mirror of
https://github.com/diegosouzapw/OmniRoute.git
synced 2026-08-13 18:52:18 +03:00
* fix(ci): clear base-reds on release/v3.8.50 (round 3) - CHANGELOG.md: restore the top [Unreleased] section dropped by the #10189 reconcile (docs-sync gate: first section must be Unreleased) - env-doc-sync: document CONDUCTOR_ORCHESTRATOR_TOKEN + CONDUCTOR_SPOKESPERSON_URL in .env.example/ENVIRONMENT.md; allowlist the CI-only GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY and TS7_BASE_REF (ts7 ratchet signals); drop a stray merge artifact line - providers: restore the audited chatanywhere metadata entry that base-reds round 2 dropped together with its duplicate — the provider was half-wired (registry+endpoint without APIKEY metadata), which is what the wave3 test catches; re-pin providers-constants-split at the measured 228 - docs counts: 338 -> 339 (today's +2 void-ai/helixmind, -1 Puter) via gen:provider-reference + README/AGENTS/llm.txt/package.json/diagrams/i18n mirrors - file-size ratchet: annotated rebaseline for the two pre-existing drifts (ModelSelectModal 1138, gateways 1250) following the 2026-08-11 precedent Refs #9985 * fix(ci): base-reds round 3b — stale sibling tests + mode-pack weight contract - check-docs-counts-sync.test.ts: drop the imports/subtests of the four helpers #10196 removed from the gate script (readMcpFactsFromSource, listLocalizedDocs, makeRequiredCountsValidator, checkFreeTierInventory) — the new-API tests that #10196 added stay; the file now loads again under the node runner - quota-connection-recovery.test.ts: convert from vitest APIs to node:test — the file lives in tests/unit/*.test.ts (node-runner glob) and the vitest runtime crashes when imported outside vitest, killing the whole shard entry - modePacks.ts: re-normalize all six mode packs to sum 1.0 — #8940 added sessionAvailability: 0.05 to every pack without rebalancing (1.05 total); ratios preserved exactly (÷1.05), so post-normalizeScoringWeights behavior is unchanged; restores the declared sum-to-1.0 contract the 4235 test pins Refs #9985 * fix(ci): base-reds round 3c — vitest siblings, weights default, secrets FP, mutation tap - DistributeProxiesButton.test.tsx: wrap renders in NextIntlClientProvider — #9245 localized the component (useTranslations) and left the test without the intl context, failing all 14 cases - scoring.ts: re-normalize DEFAULT_WEIGHTS to sum 1.0 (same #8940 class as the mode packs — sessionAvailability added without rebalancing; ratios preserved) - .gitleaks.toml: generalize the kimi sponsor-banner localStorage-key allowlist to -v\d+ — #10200 bumped v1→v2 and the stale regex regressed the secrets ratchet with a false positive - stryker.conf.json: register 6 covering unit tests in tap.testFiles (4 modules) so their mutant kills count — unblocks check:mutation-test-coverage --strict Refs #9985 * fix(ci): base-reds round 3d — inspector factor gap, stale registry/gap tests, i18n key sync - comboScoringInspector: add cacheAffinity/sessionAvailability/connectionDensity to FACTOR_KEYS + the factor-key type — calculateScore() weighs them but the breakdown omitted them, so the explained contributions never summed to the reported score (inspector bug, red on the pure tip) - combo-scoring-inspector.test: make the explicit-weights override sum-neutral (±0.05 shift) so it stays valid for any DEFAULT_WEIGHTS values — the hardcoded override only summed to 1.0 against the pre-#8940 defaults, which is also why explicit weights silently fell back to 'default' on the tip - unorouter-registry.test: align to the canonical .com host (api.unorouter.ai 301-redirects there, verified live) and to wave4's live model discovery (passthrough, no static seed) — the .ai/auto-model expectations were stale - check-migration-numbering.test: 147 left KNOWN_GAPS when 147_api_keys_model_access_mode.sql landed — assert absent (same as 143) - i18n: sync-ui pass — 35,914 missing UI keys stamped as __MISSING__ placeholders across 42 locales (mechanical; greens the pt-BR key-presence integrity test; coverage pct unchanged by design — translation is a separate workstream) Refs #9985 * fix(ci): base-reds round 3e — 2 real defects + 14 stale sibling tests (waves A-E) Real defects fixed: - src/lib/db/apiKeys.ts: #9313's empty-allowlist early return bypassed the group permission check, silently disabling group deny rules (#8817) for every key without a per-key allowlist; fall-through restored, restricted+[] deny-all kept - open-sse/utils/proxyFetch.ts: #10032 re-appended the raw transport error to the propagated message, reintroducing the proxy user:password leak #9837 closed; new redactProxyDetailsInMessage() keeps the reason, redacts URL/credentials - .github/workflows/quality.yml: #10134 added the TS7 ratchet as a separate blocking step AFTER the aggregated gates — the exact #8542 masking mechanism; folded into the non-fail-fast loop (still blocking, still PR-only) ⚠️ CI edit, gate-strengthening — explicit owner sign-off requested on the PR - src/i18n/messages/ko.json: 3 machine-mistranslation regressions caught by the #8244 glossary checker (장애인→비활성화됨, 양말5://→socks5://, 비클로드→Claude가 아닌) Stale sibling tests aligned to deliberately-moved contracts (each cites its mover): request-log-detail-layout + -stream (#9245 intl provider), repro-8542 pin update, quality-rail-gate-membership (#10134 shape), agentSkills-routes 45→46 (#9058), cloudflare-ai-catalog-8717 (#8804 supersedes #8808), executor-xai (#9994), vision-bridge-claude-wire (#9463 minimax→openai), sse-auth forced-pin (#8893), tls-proxy-context (strengthened leak guards), rate-limit-local-error-classification (#9164/#9342), minimax-thinking-signature (#9463), codebuddy-cn (#9723 +1 test), github-copilot-custom-model (#9050), providers-g4f-batch3 (#9584), synced-capability-warmup (#9199, stricter), sidebar-tools-group (#8221), oauth-modal-grok-cli-paste (#9245); agentSkills/catalog.ts comment 45→46; file-size rebaseline for proxyFetch (+19, annotated) Refs #9985 * fix(ci): base-reds round 3f — waves F-J: 9 more real defects + stale sibling sweep Real production defects fixed (all red on the pure tip, each with its origin): - routeGuard.ts: #8949 accidentally DELETED the /api/providers/[id]/login local-only pattern — the route spawns a browser, so the loopback gate for a process-spawning route was gone (Hard Rules #15/#17); restored (314 guard tests green) - agentSkills generator: #9058's category dispatch gave the config category an empty body, wiping skills/config-codex-cli/SKILL.md at the #10131 sync; fixed + SKILL.md regenerated via the official generator - imageRegistry: #9982 broke same-provider bare aliasing (antigravity preview id sent upstream unresolved); new resolveSameProviderBareAlias() keeps the fal cross-provider fix intact - imageRegistry: #9982's prefix strip handed the bare nano-banana ids to fal-ai, violating the pinned 2026-07-31 operator decision (adobe-firefly owns them); fal entries made prefix-only (dispatch already re-prefixes) - mediaGeneration/fal.ts: the missing-credential 401 guard was lost when #10198 deleted the superseded falHandler — tests were hitting the live network - bottleneckPatch/rateLimitManager: #9041's merge clobbered #9604, resurrecting the Bottleneck v2.19.5 heartbeat bug (reservoir never refills); patched the library defect at the root and re-aligned chat-rate-limit-body-lock to the working reservoir contract - processSupervisor.mjs: #9761 regressed the Node spawn to bare "node" (the #9156 launchd bug) and dropped #9209's ipv4first args; both restored - openai-responses/pureHelpers: #9423's Agent null-sentinel was unreachable on the schemaless JSON-string path; gate extended - i18n en.json: #8222's regen reverted the #9976 unclosed-tag fix and #8559's combo-cooldown copy; #9038 shipped 40 t() calls with no messages (runtime MISSING_MESSAGE); all restored/added + official sync-ui stamps, and vi's zero-marker policy re-established via the sanctioned translation backend Stale sibling tests aligned (movers cited inline): chat-helpers (#9447), executor-antigravity (#9351), video-fal-grok (#9982), visionBridge (#9759), web-session-credentials (#8974), production-build-module-integrity (positive anchor added), agentSkills-generator/skillManifestsLint/skills-injection/ agentSkillTools-mcp/listCapabilities-a2a (#9058), memory-settings (#10010), model-catalog-policy-invalidation (#8906), model-alias-seed (#9485), reactive-context-compaction (#8949), combo-provider-wildcard (broken upsert helper), oauth-google-loopback (43-locale resurrected-key removal) Validation: 501/501 across the 47 touched test files; typecheck:core, lint, file-size, docs-sync all green. Refs #9985 * fix(ci): base-reds round 3g — wave K/L: 4 more real defects + stale alignments Real defects: - base/reasoningEffort.ts: the stale duplicate cherry-pick #9612 re-added the codex minimal→low rewrite that #9883 had deliberately removed (OMP minimal passthrough); block removed again - cursorImages.ts: #9840 wired prepareCursorImageForWire (sharp re-encode, fail-closed) into the SHARED resolveCursorImages, breaking zai-web and conol-web image uploads (HTTP 400 'undecodable'); new prepareForWire opt-out, Cursor default path unchanged (8 cursor suites green) - modelCapabilities/snapshot: catalog prepare still issued 323 per-model reads of model_context_overrides + max_input_tokens overrides, violating #9199's bulk-load contract; both now resolve from the snapshot single pass - v1-models-discovery-conformance: re-pinned to the bounded 30s SWR window (#9199/#10198) — the old 'stale-first regardless of age' contract is gone Stale tests aligned (movers cited inline): codex-tools-strict-default (#9828 redundant-oneOf strip), devin-providers (#9245 i18n), db-migrationrunner- constants-split (147→151 renumber #8228), gitlab-duo-oauth-setup (#9245), chatcore-extracted-modules (#9161 outbound-protocol keying) compression-api CI failures were cascade artifacts of codex-tools-strict-default failing in the same force-exit shard process — no own defect (171/171 local). Refs #9985 * fix(test): compression-api — register both describes before the runner starts The DATA_DIR setup + route/db top-level awaits sat BETWEEN the two describes; under --test-force-exit (the CI unit-runner flag) the process exits once the already-registered tests finish, so on slow CI machines the whole second describe died as 'Promise resolution is still pending' — the recurring CI-only shard-2 failure that never reproduced locally without the flag. Moved to the top of the file; 10/10 under --test-force-exit locally. Refs #9985 * fix(quality): freeze modelCapabilities.ts at 1006 (annotated) — snapshot routing growth Refs #9985 * fix(quality): move the modelCapabilities freeze into the frozen map (nested schema) Refs #9985 * fix(i18n): translate all 39,718 pending UI keys across 42 locales (owner-approved) Mass-translated every __MISSING__ placeholder via the official i18n:sync-ui --translate-markers pipeline (operator backend), restoring i18nUiCoverage to the 100 baseline (was 89.9 after the merge-storm UI landings + the 42 keys #9038 never shipped). Post-pass repairs, all caught by the existing gates: - glossary: retired renderings the machine reintroduced normalized again (提供商→提供者 zh-CN/zh-TW, 鏈接→連結, 文檔→文件, 調用→呼叫, 供應商→提供者, 響應→回應, 不活躍→未啟用 zh-TW; 클로드→Claude, 옴니루트→OmniRoute ko); DATA_DIR forbidden rendering avoided via 数据文件夹 rephrase - ICU integrity: 120 values with renamed/dropped {params} repaired (39 positional renames, 81 reset to the en source — functional over fluent) Validation: glossary/pt-BR/vi/deno-relay/settings-keys/value-drift/google- loopback suites 76/76; placeholder diff en×42 locales = 0; worst-locale coverage = 100.0%. Refs #9985 --------- Co-authored-by: backryun <bakryun0718@proton.me>
740 lines
27 KiB
TypeScript
740 lines
27 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Image resolution + security for Cursor vision input.
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*
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* Turns OpenAI `image_url` parts (base64 `data:` URIs or remote `http(s)`
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* URLs) into decoded, JPEG-prepped bytes ready for SelectedImage
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* `blobIdWithData` encoding (see cursorAgentProtobuf.ts).
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*
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* Security (OmniRoute hard rules):
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* - SSRF: remote fetches go through the repo's canonical outbound guard
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* (`parseAndValidatePublicUrl`), which rejects non-http(s) schemes,
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* embedded credentials, localhost, link-local, private/CGNAT ranges, and
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* cloud-metadata hostnames. Client-supplied image URLs are always held to
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* the strict public-only policy (never gated by the private-URL toggle that
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* admin-configured provider URLs use).
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* - Size caps: inbound decode/fetch is bounded (16 MiB) so large clipboard
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* PNGs can shrink via JPEG soft-cap prep; the final wire image must be
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* <= 1 MiB. Soft target is ~100 KiB JPEG for reliable Cursor hydration.
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* - Content type: data URIs and URL responses must be `image/*`.
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* - Errors throw `CursorImageError` with a clean, path-free message; the
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* executor routes it through the sanitized 400 path (hard rule #12).
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*/
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import crypto from "node:crypto";
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import dns from "node:dns";
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import { isIP } from "node:net";
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import {
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parseAndValidatePublicUrl,
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isPrivateHost,
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OutboundUrlGuardError,
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} from "@/shared/network/outboundUrlGuard";
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import type { EncodedImage } from "./cursorAgentProtobuf.ts";
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type SharpFactory = (typeof import("sharp"))["default"];
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let sharpFactoryPromise: Promise<SharpFactory> | undefined;
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function loadSharp(): Promise<SharpFactory> {
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sharpFactoryPromise ??= import("sharp").then((module) => module.default);
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return sharpFactoryPromise;
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}
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/** Final per-image byte cap after prep (composer-api / wire bound). */
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export const MAX_CURSOR_IMAGE_BYTES = 1024 * 1024;
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/**
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* Inbound decode/fetch bomb ceiling before JPEG prep. Large clipboard PNGs may
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* exceed {@link MAX_CURSOR_IMAGE_BYTES} raw but shrink under the wire cap after
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* re-encode.
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*/
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export const MAX_CURSOR_IMAGE_DECODE_BYTES = 16 * 1024 * 1024;
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/**
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* Soft target for Cursor vision hydration. Prefer JPEG at or under this size.
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*/
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export const CURSOR_VISION_SOFT_MAX_BYTES = 100 * 1024;
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/** Soft target when the client requests `detail: original` or `high`. */
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export const CURSOR_VISION_SOFT_MAX_BYTES_HIGH = 256 * 1024;
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/** Longest edge after Cursor vision prep. */
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export const CURSOR_VISION_MAX_EDGE = 2000;
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/** Decode bomb: reject images whose sniffed longest edge exceeds this. */
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export const MAX_CURSOR_IMAGE_DECODE_EDGE = 8192;
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/** Decode bomb: reject images whose sniffed pixel count exceeds this. */
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export const MAX_CURSOR_IMAGE_PIXELS = 25_000_000;
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const CURSOR_VISION_JPEG_QUALITIES_DEFAULT = [85, 70, 55, 40] as const;
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const CURSOR_VISION_JPEG_QUALITIES_HIGH = [90, 80, 65, 50] as const;
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const CURSOR_VISION_SOFT_MIN_EDGE = 256;
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const CURSOR_VISION_SOFT_SHRINK = 0.85;
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const CURSOR_VISION_PASSTHROUGH_MIME = new Set([
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"image/jpeg",
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"image/jpg",
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"image/png",
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"image/gif",
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"image/webp",
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]);
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/** Upper bound on images attached to one Cursor turn. */
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export const MAX_CURSOR_IMAGES = 12;
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// Wall-clock cap for a single remote image fetch. A malformed env value
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// (NaN / non-positive) falls back to the default rather than breaking setTimeout.
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const IMAGE_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS = (() => {
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const parsed = parseInt(process.env.CURSOR_IMAGE_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS || "15000", 10);
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return Number.isInteger(parsed) && parsed > 0 ? parsed : 15000;
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})();
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// Bound on how many redirects fetchImageBytes will follow (each re-validated
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// against the SSRF guard before the next hop).
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const MAX_IMAGE_REDIRECTS = 3;
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/**
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* A 400-class error carrying a clean, non-sensitive message. The executor
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* catches it and emits a sanitized error response.
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*/
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export class CursorImageError extends Error {
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status: number;
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constructor(message: string, status = 400) {
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super(message);
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this.name = "CursorImageError";
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this.status = status;
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}
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}
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function estimatedBase64DecodedBytes(payload: string): number {
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return Math.floor((payload.length * 3) / 4);
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}
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function isHighDetail(detail: string | undefined): boolean {
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const normalized = (detail || "").toLowerCase();
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return normalized === "high" || normalized === "original";
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}
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function softMaxBytesForDetail(detail: string | undefined): number {
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return isHighDetail(detail) ? CURSOR_VISION_SOFT_MAX_BYTES_HIGH : CURSOR_VISION_SOFT_MAX_BYTES;
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}
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function jpegQualitiesForDetail(detail: string | undefined): readonly number[] {
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return isHighDetail(detail)
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? CURSOR_VISION_JPEG_QUALITIES_HIGH
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: CURSOR_VISION_JPEG_QUALITIES_DEFAULT;
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}
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function decodeDataUrl(url: string): { data: Buffer; mimeType: string } {
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// data:[<mediatype>][;base64],<data>
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const comma = url.indexOf(",");
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if (comma < 0) {
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throw new CursorImageError("Image data URL is malformed.");
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}
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const header = url.slice(5, comma); // strip leading "data:"
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const payload = url.slice(comma + 1);
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const isBase64 = /;base64/i.test(header);
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const mimeType = (header.split(";")[0] || "").trim().toLowerCase() || "application/octet-stream";
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if (!mimeType.startsWith("image/")) {
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throw new CursorImageError("Image data URL must have an image/* media type.");
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}
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if (!isBase64) {
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// Non-base64 data URLs (percent-encoded) are not a real image transport;
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// reject rather than guess.
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throw new CursorImageError("Image data URL must be base64-encoded.");
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}
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// Reject on the raw payload length BEFORE the regex/normalize pass, so an
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// arbitrarily large data URL can't burn CPU on the whitespace strip. Base64
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// expands ~4:3, so 2x the decode ceiling is a safe upper bound on the text.
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if (payload.length > MAX_CURSOR_IMAGE_DECODE_BYTES * 2) {
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throw new CursorImageError("Image input is too large to process safely.");
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}
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const normalized = payload.replace(/\s/g, "");
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if (normalized.length === 0) {
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throw new CursorImageError("Image data URL contains invalid base64 data.");
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}
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// Reject lenient Buffer.from acceptances (wrong alphabet, bad padding).
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if (normalized.length % 4 !== 0 || !/^[A-Za-z0-9+/]+={0,2}$/.test(normalized)) {
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throw new CursorImageError("Image data URL contains invalid base64 data.");
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}
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if (estimatedBase64DecodedBytes(normalized) > MAX_CURSOR_IMAGE_DECODE_BYTES) {
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throw new CursorImageError("Image input is too large to process safely.");
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}
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let data: Buffer;
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try {
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data = Buffer.from(normalized, "base64");
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} catch {
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throw new CursorImageError("Image data URL contains invalid base64 data.");
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}
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if (data.length === 0) {
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throw new CursorImageError("Image data URL contains invalid base64 data.");
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}
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// Round-trip guard: Node can silently drop trailing garbage.
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if (data.toString("base64").replace(/=+$/, "") !== normalized.replace(/=+$/, "")) {
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throw new CursorImageError("Image data URL contains invalid base64 data.");
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}
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if (data.length > MAX_CURSOR_IMAGE_DECODE_BYTES) {
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throw new CursorImageError("Image input is too large to process safely.");
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}
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return { data, mimeType };
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}
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// Validate a URL through the SSRF guard, mapping guard errors to clean,
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// non-sensitive CursorImageErrors (no URL echoed back).
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function validatePublicImageUrl(url: string): URL {
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try {
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return parseAndValidatePublicUrl(url);
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} catch (err) {
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if (err instanceof OutboundUrlGuardError) {
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throw new CursorImageError(
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err.code === "OUTBOUND_URL_INVALID"
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? "Image URL is invalid or uses an unsupported scheme."
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: "Image URL points to a blocked address."
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);
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}
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throw new CursorImageError("Image URL is invalid.");
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}
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}
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/**
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* Throw if any of the resolved addresses falls in a private / link-local /
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* loopback / CGNAT / metadata range. Exported for unit testing the IP gate
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* without going through DNS.
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*/
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export function assertResolvedAddressesPublic(addresses: string[]): void {
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for (const addr of addresses) {
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if (isPrivateHost(addr)) {
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throw new CursorImageError("Image URL points to a blocked address.");
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}
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}
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}
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/**
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* Defence-in-depth against DNS-rebinding SSRF: `parseAndValidatePublicUrl`
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* only checks the hostname *string*, so a public-looking host that resolves to
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* a private/metadata IP would otherwise be fetched. Resolve the host and
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* reject if ANY answer is private. IP literals are skipped (already validated
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* by the guard above). This narrows — but doesn't fully eliminate — the
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* TOCTOU window between our resolution and fetch's own; a connection-time IP
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* filter (e.g. ssrf-req-filter) on the shared outbound guard would close it
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* for every caller.
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*/
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async function assertHostnameResolvesPublic(hostname: string): Promise<void> {
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const bare =
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hostname.startsWith("[") && hostname.endsWith("]") ? hostname.slice(1, -1) : hostname;
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if (isIP(bare)) return; // IP literal — already checked by the URL guard.
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let resolved: Array<{ address: string }>;
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try {
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resolved = await dns.promises.lookup(bare, { all: true });
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} catch {
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throw new CursorImageError("Image URL host could not be resolved.");
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}
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assertResolvedAddressesPublic(resolved.map((r) => r.address));
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}
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async function fetchImageBytes(url: string): Promise<{ data: Buffer; mimeType: string }> {
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// Follow redirects MANUALLY and re-validate every hop through the SSRF guard.
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// `fetch` follows redirects by default, so validating only the initial URL
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// would let a public host 30x-redirect to a private/link-local address and
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// bypass the guard. Each Location is resolved + re-checked before we fetch it.
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let currentUrl = url;
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for (let hop = 0; hop <= MAX_IMAGE_REDIRECTS; hop++) {
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const parsed = validatePublicImageUrl(currentUrl);
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// Resolve + IP-check the host (DNS-rebinding defence) before connecting.
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await assertHostnameResolvesPublic(parsed.hostname);
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const controller = new AbortController();
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const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), IMAGE_FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS);
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let response: Response;
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try {
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response = await fetch(parsed.toString(), {
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method: "GET",
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signal: controller.signal,
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redirect: "manual",
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});
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} catch {
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clearTimeout(timer);
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throw new CursorImageError("Could not fetch the image URL.");
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}
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try {
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// Manual redirect: resolve Location against the current URL and loop so
|
|
// the next hop is re-validated by the SSRF guard.
|
|
if (response.status >= 300 && response.status < 400) {
|
|
const location = response.headers.get("location");
|
|
if (!location) {
|
|
throw new CursorImageError("Image URL redirect is missing a destination.");
|
|
}
|
|
try {
|
|
currentUrl = new URL(location, parsed.toString()).toString();
|
|
} catch {
|
|
throw new CursorImageError("Image URL redirect destination is invalid.");
|
|
}
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!response.ok) {
|
|
throw new CursorImageError(`Could not fetch the image URL (status ${response.status}).`);
|
|
}
|
|
const contentType = (response.headers.get("content-type") || "").toLowerCase();
|
|
const mimeType = contentType.split(";")[0].trim();
|
|
if (!mimeType.startsWith("image/")) {
|
|
throw new CursorImageError("Image URL did not return an image content type.");
|
|
}
|
|
// Reject early on an oversized Content-Length, then still cap during read
|
|
// (the header is advisory / may be absent).
|
|
const declaredLen = Number(response.headers.get("content-length") || "0");
|
|
if (Number.isFinite(declaredLen) && declaredLen > MAX_CURSOR_IMAGE_DECODE_BYTES) {
|
|
throw new CursorImageError("Image input is too large to process safely.");
|
|
}
|
|
const data = await readCapped(response, MAX_CURSOR_IMAGE_DECODE_BYTES);
|
|
return { data, mimeType };
|
|
} finally {
|
|
clearTimeout(timer);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
throw new CursorImageError("Image URL has too many redirects.");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Read a fetch Response body into a Buffer, aborting as soon as the
|
|
* accumulated size exceeds `cap`. Consumes the body incrementally — as an
|
|
* async iterable (Node Readable streams and Web Streams both support this) or
|
|
* via a web ReadableStream reader — so an oversized body is rejected mid-read
|
|
* rather than fully buffered. The uncapped arrayBuffer() path is only a last
|
|
* resort for exotic body shapes, and is still cap-checked afterwards.
|
|
*/
|
|
async function readCapped(response: Response, cap: number): Promise<Buffer> {
|
|
const body = response.body as
|
|
| (AsyncIterable<Uint8Array> & { getReader?: () => ReadableStreamDefaultReader<Uint8Array> })
|
|
| null;
|
|
if (!body) {
|
|
return Buffer.alloc(0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const chunks: Buffer[] = [];
|
|
let total = 0;
|
|
const pushCapped = (chunk: Uint8Array) => {
|
|
total += chunk.byteLength;
|
|
if (total > cap) {
|
|
throw new CursorImageError("Image input is too large to process safely.");
|
|
}
|
|
chunks.push(Buffer.from(chunk));
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
// Preferred: async iteration (works for Node Readable + Web Streams).
|
|
if (typeof (body as { [Symbol.asyncIterator]?: unknown })[Symbol.asyncIterator] === "function") {
|
|
for await (const chunk of body) {
|
|
pushCapped(chunk as Uint8Array);
|
|
}
|
|
return Buffer.concat(chunks, total);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Fallback: web ReadableStream reader.
|
|
if (typeof body.getReader === "function") {
|
|
const reader = body.getReader();
|
|
try {
|
|
for (;;) {
|
|
const { done, value } = await reader.read();
|
|
if (done) break;
|
|
if (value) pushCapped(value);
|
|
}
|
|
} finally {
|
|
try {
|
|
await reader.cancel();
|
|
} catch {
|
|
/* already closed */
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return Buffer.concat(chunks, total);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Last resort: buffer then cap-check (only exotic non-stream bodies).
|
|
const buf = Buffer.from(await response.arrayBuffer());
|
|
if (buf.length > cap) {
|
|
throw new CursorImageError("Image input is too large to process safely.");
|
|
}
|
|
return buf;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Magic-byte format sniff (independent of declared MIME). */
|
|
export function sniffCursorImageFormat(
|
|
data: Uint8Array
|
|
): "png" | "jpeg" | "gif" | "webp" | undefined {
|
|
if (
|
|
data.byteLength >= 8 &&
|
|
data[0] === 0x89 &&
|
|
data[1] === 0x50 &&
|
|
data[2] === 0x4e &&
|
|
data[3] === 0x47 &&
|
|
data[4] === 0x0d &&
|
|
data[5] === 0x0a &&
|
|
data[6] === 0x1a &&
|
|
data[7] === 0x0a
|
|
) {
|
|
return "png";
|
|
}
|
|
if (
|
|
data.byteLength >= 6 &&
|
|
data[0] === 0x47 &&
|
|
data[1] === 0x49 &&
|
|
data[2] === 0x46 &&
|
|
data[3] === 0x38
|
|
) {
|
|
return "gif";
|
|
}
|
|
if (data.byteLength >= 4 && data[0] === 0xff && data[1] === 0xd8) return "jpeg";
|
|
if (
|
|
data.byteLength >= 12 &&
|
|
data[0] === 0x52 &&
|
|
data[1] === 0x49 &&
|
|
data[2] === 0x46 &&
|
|
data[3] === 0x46 &&
|
|
data[8] === 0x57 &&
|
|
data[9] === 0x45 &&
|
|
data[10] === 0x42 &&
|
|
data[11] === 0x50
|
|
) {
|
|
return "webp";
|
|
}
|
|
return undefined;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Sniff PNG/JPEG/GIF/WebP dimensions from raw bytes when the header is present.
|
|
* Best-effort only — unknown formats return undefined (dimension is optional).
|
|
*/
|
|
export function sniffCursorImageDimensions(
|
|
data: Uint8Array
|
|
): { width: number; height: number } | undefined {
|
|
// PNG: signature + IHDR chunk (width/height at bytes 16..23)
|
|
if (
|
|
data.byteLength >= 24 &&
|
|
data[0] === 0x89 &&
|
|
data[1] === 0x50 &&
|
|
data[2] === 0x4e &&
|
|
data[3] === 0x47 &&
|
|
data[4] === 0x0d &&
|
|
data[5] === 0x0a &&
|
|
data[6] === 0x1a &&
|
|
data[7] === 0x0a
|
|
) {
|
|
const width = ((data[16]! << 24) | (data[17]! << 16) | (data[18]! << 8) | data[19]!) >>> 0;
|
|
const height = ((data[20]! << 24) | (data[21]! << 16) | (data[22]! << 8) | data[23]!) >>> 0;
|
|
if (width > 0 && height > 0) return { width, height };
|
|
}
|
|
// GIF: "GIF8" + width/height as little-endian u16 at bytes 6..9
|
|
if (
|
|
data.byteLength >= 10 &&
|
|
data[0] === 0x47 &&
|
|
data[1] === 0x49 &&
|
|
data[2] === 0x46 &&
|
|
data[3] === 0x38
|
|
) {
|
|
const width = data[6]! | (data[7]! << 8);
|
|
const height = data[8]! | (data[9]! << 8);
|
|
if (width > 0 && height > 0) return { width, height };
|
|
}
|
|
// WebP: RIFF....WEBP + VP8X / VP8 / VP8L
|
|
if (
|
|
data.byteLength >= 30 &&
|
|
data[0] === 0x52 &&
|
|
data[1] === 0x49 &&
|
|
data[2] === 0x46 &&
|
|
data[3] === 0x46 &&
|
|
data[8] === 0x57 &&
|
|
data[9] === 0x45 &&
|
|
data[10] === 0x42 &&
|
|
data[11] === 0x50
|
|
) {
|
|
const fourcc = String.fromCharCode(data[12]!, data[13]!, data[14]!, data[15]!);
|
|
if (fourcc === "VP8X") {
|
|
const width = 1 + (data[24]! | (data[25]! << 8) | (data[26]! << 16));
|
|
const height = 1 + (data[27]! | (data[28]! << 8) | (data[29]! << 16));
|
|
if (width > 0 && height > 0) return { width, height };
|
|
} else if (fourcc === "VP8 ") {
|
|
if (data[23] === 0x9d && data[24] === 0x01 && data[25] === 0x2a) {
|
|
const width = (data[26]! | (data[27]! << 8)) & 0x3fff;
|
|
const height = (data[28]! | (data[29]! << 8)) & 0x3fff;
|
|
if (width > 0 && height > 0) return { width, height };
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (fourcc === "VP8L" && data[20] === 0x2f) {
|
|
const raw = data[21]! | (data[22]! << 8) | (data[23]! << 16) | (data[24]! << 24);
|
|
const width = (raw & 0x3fff) + 1;
|
|
const height = ((raw >> 14) & 0x3fff) + 1;
|
|
if (width > 0 && height > 0) return { width, height };
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// JPEG: scan for SOF0/SOF2 marker with dimensions
|
|
if (data.byteLength >= 4 && data[0] === 0xff && data[1] === 0xd8) {
|
|
let offset = 2;
|
|
while (offset + 8 < data.byteLength) {
|
|
if (data[offset] !== 0xff) break;
|
|
const marker = data[offset + 1]!;
|
|
// Standalone markers (TEM, RSTn, SOI, EOI) carry no length payload.
|
|
if (marker === 0x01 || (marker >= 0xd0 && marker <= 0xd9)) {
|
|
offset += 2;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
const length = (data[offset + 2]! << 8) | data[offset + 3]!;
|
|
if (marker === 0xc0 || marker === 0xc2) {
|
|
const height = (data[offset + 5]! << 8) | data[offset + 6]!;
|
|
const width = (data[offset + 7]! << 8) | data[offset + 8]!;
|
|
if (width > 0 && height > 0) return { width, height };
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
if (length < 2) break;
|
|
offset += 2 + length;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return undefined;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type PreparedImage = {
|
|
data: Buffer;
|
|
mimeType: string;
|
|
width?: number;
|
|
height?: number;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Re-encode toward a JPEG under the soft vision cap when sharp can decode the
|
|
* payload. Fail-closed with CursorImageError on unsupported MIME, decode bombs,
|
|
* or undecodable bytes. After the quality ladder, edges shrink iteratively
|
|
* until the soft byte cap is met (or the min edge floor is hit).
|
|
*/
|
|
export async function prepareCursorImageForWire(input: {
|
|
data: Buffer;
|
|
mimeType: string;
|
|
detail?: string;
|
|
}): Promise<PreparedImage> {
|
|
const sharp = await loadSharp();
|
|
const mime = input.mimeType.toLowerCase();
|
|
const softMax = softMaxBytesForDetail(input.detail);
|
|
const qualities = jpegQualitiesForDetail(input.detail);
|
|
const lowestQuality = qualities[qualities.length - 1]!;
|
|
|
|
if (!CURSOR_VISION_PASSTHROUGH_MIME.has(mime)) {
|
|
throw new CursorImageError("Image input type is unsupported.");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const format = sniffCursorImageFormat(input.data);
|
|
const sniffed = sniffCursorImageDimensions(input.data);
|
|
if (sniffed) {
|
|
const edge = Math.max(sniffed.width, sniffed.height);
|
|
const pixels = sniffed.width * sniffed.height;
|
|
if (edge > MAX_CURSOR_IMAGE_DECODE_EDGE || pixels > MAX_CURSOR_IMAGE_PIXELS) {
|
|
throw new CursorImageError("Image input dimensions are too large.");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Soft-cap skip: already soft-capped JPEG that has a real SOF (not SOI-only).
|
|
const declaredJpeg = mime === "image/jpeg" || mime === "image/jpg";
|
|
const alreadySmallJpeg =
|
|
declaredJpeg && format === "jpeg" && sniffed !== undefined && input.data.byteLength <= softMax;
|
|
if (alreadySmallJpeg) {
|
|
return {
|
|
data: input.data,
|
|
mimeType: "image/jpeg",
|
|
width: sniffed!.width,
|
|
height: sniffed!.height,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
// Force a full decode before accepting passthrough / encode.
|
|
await sharp(input.data, { failOn: "error" }).resize(1, 1).jpeg({ quality: 1 }).toBuffer();
|
|
|
|
// Passthrough only when declared MIME matches actual JPEG magic.
|
|
if (declaredJpeg && format === "jpeg" && input.data.byteLength <= softMax) {
|
|
const dims = sniffed ?? (await sharp(input.data).metadata());
|
|
const width = typeof dims.width === "number" ? dims.width : undefined;
|
|
const height = typeof dims.height === "number" ? dims.height : undefined;
|
|
return {
|
|
data: input.data,
|
|
mimeType: "image/jpeg",
|
|
...(width && height && width > 0 && height > 0 ? { width, height } : {}),
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const meta = await sharp(input.data).metadata();
|
|
const width = typeof meta.width === "number" ? meta.width : 0;
|
|
const height = typeof meta.height === "number" ? meta.height : 0;
|
|
if (width > 0 && height > 0) {
|
|
const edge = Math.max(width, height);
|
|
if (edge > MAX_CURSOR_IMAGE_DECODE_EDGE || width * height > MAX_CURSOR_IMAGE_PIXELS) {
|
|
throw new CursorImageError("Image input dimensions are too large.");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let targetW = width;
|
|
let targetH = height;
|
|
if (width > 0 && height > 0 && Math.max(width, height) > CURSOR_VISION_MAX_EDGE) {
|
|
const scale = CURSOR_VISION_MAX_EDGE / Math.max(width, height);
|
|
targetW = Math.max(1, Math.round(width * scale));
|
|
targetH = Math.max(1, Math.round(height * scale));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const encodeAt = async (w: number, h: number, quality: number): Promise<Buffer> => {
|
|
let pipeline = sharp(input.data, { failOn: "error" });
|
|
if (w > 0 && h > 0 && (w !== width || h !== height)) {
|
|
pipeline = pipeline.resize(w, h);
|
|
}
|
|
return pipeline.jpeg({ quality, mozjpeg: true }).toBuffer();
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let best: Buffer | undefined;
|
|
for (const quality of qualities) {
|
|
const encoded = await encodeAt(targetW, targetH, quality);
|
|
if (!best || encoded.byteLength < best.byteLength) best = encoded;
|
|
if (encoded.byteLength <= softMax) {
|
|
const outDims = sniffCursorImageDimensions(encoded);
|
|
return {
|
|
data: encoded,
|
|
mimeType: "image/jpeg",
|
|
...(outDims ?? (targetW > 0 && targetH > 0 ? { width: targetW, height: targetH } : {})),
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while (
|
|
best &&
|
|
best.byteLength > softMax &&
|
|
targetW > 0 &&
|
|
targetH > 0 &&
|
|
Math.max(targetW, targetH) > CURSOR_VISION_SOFT_MIN_EDGE
|
|
) {
|
|
const nextW = Math.max(1, Math.round(targetW * CURSOR_VISION_SOFT_SHRINK));
|
|
const nextH = Math.max(1, Math.round(targetH * CURSOR_VISION_SOFT_SHRINK));
|
|
if (Math.max(nextW, nextH) < CURSOR_VISION_SOFT_MIN_EDGE) {
|
|
const scale = CURSOR_VISION_SOFT_MIN_EDGE / Math.max(targetW, targetH);
|
|
targetW = Math.max(1, Math.round(targetW * scale));
|
|
targetH = Math.max(1, Math.round(targetH * scale));
|
|
} else {
|
|
targetW = nextW;
|
|
targetH = nextH;
|
|
}
|
|
const encoded = await encodeAt(targetW, targetH, lowestQuality);
|
|
if (!best || encoded.byteLength < best.byteLength) best = encoded;
|
|
if (encoded.byteLength <= softMax) {
|
|
const outDims = sniffCursorImageDimensions(encoded);
|
|
return {
|
|
data: encoded,
|
|
mimeType: "image/jpeg",
|
|
...(outDims ?? { width: targetW, height: targetH }),
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
if (Math.max(targetW, targetH) <= CURSOR_VISION_SOFT_MIN_EDGE) break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (best) {
|
|
const outDims = sniffCursorImageDimensions(best);
|
|
return {
|
|
data: best,
|
|
mimeType: "image/jpeg",
|
|
...(outDims ?? (targetW > 0 && targetH > 0 ? { width: targetW, height: targetH } : {})),
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (declaredJpeg && format !== "jpeg") {
|
|
throw new CursorImageError("Image input is not a valid JPEG.");
|
|
}
|
|
throw new CursorImageError("Image input could not be prepared for Cursor vision.");
|
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
if (err instanceof CursorImageError) throw err;
|
|
throw new CursorImageError("Image input is undecodable or unsupported.");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Resolve OpenAI `image_url` URLs (data: or http(s):) into EncodedImage[]
|
|
* ready for SelectedImage blobIdWithData encoding. Each image gets a stable
|
|
* random uuid. Throws CursorImageError (clean message, sanitizable) on any
|
|
* invalid / oversized / blocked / undecodable input.
|
|
*/
|
|
export async function resolveCursorImages(
|
|
imageUrls: string[],
|
|
options?: { detail?: string; prepareForWire?: boolean }
|
|
): Promise<EncodedImage[]> {
|
|
// Cursor's SelectedImage wire format needs the JPEG soft-cap prep (#9840).
|
|
// Browser-upload callers (zai-web, conol-web) upload the ORIGINAL bytes to
|
|
// their own web UIs, so they opt out and keep the pre-#9840 decode+validate
|
|
// behavior: raw data + declared mimeType, capped at MAX_CURSOR_IMAGE_BYTES.
|
|
const prepareForWire = options?.prepareForWire !== false;
|
|
if (imageUrls.length > MAX_CURSOR_IMAGES) {
|
|
throw new CursorImageError(`Too many images in one request (max ${MAX_CURSOR_IMAGES}).`);
|
|
}
|
|
const out: EncodedImage[] = [];
|
|
for (const url of imageUrls) {
|
|
if (typeof url !== "string" || !url) {
|
|
throw new CursorImageError("Image URL is missing.");
|
|
}
|
|
// The data: scheme is case-insensitive (RFC 2397); match it that way but
|
|
// pass the original (un-lowercased) url so the base64 payload is preserved.
|
|
const { data, mimeType } = url.toLowerCase().startsWith("data:")
|
|
? decodeDataUrl(url)
|
|
: await fetchImageBytes(url);
|
|
if (!data.length) {
|
|
throw new CursorImageError("Image input is empty.");
|
|
}
|
|
if (data.length > MAX_CURSOR_IMAGE_DECODE_BYTES) {
|
|
throw new CursorImageError("Image input is too large to process safely.");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!prepareForWire) {
|
|
if (data.length > MAX_CURSOR_IMAGE_BYTES) {
|
|
throw new CursorImageError("Image input is too large (max 1 MiB). Resize and retry.");
|
|
}
|
|
out.push({ data, mimeType, uuid: crypto.randomUUID() });
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const prepared = await prepareCursorImageForWire({
|
|
data,
|
|
mimeType,
|
|
detail: options?.detail,
|
|
});
|
|
if (prepared.data.length > MAX_CURSOR_IMAGE_BYTES) {
|
|
throw new CursorImageError("Image input is too large (max 1 MiB). Resize and retry.");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
out.push({
|
|
data: prepared.data,
|
|
mimeType: prepared.mimeType,
|
|
uuid: crypto.randomUUID(),
|
|
...(typeof prepared.width === "number" && typeof prepared.height === "number"
|
|
? { width: prepared.width, height: prepared.height }
|
|
: {}),
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
return out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Extract image_url URLs from an OpenAI-shaped message content array.
|
|
* Returns the raw url strings (data: or http(s):) in order. Non-image parts
|
|
* are ignored. A plain string content has no images.
|
|
*/
|
|
export function extractImageUrls(content: unknown): string[] {
|
|
if (!Array.isArray(content)) return [];
|
|
const urls: string[] = [];
|
|
for (const part of content) {
|
|
if (part && typeof part === "object" && (part as { type?: unknown }).type === "image_url") {
|
|
const imageUrl = (part as { image_url?: unknown }).image_url;
|
|
if (typeof imageUrl === "string") {
|
|
urls.push(imageUrl);
|
|
} else if (
|
|
imageUrl &&
|
|
typeof imageUrl === "object" &&
|
|
typeof (imageUrl as { url?: unknown }).url === "string"
|
|
) {
|
|
urls.push((imageUrl as { url: string }).url);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return urls;
|
|
}
|