* chore(release): open v3.8.28 development cycle * fix(ws): warm SSE auth import on LiveWS startup; relocate boot test to integration (#4063) The live dashboard WebSocket sidecar lazily import()-ed the SSE auth module inside the connection handler, only on the API-key path. That cold import pulls in hundreds of transitive modules and takes ~7s under tsx, blocking the single-threaded event loop. The first API-key WebSocket connection therefore stalled the loop long enough that any connection arriving in that window — e.g. a same-origin cookie client — could not complete its handshake and timed out. This was deterministic, not an "env flake": the boot test fires an API-key connection immediately followed by a cookie connection, so the cookie connection always raced the cold import and timed out (reproduced 3/3 locally and red on every CI run; proven via instrumented probes — reversing the order or warming the module first makes both connections open in ~20ms). Fix: - Memoize the auth-module import and warm it once at startup (before listen), so connection handling never pays the cold-import cost. Real improvement: the first API-key client no longer stalls the event loop for concurrent clients. - Relocate the boot test from tests/unit/cli to tests/integration. It spawns a real subprocess + WS server + SQLite (~9-11s); under the unit suite's --test-concurrency=20 it contended for CPU and destabilized the shard. The serial integration runner is its correct home; it still guards #4004's cookie-parse fix on every PR via the integration CI job. - Bump the test's startup/overall timeouts to absorb the eager auth warm. Makes `npm run test:unit` deterministically green (the only remaining unit red). Validated: relocated test 3/3 green via the integration runner (was 3/3 red); typecheck:core + eslint clean; confirmed it no longer matches the test:unit glob and does match tests/integration/*.test.ts. * fix(ws): start LiveWS sidecar with cwd at package root (#4055) (#4064) * chore(deps): bump ossf/scorecard-action from 2.4.0 to 2.4.3 (#4045) Integrado em release/v3.8.28. Patch de SHA do ossf/scorecard-action (2.4.0→2.4.3), mantém SHA-pin. Reds de CI são exclusivamente os shards flaky pré-existentes branch-wide (Unit 7/8, Integration, Coverage 7/8, Node 1/2) — não relacionados ao bump (PR deps-only). * deps: bump electron from 42.4.0 to 42.4.1 in /electron (#4049) Integrado em release/v3.8.28. Patch do electron (42.4.0→42.4.1). Reds de CI: shards flaky pré-existentes + PR Test Policy = falso-positivo (mudança deps-only sob electron/ não comporta teste de código) + Node 26(2/2) sem step (flake/infra). Precedente #3913/#3914 (electron dependabot mergeado nessas condições). * fix(auto): resolve built-in auto catalog combos (#4058) Integrado em release/v3.8.28. Resolve os IDs de catálogo `auto/*` built-in (combos virtuais) — corrige o 400 "No auto combos configured" em auto/best-coding etc. Ajuste de review: os mapas AUTO_TEMPLATE_VARIANTS/VALID_AUTO_VARIANTS duplicados em chat.ts e chatHelpers.ts foram extraídos para open-sse/services/autoCombo/builtinCatalog.ts (DRY), devolvendo chatHelpers.ts <800 LOC; baseline de chat.ts rebaselinado 1432→1458 (lógica nova). Fast QG + semgrep + dast verdes; 22/22 testes. * chore(docs): update Discord invite link to a non-expiring one (#4067) * chore(deps): freeze @huggingface/transformers in dependabot (hard-pin) (#4066) Integrado em release/v3.8.28. Congela @huggingface/transformers no dependabot (pin exato 3.5.2, load-bearing p/ LLMLingua + memory embeddings, VPS-validado #4014). Fast QG + semgrep + dast verdes. * ci(quality): flip TIA impacted-unit-tests gate from advisory to blocking (#4069) The pre-existing release unit test-debt that kept the TIA "Impacted unit tests" step advisory has been cleared: - #4030 restored 16 lossless Zod/registry reds (from the oyi77 modularize refactors). - #4063 fixed the last red — the LiveWS boot test — which was a real deterministic event-loop stall in the WS sidecar (cold ~7s lazy auth import racing a second connection), not an env flake; fixed (warm the import at startup) and relocated to the integration suite. A full workflow_dispatch ci.yml run on release/v3.8.28 then showed all 8 Unit Tests shards green. The remaining Integration Tests / Quality Ratchet reds are pre-existing and unrelated (combo/resilience env-flakes; eslint/i18n baseline drift). Removing continue-on-error makes PR->release block on unit-test regressions in the TIA-selected impacted set (fail-safe still runs the full unit suite on hub/unmapped changes). typecheck:core was already blocking. Closes the fast-gates "no tests on PR->release" hole (Quality Gate v2 / Fase 9, P2). * docs(compression): document LLMLingua optional deps + on-demand install (#4061) Integrado em release/v3.8.28. Docs LLMLingua optional deps + on-demand install (F3.1). * feat(dashboard): Combo Studio connection-cooldown badge (U1b Slice 2) (#4068) Integrado em release/v3.8.28. Combo Studio connection-cooldown badge (U1b Slice 2 / F5.1). * feat(compression): record Context Editing telemetry (engine: context-editing) (#4062) Integrado em release/v3.8.28. Context Editing telemetry (F4.1). * feat(sse): Context Editing relay coverage + 400-fallback (#4065) Integrado em release/v3.8.28. Context Editing relay coverage (cc-*) + 400-fallback (F4.2/F4.3). Conflito de file-size-baseline.json (vs #4062) resolvido por união (ambas justificativas + base.ts 1292 + chatCore.ts 5898). Validado local no tree mergeado: typecheck:core ✓, eslint ✓, check:file-size ✓, 4/4 testes ✓; semgrep + semgrep-cloud verdes. Fast QG enfileirado (saturação de runner) — mergeado nos gates de política verificados (precedente #4034/#4020). * feat(providers): add OrcaRouter (OpenAI-compatible routing gateway) (#4070) Integrado em release/v3.8.28. Adiciona o provider OrcaRouter (OpenAI-compatible, API-key, DefaultExecutor). Ajuste de review: rebaseline de file-size de providers.ts 3147→3159 (+12 da entrada OrcaRouter). Validado local no tree sincronizado: provider-consistency ✓, docs-counts STRICT 227 ✓, typecheck:core ✓, teste 3/3 ✓, eslint ✓; semgrep + semgrep-cloud verdes. Fast QG/dast enfileirados (saturação de runner) — merge nos gates de política verificados (precedente #4034/#4065). * test(infra): isolate DATA_DIR per test process; raise Stryker concurrency 1→4 (#4078) * test(infra): isolate DATA_DIR per test process; raise Stryker concurrency 1→4 Every test process resolved DATA_DIR to the same default (~/.omniroute) when the env var was unset (src/lib/dataPaths.ts::resolveDataDir), so concurrent test files opened the SAME on-disk storage.sqlite. node:test spawns a process per file and Stryker spawns one per sandbox, so this shared file caused cross-file state races: - SQLite lock contention that hung `npm run test:unit` under high --test-concurrency (the ~95-min local hang), and - the non-deterministic baseline that forced stryker.conf.json to concurrency: 1, which in turn could not finish the ~15k-mutant run inside the nightly timeout (the cancelled 2026-06-16/17 nightly-mutation runs) — blocking Quality Gate v2 / Fase 9 Onda 2. open-sse/utils/setupPolyfill.ts could NOT host the fix: it is imported by production (bin/omniroute.mjs, proxyFetch.ts, proxyDispatcher.ts), where redirecting DATA_DIR would point the live SQLite DB at a throwaway temp dir. So this adds a TEST-ONLY tests/_setup/isolateDataDir.ts that gives each process its own temp DATA_DIR when none is set (tests that set DATA_DIR explicitly still win), wired via --import into the test, mutation and CI invocations. Verified: - Stryker dry-run A/B at concurrency=4: FAILS without the isolation import (account-fallback-service tap exit 9, a cross-file race) and PASSES with it. - Full `npm run test:unit` green with isolation (0 fail; a one-off chatcore-translation-paths timeout flake did not reproduce and passes 3/3 isolated) and noticeably faster — the DB lock contention is gone. - New tests/unit/isolate-datadir.test.ts guards the contract (unique temp DATA_DIR when unset; explicit DATA_DIR respected). Wired the --import into: package.json (13 test scripts), stryker.conf.json (tap.nodeArgs + concurrency 1→4), .github/workflows/quality.yml (TIA step), ci.yml (the 5 unit/coverage/integration commands), and bumped nightly-mutation.yml timeout 120→180 for the first cold run before the incremental cache is seeded. * ci(quality): run the TIA gate at CI concurrency (4) to stop oversubscription flakes The TIA "Impacted unit tests" step (made blocking in #4069) ran its fail-safe via `npm run test:unit` — concurrency=20, tuned for multi-core dev machines. On a 4-vCPU CI runner that is 5x oversubscribed, so timing-sensitive tests flake under the load (e.g. `db-backup-extended` "The database connection is not open", `chatcore-translation-paths` upstream-timeout). That intermittently fails a blocking gate on legitimate PRs — exactly what surfaced on the DATA_DIR-isolation PR, whose package.json/workflow changes trip the __RUN_ALL__ fail-safe. Run both the impacted set and the fail-safe at --test-concurrency=4, matching the stable ci.yml unit job. Adds a `test:unit:ci` script (test:unit at concurrency=4). The DATA_DIR isolation in this PR keeps the parallel run race-free, so the only change here is matching the runner's core count. Verified locally: db-backup-extended passes 8/8 in isolation (5 with isolation, 3 without). * docs(quality-gates): reconcile gate inventory with ci.yml + add ROI rationalization backlog (#4095) The "authoritative" gate inventory in QUALITY_GATES.md had drifted from ci.yml: it omitted 9 wired gates — `audit:deps`, `check:tracked-artifacts`, `check:lockfile`, `check:licenses` (lint job), `check:dead-code`, `check:cognitive-complexity`, `check:type-coverage`, `check:codeql-ratchet` (quality-gate job), and `check:pr-evidence` (pr-test-policy job). You can't rationalize an inventory you can't trust, so this reconciles it first. Adds those 9 rows to their job tables and a "Rationalization Backlog (ROI review)" section capturing the Fase 9 Onda 3 findings: mechanical merge/dedup candidates (CVE scanners audit:deps↔osv, the two complexity ESLint passes, cycles↔circular-deps, the two /api anti-hallucination gates, the doubly-run check:docs-sync, check:node-runtime ×11) and the operator-only flip/drop decisions (typecheck:noimplicit vs the type-coverage ratchet, test:vitest:ui parked fails, check:secrets frozen FPs, openapi-security-tiers, pr-evidence, the orphaned semgrep baseline). Also flags the undocumented advisory docs-lint job and the standalone scanner workflows. Docs-only — no gate behavior changes. The merges (CI changes) and flips (policy) are deferred to operator-scoped follow-ups; this PR only makes the map accurate. * test(dashboard): smoke e2e for the Combo Live Studio page (#4075) Integrated into release/v3.8.28 * fix(sse): friendly 413 message for ChatGPT web payload-too-large (#4080) Integrated into release/v3.8.28 * feat(sse): port Claude Code quota-probe bypass + command meta-request helpers (#4083) Integrated into release/v3.8.28 * feat(api): exact offline token counting for count_tokens fallback via tiktoken (#4087) Integrated into release/v3.8.28 * feat(compression): RTK learn/discover (sample source + API + UI) (#4088) Integrated into release/v3.8.28 * feat(dashboard): 2026-06-17 free-tier refresh — honest catalog, uncapped + boost tiers, Layout A budget table (#4089) Integrated into release/v3.8.28 * feat(mitm): capture-pipeline self-test route (Gap 12) (#4093) Integrated into release/v3.8.28 * fix(mitm): crash-safe system-state teardown + socket timeouts (ProxyBridge-inspired hardening) (#4084) Integrated into release/v3.8.28 (Fast QG TIA red = 3 pre-existing timing flakes verified passing locally 82/82; PR own tests green) * feat(mitm): attribute intercepted requests to originating process (Gap 1) (#4085) Integrated into release/v3.8.28 (Fast QG TIA red = 3 pre-existing timing flakes verified passing locally 82/82; PR own tests green) * fix(sse): route image requests only to confirmed-vision combo targets (#4071) Integrated into release/v3.8.28 * fix(security): injection guard respects INJECTION_GUARD_MODE DB feature flag (#4077) Integrated into release/v3.8.28 * fix(ws): proxy LAN /live-ws upgrades and add unset JWT_SECRET warning (#4079) Integrated into release/v3.8.28 * fix(dev): force webpack in custom dev server (Turbopack 16.2.x panics) (#4092) Integrated into release/v3.8.28 * ci(quality): dedup the doubly-run check:docs-sync + record validated ROI backlog (#4099) Onda 3 (gate ROI-review) Phase 2. Two parts, both low-risk: 1. Remove the standalone `check:docs-sync` from the `lint` job — it already runs in the `docs-sync-strict` job (via `check:docs-all`) and the husky pre-commit hook, so the `lint`-job copy was a pure duplicate. No coverage lost. 2. Update the Rationalization Backlog in QUALITY_GATES.md with trust-but-verify findings: several "obvious" merges/flips from the ROI review turned out to hide debt and are NOT clean drop-ins — - CVE merge (audit:deps→osv): different semantics (hard high/critical vs regression-ratchet) — keep both. - cycles→circular-deps: dpdm reports 91 cycles (can't promote to blocking) and is broader-scope than the green curated check:cycles — keep both. - openapi-security-tiers flip: blocked by traffic-inspector routes missing the x-loopback-only annotation. - complexity + /api merges: valid but real config/script surgery — deferred. - node-runtime ×11: ~10s savings vs a cheap guard — low ROI, skip. The remaining flips (typecheck:noimplicit, test:vitest:ui, check:secrets, pr-evidence, semgrep) are operator policy decisions, left for the owner. * chore(deps): bump actions/github-script from 7 to 9 (#4046) Integrated into release/v3.8.28 (dependabot GH-Action bump; SHA-pin preserved) * chore(deps): bump actions/setup-node from 4 to 6 (#4048) Integrated into release/v3.8.28 (dependabot GH-Action bump; SHA-pin preserved) * chore(deps): bump actions/upload-artifact from 4 to 7 (#4044) Integrated into release/v3.8.28 (dependabot GH-Action bump; SHA-pin preserved) * chore(deps): bump actions/cache from 4.3.0 to 5.0.5 (#4047) Integrated into release/v3.8.28 (dependabot GH-Action bump; SHA-pin preserved) * deps: bump the development group with 10 updates (#4051) Integrated into release/v3.8.28 (dependabot dev group; cyclonedx 4->5 verified compatible with the SBOM invocation --ignore-npm-errors/--output-format JSON/--output-file) * fix(dashboard): event-driven fail-open auto-refresh for embedded log views (#4054) (#4103) The Request Logger gated each auto-refresh tick on a static document.visibilityState === "visible" read. Hosts that report a permanent non-"visible" state without ever firing a visibilitychange event (Docker dashboard wrappers, embedded/proxied webviews) froze auto-refresh entirely — only the manual Refresh button worked, a regression from 3.8.24's unconditional polling. The pause is now event-driven and fail-open: visibleRef starts true and is only flipped to false on a real visibilitychange → hidden transition, so a host that never signals a genuine background transition keeps polling, while normal browser tabs still pause when actually backgrounded. Regression test reproduces the misreporting-host case (RED) and the perf guard is re-encoded under the event-driven semantics. * fix(docker): raise build-stage Node heap to stop production-build OOM (#4076) (#4104) The Docker builder stage ran `npm run build` with V8's default heap ceiling (~2 GB). After #4052 forced the heavier webpack engine (Turbopack panics on this Next.js version), the production optimization pass exceeded that ceiling and the build died with "FATAL ERROR: ... JavaScript heap out of memory" at [builder] npm run build. The builder stage now sets NODE_OPTIONS=--max-old-space-size (default 4096 MB, overridable via --build-arg OMNIROUTE_BUILD_MEMORY_MB) before the build; the value propagates to the spawned next build (resolveNextBuildEnv spreads process.env). Build-only — the runtime heap on the runner stage is unchanged, and CI/local builds (which invoke npm run build directly) are unaffected. Regression guard: tests/unit/dockerfile-build-heap-4076.test.ts asserts the builder stage sets the heap ceiling, before npm run build, at >= 4096 MB. * feat(agent-bridge): portable JSON import/export of config (Gap 4) (#4094) Integrated into release/v3.8.28 * feat(cli): add 'omniroute launch' zero-config Claude Code launcher (#4097) Integrated into release/v3.8.28 (Fast QG TIA red = pre-existing env-doc-contract drift [MITM_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS/TURBOPACK from #4084/#4092] + opencode-plugin-dist env flake; #4097 own test 3/3 green) * feat(mitm): loop-guard self-check + verbosity control in server.cjs (Gaps 14+15) (#4101) Integrated into release/v3.8.28 (rebased onto release — dropped the already-squash-merged #4084 commits; only the Gaps 14+15 loop-guard/verbosity delta remains) * feat(sse): generic 400 field-downgrade retry + Groq field stripping (#4096) Integrated into release/v3.8.28 * feat(providers): add Wafer AI (Anthropic-compatible, Bearer auth) (#4098) Integrated into release/v3.8.28 * chore(docs) * fix(responses): clear /v1/responses keepalive timer on cancel/abort (timer + CPU leak) (#4105) Integrated into release/v3.8.28 (r7). * perf(gemini): cache reasoning close-tag regex instead of recompiling per token (#4106) Integrated into release/v3.8.28 (r7). * fix(usage): reap orphaned pending-request details (unbounded memory leak) (#4107) Integrated into release/v3.8.28 (r7). * perf(stream): use structuredClone instead of JSON round-trip for per-chunk reasoning split (#4108) Integrated into release/v3.8.28 (r7). * fix(dashboard): restore Update Available banner with npm-binary-free version fallback (#4100) (#4112) getLatestNpmVersion() derived the latest version only from the npm CLI binary and returned null on any error, so Docker/desktop/locked-down installs without npm on PATH silently hid the home banner even when an update existed. Add resolveLatestVersion() (npm CLI -> registry HTTP fallback -> logged warning) and harden version parsing for v-prefix/pre-release strings. Extracted into testable src/lib/system/versionCheck.ts with TDD coverage. * fix(auth): prune expired entries from login brute-force guard map (unbounded growth) (#4111) Integrated into release/v3.8.28 (r8) * fix(logger): hard-cap the error-dedup map to bound memory under unique-message bursts (#4113) Integrated into release/v3.8.28 (r8) * fix(circuit-breaker): enforce MAX_REGISTRY_SIZE (declared but never applied) (#4114) Integrated into release/v3.8.28 (r8) * perf(obfuscation): cache per-word regexes instead of recompiling every request (#4109) Integrated into release/v3.8.28 (r8) * perf(registry): precompute model->provider index in parseModelFromRegistry (#4110) Integrated into release/v3.8.28 (r8) * fix(timers): unref background interval timers so they don't block clean shutdown (#4117) Integrated into release/v3.8.28 (r8) * fix(webhook): clear abort timer in finally to avoid dangling timers on fetch error (#4115) Integrated into release/v3.8.28 (r8) * fix(combo): detach per-target listener from shared hedge abort signal (#4116) Integrated into release/v3.8.28 (r8) * chore(release): finalize v3.8.28 CHANGELOG + reconcile env-doc contract - Build the complete [3.8.28] CHANGELOG section (55 bullets) covering every commit since v3.8.27, grouped by type with PR back-references and human contributor attribution (artickc's memory-leak/perf cluster, OrcaRouter, Wafer AI, MITM gaps, etc.); move the OrcaRouter bullet out of [Unreleased]. - Inject the EN [3.8.28] section into all 41 i18n CHANGELOG mirrors (parity). - Reconcile the env/docs contract: document MITM_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS + MITM_VERBOSE in .env.example and ENVIRONMENT.md; allowlist the framework-internal TURBOPACK and the Claude Code ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN in check-env-doc-sync. - Fix 3 broken relative links in docs/providers/AGENTROUTER.md (regressed when the file was relocated this cycle) so docs-sync-strict passes. * fix(quality): treat test→test renames as relocations, not deletions The anti-test-masking gate's subcheck-1 collected deleted AND renamed test files via `--diff-filter=DR --name-only` and flagged every one as "deleted — human review required", contradicting its own documented contract ("DELETADOS ou renomeados-e-NÃO-substituídos"): a rename test→test IS a substitution (the test moved, coverage preserved). This false-positived on #4063's legitimate relocation of live-ws-startup.test.ts (unit/cli → integration, asserts 2→2) and would block every PR that relocates a test — surfacing only at release-day because the Fast QG (PR→release) doesn't run test-masking. The gate now parses `--name-status -M`: true deletions and test→non-test renames still flag; a test→test rename is run through the assert-reduction check across the move, so a clean relocation passes while gutting-via-rename (dropped asserts / new tautologies / skips) still fires. Adds partitionDeletedRenamed + 6 regression tests. --------- Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Demiurge The Single <megamen932@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: jinhaosong-source <jinhao.song@myflashcloud.com> Co-authored-by: diego-anselmo <contato@diegoanselmo.com.br> Co-authored-by: Felipe Almeman <4226997+zhiru@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Rahul sharma <sharmaR0810@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Chirag Singhal <76880977+chirag127@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: NOXX - Commiter <artur1992123@mail.ru>
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title, version, lastUpdated
| title | version | lastUpdated |
|---|---|---|
| Guardrails | 3.8.2 | 2026-05-13 |
Guardrails
Source of truth:
src/lib/guardrails/Last updated: 2026-05-13 — v3.8.0
Guardrails enforce safety, policy, and content transformations at the boundary
between OmniRoute and upstream providers. Each guardrail can inspect (and
optionally reject, transform, or annotate) request payloads (preCall) and
upstream responses (postCall).
The system is fail-open: if a guardrail throws while executing, the registry
records the error and continues with the next guardrail rather than failing the
request. Blocking is an explicit decision (block: true), never an accident.
Built-in Guardrails
The registry auto-loads three guardrails in priority order on import
(see registry.ts → registerDefaultGuardrails()):
| Priority | Name | Stage(s) | File |
|---|---|---|---|
5 |
vision-bridge |
preCall |
visionBridge.ts |
10 |
pii-masker |
pre + post |
piiMasker.ts |
20 |
prompt-injection |
preCall |
promptInjection.ts |
Lower priority numbers run first.
Vision Bridge (visionBridge.ts)
Intercepts image-bearing requests aimed at non-vision models and replaces the image parts with text descriptions produced by a configurable vision model before the upstream call. This lets text-only providers transparently handle multimodal payloads.
Flow:
- Skip if the target model already supports vision (unless it appears in the
forced-bridge list
isVisionBridgeForcedModel). - Extract image parts via
extractImageParts(messages). Skip if none. - Load runtime config from
getSettings()(visionBridgeEnabled,visionBridgeModel,visionBridgePrompt,visionBridgeTimeout,visionBridgeMaxImages). - Cap images at
maxImages, call the vision model in parallel (Promise.allSettled), and inject[Image N]: <description>text parts in their place — failed images become[Image N]: (unavailable). - Return
modifiedPayload+ meta (imagesProcessed,processingTimeMs,visionModel).
Defaults live in src/shared/constants/visionBridgeDefaults.ts. The guardrail
exposes a deps constructor option so tests can inject fake getSettings and
callVisionModel implementations.
PII Masker (piiMasker.ts)
Runs on both stages.
preCallclones the payload, walkssystem,messages, andinputarrays, and appliesprocessPII()(from@/shared/utils/inputSanitizer) to stringcontent/textfields. WhenPII_REDACTION_ENABLED=trueandINPUT_SANITIZER_MODE=redact, detected PII is stripped/redacted in the outbound payload. Otherwise the call records detection counts without rewriting content.postCalldeep-clones the response, runssanitizePIIResponse()plus the Responses-API-shape masker (maskResponsesOutput— coversoutput_textandoutput[].content[].text). If any redaction occurs, the modified response replaces the original.
The guardrail never blocks; it only annotates (meta.detections,
meta.redacted) or rewrites.
Prompt Injection (promptInjection.ts)
Detects adversarial structures in user-supplied content and enforces the configured policy. Behavior is driven by environment variables and constructor options:
| Setting | Env var | Default | Effect |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enabled | INPUT_SANITIZER_ENABLED |
true |
When false, guardrail short-circuits. |
| Mode | INJECTION_GUARD_MODE / INPUT_SANITIZER_MODE |
warn |
block, warn, or log. |
| Block threshold | blockThreshold option |
high |
Minimum severity required to block. |
Mode precedence (getMode): caller options.mode →
INJECTION_GUARD_MODE DB feature-flag override (Dashboard → Settings →
Feature Flags) → INJECTION_GUARD_MODE env → INPUT_SANITIZER_MODE env →
warn. A dashboard override therefore wins over the env vars, so the Feature
Flags UI controls the running guard live (no restart). The DB read is fail-safe:
if it errors, the guard falls back to the env-based behavior, and when no
override is set behavior is identical to env-only resolution.
Detection sources:
sanitizeRequest()from@/shared/utils/inputSanitizer(shared detector set used elsewhere in the pipeline).- Built-in
DEFAULT_GUARD_PATTERNS(currentlysystem_override_inlineandmarkdown_system_block, bothhighseverity). - Optional
customPatternspassed via constructor options (strings, regex, or{ name, pattern, severity }records).
When mode === "block" and at least one detection meets the severity
threshold, preCall returns { block: true, message: "Request rejected: suspicious content detected" }. In warn/log modes the guardrail logs but
allows the call. The shared helper evaluatePromptInjection() is also exported
for callers that need to evaluate prompts without going through the registry.
Base Contract (base.ts)
class BaseGuardrail {
enabled: boolean;
name: string;
priority: number;
constructor(name: string, options?: { enabled?: boolean; priority?: number });
async preCall(payload: unknown, context: GuardrailContext): Promise<GuardrailResult | void>;
async postCall(response: unknown, context: GuardrailContext): Promise<GuardrailResult | void>;
}
interface GuardrailResult<TValue = unknown> {
block?: boolean; // true short-circuits the chain
message?: string; // surfaced when blocking
meta?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
modifiedPayload?: TValue; // returned by preCall to rewrite the request
modifiedResponse?: TValue; // returned by postCall to rewrite the response
}
interface GuardrailContext {
apiKeyInfo?: Record<string, unknown> | null;
disabledGuardrails?: string[] | null;
endpoint?: string | null;
headers?: Headers | Record<string, unknown> | null;
log?: GuardrailLog | Console | null;
method?: string | null;
model?: string | null;
provider?: string | null;
sourceFormat?: string | null;
stream?: boolean;
targetFormat?: string | null;
}
A guardrail signals "no change" by returning either void, {}, or
{ block: false }. Returning a modifiedPayload/modifiedResponse replaces
the value flowing through the chain for downstream guardrails.
Registry (registry.ts)
The singleton guardrailRegistry exposes:
register(guardrail)— adds (or replaces by normalized name) a guardrail and re-sorts by ascendingpriority.clear()/list()— administrative helpers.runPreCallHooks(payload, context)— iterates active guardrails, threads the payload throughmodifiedPayload, and stops on the firstblock: true.runPostCallHooks(response, context)— same flow on the response side.resetGuardrailsForTests({ registerDefaults })— clears state and optionally re-registers the defaults for clean test isolation.
Both runners return { blocked, payload|response, results, guardrail?, message? }
where results is an array of GuardrailExecutionResult records that include
per-guardrail blocked, skipped, modified, error, and meta fields,
useful for tracing.
Disabling Guardrails Per-Request
resolveDisabledGuardrails({ apiKeyInfo, body, headers }) aggregates a
de-duplicated list of guardrail names that should be skipped for the current
request. Sources (all optional, all merged):
apiKeyInfo.disabledGuardrails- Request body
disabledGuardrails(top-level) - Request body
metadata.disabledGuardrails - Header
x-omniroute-disabled-guardrails(or legacyx-disabled-guardrails)
Values may be arrays of strings or a comma-separated string; names are
normalized to lowercase kebab-case (pii_masker → pii-masker). The result
is passed through context.disabledGuardrails to the registry, which skips
matching guardrails (skipped: true in results).
Execution Order
For each request flowing through src/sse/handlers/chat.ts and
open-sse/handlers/chatCore.ts:
resolveDisabledGuardrails(...)builds the skip list from API key, body, and headers.guardrailRegistry.runPreCallHooks(body, ctx)runs guardrails in ascending priority order:- Disabled guardrails are recorded as
skipped. - Each guardrail's
preCallmay rewrite the payload viamodifiedPayload. - The first
block: trueshort-circuits the chain and the handler returns a guardrail rejection response.
- Disabled guardrails are recorded as
- The (potentially rewritten) payload flows into combo routing and upstream dispatch.
- After the response is assembled,
guardrailRegistry.runPostCallHooks(...)runs the same chain on the response.block: truehere drops the upstream response.
Guardrails that throw are recorded with error: <message> and logged via
logger.warn, but the chain continues — fail-open by design.
Configuration
Environment variables read by the built-in guardrails:
| Variable | Used by | Effect |
|---|---|---|
INPUT_SANITIZER_ENABLED |
prompt-injection |
Set false to disable detection entirely. |
INPUT_SANITIZER_MODE |
prompt-injection, pii-masker |
Shared mode: warn, block, log, or redact. |
INJECTION_GUARD_MODE |
prompt-injection |
Mode for the injection guard; also a DB feature flag that overrides the env vars (DB > ENV). |
PII_REDACTION_ENABLED |
pii-masker |
When true + mode redact, request PII is stripped. |
PII_RESPONSE_SANITIZATION / _MODE |
pii-masker (downstream) |
Controls response-side masker behavior. |
The Vision Bridge reads runtime config from the DB-backed settings store
(getSettings()), not env vars: visionBridgeEnabled, visionBridgeModel,
visionBridgePrompt, visionBridgeTimeout, visionBridgeMaxImages. Defaults
live in src/shared/constants/visionBridgeDefaults.ts.
Custom Guardrails
import { BaseGuardrail, guardrailRegistry } from "@/lib/guardrails";
class BudgetGuardrail extends BaseGuardrail {
constructor() {
super("budget", { priority: 50 });
}
async preCall(payload, ctx) {
if (ctx.apiKeyInfo?.budgetExceeded) {
return { block: true, message: "Daily budget exceeded" };
}
return { block: false };
}
}
guardrailRegistry.register(new BudgetGuardrail());
Steps:
- Create
src/lib/guardrails/myGuardrail.tsextendingBaseGuardrail. - Implement
preCalland/orpostCall. - Either register at import time (push from
registerDefaultGuardrails) or callguardrailRegistry.register(...)at runtime — the registry replaces any prior guardrail with the same normalized name. - Add tests under
tests/unit/(existing examples:tests/unit/guardrails-registry.test.ts,tests/unit/prompt-injection-guard.test.ts,tests/unit/guardrails/visionBridge.test.ts).
Testing
Use resetGuardrailsForTests() between tests to start from a known state.
Pass { registerDefaults: false } to start with an empty registry and
register only the guardrails under test. The Vision Bridge guardrail accepts
dependency injection (deps.getSettings, deps.callVisionModel) so tests can
exercise the full flow without DB or network access.
See Also
src/lib/guardrails/— implementationsrc/shared/utils/inputSanitizer.ts— shared detector that powers prompt-injection and PII maskingsrc/shared/constants/visionBridgeDefaults.ts— Vision Bridge defaults and forced-bridge model listdocs/architecture/RESILIENCE_GUIDE.md— orthogonal layer (circuit breaker, cooldowns)docs/reference/ENVIRONMENT.md— full env var reference
Injection-guard route coverage & red-team (Fase 8 · Bloco D)
O injection-guard (createInjectionGuard / withInjectionGuard) cobre todas as rotas
que aceitam prompt do usuário. Respeita INJECTION_GUARD_MODE (default warn = só loga;
block = retorna HTTP 400 SECURITY_001).
| Tipo | Rotas | Modo default |
|---|---|---|
| Texto (já existente) | /v1/chat/completions, /v1/completions, /v1/relay/chat/completions |
warn |
| Generativas | /v1/messages, /v1/responses, /v1/images/generations, /v1/images/edits, /v1/videos/generations, /v1/music/generations, /v1/audio/speech |
warn |
| Dados | /v1/embeddings, /v1/rerank, /v1/search, /v1/moderations |
warn |
A extração de texto (extractMessageContents) cobre messages/input/prompt/query+documents/instructions/system.
Red-team (nightly, nightly-llm-security.yml): promptfoo valida que cada rota bloqueia
o corpus OWASP-LLM em INJECTION_GUARD_MODE=block; garak roda probes (skip sem secret).
moderations é incluída por consistência — operadores em block-mode podem isentá-la via
resolveDisabledGuardrails.