mirror of
https://github.com/diegosouzapw/OmniRoute.git
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20c31493af
Integrates two community contributions into release/v3.8.8 with security hardening and conflict resolution. - **Plugins framework** (#2913 — thanks @oyi77): hooks + registry unification, plugin SDK (`definePlugin`), worker-thread sandbox, per-plugin hook rate limiting, SHA-256 integrity verification, semver-gated upgrade, and execution analytics. Plugin routes are loopback-only (`isLocalOnlyPath`); `child_process` exec is opt-in via `OMNIROUTE_PLUGINS_ALLOW_EXEC` (default off). - **API key option: disable non-published models** (#3017 — thanks @androw): a per-key flag restricting the key to discovered public models (combos / `auto/*` / `qtSd/*` routing still allowed). Hardening applied during integration: migration renumber (089/090/091), `/api/plugins` LOCAL_ONLY route-guard classification (closes the plugin-RCE vector), atomic install/upgrade with path containment, `O_EXCL` tmp-file creation (TOCTOU), rate-limit-map eviction, `validatePluginConfig` on configure, `buildErrorBody` on all plugin error paths. 246/246 tests; typecheck / cycles / docs-sync clean. Co-authored-by: oyi77 <14921983+oyi77@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Nicolas Lorin <androw95220@gmail.com>
57 lines
2.5 KiB
TypeScript
57 lines
2.5 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Security regression: /api/plugins/* routes must be classified as LOCAL_ONLY
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* so loopback enforcement runs unconditionally before any auth check.
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*
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* These routes trigger plugin loading via worker_threads + child_process:
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* POST /api/plugins — install (loads plugin file via worker)
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* GET /api/plugins — list (read-only, but same prefix must be gated
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* to avoid auth-bypass leaking installed plugin names)
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* GET/DELETE /api/plugins/[name] — inspect / uninstall
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* POST /api/plugins/[name]/activate — loads + executes the plugin worker
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* POST /api/plugins/[name]/deactivate — stops the plugin worker
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* GET/PUT /api/plugins/[name]/config — configure the plugin
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* POST /api/plugins/scan — filesystem scan (spawns child_process)
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*
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* Classifying the whole prefix as LOCAL_ONLY closes the remote-RCE vector:
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* a leaked JWT over a Cloudflared/Ngrok tunnel cannot trigger process spawning.
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* Hard Rules #15 + #17. See docs/security/ROUTE_GUARD_TIERS.md.
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*/
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import test from "node:test";
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import assert from "node:assert/strict";
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import { isLocalOnlyPath } from "../../src/server/authz/routeGuard.ts";
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test("/api/plugins prefix (trailing slash) is LOCAL_ONLY", () => {
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assert.equal(isLocalOnlyPath("/api/plugins/"), true);
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});
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test("/api/plugins (bare, no trailing slash) is LOCAL_ONLY", () => {
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// The GET-list + POST-install route lives at exactly /api/plugins — must also be gated.
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assert.equal(isLocalOnlyPath("/api/plugins"), true);
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});
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test("/api/plugins/[name]/activate is LOCAL_ONLY (worker_threads execution)", () => {
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assert.equal(isLocalOnlyPath("/api/plugins/my-plugin/activate"), true);
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});
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test("/api/plugins/[name]/deactivate is LOCAL_ONLY", () => {
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assert.equal(isLocalOnlyPath("/api/plugins/my-plugin/deactivate"), true);
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});
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test("/api/plugins/[name]/config is LOCAL_ONLY", () => {
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assert.equal(isLocalOnlyPath("/api/plugins/my-plugin/config"), true);
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});
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test("/api/plugins/[name] (GET/DELETE) is LOCAL_ONLY", () => {
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assert.equal(isLocalOnlyPath("/api/plugins/my-plugin"), true);
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});
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test("/api/plugins/scan is LOCAL_ONLY (spawns child_process)", () => {
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assert.equal(isLocalOnlyPath("/api/plugins/scan"), true);
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});
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test("non-plugin paths are NOT LOCAL_ONLY (no over-match)", () => {
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assert.equal(isLocalOnlyPath("/api/combos"), false);
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assert.equal(isLocalOnlyPath("/api/providers"), false);
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assert.equal(isLocalOnlyPath("/api/keys"), false);
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});
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