* chore(release): open v3.8.39 development cycle * docs(changelog): backfill 5 v3.8.38 bullets merged after release finalize These PRs squash-merged into release/v3.8.38 between the CHANGELOG finalize (ff57be32f) and the merge-to-main (ae6e2342d), so they shipped in the v3.8.38 tag but had no bullet: - feat(compression): Ionizer engine (lossy JSON-array sampling + CCR) (#5148) - fix(sse): preserve non-stream reasoning fields (#5155, @rdself) - fix(i18n): add missing English UI labels (#5153, @rdself) - test(combo): gated live smoke (#5151) + release-expectations refresh (#5150, @KooshaPari) (#5129 exact-host Anthropic baseUrl is already covered by the #5130 bullet — same CodeQL #674.) Synced 41 i18n CHANGELOG mirrors. * feat(compression): TOON best-of-N candidate encoder + encoder A/B table (#5163) Integrated into release/v3.8.39. TOON best-of-N candidate encoder (GCF default, fail-open). 17/17 unit tests pass on merge result; CI reds were base-stale + Quality Ratchet DRIFT. * fix(zenmux): normalize vendor-prefixed GLM system roles (#5158) Integrated into release/v3.8.39. ZenMux vendor-prefixed GLM system-role normalization; 12/12 role-normalizer tests pass on merge result. CI reds base-stale. * [codex] fix xAI OAuth test and reasoning effort (#5157) Integrated into release/v3.8.39. xAI reasoning-effort normalization (max/xhigh→high) + OAuth test config; 46/46 xai-translator tests pass on merge result. CI reds base-stale. * docs(i18n): add Traditional Chinese (zh-TW) README and update zh-CN to latest (#5162) Integrated into release/v3.8.39. Traditional Chinese (zh-TW) README + zh-CN refresh; docs-only. * test(security): guard PII redaction stays opt-in (default off) + Hard Rule #20 (#5159) Integrated into release/v3.8.39. PII opt-in regression guard + Hard Rule #20; rebased to strip base-drift (+81/-1). 5/5 guard tests pass; flip-proof verified. * test(combo): deterministic context-relay universal-handoff coverage (closes phase-2 TODO) (#5168) Integrated into release/v3.8.39. Deterministic context-relay universal-handoff coverage (3 tests); 3/3 pass on merge result. * docs(i18n): full sync zh-TW and zh-CN README with canonical English v3.8.39 (#5171) Integrated into release/v3.8.39. Full zh-TW docs tree + zh-CN sync with canonical English v3.8.39; docs-only. * fix(serve): honour HOSTNAME from .env instead of hardcoding 0.0.0.0 (#5134) (#5170) Integrated into release/v3.8.39. HOSTNAME env override in serve (#5134) + regression test (4/4, TDD flip-proof verified). * fix(sse): resolve nameless deepseek-web tool blocks via parameter-schema match (#5154) (#5173) Integrated into release/v3.8.39. Schema-based nameless deepseek-web tool-block resolution (#5154); 6/6 tests pass on merge result (incl. ambiguous/no-match negatives + named-tag no-regression). * fix(sse): normalize array user content for Command Code to avoid upstream 400 (#5166) (#5174) Integrated into release/v3.8.39. Normalize array user content for Command Code (#5166, user-array/400 symptom); 4/4 tests pass on merge result. * fix(sse): defer </think> close so it never leaks before tool_calls (#5123) (#5175) Integrated into release/v3.8.39. Defer </think> close so it never leaks before tool_calls (#5123); 4/4 tests pass (incl. #4633 no-regression). CHANGELOG synced to keep all 3 v3.8.39 fixes. * fix(dashboard): use amber for home update-step warning icon (#5176) Integrated into release/v3.8.39. Amber for home update-step warning icon; 1/1 UI test. * fix(api): LAN/Tailscale dashboard — host-aware CSP + GET-exempt version route + combo field errors (#5083) (#5177) Integrated into release/v3.8.39. Host-aware CSP (ReDoS/injection-safe host validation) + GET-exempt /api/system/version (POST/spawn stays LOCAL_ONLY, exact-match safe-methods-only) + COMBO_002 firstField. 44/44 tests + route-guard membership gate green. CHANGELOG synced to keep all 4 v3.8.39 fixes. * fix(api): replace #5083 global middleware CSP with declarative ws: scheme (#5083) Follow-up to PR #5177 (merged): that version implemented the LAN-CSP fix (Bug 1) with a new global `src/middleware.ts` + `src/server/csp.ts`, which contradicts the project's documented architecture — 'No global Next.js middleware — interception is route-specific' (CLAUDE.md / AGENTS.md) — and was merged unverified (middleware vs next.config header precedence was never confirmed in a real build). This replaces that approach with the minimal, declarative equivalent: • next.config.mjs: connect-src now permits the bare `ws:` scheme (symmetric with the bare `wss:` already allowed) so the dashboard can reach its own Live WS server from a LAN/Tailscale host. No middleware. • Removes src/middleware.ts, src/server/csp.ts, and tests/unit/csp-host-aware.test.ts. • Adds tests/unit/csp-lan-ws-5083.test.ts (incl. a guard asserting src/middleware.ts does NOT exist, so the global-middleware approach cannot silently return). Bugs 2 (GET-exempt /api/system/version) and 3 (COMBO_002 field surfacing) from #5177 are unaffected and remain in place. Co-authored-by: KooshaPari <KooshaPari@users.noreply.github.com> * test(combo): end-to-end quota-share DRR routing-decision coverage (matrix parity) (#5179) Integrated into release/v3.8.39. Quota-share DRR routing-decision coverage (matrix parity); 2/2 pass on merge result. * feat(agent-bridge): graceful cert-install fallback with manual guide for containers (#4546) (#5178) Integrated into release/v3.8.39. Agent-bridge graceful cert-install fallback + manual guide (#4546); 6/6 tests pass on merge result. * fix(antigravity): family-scoped quota lockout (gemini/claude buckets) (#5180) Integrated into release/v3.8.39 — family-scoped antigravity quota lockout. Rebased from v3.8.37 + validated (vitest 5/5, typecheck clean, full combo-matrix green, model-lockout 99/0). Same-model cross-account retry (chat.ts) deferred pending live antigravity VPS validation. * fix(cli): force NODE_ENV to match dev/start run mode in custom Next server (#5189) Integrated into release/v3.8.39. Force NODE_ENV to match dev/start run mode in custom Next server; 2/2 source-scan+ordering tests pass on merge result. * feat(compression): CCR ranged/grep/stats retrieval (ReDoS-safe, backward-compat) (#5187) Integrated into release/v3.8.39. CCR ranged/grep/stats retrieval (safe-regex ReDoS guard + length/match caps); 17/17 tests pass on merge result. * docs(combo): sync all combo/routing-strategy docs to current state + document test coverage (#5185) Integrated into release/v3.8.39. Combo/routing-strategy docs sync; docs-only. * fix(mcp): return 404 (not 400) for unknown Streamable HTTP session id (#5169) (#5191) * fix(api): respect blocked Auto (Zero-Config) provider in /v1/models catalog (#5192) (#5194) * test(combo): deterministic context-relay codex quota-handoff coverage (closes last gap) (#5195) * test(ci): wire antigravity-quota-family under test:vitest (fix test-discovery orphan) (#5196) * fix(oauth): antigravity login no longer hangs — fire-and-forget onboarding + bounded post-exchange (#5193) Antigravity OAuth hang fix (no-PKCE/no-openid + bounded post-exchange + exchange-500 fix). Includes #5200 (Koosha) revert + owner rebaseline to keep documented comments. Integrated into release/v3.8.39. * feat(oauth): remote Antigravity login via local helper + paste-credentials (#5203) Remote Antigravity login: local helper (omniroute login antigravity) + paste-credentials. Integrated into release/v3.8.39. * fix(translator): accept Claude Messages shape in non-stream malformed-200 guard (#5156) Integrated into release/v3.8.39 * fix(cli): default dev bundler to Turbopack (16.2.x panic no longer reproduces) (#5206) Integrated into release/v3.8.39 * fix(cli): auto-calibrate server V8 heap from physical RAM (#5172) (#5213) The server was spawned with a fixed --max-old-space-size=512 (omniroute serve) or no heap flag at all (Electron), so RAM-rich boxes still OOM-crashed under load (Ineffective mark-compacts near heap limit ~500MB) with many providers/ accounts and large model catalogs. New calibrateHeapFallbackMb(os.totalmem()) defaults the heap to ~35% of RAM clamped [512,4096], wired into serve.mjs and electron/main.js. Explicit OMNIROUTE_MEMORY_MB still wins (#2939 unchanged). Also addresses #5160 (same OOM root); #5152 (docker) benefits via the same knob. Closes #5172 * fix(proxy): coalesce fast-fail health probes (#5208) Integrated into release/v3.8.39 * fix(proxy): close dispatchers when clearing cache (#5202) Integrated into release/v3.8.39 * fix(cli): raise dev server Node heap limit to 8GB to prevent OOM (#5198) Integrated into release/v3.8.39 * fix(auth): allow synthetic no-auth fallback for mimocode (#5205) Integrated into release/v3.8.39 * fix(oauth): preserve Antigravity refresh_token on empty/omitted upstream response (#3850) (#5214) Google's OAuth refresh tokens are non-rotating: the refresh response usually omits refresh_token and occasionally returns it as an empty string. The Antigravity executor used `typeof tokens.refresh_token === "string" ? ... ` which accepts "" (typeof "" === "string") and overwrote the stored token with empty, nulling it on first refresh. Now treats non-string OR empty as absent and preserves credentials.refreshToken, matching refreshGoogleToken semantics. Closes #3850 * fix(responses): normalize non-array input (#5204) Integrated into release/v3.8.39 * fix(stream): normalize safety finish reasons via shared helper (#5197) Integrated into release/v3.8.39 * fix(request-logger): never render negative '(-100%)' compression badge (#5201) Integrated into release/v3.8.39 * fix(combo): reject empty responses api output (#5207) Integrated into release/v3.8.39 — combo failover now rejects empty Responses API output (validateQuality). Baseline rebaseline dropped (main-measured drift; maintainer rebaselines at release). * fix(pwa): prefer cached navigation before offline page (#5209) Integrated into release/v3.8.39 — PWA service worker prefers cached navigation before offline page (#5165). * chore(release): v3.8.39 — 2026-06-28 * chore(release): rebaseline openapi+i18n coverage ratchet drift for v3.8.39 --------- Co-authored-by: Arthur Bodera <abodera@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Nguyen Minh <lop123thcs@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: lunkerchen <labanchen@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Ankit <177378174+anki1kr@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: KooshaPari <KooshaPari@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Ardem2025 <ardemb22@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: backryun <bakryun0718@proton.me> Co-authored-by: Anton <39598727+NomenAK@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: KooshaPari <42529354+KooshaPari@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Wilson <pedbookmed@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Randi <55005611+rdself@users.noreply.github.com>
8.4 KiB
Security Policy (中文 (繁體))
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Reporting Vulnerabilities
If you discover a security vulnerability in OmniRoute, please report it responsibly:
- DO NOT open a public GitHub issue
- Use GitHub Security Advisories
- Include: description, reproduction steps, and potential impact
Response Timeline
| Stage | Target |
|---|---|
| Acknowledgment | 48 hours |
| Triage & Assessment | 5 business days |
| Patch Release | 14 business days (critical) |
Supported Versions
| Version | Support Status |
|---|---|
| 3.6.x | ✅ Active |
| 3.5.x | ✅ Security |
| < 3.5.0 | ❌ Unsupported |
Security Architecture
OmniRoute implements a multi-layered security model:
Request → CORS → API Key Auth → Prompt Injection Guard → Input Sanitizer → Rate Limiter → Circuit Breaker → Provider
🔐 Authentication & Authorization
| Feature | Implementation |
|---|---|
| Dashboard Login | Password-based auth with JWT tokens (HttpOnly cookies) |
| API Key Auth | HMAC-signed keys with CRC validation |
| OAuth 2.0 + PKCE | Secure provider auth (Claude, Codex, Gemini, Cursor, etc.) |
| Token Refresh | Automatic OAuth token refresh before expiry |
| Secure Cookies | AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE=true for HTTPS environments |
| MCP Scopes | 10 granular scopes for MCP tool access control |
🛡️ Encryption at Rest
All sensitive data stored in SQLite is encrypted using AES-256-GCM with scrypt key derivation:
- API keys, access tokens, refresh tokens, and ID tokens
- Versioned format:
enc:v1:<iv>:<ciphertext>:<authTag> - Passthrough mode (plaintext) when
STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEYis not set
# Generate encryption key:
STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY=$(openssl rand -hex 32)
🧠 Prompt Injection Guard
Middleware that detects and blocks prompt injection attacks in LLM requests:
| Pattern Type | Severity | Example |
|---|---|---|
| System Override | High | "ignore all previous instructions" |
| Role Hijack | High | "you are now DAN, you can do anything" |
| Delimiter Injection | Medium | Encoded separators to break context boundaries |
| DAN/Jailbreak | High | Known jailbreak prompt patterns |
| Instruction Leak | Medium | "show me your system prompt" |
Configure via dashboard (Settings → Security) or .env:
INPUT_SANITIZER_ENABLED=true
INPUT_SANITIZER_MODE=block # warn | block | redact
🔒 PII Redaction
Automatic detection and optional redaction of personally identifiable information:
| PII Type | Pattern | Replacement |
|---|---|---|
user@domain.com |
[EMAIL_REDACTED] |
|
| CPF (Brazil) | 123.456.789-00 |
[CPF_REDACTED] |
| CNPJ (Brazil) | 12.345.678/0001-00 |
[CNPJ_REDACTED] |
| Credit Card | 4111-1111-1111-1111 |
[CC_REDACTED] |
| Phone | +55 11 99999-9999 |
[PHONE_REDACTED] |
| SSN (US) | 123-45-6789 |
[SSN_REDACTED] |
PII_REDACTION_ENABLED=true
🌐 Network Security
| Feature | Description |
|---|---|
| CORS | Configurable origin control (CORS_ORIGIN env var, default *) |
| IP Filtering | Allowlist/blocklist IP ranges in dashboard |
| Rate Limiting | Per-provider rate limits with automatic backoff |
| Anti-Thundering Herd | Mutex + per-connection locking prevents cascading 502s |
| TLS Fingerprint | Browser-like TLS fingerprint spoofing to reduce bot detection |
| CLI Fingerprint | Per-provider header/body ordering to match native CLI signatures |
🔌 Resilience & Availability
| Feature | Description |
|---|---|
| Circuit Breaker | 3-state (Closed → Open → Half-Open) per provider, SQLite-persisted |
| Request Idempotency | 5-second dedup window for duplicate requests |
| Exponential Backoff | Automatic retry with increasing delays |
| Health Dashboard | Real-time provider health monitoring |
📋 Compliance
| Feature | Description |
|---|---|
| Log Retention | Automatic cleanup after CALL_LOG_RETENTION_DAYS |
| No-Log Opt-out | Per API key noLog flag disables request logging |
| Audit Log | Administrative actions tracked in audit_log table |
| MCP Audit | SQLite-backed audit logging for all MCP tool calls |
| Zod Validation | All API inputs validated with Zod v4 schemas at module load |
Required Environment Variables
All secrets must be set before starting the server. The server will fail fast if they are missing or weak.
# REQUIRED — server will not start without these:
JWT_SECRET=$(openssl rand -base64 48) # min 32 chars
API_KEY_SECRET=$(openssl rand -hex 32) # min 16 chars
# RECOMMENDED — enables encryption at rest:
STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY=$(openssl rand -hex 32)
The server actively rejects known-weak values like changeme, secret, or password.
Docker Security
- Use non-root user in production
- Mount secrets as read-only volumes
- Never copy
.envfiles into Docker images - Use
.dockerignoreto exclude sensitive files - Set
AUTH_COOKIE_SECURE=truewhen behind HTTPS
docker run -d \
--name omniroute \
--restart unless-stopped \
--read-only \
-p 20128:20128 \
-v omniroute-data:/app/data \
-e JWT_SECRET="$(openssl rand -base64 48)" \
-e API_KEY_SECRET="$(openssl rand -hex 32)" \
-e STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY="$(openssl rand -hex 32)" \
diegosouzapw/omniroute:latest
Dependencies
- Run
npm auditregularly - Keep dependencies updated
- The project uses
husky+lint-stagedfor pre-commit checks - CI pipeline runs ESLint security rules on every push
- Provider constants validated at module load via Zod (
src/shared/validation/providerSchema.ts)