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* fix(deps): bump nanoid, dompurify for 2 new Dependabot alerts (#189, #190) Bumps: nanoid ^3.3.17 (was transitive, now overridden), dompurify ^3.4.13 (with monaco-editor scoped override). Closes Dependabot #189, #190. Remaining #182-#188 (js-yaml + mermaid) already closed by #9651 merge — awaiting Dependabot re-scan. npm audit → 0 vulnerabilities. * fix(repo): harden .gitignore to also ignore a _tasks symlink (/_tasks) _tasks is a SEPARATE nested git repo (gitignored). The pattern _tasks/ (trailing slash) ignores only a directory, not a SYMLINK named _tasks. A self-referential _tasks symlink can slip in via git add -A and, once pulled, checkout materializes it over the real _tasks repo (destroying plans/specs/hands-off). Anchored /_tasks ignores the symlink too, preventing re-capture. * Hide health-check excluded models from /v1/models catalog (#10026) Mirror the request-time exclusion rule (provider_specific_data.excludedModels) in the unified catalog builder: a model is hidden when its provider has connections but none of them is eligible for it. Applied across the PROVIDER_MODELS, synced, custom, alias-backed, and managed-fallback loops so ghost models no longer appear as available. Co-authored-by: ritheshcn25 <ritheshcn25@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(models): memoize getModelsDevPricing (event loop / healthz) (#10055) * fix(models): memoize getModelsDevPricing for /v1/models catalog resolveCatalogPricing called getModelsDevPricing once per model while building GET /v1/models. Each call re-scanned models_dev_pricing and JSON.parsed every row (~10k SQL scans + multi-GB parse work), pegging the event loop so even /healthz timed out (#9685, #10052). Memoize the parsed map until saveModelsDevPricing / clearModelsDevPricing and add a unit test for invalidation. Signed-off-by: Ravi Tharuma <RaviTharuma@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(db): invalidate modelsDevPricing cache on DB reset (#10055) Copilot review fixes: 1. Register invalidateModelsDevPricingCache() with DB state reset system so resetDbInstance() clears the process-local memo, preventing stale pricing data from surviving across DB reset/restore operations. 2. Add test assertion verifying DB reset bypasses the memo (Copilot #10055). The process-local memo at modelsDevSync.ts:204 caches getModelsDevPricing() results until saveModelsDevPricing()/clearModelsDevPricing() to avoid re-scanning all pricing rows on every /v1/models request. Without this hook, backup restore and test DB resets would serve stale cached data from the previous connection. Tests: npm run test:unit:serial -- tests/unit/modelsDevSync-extended.test.ts --------- Signed-off-by: Ravi Tharuma <RaviTharuma@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Ravi Tharuma <RaviTharuma@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(oauth): route Zed hosted sign-in callback back to the dashboard port Zed's native-app sign-in always redirects the browser to the loopback port sent as native_app_port (hardcoded default 58443), where nothing listens: the browser shows "site can't be reached" and the login looks broken even though the token is in the URL. The manual paste fallback was broken too - handleManualSubmit requires a ?code= param that Zed's callback (user_id + access_token) never carries, so the flow could never complete. - zed-hosted: derive native_app_port from the dashboard's own loopback port so the redirect lands back on OmniRoute; remote/LAN origins keep the old default port and the paste flow - app root: forward ?user_id=...&access_token=... to the /callback relay instead of dropping the query string on the /dashboard redirect - /callback relay: recognize the Zed payload (no code param) and relay the full URL as the exchange payload; allow postMessage to both loopback spellings (localhost/127.0.0.1) of the same port - OAuthModal: zed-hosted popup auto-completes on true localhost; the manual paste path passes the full URL through to the exchange instead of erroring with "No authorization code found" - manual input panel: zed-hosted-specific placeholder and hint - tests: extend the postMessage scope guard with the loopback same-port trusted origins * changelog: fragment for #10517 * fix(oauth): derive Zed native_app_port from server config, not browser scheme/port resolveDashboardLoopbackPort() previously re-derived the dashboard's loopback port from the browser-supplied redirectUri (window.location.port || protocol === "https:" ? "443" : "80"), which produced http://127.0.0.1:443/ native-app redirects when the dashboard was reached over HTTPS on its implicit default port (e.g. behind a local TLS-terminating reverse proxy) - a scheme/port mismatch, since Zed's own redirect is always plain http and nothing serves plain HTTP on 443 in that scenario. This code runs server-side (in the OAuth authorize API route), so once the redirect URI's hostname is confirmed loopback it now uses the OmniRoute process's own authoritative listening port via getRuntimePorts() (OMNIROUTE_PORT/PORT/DASHBOARD_PORT) instead of re-deriving it from the browser-observed scheme/port. Non-loopback (remote/LAN) redirect URIs still return null and fall back to the manual paste flow. Adds tests/unit/zed-hosted-loopback-port-derivation.test.ts (8 cases) covering the port-derivation logic directly, including the HTTPS-default-port mismatch scenario that motivated this fix, env-var precedence, IPv6 loopback, non-loopback/remote fallback, and buildAuthUrl's native_app_port wiring. Also rebaselines config/quality/file-size-baseline.json for OAuthModal.tsx's own growth from this PR's earlier commit (1134->1149 gate units) - legitimate zed-hosted callback wiring at the existing provider-switch chokepoint, not extractable without a broader modal decomposition (tracked in #3501). The live Zed OAuth handshake itself (root -> /callback -> OAuthModal exchange against the real zed.dev endpoint) still needs a documented VPS smoke test per Hard Rule #18; this fix covers the TDD-able port-derivation logic that motivated the change. Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <8016841+diegosouzapw@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Ravi Tharuma <RaviTharuma@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <diegosouzapw@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Diego Rodrigues de Sa e Souza <diegosouza.pw@outlook.com> Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <diegosouza.pw@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: ritheshcn25 <rithesh.chandran@snb.ca> Co-authored-by: ritheshcn25 <ritheshcn25@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Ravi Tharuma <25951435+RaviTharuma@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Ravi Tharuma <RaviTharuma@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com> Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <8016841+diegosouzapw@users.noreply.github.com>
123 lines
4.1 KiB
TypeScript
123 lines
4.1 KiB
TypeScript
// @vitest-environment jsdom
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import React from "react";
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import { act } from "react";
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import { createRoot, type Root } from "react-dom/client";
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import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
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// Mock next-intl translations (the page imports useTranslations("auth")).
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vi.mock("next-intl", () => ({
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useTranslations: () => (key: string) => key,
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}));
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import CallbackPage from "@/app/callback/page";
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/**
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* Regression guard for ported upstream PR decolua/9router#998 (security):
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* the OAuth callback page must never relay {code, state} to a wildcard
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* postMessage target ("*"), as a hostile opener can read the code/state and
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* complete the OAuth flow as the user. Trusted targets are the same-origin
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* parent, the loopback hostname variants of the same port (localhost vs
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* 127.0.0.1 — Zed native-app redirects may land on the other spelling than the
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* dashboard the modal was opened from; same port means the same OmniRoute
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* server), and Codex's fixed loopback helper (127.0.0.1:1455).
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*/
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describe("OAuth callback page — postMessage target origin scope (#998)", () => {
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let container: HTMLDivElement;
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let root: Root;
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let postMessageSpy: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
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let originalOpener: typeof window.opener;
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beforeEach(() => {
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container = document.createElement("div");
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document.body.appendChild(container);
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root = createRoot(container);
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postMessageSpy = vi.fn();
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originalOpener = window.opener;
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// Set the callback URL with OAuth params (triggers the postMessage send).
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window.history.replaceState({}, "", "/callback?code=test_code_abc123&state=test_state_xyz789");
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// Stub window.opener as a CROSS-ORIGIN opener: same-origin probe must throw
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// (mimics a real cross-origin window.opener), which means the page falls into
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// the fallback path that previously used a wildcard "*" target origin.
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Object.defineProperty(window, "opener", {
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configurable: true,
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writable: true,
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value: {
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postMessage: postMessageSpy,
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get location(): never {
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throw new Error("cross-origin access blocked");
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},
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},
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});
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});
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afterEach(() => {
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act(() => root.unmount());
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container.remove();
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Object.defineProperty(window, "opener", {
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configurable: true,
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writable: true,
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value: originalOpener,
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});
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vi.clearAllMocks();
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});
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it("never targets the wildcard '*' origin even when opener is cross-origin", async () => {
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await act(async () => {
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root.render(<CallbackPage />);
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});
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// Give useEffect a microtask to flush.
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await act(async () => {
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await Promise.resolve();
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});
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const targetOrigins = postMessageSpy.mock.calls.map((call) => call[1]);
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expect(targetOrigins).not.toContain("*");
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});
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it("only targets trusted origins (same-origin + Codex 127.0.0.1:1455)", async () => {
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await act(async () => {
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root.render(<CallbackPage />);
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});
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await act(async () => {
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await Promise.resolve();
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});
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const loopbackSamePort = window.location.port
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? [`http://localhost:${window.location.port}`, `http://127.0.0.1:${window.location.port}`]
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: [];
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const trusted = new Set([
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window.location.origin,
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...loopbackSamePort,
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"http://localhost:1455",
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"http://127.0.0.1:1455",
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]);
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const targetOrigins = postMessageSpy.mock.calls.map((call) => call[1]);
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expect(targetOrigins.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
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for (const origin of targetOrigins) {
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expect(trusted.has(origin)).toBe(true);
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}
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});
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it("delivers the OAuth code/state payload at least once via postMessage", async () => {
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await act(async () => {
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root.render(<CallbackPage />);
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});
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await act(async () => {
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await Promise.resolve();
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});
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// Sanity: the scoped postMessage path still actually attempts delivery.
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expect(postMessageSpy).toHaveBeenCalled();
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const firstCall = postMessageSpy.mock.calls[0];
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expect(firstCall[0]).toMatchObject({
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type: "oauth_callback",
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data: expect.objectContaining({
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code: "test_code_abc123",
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state: "test_state_xyz789",
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}),
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});
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});
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});
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