Files
OmniRoute/scripts/check/check-vuln-ratchet.mjs
Diego Rodrigues de Sa e Souza fa367dd99e Release v3.8.27 (#3968)
* chore(release): open v3.8.27 development cycle

* fix(security): polynomial ReDoS in comboAgentMiddleware regex (#3982)

* fix(security): eliminate polynomial ReDoS in comboAgentMiddleware <omniModel> regex (CodeQL js/polynomial-redos)

CACHE_TAG_PATTERN wrapped the tag in an unbounded `(?:\\n|\n|\r)*` prefix/suffix.
On an unanchored `.test()`/`.exec()` that is O(n²) on inputs with many newlines
(CodeQL js/polynomial-redos, alerts #612/#613). The surrounding runs are irrelevant
to detecting/capturing the tag, so the detection pattern now matches only the core
`<omniModel>([^<]+)</omniModel>`; the global strip pattern still consumes the
wrapping newlines (combo.ts streaming, #531) but BOUNDED ({0,16}) so it stays linear.

Behavior preserved: detection, model extraction, multi-tag stripping (#454) and
blank-line cleanup all unchanged (107 related tests green). Adds ReDoS-safety
regression tests (50k-newline inputs complete in <1ms).

* docs(changelog): add #3982 ReDoS fix to [3.8.27]

* ci(security): harden workflows — artipacked persist-credentials + cache-poisoning + SC2086 (#3965)

* Refine provider quota card display (#3969)

Integrated into release/v3.8.27

* feat: add sidebar group separator toggles (#3971)

Integrated into release/v3.8.27

* Gate control-plane proxy direct fallback (#3963)

Integrated into release/v3.8.27

* Capture actual upstream provider requests (#3941)

Integrated into release/v3.8.27

* ci(quality): flip require-tighten + osv + Trivy to blocking (v3.8.27 cycle-end) (#3984)

* fix(resilience): respect connection cooldown stored as numeric epoch (#3954) (#3995)

rate_limited_until is a TEXT column, but setConnectionRateLimitUntil (Antigravity full-quota path) persists a raw epoch number that SQLite coerces to a numeric string ("1781696905131.0"). The selection predicate isAccountUnavailable then did new Date("1781696905131.0") -> NaN, so the cooling connection was never skipped and the router kept dispatching to rate-limited accounts. Normalize numeric-epoch strings (and number/Date/ISO) via a shared cooldownUntilMs() helper in isAccountUnavailable / getEarliestRateLimitedUntil / filterAvailableAccounts / parseFutureDateMs. ISO behavior preserved.

* fix(providers): fetch live /models for LLM7 and BytePlus (#3976) (#3996)

llm7 and byteplus carry a real modelsUrl but were not classified by any live-fetch branch of the model-import route, so their hardcoded 4-entry registry catalog was served (source local_catalog) instead of the upstream catalog. Add both to NAMED_OPENAI_STYLE_PROVIDERS so the route probes <baseUrl>/models and serves the live list, falling back to the local catalog only on fetch failure.

* fix(dashboard): logs auto-refresh reads live visibility, not a stale mount ref (#3972) (#3997)

The auto-refresh interval gated each tick on visibleRef, seeded once at mount and updated only by a visibilitychange event. A tab mounted while document.visibilityState is 'hidden' (background load, bfcache, embedded/proxied webviews) with no later visibilitychange left the ref false forever, so the interval ticked but never fetched — only the manual button worked. Read the live document.visibilityState in the tick instead.

* feat(compression): add Indonesian caveman rules and language pack (#3975)

Integrated into release/v3.8.27

(cherry picked from commit c9b5b1a892)

* fix(combo): shuffle strict-random fallback remainder to spread load (#3959) (#3998)

strict-random shuffled only the deck-selected slot 0 and left the fallback remainder in fixed priority order, so after a failing deck pick the chain always fell through to the same top-priority model — a persistently-failing model was retried on essentially every request and fallback load never spread across peers. Shuffle the remainder too (like the random strategy).

* Add provider auth visibility controls (#3953)

Integrated into release/v3.8.27

* fix(claude): forward client tool-search-tool anthropic-beta on the Claude OAuth path (#3974) (#3999)

The client-negotiated anthropic-beta: tool-search-tool-2025-10-19 was dropped on both Claude code paths (default executor rebuilt from static ANTHROPIC_BETA_CLAUDE_OAUTH; selectBetaFlags only read the client beta to gate thinking/effort), so claude.ai rejected deferred-tool requests with 400 'Tool reference not found'. Add an allowlist-merge (mergeClientAnthropicBeta) that unions the client's allowlisted betas into the outbound set on both paths, preserving #3415 (no forced thinking/effort).

* feat(providers): add model search filter to provider dashboard (#3950)

Integrated into release/v3.8.27

* fix(vision-bridge): force bridge for tokenrouter deepseek models (#3946)

Integrated into release/v3.8.27

* fix(executor): strip stream_options on non-streaming requests (#3884) (#4000)

Clients that send stream_options:{include_usage:true} regardless of stream (e.g. the OpenAI Python SDK) had it passed through on non-streaming calls; NVIDIA NIM rejected it with 400 'Stream options can only be defined when stream=True'. DefaultExecutor.transformRequest only injected/cleared stream_options on the streaming branch and never stripped a client-sent value when stream=false. Add a !stream strip branch; the streaming injection path is unchanged. Global to openai-compat providers.

* fix(qwen-web): cookie validation false-positive - check response body for user object (#3958)

Integrated into release/v3.8.27

* fix(db): persist backup retention days (#3970)

Integrated into release/v3.8.27

* 大量UI显示和i18n优化 (#3973)

Integrated into release/v3.8.27

* deps: bump the npm_and_yarn group across 1 directory with 2 updates (#3943)

Integrated into release/v3.8.27

* deps: bump form-data from 4.0.5 to 4.0.6 (#3944)

Integrated into release/v3.8.27

* deps: bump vite from 8.0.5 to 8.0.16 (#3942)

Integrated into release/v3.8.27

* chore(quality): re-baseline validation.ts 4407->4428 (#3958 qwen body-check)

The qwen-web validation body-check merged in #3958 pushed validation.ts past its
frozen size on the integrated release tip. Bump the baseline with justification;
no logic is separately extractable from the existing qwen-web validation branch.

* deps: bump the production group with 13 updates (#3915)

Integrated into release/v3.8.27 — low-risk group (playwright 1.60→1.61 minor + transitive patches; fumadocs-core 16.9→16.10 minor).

* chore(deps): ignore jscpd major bumps (v5 Rust rewrite breaks the duplication gate)

Our duplication ratchet (scripts/check/check-duplication.mjs) is pinned to jscpd@4
and parses jscpd-report.json against a frozen baseline. jscpd v5 is a native Rust
binary with no Node.js API and a different report/bin, so a major bump would break
the gate. Migrate deliberately, not via dependabot. Closes the noise from #3916.

* fix(perplexity-web): parse schematized diff_block stream so answers aren't empty (#4001)

Integrated into release/v3.8.27 — schematized diff_block parsing follow-up to #3938.

* refactor: modularize providerRegistry.ts into 159 individual provider plugins (#3993)

Modularize provider registry (#3594). Integrated into release/v3.8.27 after rebase + behavior-preservation verification (provider-consistency gate 159/232/0, typecheck, registry tests, build 556/556).

Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <diegosouza.pw@gmail.com>

* fix(registry): restore byteplus + mimocode dropped by #3993 modularization

The provider-registry modularization (#3993) was cut from a base predating the
byteplus (#3877) and mimocode (#3837) registry entries, so merging it silently
dropped both providers (getRegistryEntry returned undefined → validation reported
'not supported'). Re-add them as registry modules in the new structure; registered
count 159→161, provider-consistency 161/232/0.

Also align the pre-existing qwen-web validator test to #3958: since the validator
now requires a real `user` object in the 200 body, the mock must carry one.

* refactor: modularize schemas (non-stacked) (#3988)

Modularize validation schemas (#3594). Integrated into release/v3.8.27 after rebase (reconciled the merged hiddenSidebarGroupLabels #3971 + intelligenceSyncRequestSchema into the new modules) + behavior verification (typecheck, 195 schema/settings/validation tests, build 556/556).

Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <diegosouza.pw@gmail.com>

* fix(default-executor): honor custom providerSpecificData.baseUrl for OpenAI-format providers (#4002)

Integrated into release/v3.8.27 — honor custom providerSpecificData.baseUrl in DefaultExecutor (openai-format), tested.

* feat(openai): honor custom base URL in model discovery + complete openai/codex pricing (#4005)

Integrated into release/v3.8.27 — openai model-discovery honors custom base URL (SSRF-guarded) + pricing rows for new openai/codex models. Tested + baselines bumped.

* fix(live-ws): bridge sidecar events to dashboard (#4004)

Integrated into release/v3.8.27 — repair LiveWS sidecar (startup, same-origin /live-ws, main→sidecar compression.completed bridge, early-msg queue). Fixed the cookie-parse regex (\s) + added a focused unit test; baseline bumped for the non-blocking chatCore bridge.

* docs(troubleshooting): note MITM proxy cannot intercept Windows-host apps under WSL (#4003)

Integrated into release/v3.8.27 — MITM/WSL troubleshooting note.

* fix(repo): untrack accidentally-committed root node_modules symlink + gitignore it

A worktree node_modules symlink (-> the main checkout's node_modules) was staged by a
`git add -A` during the #3988 merge and committed into 05213ac6a. The symlink points
at the repo's own node_modules path, so checking it out turns the main checkout's
node_modules into a self-referential symlink (breaking tsx/all node ops). Untrack it and
add a root-anchored /node_modules ignore so the symlink form can't be re-committed (the
existing 'node_modules/' only matches directories).

* fix(quality): allowlist socks dep (declared by #4004, never allowlisted)

socks@^2.8.7 was added to package.json in #4004 (LiveWS sidecar, 02302131f)
as a phantom-dep cleanup but never added to dependency-allowlist.json, so
check:deps has been red on the release tip ever since. socks is the standard
SOCKS proxy client (dep of fetch-socks), legitimate and years old.

* feat(sse): real LLMLingua-2 ONNX compression engine (stable) (#4014)

Integrated into release/v3.8.27.

Adjustments before merge:
- Synced with the current release tip (was 11 commits behind).
- Added the 3 LLMLingua-2 ONNX optional-runtime deps to dependency-allowlist.json
  (@atjsh/llmlingua-2, @tensorflow/tfjs, js-tiktoken) — the only gate that was red.
- socks was allowlisted directly on release (separate fix d7db5c73d; it was declared
  by #4004 but never allowlisted, leaving check:deps red release-wide).

Verified locally: check:deps OK, file-size OK, public-creds OK, provider-consistency
161/232/0, typecheck:core clean, 24/24 LLMLingua tests pass. The only remaining Fast-QG
red is the pre-existing #3972 orphan test (request-logger-autorefresh-visibility-3972.test.tsx),
which is release-wide and unrelated to this PR.

* test(dashboard): rehome #3972 logs auto-refresh test so a runner collects it

tests/unit/request-logger-autorefresh-visibility-3972.test.tsx (added by #3972
via #3997) sat at the top level of tests/unit/ as a .tsx vitest test, which NO
runner collects: the node runner only globs *.test.ts, and test:vitest:ui only
runs tests/unit/ui. So the #3972 regression guard never executed in CI and
check:test-discovery was red release-wide. Move it under tests/unit/ui/ (the
collected vitest:ui path) and fix the relative import depth. Verified: the test
now runs and passes (2/2), and check:test-discovery is green.

* feat(compression): capture per-engine analytics (#3960) + Lite schema fix (#3952) (#4018)

Captures the net-new value from #3960 (per-engine breakdown analytics) and #3952 (Lite engine schema fix) onto release/v3.8.27. Fast QG green; 622/622 compression+analytics tests pass.

* fix(sse): guard model-less registry entries in getUnsupportedParams (mimocode) (#4015)

Real bugfix: guard model-less registry entries (mimocode) in getUnsupportedParams so handleChatCore no longer throws 'entry.models is not iterable' / reports 'All models failed' for unrelated requests. Includes a regression test. Fast QG green.

* feat(ci): Quality Gate v2 — Onda 0 + Onda 1 (gate flips, TIA, SAST, DAST-smoke, mutation infra) (#4016)

* docs(ops): add quality-gate assessment + replication playbook (Fase 9 foundation)

* feat(ci): flip oasdiff breaking-change gate to blocking (ratchet)

* docs(ops): deliver main branch-protection ruleset for owner to apply

* fix(ci): run typecheck:core in PR->release fast-gates (close fast-gates hole, part 1)

* perf(mutation): enable Stryker incremental mode + cache (scales the 60/80 rollout)

* feat(ci): commit CodeQL advanced config (security-extended), replacing default-setup

* feat(ci): version semgrep SAST workflow (owasp/secrets), advisory

* feat(quality): TIA test-impact map builder (import-graph; map built at runtime, gitignored)

* feat(quality): TIA impacted-test selector with run-all fail-safe

* fix(ci): run TIA-impacted unit tests in PR->release fast-gates (build map at runtime, fail-safe full)

* feat(ci): DAST-smoke per-PR (schemathesis subset + promptfoo injection-guard, blocking)

* fix(ci): unbreak Fase 9 PR CI (MDX frontmatter, CodeQL conflict, dast-smoke advisory)

- Add MDX frontmatter to docs/ops/{BRANCH_PROTECTION_MAIN,QUALITY_GATE_PLAYBOOK}.md.
  fumadocs rejects frontmatter-less docs -> 'npm run build' failed -> broke dast-smoke's
  build step (the release fast-gates never runs build, so this only surfaced on the PR).
- codeql.yml: workflow_dispatch-only until the owner switches repo CodeQL Default->Advanced
  (advanced configs cannot be processed while default setup is enabled; documented inline).
- dast-smoke.yml: job-level continue-on-error (advisory) so this brand-new gate matures
  before it blocks (repo convention: advisory -> blocking).

* ci(quality): make TIA unit-test step advisory until release test-debt is cleared

release/v3.8.27 carries ~17 pre-existing failing unit tests (budget #3537, apiKey
#3552, several Zod schemas, Puter/Qwen executors, mimocode entry, etc.) unrelated to
this PR — the new 'run tests on PR->release' gate surfaced them. Per the repo's
advisory->blocking convention, this step enters advisory (it still runs + reports)
so pre-existing debt doesn't block the gate program. typecheck:core stays blocking.
Flip to blocking (remove continue-on-error) once the release suite is green.

* fix(sse): preserve Kiro streaming finish_reason tool_calls (#3980) (#4025)

* fix(guardrails): preserve original image when vision-bridge describe fails (#4012) (#4026)

* feat(api): advertise combo capabilities on import surfaces (#3979) (#4027)

* feat(sse): delegated Anthropic Context Editing for Claude (clear_tool_uses) (#4021)

Opt-in Claude-only delegated compression: injects context_management.clear_tool_uses_20250919 at the Claude pre-serialization chokepoint (composes with clear_thinking, thinking first), threaded via ExecuteInput from handleChatCore. Pure edit-builder + 11 tests (7 unit + 4 e2e fetch-capture). Beta context-management-2025-06-27 already advertised; allowlist done. Telemetry/400-fallback/claude-web coverage deferred.

* fix(opencode): map x-session-affinity to x-opencode-session for custom providers (#4022) (#4028)

* fix(dashboard): Playground Compare tab loading + HTTP method guard (#4024)

randomUUID non-HTTPS fallback + static CompareTab import; raw HTTP TRACE->405 method guard wired into dev + standalone servers. Integrated into release/v3.8.27.

* refactor(dashboard): settings UI layout + API Keys naming (#4020)

Presentation/relabel refactor of the Settings dashboard (API Manager -> API Keys), card relocations, Toggle adoption, present-but-disabled engine steps. Auth-file changes are string/comment-only (no behavior change). Integrated into release/v3.8.27.

* fix: restore unit regressions dropped by lossy schema/registry modularizations (#4030)

Restores schema fields (combo reasoningTokenBuffer, budget-0 #3537, openrouter preset, proxy family #3777, resilience degradation/providerCooldown), qwen-web v2 endpoint+catalog, mimocode models key — all dropped by #3988/#3993 — and aligns 3 tests to #3941/#3993. Verified: 8 failing regression tests on release tip -> 131/131 green on this branch. Integrated into release/v3.8.27.

* fix(api): return 400 (not 500) for malformed JSON on /api/auth/login (#4031)

Wrap request.json() so a malformed/non-JSON login body returns a structured 400 instead of falling through to the 500 catch. Fixes the schemathesis high-risk-endpoint DAST finding (verified: schemathesis step now passes). +TDD test. Integrated into release/v3.8.27.

* feat(dashboard): real circuit-breaker state in the Combo Live cascade (U1b) (#4029)

Overlays real provider circuit-breaker state (GET /api/monitoring/health) onto the Combo Live cascade as a 'CB: OPEN · 41s' badge. Pure enrichRunWithBreakers + fail-soft useProviderBreakerHealth poll; graceful when health is absent. +13 tests. Integrated into release/v3.8.27.

* Fix promptfoo security assertion parsing (#4032)

* chore(deps): dependabot security bumps + drop unused gray-matter (#4036)

Integrated into release/v3.8.27 — dependabot security bumps (form-data/js-yaml/protobufjs/dompurify/hono) + drop unused gray-matter. Unblocks the npm audit:deps gate (Lint) branch-wide.

* fix(ci): scope TIA to node:test unit files only (mirror test:unit glob) (#4035)

Integrated into release/v3.8.27 — scopes the advisory TIA step to the test:unit node:test glob, fixing the 99 false failures. +4 TDD.

* Refine compression settings, storage labels, and sidebar grouping (#4033)

Integrated into release/v3.8.27 — relocate Token Saver into Compression Settings (controlled component), reorder Security/Authz tabs, storage labels + i18n relabel. Thanks @rdself!

* [codex] add per-key local usage command (#4034)

Integrated into release/v3.8.27 — per-key local @@om-usage command (cached quota, no upstream routing). Rebased onto modularized schemas/keys.ts + file-size rebaseline. Thanks @Witroch4!

* chore(release): reconcile v3.8.27 CHANGELOG + i18n mirrors

* ci(quality): unblock v3.8.27 release gates (zizmor pin + test-masking allowlist)

- zizmor ratchet (151→139, no regression): SHA-pin every action ref ADDED this
  cycle — codeql/dast-smoke/semgrep (3 new workflows) + trivy-action (docker-publish)
  + actions/cache (nightly-mutation). Pre-existing tag refs keep the repo convention.
- test-masking: add config/quality/test-masking-allowlist.json + allowlist support in
  check-test-masking.mjs (exempts ONLY the net-assert-reduction signal; tautology/skip/
  deletion still fire). Allowlists 2 verified-legitimate reductions:
  appearance-widget-settings-schema (#4033 removed showTokenSaverOnEndpoint field) and
  dashboard-shell-tabs (#3973 tabs→redirect refactor, asserts replaced). +4 gate tests.

* test(quality): reword test-masking self-test comments to avoid literal masking patterns

The added allowlist-test comments contained the literal strings 'assert.ok(true)' and
'.skip' which the masking detector's own regexes match as text — making the gate flag
its own test file (net +1 tautology/skip/extended-tautology vs main). Reworded to plain
prose ('a new tautology', 'a new skip marker'); test logic unchanged (24/24 pass).

* fix(quality): unblock v3.8.27 release — align 3 stale tests + restore modularized settings-schema parity

Release-PR full CI surfaced 3 deterministic test failures (no live product regression),
all stale vs legitimate cycle changes:

- settings-schema parity (#3988): the modularized updateSettingsSchema barrel
  (schemas/settings.ts) had diverged from the canonical settingsSchemas.ts (45 vs 85
  fields — 40 dropped + 6 extra), a lossy-modularization dead-code copy. Re-export from
  the canonical source so the barrel can never diverge again (runtime already uses
  canonical). Parity test now passes.
- api-manager permissions modal: #4034 added a 4th self-service switch (per-key usage
  allowance); a11y invariant (every switch type="button") still holds. Updated the
  static count 3 -> 4.
- pack-artifact policy: dist/http-method-guard.cjs became a required runtime path;
  added it to the test's expected missing-paths list.

Also documents the gate gap for Fase 9 (QUALITY_GATE_PLAYBOOK Parte 6): G1 run the
deterministic unit layer + test-masking on PR->release (not just PR->main), G2 a
modularization-parity gate (would have caught the #3988 drop at its PR), G3 flake
quarantine. Env flakes (LiveWS startup timeout, integration server-startup cascade)
are pre-existing/CI-env, triaged separately.

---------

Co-authored-by: Randi <55005611+rdself@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Veier04 <118300867+Veier04@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Felipe Sartori <felipesartori.ti@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: WormAlien <164898390+WormAlien@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: thezukiru <121331256+thezukiru@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: NOXX - Commiter <artur1992123@mail.ru>
Co-authored-by: Paijo <14921983+oyi77@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Demiurge The Single <megamen932@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Witroch4 <witalo_rocha@hotmail.com>
2026-06-17 02:43:21 -03:00

376 lines
13 KiB
JavaScript

#!/usr/bin/env node
// scripts/check/check-vuln-ratchet.mjs
// Catraca de vulnerabilidades de dependências via osv-scanner (Task 7.2 — Fase 7).
//
// Saída (stdout):
// vulnCount=N — total de vulnerabilidades encontradas (todos os severities)
// vulnCount=SKIP reason=binary-absent — osv-scanner não está no PATH
//
// Por default é ADVISORY (sai 0 sempre). Passe --ratchet para tornar BLOQUEANTE:
// lê metrics.vulnCount.value de config/quality/quality-baseline.json, compara a
// contagem MEDIDA e SAI 1 SE — E SOMENTE SE — a medida for MAIOR que o baseline
// (regressão real, direction:down). Qualquer SKIP gracioso (binário ausente,
// osv.dev/rede inacessível, erro de parse) SAI 0 mesmo com --ratchet — uma falha
// de MEDIÇÃO nunca bloqueia, só uma regressão medida bloqueia.
//
// NB (variância de CVE): osv mede contra um banco de CVEs que cresce de forma
// contínua. Um PR que NÃO toca dependências pode subitamente medir vulnCount >
// baseline porque um novo CVE foi divulgado nas deps existentes — isso é o
// comportamento ESPERADO de um gate de CVE bloqueante, não uma regressão de
// produto. O remédio é (a) bumpar a dep afetada (preferível) ou, se não houver
// fix, (b) re-baseline metrics.vulnCount com justificativa + issue de tracking.
// Ver docs/security/SUPPLY_CHAIN.md → "Variância de CVE".
//
// Uso:
// node scripts/check/check-vuln-ratchet.mjs
// node scripts/check/check-vuln-ratchet.mjs --json # imprime JSON bruto do osv-scanner
// node scripts/check/check-vuln-ratchet.mjs --quiet # suprime logs de diagnóstico
// node scripts/check/check-vuln-ratchet.mjs --ratchet # falha (exit 1) numa regressão
import fs from "node:fs";
import { execFileSync, spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
import path from "node:path";
import { pathToFileURL } from "node:url";
const ROOT = process.cwd();
const QUIET = process.argv.includes("--quiet");
const PRINT_JSON = process.argv.includes("--json");
const RATCHET = process.argv.includes("--ratchet");
const BASELINE_PATH = path.join(ROOT, "config/quality/quality-baseline.json");
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Pure parsing function (exported for tests)
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Conta vulnerabilidades no JSON emitido por `osv-scanner --format json`.
*
* Formato do osv-scanner v1+:
* {
* results: [
* {
* packages: [
* {
* package: { name, version, ecosystem },
* vulnerabilities: [ { id, aliases, affected, ... }, ... ],
* groups: [ { ids: [...] }, ... ]
* },
* ...
* ]
* },
* ...
* ]
* }
*
* Contagem: cada entrada em `vulnerabilities[]` de cada package conta como 1 vuln.
* Se `groups` estiver presente e tiver menos entradas que `vulnerabilities`, usamos
* `groups.length` para deduplificar (mesma vuln em múltiplos pacotes conta 1x por
* grupo). Caso contrário, contamos `vulnerabilities.length`.
*
* @param {object|null} osvJson - Objeto JSON parseado do osv-scanner
* @returns {{ vulnCount: number, bySeverity: Record<string, number> }}
*/
export function parseOsvJson(osvJson) {
if (!osvJson || !Array.isArray(osvJson.results)) {
return { vulnCount: 0, bySeverity: {} };
}
let vulnCount = 0;
const bySeverity = {};
for (const result of osvJson.results) {
if (!Array.isArray(result.packages)) continue;
for (const pkg of result.packages) {
if (!Array.isArray(pkg.vulnerabilities)) continue;
// Use groups for deduplication when available (same vuln in multiple paths)
const pkgCount = Array.isArray(pkg.groups) && pkg.groups.length > 0
? pkg.groups.length
: pkg.vulnerabilities.length;
vulnCount += pkgCount;
// Collect severity info from the vulnerability entries
for (const vuln of pkg.vulnerabilities) {
const severity = extractSeverity(vuln);
bySeverity[severity] = (bySeverity[severity] ?? 0) + 1;
}
}
}
return { vulnCount, bySeverity };
}
/**
* Extrai a severidade de uma entrada de vulnerabilidade do osv-scanner.
* Tenta database_specific.severity, depois severity[0].type, depois "UNKNOWN".
*
* @param {object} vuln - Entrada de vulnerabilidade do osv-scanner
* @returns {string}
*/
export function extractSeverity(vuln) {
if (!vuln) return "UNKNOWN";
// osv-scanner v2 field: database_specific.severity (common in OSV schema)
const dbSeverity = vuln.database_specific?.severity;
if (typeof dbSeverity === "string" && dbSeverity.length > 0) {
return dbSeverity.toUpperCase();
}
// CVSS severity array: [{ type: "CVSS_V3", score: "CVSS:3.1/..." }, ...]
if (Array.isArray(vuln.severity) && vuln.severity.length > 0) {
const first = vuln.severity[0];
if (typeof first?.type === "string") {
return first.type;
}
}
return "UNKNOWN";
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Ratchet (direction:down) — exported for tests
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Avalia a contagem MEDIDA de vulnerabilidades contra o baseline.
* Direction: down (a contagem só pode CAIR — mais vulns = regressão).
*
* @param {number} current - Contagem de vulnerabilidades medida agora.
* @param {number} baseline - Contagem congelada em quality-baseline.json.
* @returns {{ regressed: boolean, improved: boolean }}
*/
export function evaluateVulnRatchet(current, baseline) {
return {
regressed: current > baseline,
improved: current < baseline,
};
}
/**
* Lê metrics.vulnCount.value do quality-baseline.json.
* Retorna null se o arquivo ou a métrica estiverem ausentes (sem baseline não há
* ratchet possível — o caller trata como SKIP gracioso, exit 0).
*
* @param {string} baselinePath
* @returns {number|null}
*/
export function readBaselineVulnValue(baselinePath = BASELINE_PATH) {
if (!fs.existsSync(baselinePath)) return null;
let baselineJson;
try {
baselineJson = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(baselinePath, "utf8"));
} catch {
return null;
}
const metric = baselineJson?.metrics?.vulnCount;
if (!metric || typeof metric.value !== "number") return null;
return metric.value;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Binary detection
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Detecta se o binário `osv-scanner` está disponível no PATH.
* Usa `which` (Unix) sem interpolação de shell — Hard Rule #13.
*
* @returns {string|null} Caminho absoluto para o binário, ou null se ausente.
*/
export function findOsvScanner() {
try {
const result = spawnSync("which", ["osv-scanner"], {
encoding: "utf8",
timeout: 5_000,
});
if (result.status === 0) {
return result.stdout.trim();
}
} catch {
// which não disponível — tentar command -v via sh
}
// Fallback: tentar executar diretamente para verificar ENOENT
try {
const result = spawnSync("osv-scanner", ["--version"], {
encoding: "utf8",
timeout: 5_000,
});
if (result.error?.code === "ENOENT") return null;
if (result.status !== null) return "osv-scanner"; // found in PATH
} catch {
// noop
}
return null;
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Runner
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Executa o osv-scanner sobre o lockfile/diretório.
* Usa execFileSync sem shell interpolation (Hard Rule #13).
*
* Em uma falha de MEDIÇÃO (osv-scanner não produziu JSON — rede/osv.dev
* inacessível, timeout, JSON inválido) retorna { skip: true, reason } em vez de
* abortar o processo: o caller traduz isso num SKIP gracioso (exit 0 mesmo com
* --ratchet). Uma falha de medição NUNCA bloqueia; só uma regressão MEDIDA bloqueia.
*
* @param {string} osvBin - Caminho para o binário osv-scanner
* @returns {{ json: object } | { skip: true, reason: string }}
*/
function runOsvScanner(osvBin) {
const args = [
"--format", "json",
"--lockfile", path.join(ROOT, "package-lock.json"),
];
if (!QUIET) {
process.stderr.write("[vuln-ratchet] Rodando osv-scanner --format json ...\n");
}
let stdout;
try {
stdout = execFileSync(osvBin, args, {
cwd: ROOT,
encoding: "utf8",
maxBuffer: 32 * 1024 * 1024,
timeout: 120_000, // 2 min
});
} catch (err) {
// osv-scanner sai com código != 0 quando encontra vulnerabilidades;
// o JSON ainda vai no stdout.
stdout = err.stdout ? String(err.stdout) : "";
if (!stdout.trim()) {
process.stderr.write(`[vuln-ratchet] ERRO ao executar osv-scanner: ${err.message}\n`);
return { skip: true, reason: "osv-error" };
}
}
try {
return { json: JSON.parse(stdout) };
} catch (parseErr) {
process.stderr.write(`[vuln-ratchet] ERRO ao parsear JSON do osv-scanner: ${parseErr.message}\n`);
process.stderr.write(`[vuln-ratchet] stdout (primeiros 500 chars): ${stdout.slice(0, 500)}\n`);
return { skip: true, reason: "parse-error" };
}
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Main
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
function main() {
const osvBin = findOsvScanner();
if (!osvBin) {
// Skip gracioso: binário ausente — esperado em ambientes sem osv-scanner instalado.
// SKIP sai 0 MESMO com --ratchet (binário ausente nunca bloqueia).
console.log("vulnCount=SKIP reason=binary-absent");
if (!QUIET) {
process.stderr.write(
"[vuln-ratchet] SKIP — osv-scanner não encontrado no PATH.\n" +
"[vuln-ratchet] Instale via: https://google.github.io/osv-scanner/\n" +
"[vuln-ratchet] SKIP gracioso — sai 0 mesmo com --ratchet (binário ausente nunca bloqueia).\n"
);
}
process.exitCode = 0;
return;
}
const osvResult = runOsvScanner(osvBin);
// Falha de MEDIÇÃO (rede/osv.dev inacessível, timeout, JSON inválido) → SKIP
// gracioso, sai 0 mesmo com --ratchet (uma falha de medição nunca bloqueia).
if (osvResult.skip) {
console.log(`vulnCount=SKIP reason=${osvResult.reason}`);
if (!QUIET) {
process.stderr.write(
`[vuln-ratchet] SKIP — osv-scanner não produziu uma medição (${osvResult.reason}).\n` +
"[vuln-ratchet] SKIP gracioso — sai 0 mesmo com --ratchet (falha de medição nunca bloqueia).\n"
);
}
process.exitCode = 0;
return;
}
const osvJson = osvResult.json;
if (PRINT_JSON) {
process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(osvJson, null, 2) + "\n");
return;
}
const { vulnCount, bySeverity } = parseOsvJson(osvJson);
// Emitir em formato KEY=VALUE para o coletor de métricas (collect-metrics.mjs)
console.log(`vulnCount=${vulnCount}`);
if (!QUIET) {
const severitySummary = Object.entries(bySeverity)
.map(([k, v]) => `${k}=${v}`)
.join(", ") || "nenhuma";
process.stderr.write(
`[vuln-ratchet] Total de vulnerabilidades: ${vulnCount} (${severitySummary})\n`
);
}
// Medição bem-sucedida → aplica o ratchet (bloqueante só com --ratchet).
applyRatchet(vulnCount);
}
/**
* Aplica o ratchet (direction:down) sobre a contagem medida vs o baseline.
* Sem --ratchet: advisory (exit 0). Com --ratchet: exit 1 numa regressão real
* (medida > baseline). Baseline ausente → SKIP gracioso (exit 0).
*
* @param {number} vulnCount - Contagem MEDIDA (medição bem-sucedida).
*/
function applyRatchet(vulnCount) {
if (!RATCHET) {
if (!QUIET) {
process.stderr.write(
"[vuln-ratchet] ADVISORY — não falha pela contagem (passe --ratchet para bloquear regressão).\n"
);
}
process.exitCode = 0;
return;
}
const baselineValue = readBaselineVulnValue(BASELINE_PATH);
if (baselineValue === null) {
if (!QUIET) {
process.stderr.write(
"[vuln-ratchet] baseline ausente (metrics.vulnCount) — SKIP gracioso, sai 0.\n"
);
}
process.exitCode = 0;
return;
}
const { regressed } = evaluateVulnRatchet(vulnCount, baselineValue);
if (regressed) {
process.stderr.write(
`[vuln-ratchet] REGRESSÃO — ${vulnCount} vulnerabilidades > baseline ${baselineValue}\n` +
" → Bumpe a(s) dep(s) afetada(s) (preferível). Se não houver fix, re-baseline\n" +
" metrics.vulnCount em config/quality/quality-baseline.json com justificativa\n" +
" + issue de tracking. Ver docs/security/SUPPLY_CHAIN.md → 'Variância de CVE'.\n"
);
process.exitCode = 1;
return;
}
if (!QUIET) {
process.stderr.write(
`[vuln-ratchet] OK — sem regressão (${vulnCount} vulns, baseline ${baselineValue}).\n`
);
}
process.exitCode = 0;
}
if (import.meta.url === pathToFileURL(process.argv[1] || "").href) main();