Files
OmniRoute/open-sse/utils/cursorImages.ts
Diego Rodrigues de Sa e Souza d259d9fcba fix(ci): clear base-reds on release/v3.8.50 (round 3) (#10213)
* fix(ci): clear base-reds on release/v3.8.50 (round 3)

- CHANGELOG.md: restore the top [Unreleased] section dropped by the #10189
  reconcile (docs-sync gate: first section must be Unreleased)
- env-doc-sync: document CONDUCTOR_ORCHESTRATOR_TOKEN + CONDUCTOR_SPOKESPERSON_URL
  in .env.example/ENVIRONMENT.md; allowlist the CI-only GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY and
  TS7_BASE_REF (ts7 ratchet signals); drop a stray merge artifact line
- providers: restore the audited chatanywhere metadata entry that base-reds
  round 2 dropped together with its duplicate — the provider was half-wired
  (registry+endpoint without APIKEY metadata), which is what the wave3 test
  catches; re-pin providers-constants-split at the measured 228
- docs counts: 338 -> 339 (today's +2 void-ai/helixmind, -1 Puter) via
  gen:provider-reference + README/AGENTS/llm.txt/package.json/diagrams/i18n mirrors
- file-size ratchet: annotated rebaseline for the two pre-existing drifts
  (ModelSelectModal 1138, gateways 1250) following the 2026-08-11 precedent

Refs #9985

* fix(ci): base-reds round 3b — stale sibling tests + mode-pack weight contract

- check-docs-counts-sync.test.ts: drop the imports/subtests of the four helpers
  #10196 removed from the gate script (readMcpFactsFromSource, listLocalizedDocs,
  makeRequiredCountsValidator, checkFreeTierInventory) — the new-API tests that
  #10196 added stay; the file now loads again under the node runner
- quota-connection-recovery.test.ts: convert from vitest APIs to node:test —
  the file lives in tests/unit/*.test.ts (node-runner glob) and the vitest
  runtime crashes when imported outside vitest, killing the whole shard entry
- modePacks.ts: re-normalize all six mode packs to sum 1.0 — #8940 added
  sessionAvailability: 0.05 to every pack without rebalancing (1.05 total);
  ratios preserved exactly (÷1.05), so post-normalizeScoringWeights behavior
  is unchanged; restores the declared sum-to-1.0 contract the 4235 test pins

Refs #9985

* fix(ci): base-reds round 3c — vitest siblings, weights default, secrets FP, mutation tap

- DistributeProxiesButton.test.tsx: wrap renders in NextIntlClientProvider —
  #9245 localized the component (useTranslations) and left the test without
  the intl context, failing all 14 cases
- scoring.ts: re-normalize DEFAULT_WEIGHTS to sum 1.0 (same #8940 class as the
  mode packs — sessionAvailability added without rebalancing; ratios preserved)
- .gitleaks.toml: generalize the kimi sponsor-banner localStorage-key allowlist
  to -v\d+ — #10200 bumped v1→v2 and the stale regex regressed the secrets
  ratchet with a false positive
- stryker.conf.json: register 6 covering unit tests in tap.testFiles (4 modules)
  so their mutant kills count — unblocks check:mutation-test-coverage --strict

Refs #9985

* fix(ci): base-reds round 3d — inspector factor gap, stale registry/gap tests, i18n key sync

- comboScoringInspector: add cacheAffinity/sessionAvailability/connectionDensity
  to FACTOR_KEYS + the factor-key type — calculateScore() weighs them but the
  breakdown omitted them, so the explained contributions never summed to the
  reported score (inspector bug, red on the pure tip)
- combo-scoring-inspector.test: make the explicit-weights override sum-neutral
  (±0.05 shift) so it stays valid for any DEFAULT_WEIGHTS values — the hardcoded
  override only summed to 1.0 against the pre-#8940 defaults, which is also why
  explicit weights silently fell back to 'default' on the tip
- unorouter-registry.test: align to the canonical .com host (api.unorouter.ai
  301-redirects there, verified live) and to wave4's live model discovery
  (passthrough, no static seed) — the .ai/auto-model expectations were stale
- check-migration-numbering.test: 147 left KNOWN_GAPS when
  147_api_keys_model_access_mode.sql landed — assert absent (same as 143)
- i18n: sync-ui pass — 35,914 missing UI keys stamped as __MISSING__ placeholders
  across 42 locales (mechanical; greens the pt-BR key-presence integrity test;
  coverage pct unchanged by design — translation is a separate workstream)

Refs #9985

* fix(ci): base-reds round 3e — 2 real defects + 14 stale sibling tests (waves A-E)

Real defects fixed:
- src/lib/db/apiKeys.ts: #9313's empty-allowlist early return bypassed the group
  permission check, silently disabling group deny rules (#8817) for every key
  without a per-key allowlist; fall-through restored, restricted+[] deny-all kept
- open-sse/utils/proxyFetch.ts: #10032 re-appended the raw transport error to the
  propagated message, reintroducing the proxy user:password leak #9837 closed;
  new redactProxyDetailsInMessage() keeps the reason, redacts URL/credentials
- .github/workflows/quality.yml: #10134 added the TS7 ratchet as a separate
  blocking step AFTER the aggregated gates — the exact #8542 masking mechanism;
  folded into the non-fail-fast loop (still blocking, still PR-only) ⚠️ CI edit,
  gate-strengthening — explicit owner sign-off requested on the PR
- src/i18n/messages/ko.json: 3 machine-mistranslation regressions caught by the
  #8244 glossary checker (장애인→비활성화됨, 양말5://→socks5://, 비클로드→Claude가 아닌)

Stale sibling tests aligned to deliberately-moved contracts (each cites its mover):
request-log-detail-layout + -stream (#9245 intl provider), repro-8542 pin update,
quality-rail-gate-membership (#10134 shape), agentSkills-routes 45→46 (#9058),
cloudflare-ai-catalog-8717 (#8804 supersedes #8808), executor-xai (#9994),
vision-bridge-claude-wire (#9463 minimax→openai), sse-auth forced-pin (#8893),
tls-proxy-context (strengthened leak guards), rate-limit-local-error-classification
(#9164/#9342), minimax-thinking-signature (#9463), codebuddy-cn (#9723 +1 test),
github-copilot-custom-model (#9050), providers-g4f-batch3 (#9584),
synced-capability-warmup (#9199, stricter), sidebar-tools-group (#8221),
oauth-modal-grok-cli-paste (#9245); agentSkills/catalog.ts comment 45→46;
file-size rebaseline for proxyFetch (+19, annotated)

Refs #9985

* fix(ci): base-reds round 3f — waves F-J: 9 more real defects + stale sibling sweep

Real production defects fixed (all red on the pure tip, each with its origin):
- routeGuard.ts: #8949 accidentally DELETED the /api/providers/[id]/login
  local-only pattern — the route spawns a browser, so the loopback gate for a
  process-spawning route was gone (Hard Rules #15/#17); restored (314 guard
  tests green)
- agentSkills generator: #9058's category dispatch gave the config category an
  empty body, wiping skills/config-codex-cli/SKILL.md at the #10131 sync;
  fixed + SKILL.md regenerated via the official generator
- imageRegistry: #9982 broke same-provider bare aliasing (antigravity preview
  id sent upstream unresolved); new resolveSameProviderBareAlias() keeps the
  fal cross-provider fix intact
- imageRegistry: #9982's prefix strip handed the bare nano-banana ids to fal-ai,
  violating the pinned 2026-07-31 operator decision (adobe-firefly owns them);
  fal entries made prefix-only (dispatch already re-prefixes)
- mediaGeneration/fal.ts: the missing-credential 401 guard was lost when #10198
  deleted the superseded falHandler — tests were hitting the live network
- bottleneckPatch/rateLimitManager: #9041's merge clobbered #9604, resurrecting
  the Bottleneck v2.19.5 heartbeat bug (reservoir never refills); patched the
  library defect at the root and re-aligned chat-rate-limit-body-lock to the
  working reservoir contract
- processSupervisor.mjs: #9761 regressed the Node spawn to bare "node" (the
  #9156 launchd bug) and dropped #9209's ipv4first args; both restored
- openai-responses/pureHelpers: #9423's Agent null-sentinel was unreachable on
  the schemaless JSON-string path; gate extended
- i18n en.json: #8222's regen reverted the #9976 unclosed-tag fix and #8559's
  combo-cooldown copy; #9038 shipped 40 t() calls with no messages (runtime
  MISSING_MESSAGE); all restored/added + official sync-ui stamps, and vi's
  zero-marker policy re-established via the sanctioned translation backend

Stale sibling tests aligned (movers cited inline): chat-helpers (#9447),
executor-antigravity (#9351), video-fal-grok (#9982), visionBridge (#9759),
web-session-credentials (#8974), production-build-module-integrity (positive
anchor added), agentSkills-generator/skillManifestsLint/skills-injection/
agentSkillTools-mcp/listCapabilities-a2a (#9058), memory-settings (#10010),
model-catalog-policy-invalidation (#8906), model-alias-seed (#9485),
reactive-context-compaction (#8949), combo-provider-wildcard (broken upsert
helper), oauth-google-loopback (43-locale resurrected-key removal)

Validation: 501/501 across the 47 touched test files; typecheck:core, lint,
file-size, docs-sync all green.

Refs #9985

* fix(ci): base-reds round 3g — wave K/L: 4 more real defects + stale alignments

Real defects:
- base/reasoningEffort.ts: the stale duplicate cherry-pick #9612 re-added the
  codex minimal→low rewrite that #9883 had deliberately removed (OMP minimal
  passthrough); block removed again
- cursorImages.ts: #9840 wired prepareCursorImageForWire (sharp re-encode,
  fail-closed) into the SHARED resolveCursorImages, breaking zai-web and
  conol-web image uploads (HTTP 400 'undecodable'); new prepareForWire opt-out,
  Cursor default path unchanged (8 cursor suites green)
- modelCapabilities/snapshot: catalog prepare still issued 323 per-model reads
  of model_context_overrides + max_input_tokens overrides, violating #9199's
  bulk-load contract; both now resolve from the snapshot single pass
- v1-models-discovery-conformance: re-pinned to the bounded 30s SWR window
  (#9199/#10198) — the old 'stale-first regardless of age' contract is gone

Stale tests aligned (movers cited inline): codex-tools-strict-default (#9828
redundant-oneOf strip), devin-providers (#9245 i18n), db-migrationrunner-
constants-split (147→151 renumber #8228), gitlab-duo-oauth-setup (#9245),
chatcore-extracted-modules (#9161 outbound-protocol keying)

compression-api CI failures were cascade artifacts of codex-tools-strict-default
failing in the same force-exit shard process — no own defect (171/171 local).

Refs #9985

* fix(test): compression-api — register both describes before the runner starts

The DATA_DIR setup + route/db top-level awaits sat BETWEEN the two describes;
under --test-force-exit (the CI unit-runner flag) the process exits once the
already-registered tests finish, so on slow CI machines the whole second
describe died as 'Promise resolution is still pending' — the recurring
CI-only shard-2 failure that never reproduced locally without the flag.
Moved to the top of the file; 10/10 under --test-force-exit locally.

Refs #9985

* fix(quality): freeze modelCapabilities.ts at 1006 (annotated) — snapshot routing growth

Refs #9985

* fix(quality): move the modelCapabilities freeze into the frozen map (nested schema)

Refs #9985

* fix(i18n): translate all 39,718 pending UI keys across 42 locales (owner-approved)

Mass-translated every __MISSING__ placeholder via the official i18n:sync-ui
--translate-markers pipeline (operator backend), restoring i18nUiCoverage to the
100 baseline (was 89.9 after the merge-storm UI landings + the 42 keys #9038
never shipped).

Post-pass repairs, all caught by the existing gates:
- glossary: retired renderings the machine reintroduced normalized again
  (提供商→提供者 zh-CN/zh-TW, 鏈接→連結, 文檔→文件, 調用→呼叫, 供應商→提供者,
  響應→回應, 不活躍→未啟用 zh-TW; 클로드→Claude, 옴니루트→OmniRoute ko);
  DATA_DIR forbidden rendering avoided via 数据文件夹 rephrase
- ICU integrity: 120 values with renamed/dropped {params} repaired (39
  positional renames, 81 reset to the en source — functional over fluent)

Validation: glossary/pt-BR/vi/deno-relay/settings-keys/value-drift/google-
loopback suites 76/76; placeholder diff en×42 locales = 0; worst-locale
coverage = 100.0%.

Refs #9985

---------

Co-authored-by: backryun <bakryun0718@proton.me>
2026-08-13 00:02:25 -03:00

740 lines
27 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Image resolution + security for Cursor vision input.
*
* Turns OpenAI `image_url` parts (base64 `data:` URIs or remote `http(s)`
* URLs) into decoded, JPEG-prepped bytes ready for SelectedImage
* `blobIdWithData` encoding (see cursorAgentProtobuf.ts).
*
* Security (OmniRoute hard rules):
* - SSRF: remote fetches go through the repo's canonical outbound guard
* (`parseAndValidatePublicUrl`), which rejects non-http(s) schemes,
* embedded credentials, localhost, link-local, private/CGNAT ranges, and
* cloud-metadata hostnames. Client-supplied image URLs are always held to
* the strict public-only policy (never gated by the private-URL toggle that
* admin-configured provider URLs use).
* - Size caps: inbound decode/fetch is bounded (16 MiB) so large clipboard
* PNGs can shrink via JPEG soft-cap prep; the final wire image must be
* <= 1 MiB. Soft target is ~100 KiB JPEG for reliable Cursor hydration.
* - Content type: data URIs and URL responses must be `image/*`.
* - Errors throw `CursorImageError` with a clean, path-free message; the
* executor routes it through the sanitized 400 path (hard rule #12).
*/
import crypto from "node:crypto";
import dns from "node:dns";
import { isIP } from "node:net";
import {
parseAndValidatePublicUrl,
isPrivateHost,
OutboundUrlGuardError,
} from "@/shared/network/outboundUrlGuard";
import type { EncodedImage } from "./cursorAgentProtobuf.ts";
type SharpFactory = (typeof import("sharp"))["default"];
let sharpFactoryPromise: Promise<SharpFactory> | undefined;
function loadSharp(): Promise<SharpFactory> {
sharpFactoryPromise ??= import("sharp").then((module) => module.default);
return sharpFactoryPromise;
}
/** Final per-image byte cap after prep (composer-api / wire bound). */
export const MAX_CURSOR_IMAGE_BYTES = 1024 * 1024;
/**
* Inbound decode/fetch bomb ceiling before JPEG prep. Large clipboard PNGs may
* exceed {@link MAX_CURSOR_IMAGE_BYTES} raw but shrink under the wire cap after
* re-encode.
*/
export const MAX_CURSOR_IMAGE_DECODE_BYTES = 16 * 1024 * 1024;
/**
* Soft target for Cursor vision hydration. Prefer JPEG at or under this size.
*/
export const CURSOR_VISION_SOFT_MAX_BYTES = 100 * 1024;
/** Soft target when the client requests `detail: original` or `high`. */
export const CURSOR_VISION_SOFT_MAX_BYTES_HIGH = 256 * 1024;
/** Longest edge after Cursor vision prep. */
export const CURSOR_VISION_MAX_EDGE = 2000;
/** Decode bomb: reject images whose sniffed longest edge exceeds this. */
export const MAX_CURSOR_IMAGE_DECODE_EDGE = 8192;
/** Decode bomb: reject images whose sniffed pixel count exceeds this. */
export const MAX_CURSOR_IMAGE_PIXELS = 25_000_000;
const CURSOR_VISION_JPEG_QUALITIES_DEFAULT = [85, 70, 55, 40] as const;
const CURSOR_VISION_JPEG_QUALITIES_HIGH = [90, 80, 65, 50] as const;
const CURSOR_VISION_SOFT_MIN_EDGE = 256;
const CURSOR_VISION_SOFT_SHRINK = 0.85;
const CURSOR_VISION_PASSTHROUGH_MIME = new Set([
"image/jpeg",
"image/jpg",
"image/png",
"image/gif",
"image/webp",
]);
/** Upper bound on images attached to one Cursor turn. */
export const MAX_CURSOR_IMAGES = 12;
// Wall-clock cap for a single remote image fetch. A malformed env value
// (NaN / non-positive) falls back to the default rather than breaking setTimeout.
const IMAGE_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS = (() => {
const parsed = parseInt(process.env.CURSOR_IMAGE_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS || "15000", 10);
return Number.isInteger(parsed) && parsed > 0 ? parsed : 15000;
})();
// Bound on how many redirects fetchImageBytes will follow (each re-validated
// against the SSRF guard before the next hop).
const MAX_IMAGE_REDIRECTS = 3;
/**
* A 400-class error carrying a clean, non-sensitive message. The executor
* catches it and emits a sanitized error response.
*/
export class CursorImageError extends Error {
status: number;
constructor(message: string, status = 400) {
super(message);
this.name = "CursorImageError";
this.status = status;
}
}
function estimatedBase64DecodedBytes(payload: string): number {
return Math.floor((payload.length * 3) / 4);
}
function isHighDetail(detail: string | undefined): boolean {
const normalized = (detail || "").toLowerCase();
return normalized === "high" || normalized === "original";
}
function softMaxBytesForDetail(detail: string | undefined): number {
return isHighDetail(detail) ? CURSOR_VISION_SOFT_MAX_BYTES_HIGH : CURSOR_VISION_SOFT_MAX_BYTES;
}
function jpegQualitiesForDetail(detail: string | undefined): readonly number[] {
return isHighDetail(detail)
? CURSOR_VISION_JPEG_QUALITIES_HIGH
: CURSOR_VISION_JPEG_QUALITIES_DEFAULT;
}
function decodeDataUrl(url: string): { data: Buffer; mimeType: string } {
// data:[<mediatype>][;base64],<data>
const comma = url.indexOf(",");
if (comma < 0) {
throw new CursorImageError("Image data URL is malformed.");
}
const header = url.slice(5, comma); // strip leading "data:"
const payload = url.slice(comma + 1);
const isBase64 = /;base64/i.test(header);
const mimeType = (header.split(";")[0] || "").trim().toLowerCase() || "application/octet-stream";
if (!mimeType.startsWith("image/")) {
throw new CursorImageError("Image data URL must have an image/* media type.");
}
if (!isBase64) {
// Non-base64 data URLs (percent-encoded) are not a real image transport;
// reject rather than guess.
throw new CursorImageError("Image data URL must be base64-encoded.");
}
// Reject on the raw payload length BEFORE the regex/normalize pass, so an
// arbitrarily large data URL can't burn CPU on the whitespace strip. Base64
// expands ~4:3, so 2x the decode ceiling is a safe upper bound on the text.
if (payload.length > MAX_CURSOR_IMAGE_DECODE_BYTES * 2) {
throw new CursorImageError("Image input is too large to process safely.");
}
const normalized = payload.replace(/\s/g, "");
if (normalized.length === 0) {
throw new CursorImageError("Image data URL contains invalid base64 data.");
}
// Reject lenient Buffer.from acceptances (wrong alphabet, bad padding).
if (normalized.length % 4 !== 0 || !/^[A-Za-z0-9+/]+={0,2}$/.test(normalized)) {
throw new CursorImageError("Image data URL contains invalid base64 data.");
}
if (estimatedBase64DecodedBytes(normalized) > MAX_CURSOR_IMAGE_DECODE_BYTES) {
throw new CursorImageError("Image input is too large to process safely.");
}
let data: Buffer;
try {
data = Buffer.from(normalized, "base64");
} catch {
throw new CursorImageError("Image data URL contains invalid base64 data.");
}
if (data.length === 0) {
throw new CursorImageError("Image data URL contains invalid base64 data.");
}
// Round-trip guard: Node can silently drop trailing garbage.
if (data.toString("base64").replace(/=+$/, "") !== normalized.replace(/=+$/, "")) {
throw new CursorImageError("Image data URL contains invalid base64 data.");
}
if (data.length > MAX_CURSOR_IMAGE_DECODE_BYTES) {
throw new CursorImageError("Image input is too large to process safely.");
}
return { data, mimeType };
}
// Validate a URL through the SSRF guard, mapping guard errors to clean,
// non-sensitive CursorImageErrors (no URL echoed back).
function validatePublicImageUrl(url: string): URL {
try {
return parseAndValidatePublicUrl(url);
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof OutboundUrlGuardError) {
throw new CursorImageError(
err.code === "OUTBOUND_URL_INVALID"
? "Image URL is invalid or uses an unsupported scheme."
: "Image URL points to a blocked address."
);
}
throw new CursorImageError("Image URL is invalid.");
}
}
/**
* Throw if any of the resolved addresses falls in a private / link-local /
* loopback / CGNAT / metadata range. Exported for unit testing the IP gate
* without going through DNS.
*/
export function assertResolvedAddressesPublic(addresses: string[]): void {
for (const addr of addresses) {
if (isPrivateHost(addr)) {
throw new CursorImageError("Image URL points to a blocked address.");
}
}
}
/**
* Defence-in-depth against DNS-rebinding SSRF: `parseAndValidatePublicUrl`
* only checks the hostname *string*, so a public-looking host that resolves to
* a private/metadata IP would otherwise be fetched. Resolve the host and
* reject if ANY answer is private. IP literals are skipped (already validated
* by the guard above). This narrows — but doesn't fully eliminate — the
* TOCTOU window between our resolution and fetch's own; a connection-time IP
* filter (e.g. ssrf-req-filter) on the shared outbound guard would close it
* for every caller.
*/
async function assertHostnameResolvesPublic(hostname: string): Promise<void> {
const bare =
hostname.startsWith("[") && hostname.endsWith("]") ? hostname.slice(1, -1) : hostname;
if (isIP(bare)) return; // IP literal — already checked by the URL guard.
let resolved: Array<{ address: string }>;
try {
resolved = await dns.promises.lookup(bare, { all: true });
} catch {
throw new CursorImageError("Image URL host could not be resolved.");
}
assertResolvedAddressesPublic(resolved.map((r) => r.address));
}
async function fetchImageBytes(url: string): Promise<{ data: Buffer; mimeType: string }> {
// Follow redirects MANUALLY and re-validate every hop through the SSRF guard.
// `fetch` follows redirects by default, so validating only the initial URL
// would let a public host 30x-redirect to a private/link-local address and
// bypass the guard. Each Location is resolved + re-checked before we fetch it.
let currentUrl = url;
for (let hop = 0; hop <= MAX_IMAGE_REDIRECTS; hop++) {
const parsed = validatePublicImageUrl(currentUrl);
// Resolve + IP-check the host (DNS-rebinding defence) before connecting.
await assertHostnameResolvesPublic(parsed.hostname);
const controller = new AbortController();
const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), IMAGE_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS);
let response: Response;
try {
response = await fetch(parsed.toString(), {
method: "GET",
signal: controller.signal,
redirect: "manual",
});
} catch {
clearTimeout(timer);
throw new CursorImageError("Could not fetch the image URL.");
}
try {
// Manual redirect: resolve Location against the current URL and loop so
// the next hop is re-validated by the SSRF guard.
if (response.status >= 300 && response.status < 400) {
const location = response.headers.get("location");
if (!location) {
throw new CursorImageError("Image URL redirect is missing a destination.");
}
try {
currentUrl = new URL(location, parsed.toString()).toString();
} catch {
throw new CursorImageError("Image URL redirect destination is invalid.");
}
continue;
}
if (!response.ok) {
throw new CursorImageError(`Could not fetch the image URL (status ${response.status}).`);
}
const contentType = (response.headers.get("content-type") || "").toLowerCase();
const mimeType = contentType.split(";")[0].trim();
if (!mimeType.startsWith("image/")) {
throw new CursorImageError("Image URL did not return an image content type.");
}
// Reject early on an oversized Content-Length, then still cap during read
// (the header is advisory / may be absent).
const declaredLen = Number(response.headers.get("content-length") || "0");
if (Number.isFinite(declaredLen) && declaredLen > MAX_CURSOR_IMAGE_DECODE_BYTES) {
throw new CursorImageError("Image input is too large to process safely.");
}
const data = await readCapped(response, MAX_CURSOR_IMAGE_DECODE_BYTES);
return { data, mimeType };
} finally {
clearTimeout(timer);
}
}
throw new CursorImageError("Image URL has too many redirects.");
}
/**
* Read a fetch Response body into a Buffer, aborting as soon as the
* accumulated size exceeds `cap`. Consumes the body incrementally — as an
* async iterable (Node Readable streams and Web Streams both support this) or
* via a web ReadableStream reader — so an oversized body is rejected mid-read
* rather than fully buffered. The uncapped arrayBuffer() path is only a last
* resort for exotic body shapes, and is still cap-checked afterwards.
*/
async function readCapped(response: Response, cap: number): Promise<Buffer> {
const body = response.body as
| (AsyncIterable<Uint8Array> & { getReader?: () => ReadableStreamDefaultReader<Uint8Array> })
| null;
if (!body) {
return Buffer.alloc(0);
}
const chunks: Buffer[] = [];
let total = 0;
const pushCapped = (chunk: Uint8Array) => {
total += chunk.byteLength;
if (total > cap) {
throw new CursorImageError("Image input is too large to process safely.");
}
chunks.push(Buffer.from(chunk));
};
// Preferred: async iteration (works for Node Readable + Web Streams).
if (typeof (body as { [Symbol.asyncIterator]?: unknown })[Symbol.asyncIterator] === "function") {
for await (const chunk of body) {
pushCapped(chunk as Uint8Array);
}
return Buffer.concat(chunks, total);
}
// Fallback: web ReadableStream reader.
if (typeof body.getReader === "function") {
const reader = body.getReader();
try {
for (;;) {
const { done, value } = await reader.read();
if (done) break;
if (value) pushCapped(value);
}
} finally {
try {
await reader.cancel();
} catch {
/* already closed */
}
}
return Buffer.concat(chunks, total);
}
// Last resort: buffer then cap-check (only exotic non-stream bodies).
const buf = Buffer.from(await response.arrayBuffer());
if (buf.length > cap) {
throw new CursorImageError("Image input is too large to process safely.");
}
return buf;
}
/** Magic-byte format sniff (independent of declared MIME). */
export function sniffCursorImageFormat(
data: Uint8Array
): "png" | "jpeg" | "gif" | "webp" | undefined {
if (
data.byteLength >= 8 &&
data[0] === 0x89 &&
data[1] === 0x50 &&
data[2] === 0x4e &&
data[3] === 0x47 &&
data[4] === 0x0d &&
data[5] === 0x0a &&
data[6] === 0x1a &&
data[7] === 0x0a
) {
return "png";
}
if (
data.byteLength >= 6 &&
data[0] === 0x47 &&
data[1] === 0x49 &&
data[2] === 0x46 &&
data[3] === 0x38
) {
return "gif";
}
if (data.byteLength >= 4 && data[0] === 0xff && data[1] === 0xd8) return "jpeg";
if (
data.byteLength >= 12 &&
data[0] === 0x52 &&
data[1] === 0x49 &&
data[2] === 0x46 &&
data[3] === 0x46 &&
data[8] === 0x57 &&
data[9] === 0x45 &&
data[10] === 0x42 &&
data[11] === 0x50
) {
return "webp";
}
return undefined;
}
/**
* Sniff PNG/JPEG/GIF/WebP dimensions from raw bytes when the header is present.
* Best-effort only — unknown formats return undefined (dimension is optional).
*/
export function sniffCursorImageDimensions(
data: Uint8Array
): { width: number; height: number } | undefined {
// PNG: signature + IHDR chunk (width/height at bytes 16..23)
if (
data.byteLength >= 24 &&
data[0] === 0x89 &&
data[1] === 0x50 &&
data[2] === 0x4e &&
data[3] === 0x47 &&
data[4] === 0x0d &&
data[5] === 0x0a &&
data[6] === 0x1a &&
data[7] === 0x0a
) {
const width = ((data[16]! << 24) | (data[17]! << 16) | (data[18]! << 8) | data[19]!) >>> 0;
const height = ((data[20]! << 24) | (data[21]! << 16) | (data[22]! << 8) | data[23]!) >>> 0;
if (width > 0 && height > 0) return { width, height };
}
// GIF: "GIF8" + width/height as little-endian u16 at bytes 6..9
if (
data.byteLength >= 10 &&
data[0] === 0x47 &&
data[1] === 0x49 &&
data[2] === 0x46 &&
data[3] === 0x38
) {
const width = data[6]! | (data[7]! << 8);
const height = data[8]! | (data[9]! << 8);
if (width > 0 && height > 0) return { width, height };
}
// WebP: RIFF....WEBP + VP8X / VP8 / VP8L
if (
data.byteLength >= 30 &&
data[0] === 0x52 &&
data[1] === 0x49 &&
data[2] === 0x46 &&
data[3] === 0x46 &&
data[8] === 0x57 &&
data[9] === 0x45 &&
data[10] === 0x42 &&
data[11] === 0x50
) {
const fourcc = String.fromCharCode(data[12]!, data[13]!, data[14]!, data[15]!);
if (fourcc === "VP8X") {
const width = 1 + (data[24]! | (data[25]! << 8) | (data[26]! << 16));
const height = 1 + (data[27]! | (data[28]! << 8) | (data[29]! << 16));
if (width > 0 && height > 0) return { width, height };
} else if (fourcc === "VP8 ") {
if (data[23] === 0x9d && data[24] === 0x01 && data[25] === 0x2a) {
const width = (data[26]! | (data[27]! << 8)) & 0x3fff;
const height = (data[28]! | (data[29]! << 8)) & 0x3fff;
if (width > 0 && height > 0) return { width, height };
}
} else if (fourcc === "VP8L" && data[20] === 0x2f) {
const raw = data[21]! | (data[22]! << 8) | (data[23]! << 16) | (data[24]! << 24);
const width = (raw & 0x3fff) + 1;
const height = ((raw >> 14) & 0x3fff) + 1;
if (width > 0 && height > 0) return { width, height };
}
}
// JPEG: scan for SOF0/SOF2 marker with dimensions
if (data.byteLength >= 4 && data[0] === 0xff && data[1] === 0xd8) {
let offset = 2;
while (offset + 8 < data.byteLength) {
if (data[offset] !== 0xff) break;
const marker = data[offset + 1]!;
// Standalone markers (TEM, RSTn, SOI, EOI) carry no length payload.
if (marker === 0x01 || (marker >= 0xd0 && marker <= 0xd9)) {
offset += 2;
continue;
}
const length = (data[offset + 2]! << 8) | data[offset + 3]!;
if (marker === 0xc0 || marker === 0xc2) {
const height = (data[offset + 5]! << 8) | data[offset + 6]!;
const width = (data[offset + 7]! << 8) | data[offset + 8]!;
if (width > 0 && height > 0) return { width, height };
break;
}
if (length < 2) break;
offset += 2 + length;
}
}
return undefined;
}
type PreparedImage = {
data: Buffer;
mimeType: string;
width?: number;
height?: number;
};
/**
* Re-encode toward a JPEG under the soft vision cap when sharp can decode the
* payload. Fail-closed with CursorImageError on unsupported MIME, decode bombs,
* or undecodable bytes. After the quality ladder, edges shrink iteratively
* until the soft byte cap is met (or the min edge floor is hit).
*/
export async function prepareCursorImageForWire(input: {
data: Buffer;
mimeType: string;
detail?: string;
}): Promise<PreparedImage> {
const sharp = await loadSharp();
const mime = input.mimeType.toLowerCase();
const softMax = softMaxBytesForDetail(input.detail);
const qualities = jpegQualitiesForDetail(input.detail);
const lowestQuality = qualities[qualities.length - 1]!;
if (!CURSOR_VISION_PASSTHROUGH_MIME.has(mime)) {
throw new CursorImageError("Image input type is unsupported.");
}
const format = sniffCursorImageFormat(input.data);
const sniffed = sniffCursorImageDimensions(input.data);
if (sniffed) {
const edge = Math.max(sniffed.width, sniffed.height);
const pixels = sniffed.width * sniffed.height;
if (edge > MAX_CURSOR_IMAGE_DECODE_EDGE || pixels > MAX_CURSOR_IMAGE_PIXELS) {
throw new CursorImageError("Image input dimensions are too large.");
}
}
// Soft-cap skip: already soft-capped JPEG that has a real SOF (not SOI-only).
const declaredJpeg = mime === "image/jpeg" || mime === "image/jpg";
const alreadySmallJpeg =
declaredJpeg && format === "jpeg" && sniffed !== undefined && input.data.byteLength <= softMax;
if (alreadySmallJpeg) {
return {
data: input.data,
mimeType: "image/jpeg",
width: sniffed!.width,
height: sniffed!.height,
};
}
try {
// Force a full decode before accepting passthrough / encode.
await sharp(input.data, { failOn: "error" }).resize(1, 1).jpeg({ quality: 1 }).toBuffer();
// Passthrough only when declared MIME matches actual JPEG magic.
if (declaredJpeg && format === "jpeg" && input.data.byteLength <= softMax) {
const dims = sniffed ?? (await sharp(input.data).metadata());
const width = typeof dims.width === "number" ? dims.width : undefined;
const height = typeof dims.height === "number" ? dims.height : undefined;
return {
data: input.data,
mimeType: "image/jpeg",
...(width && height && width > 0 && height > 0 ? { width, height } : {}),
};
}
const meta = await sharp(input.data).metadata();
const width = typeof meta.width === "number" ? meta.width : 0;
const height = typeof meta.height === "number" ? meta.height : 0;
if (width > 0 && height > 0) {
const edge = Math.max(width, height);
if (edge > MAX_CURSOR_IMAGE_DECODE_EDGE || width * height > MAX_CURSOR_IMAGE_PIXELS) {
throw new CursorImageError("Image input dimensions are too large.");
}
}
let targetW = width;
let targetH = height;
if (width > 0 && height > 0 && Math.max(width, height) > CURSOR_VISION_MAX_EDGE) {
const scale = CURSOR_VISION_MAX_EDGE / Math.max(width, height);
targetW = Math.max(1, Math.round(width * scale));
targetH = Math.max(1, Math.round(height * scale));
}
const encodeAt = async (w: number, h: number, quality: number): Promise<Buffer> => {
let pipeline = sharp(input.data, { failOn: "error" });
if (w > 0 && h > 0 && (w !== width || h !== height)) {
pipeline = pipeline.resize(w, h);
}
return pipeline.jpeg({ quality, mozjpeg: true }).toBuffer();
};
let best: Buffer | undefined;
for (const quality of qualities) {
const encoded = await encodeAt(targetW, targetH, quality);
if (!best || encoded.byteLength < best.byteLength) best = encoded;
if (encoded.byteLength <= softMax) {
const outDims = sniffCursorImageDimensions(encoded);
return {
data: encoded,
mimeType: "image/jpeg",
...(outDims ?? (targetW > 0 && targetH > 0 ? { width: targetW, height: targetH } : {})),
};
}
}
while (
best &&
best.byteLength > softMax &&
targetW > 0 &&
targetH > 0 &&
Math.max(targetW, targetH) > CURSOR_VISION_SOFT_MIN_EDGE
) {
const nextW = Math.max(1, Math.round(targetW * CURSOR_VISION_SOFT_SHRINK));
const nextH = Math.max(1, Math.round(targetH * CURSOR_VISION_SOFT_SHRINK));
if (Math.max(nextW, nextH) < CURSOR_VISION_SOFT_MIN_EDGE) {
const scale = CURSOR_VISION_SOFT_MIN_EDGE / Math.max(targetW, targetH);
targetW = Math.max(1, Math.round(targetW * scale));
targetH = Math.max(1, Math.round(targetH * scale));
} else {
targetW = nextW;
targetH = nextH;
}
const encoded = await encodeAt(targetW, targetH, lowestQuality);
if (!best || encoded.byteLength < best.byteLength) best = encoded;
if (encoded.byteLength <= softMax) {
const outDims = sniffCursorImageDimensions(encoded);
return {
data: encoded,
mimeType: "image/jpeg",
...(outDims ?? { width: targetW, height: targetH }),
};
}
if (Math.max(targetW, targetH) <= CURSOR_VISION_SOFT_MIN_EDGE) break;
}
if (best) {
const outDims = sniffCursorImageDimensions(best);
return {
data: best,
mimeType: "image/jpeg",
...(outDims ?? (targetW > 0 && targetH > 0 ? { width: targetW, height: targetH } : {})),
};
}
if (declaredJpeg && format !== "jpeg") {
throw new CursorImageError("Image input is not a valid JPEG.");
}
throw new CursorImageError("Image input could not be prepared for Cursor vision.");
} catch (err) {
if (err instanceof CursorImageError) throw err;
throw new CursorImageError("Image input is undecodable or unsupported.");
}
}
/**
* Resolve OpenAI `image_url` URLs (data: or http(s):) into EncodedImage[]
* ready for SelectedImage blobIdWithData encoding. Each image gets a stable
* random uuid. Throws CursorImageError (clean message, sanitizable) on any
* invalid / oversized / blocked / undecodable input.
*/
export async function resolveCursorImages(
imageUrls: string[],
options?: { detail?: string; prepareForWire?: boolean }
): Promise<EncodedImage[]> {
// Cursor's SelectedImage wire format needs the JPEG soft-cap prep (#9840).
// Browser-upload callers (zai-web, conol-web) upload the ORIGINAL bytes to
// their own web UIs, so they opt out and keep the pre-#9840 decode+validate
// behavior: raw data + declared mimeType, capped at MAX_CURSOR_IMAGE_BYTES.
const prepareForWire = options?.prepareForWire !== false;
if (imageUrls.length > MAX_CURSOR_IMAGES) {
throw new CursorImageError(`Too many images in one request (max ${MAX_CURSOR_IMAGES}).`);
}
const out: EncodedImage[] = [];
for (const url of imageUrls) {
if (typeof url !== "string" || !url) {
throw new CursorImageError("Image URL is missing.");
}
// The data: scheme is case-insensitive (RFC 2397); match it that way but
// pass the original (un-lowercased) url so the base64 payload is preserved.
const { data, mimeType } = url.toLowerCase().startsWith("data:")
? decodeDataUrl(url)
: await fetchImageBytes(url);
if (!data.length) {
throw new CursorImageError("Image input is empty.");
}
if (data.length > MAX_CURSOR_IMAGE_DECODE_BYTES) {
throw new CursorImageError("Image input is too large to process safely.");
}
if (!prepareForWire) {
if (data.length > MAX_CURSOR_IMAGE_BYTES) {
throw new CursorImageError("Image input is too large (max 1 MiB). Resize and retry.");
}
out.push({ data, mimeType, uuid: crypto.randomUUID() });
continue;
}
const prepared = await prepareCursorImageForWire({
data,
mimeType,
detail: options?.detail,
});
if (prepared.data.length > MAX_CURSOR_IMAGE_BYTES) {
throw new CursorImageError("Image input is too large (max 1 MiB). Resize and retry.");
}
out.push({
data: prepared.data,
mimeType: prepared.mimeType,
uuid: crypto.randomUUID(),
...(typeof prepared.width === "number" && typeof prepared.height === "number"
? { width: prepared.width, height: prepared.height }
: {}),
});
}
return out;
}
/**
* Extract image_url URLs from an OpenAI-shaped message content array.
* Returns the raw url strings (data: or http(s):) in order. Non-image parts
* are ignored. A plain string content has no images.
*/
export function extractImageUrls(content: unknown): string[] {
if (!Array.isArray(content)) return [];
const urls: string[] = [];
for (const part of content) {
if (part && typeof part === "object" && (part as { type?: unknown }).type === "image_url") {
const imageUrl = (part as { image_url?: unknown }).image_url;
if (typeof imageUrl === "string") {
urls.push(imageUrl);
} else if (
imageUrl &&
typeof imageUrl === "object" &&
typeof (imageUrl as { url?: unknown }).url === "string"
) {
urls.push((imageUrl as { url: string }).url);
}
}
}
return urls;
}