructions/system by extractMessageContents() in src/shared/utils/inputSanitizer.ts.