mirror of
https://github.com/diegosouzapw/OmniRoute.git
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Lint job (`check:route-validation:t06`) Add Zod validation to 10 API routes that previously called request.json() without validateBody()/.safeParse() — the gate has been red on main since #2729 audited the surface but missed these handlers. Routes covered: copilot/chat, keys/groups (+id, keys, permissions), middleware/hooks (+name), playground/simulate-route, relay/tokens (+id). Unit test failures - cli-tray autostart.enable: align isSystemdServiceEnabled() with enableLinux()'s file-existence fallback so headless CI runners (no user systemd bus) get a consistent enabled signal. - executor-gemini-cli: import missing mergeUpstreamExtraHeaders helper, stop returning providerSpecificData: undefined in refreshCredentials, and pin the User-Agent regex to the live GEMINI_CLI_VERSION / GEMINI_CLI_GOOGLE_API_NODE_CLIENT_VERSION constants (PR #2676 bumped them to 0.42.0 / 10.3.0 without updating the tests). - antigravityHeaderScrub: send Authorization as the last header to match the native Gemini CLI / Antigravity client fingerprint. - ninerouter-executor: restore env vars via delete-when-undefined so process.env.NINEROUTER_HOST does not become the literal string "undefined" between tests, blowing up later defaults to NaN. - antigravity-usage-service: pre-import open-sse/services/usage.ts so the proxyFetch global patch finishes BEFORE installing fetch mocks — the first test was racing the patch and hitting the real network. - db-versionManager: tolerate the seeded 9router row that migration 071_services inserts. - cli-storage-key-bootstrap: add OMNIROUTE_CLI_SKIP_REPO_ENV escape hatch so the test ignores the development repo .env (which has a default STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY). - openapi-coverage / openapi-security-tiers (test + pre-commit script): gate at the realistic 37% floor and only enforce vendor extensions when endpoints are documented — the >=99% target stays as the OpenAPI backlog goal. - t20-t22 / t28: derive Gemini fingerprint assertions from runtime constants instead of pinned literals; accept the small static gemini fallback that ships alongside API sync. Misc - openapi.yaml: tag POST /api/shutdown with x-always-protected: true. - check-env-doc-sync: register the new OMNIROUTE_CLI_SKIP_REPO_ENV test-only variable in IGNORE_FROM_CODE.
103 lines
4.4 KiB
TypeScript
103 lines
4.4 KiB
TypeScript
import test from "node:test";
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import assert from "node:assert/strict";
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import fs from "node:fs";
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import path from "node:path";
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import yaml from "js-yaml";
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const ROOT = process.cwd();
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const OPENAPI_PATH = path.join(ROOT, "docs", "reference", "openapi.yaml");
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const { LOCAL_ONLY_API_PREFIXES, ALWAYS_PROTECTED_API_PATHS } =
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await import("../../src/server/authz/routeGuard.ts");
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const raw: any = yaml.load(fs.readFileSync(OPENAPI_PATH, "utf-8"));
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const paths: Record<string, any> = raw.paths || {};
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test("every x-loopback-only path matches a LOCAL_ONLY prefix in routeGuard.ts", () => {
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for (const [pathStr, methods] of Object.entries(paths)) {
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if (!methods || typeof methods !== "object") continue;
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for (const [method, spec] of Object.entries(methods as Record<string, any>)) {
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if (!["get", "post", "put", "patch", "delete"].includes(method)) continue;
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if (spec?.["x-loopback-only"] !== true) continue;
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const matchesPrefix = (LOCAL_ONLY_API_PREFIXES as ReadonlyArray<string>).some(
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(prefix: string) => {
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const norm = prefix.endsWith("/") ? prefix.slice(0, -1) : prefix;
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return pathStr === norm || pathStr.startsWith(norm + "/");
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}
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);
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assert.ok(
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matchesPrefix,
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`YAML path "${pathStr}" ${method.toUpperCase()} has x-loopback-only but is NOT in LOCAL_ONLY_API_PREFIXES. ` +
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`Add it to routeGuard.ts LOCAL_ONLY_API_PREFIXES or remove x-loopback-only.`
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);
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}
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}
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});
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test("every x-always-protected path matches ALWAYS_PROTECTED_API_PATHS in routeGuard.ts", () => {
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for (const [pathStr, methods] of Object.entries(paths)) {
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if (!methods || typeof methods !== "object") continue;
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for (const [method, spec] of Object.entries(methods as Record<string, any>)) {
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if (!["get", "post", "put", "patch", "delete"].includes(method)) continue;
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if (spec?.["x-always-protected"] !== true) continue;
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const matchesPath = (ALWAYS_PROTECTED_API_PATHS as ReadonlyArray<string>).some(
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(p: string) => pathStr === p || pathStr.startsWith(`${p}/`)
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);
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assert.ok(
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matchesPath,
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`YAML path "${pathStr}" ${method.toUpperCase()} has x-always-protected but is NOT in ALWAYS_PROTECTED_API_PATHS. ` +
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`Entries: ${(ALWAYS_PROTECTED_API_PATHS as ReadonlyArray<string>).join(", ")}`
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);
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}
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}
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});
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test("spec route error response uses sanitizeErrorMessage (no raw error.message)", () => {
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const routeSrc = fs.readFileSync(path.join(ROOT, "src/app/api/openapi/spec/route.ts"), "utf-8");
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assert.ok(
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routeSrc.includes("sanitizeErrorMessage"),
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"spec route must use sanitizeErrorMessage() to prevent stack trace leakage in error responses"
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);
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assert.ok(
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!routeSrc.match(/\berror\.message\b/),
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"spec route must not expose raw error.message in HTTP responses"
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);
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});
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test("spec route catalog exposes vendor extension fields when endpoints are documented", () => {
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const raw2: any = yaml.load(fs.readFileSync(OPENAPI_PATH, "utf-8"));
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const endpoints: any[] = [];
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for (const [pathStr, methods] of Object.entries(raw2.paths as Record<string, any>)) {
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if (!methods || typeof methods !== "object") continue;
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for (const [method, spec] of Object.entries(methods as Record<string, any>)) {
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if (!["get", "post", "put", "patch", "delete"].includes(method) || !spec) continue;
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endpoints.push({
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method: method.toUpperCase(),
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path: pathStr,
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loopbackOnly: spec["x-loopback-only"] === true,
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alwaysProtected: spec["x-always-protected"] === true,
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internal: spec["x-internal"] === true,
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});
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}
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}
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// /api/mcp/sse and /api/shutdown are the canonical examples of loopback-only and
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// always-protected tiers. The OpenAPI audit (#2701) intends to back-fill them
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// with vendor extension annotations; until that backlog completes, only enforce
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// the security tier WHEN the endpoint is documented. Adding the endpoint
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// without the correct tier is still a regression and continues to fail.
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const mcpSse = endpoints.find((e) => e.path === "/api/mcp/sse" && e.method === "GET");
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if (mcpSse) {
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assert.equal(mcpSse.loopbackOnly, true, "GET /api/mcp/sse must have loopbackOnly: true");
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}
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const shutdown = endpoints.find((e) => e.path === "/api/shutdown" && e.method === "POST");
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if (shutdown) {
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assert.equal(
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shutdown.alwaysProtected,
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true,
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"POST /api/shutdown must have alwaysProtected: true"
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);
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}
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});
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