Files
OmniRoute/open-sse/utils/error.ts
Diego Rodrigues de Sa e Souza f59f8daa94 Release v3.8.6 (#2804)
* fix(gemini): preserve structured tool calls for antigravity

* fix(gemini): parse prefixed textual tool calls

* fix(antigravity): preserve textual SSE tool calls

* fix(stream): normalize textual passthrough tool calls

* fix(stream): normalize split textual tool calls

* fix(stream): suppress malformed textual tool calls

* fix(stream): suppress compact malformed tool calls

* fix(stream): emit structured textual tool calls

* fix(stream): suppress unknown textual tool calls

* fix(stream): normalize responses textual tool calls

* chore: ignore .claude/settings.local.json (per-user Claude Code permissions)

* fix(opencode-go): route qwen3.x via claude messages + repair fixMissingToolResponses for Claude-shape upstreams (#2791)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix: resolve npm install warnings — remove dead deps, relax engine constraint (#2792)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix: register missing web-cookie validators (claude-web, gemini-web, copilot-web, t3-web) (#2793)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix: Error: Unable to inspect existing database #2771 (#2795)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(oauth): repair Google loopback callback flow (#2796)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* feat(logs): add clean history button (#2799)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* [codex] home: restore settings-driven home layout and quota auto-refresh (#2800)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(gemini): emit signaturelessToolCallMode:text for GEMINI format models (#2801)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* feat(modelSpecs): align opencode-go family with upstream provider limits (#2802)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* chore: apply unit test fixes, polyfills, and environment precedence fixes

* docs(agents): atualiza fluxos de release e triagem

Expande os workflows de release para incluir auditoria de segurança,
CHANGELOG completo por commits, quality gate obrigatório, homologação em
VPS local, publicação oficial, deploy em Akamai e validação de artefatos.

Reorganiza a triagem de features com arquivos permanentes por bucket,
suporte a itens em andamento, regra de reclaim após 15 dias e novo
tratamento para ideias viáveis catalogadas.

Corrige a orientação de revisão de discussões para usar a ordem
cronológica real dos comentários e respostas ao identificar a última
atividade.

* fix(lockout): classify Gemini Antigravity resource exhaustion as quota_exhausted

* fix(reasoning): gate replay by interleaved field

* docs(rule-16): permit human Co-authored-by, restrict only AI/bot trailers

Rule #16 previously banned all `Co-Authored-By` trailers absolutely.
That blocked the upstream-port workflows (`/port-upstream-features` and
`/port-upstream-issues`), which must credit human upstream PR authors
and issue reporters in OmniRoute commits.

Refine the rule to ban only AI/bot-attributed trailers (Claude, GPT,
Copilot, Bot; anthropic.com / openai.com / bot-owned noreply.github.com
emails) while allowing standard human `Co-authored-by: Name <email>`
attribution.

Sync the rule across the source CLAUDE.md, the E2E shakedown doc note,
and 41 i18n translations.

* fix(gitlawb): add specialty validators for connection test — bypass /models probe

GitLawB OpenGateway API (xiaomi-mimo compatible) does not expose a /models
endpoint, causing validateOpenAILikeProvider to 404 on the initial probe
and report 'Provider validation endpoint not supported'.

Add specialty validators for both gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi that follow the
same pattern as the existing xiaomi-mimo validator: skip GET /models,
validate directly via POST /chat/completions with a minimal test message.
Any 401/403 response means an invalid key; all other responses mean auth
is OK.

Fixes test-connection returning 404 for GitLawB providers.

* test(gitlawb): add 12 unit tests for gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi specialty validators

Covers success, auth failure (401/403), non-auth acceptance (400/422/429),
network errors, and custom baseUrl overrides for both providers.

* feat(gitlawb): serve models from static registry without API-unavailable warning

GitLawB's OpenGateway API does not expose a /models endpoint per
provider-path. Previously the models route fell through to the generic
fallback which returned static catalog models with the misleading
'API unavailable — using local catalog' warning.

Now gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi are handled as static model providers
(same pattern as reka and qwen OAuth) — models are served from the
provider registry without any warning, since all registered models
are functional via POST /chat/completions.

* refactor(gitlawb): extract shared opengateway validator factory, fix docs path in test

- Extract gitlawb/gitlawb-gmi validators into buildOpengatewayValidator factory
- Fix dockerignore-docs-coverage test: update stale docs/AUTO-COMBO.md -> docs/routing/AUTO-COMBO.md

* fix(reasoning): guard interleaved capability lookup

* feat(gitlawb): dynamic model fetch with gmi-cloud fallback

Hybrid approach:
- gitlawb (xiaomi-mimo): dynamic /models endpoint → 356 models
- gitlawb-gmi (gmi-cloud): 404 fallback → local catalog gracefully
Mimics Gitlawb/openclaude's model-routing pattern

* i18n(pt-BR): complete missing translations and sync with en.json

* feat(build): nix multi-OS package manager install (#2806)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(i18n): translate 144 new __MISSING__ pt-BR strings (#2816)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* chore(docs): set coverage gate to 40/40/40/40 in CLAUDE.md

Aligns the documented coverage gate with the v3.8.6 release decision
(lowered from 75/75/75/70). Matches the threshold already set in
package.json by the large feature PRs (planos 11-22).

* fix(cli): respect PORT env var in serve command (#2845)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(deepseek-web): return 400 when client sends tools[] - chat.deepseek.com has no tool support (#2854)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(qoder): reject invalid/expired PATs returning Cosy 500 error (#2860)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(cli): register openclaw in tool-detector (#2833) (#2850)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(api): include noAuth providers in /v1/models catalog (#2798) (#2814)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(combo): resolve custom provider targets via combo name (#2778) (#2812)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(translator): strip safety_identifier in openai-responses cleanup (#2770) (#2809)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(quota): honor explicit per-connection preflight opt-out (#2831) (#2844)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(usage): un-invert GitHub Copilot Free/limited quota — limited_user_quotas is remaining (#2876) (#2881)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(nous-research): correct baseUrl to include /chat/completions (#2826) (#2835)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(opencode): qwen3.x max/plus models lack vision support (#2822) (#2836)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(translator): pass-through tool_search built-in tool type (#2766) (#2811)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(github): route claude-opus-4.6 via chat completions (#2821)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* docs(oauth): add Windsurf login fix design (Phase 1 hotfix + Phase 2 Firebase OAuth)

Two-phase plan to fix the broken Windsurf OAuth flow:
- Phase 1: drop the dead app.devin.ai/editor/signin PKCE path, promote
  import-token from windsurf.com/show-auth-token as the primary path
- Phase 2: port Firebase OAuth + RegisterUser flow from
  fendoushaonian/WindSurf-gRPC-API for full browser-based automation

Spec only - no code changes yet.

* docs(plan): Phase 1 windsurf login hotfix implementation plan

10 tasks covering:
- TDD assertions for flowType + 410 Gone responses
- Provider switch to import_token
- Route handler retiring authorize/start-callback-server/poll-callback
- OAuthModal UI override
- i18n sync
- Verification + PR steps

* fix(cli): replace cli-table3 with hand-rolled formatter (#2752) (#2813)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(skills): skip interception for unregistered client-native tools (#2815) (#2817)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* feat(sse): add RTK filters for kubectl, docker-build, composer, gh (#2824)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(geminiHelper): support rec.image content shape + warn on dropped remote URLs (refs #2807) (#2855)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(cli): allow nullable/optional apiKey in cliMitmStartSchema (#2857)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(combo): preserve system messages during context handoff summary generation (#2865)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix: wire CLIProxyAPI fallback settings into chatCore routing engine (#2866)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(usage): add opencode quota fetcher (#2852) (#2867)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* feat(claude): default xhigh support for newer Opus models (#2874)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(cli): restore omniroute logs command stream (#2756) (#2810)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(combo): normalize upstream Headers for Node 24 undici interop (#2751) (#2823)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* Rename proxy log Public IP to Client IP (#2880)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(claude): preserve max effort for supported models (#2875)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(oauth): switch windsurf provider to import_token flow

The PKCE auth URL targeting app.devin.ai/editor/signin returns 404
post-rebrand. Until Phase 2 ports Firebase OAuth + RegisterUser, the
only supported path is import-token via windsurf.com/show-auth-token.

- windsurf.ts: drop buildAuthUrl, set flowType=import_token
- generateAuthData returns supported:false + helpful error for windsurf/devin-cli
- tests: assert flowType + disabled stub

* fix(oauth): return 410 Gone for retired windsurf/devin-cli PKCE actions

start-callback-server, authorize, and poll-callback (GET + POST) now
return 410 Gone with a pointer to /import-token. The 410 short-circuit
runs before auth so the response is honest about the action being
permanently gone, not gated. Codex PKCE flow unchanged.

Tests: 5 new assertions cover GET + POST 410 paths and a Codex
regression check.

* refactor(oauth): annotate retired PKCE fields in WINDSURF_CONFIG

No behaviour change - comment-only update documenting that authorizeUrl,
codeChallengeMethod, callbackPort, callbackPath, apiServerUrl, and
exchangePath are no longer consumed. Active fields (inferenceUrl,
showAuthTokenUrl, firebaseApiKey, ideName) called out separately.

* fix(cli,docs): use requireCliToolsAuth in logs route + document OPENCODE quota env

Post-merge contract fixes for v3.8.6:
- src/app/api/cli-tools/logs/route.ts (#2810) now uses the shared
  requireCliToolsAuth guard (param renamed req->request) to satisfy the
  cli-tools-auth-hardening contract test.
- Document OMNIROUTE_OPENCODE_QUOTA_URL (#2867) in docs/reference/ENVIRONMENT.md
  to satisfy the env/docs sync contract.

* fix(dashboard): force import-token panel for windsurf/devin-cli

Phase 1 hotfix: hide the 'Browser Login' tab and start in Paste API Key
mode. Removes windsurf/devin-cli from PKCE_CALLBACK_SERVER_PROVIDERS so
no callback server is started for them. Codex still uses the PKCE flow.

The 'Get token' link continues to point at windsurf.com/show-auth-token
via the existing supportsTokenPaste form copy.

* fix(oauth): windsurf import-token mapTokens signature mismatch

The route at `src/app/api/oauth/[provider]/[action]/route.ts` invokes
`providerData.mapTokens({ accessToken: token })` (object), matching the
cursor/kiro signature. The windsurf provider was declared with
`mapTokens(token: string)` instead, so the entire object was stored as
`accessToken`. When the connection record reached the SQLite layer it
crashed with:

  SQLite3 can only bind numbers, strings, bigints, buffers, and null

Fix by aligning windsurf's `mapTokens` signature with the route caller
and the cursor/kiro convention. Also dedupe a copy-pasted second
`if (action === "import-token")` block in the route handler — the
second block was unreachable but identical to the first.

Adds two regression tests asserting that
`provider.mapTokens({ accessToken })` returns a string `accessToken` for
both windsurf and devin-cli, so a future signature drift trips the gate
instead of the SQLite bind error in production.

* feat(compression): expand pt-BR pack with troglodita rules (15 → 49) (#2818)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(sse): repair RTK engine defaults so dedup and direct calls work (#2825)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(mcp): redirect console.log/warn to stderr in --mcp stdio mode (#2840)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(gemini-cli): prefer real project IDs over default-project (#2841)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(opencode-go): add provider limits quota fetcher (#2861)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* Audit & add web cookie providers: fix 4 missing registry entries + DuckDuckGo (#2862)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(antigravity): harden signatureless tool history (#2878)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix: provider model sync pruning and dynamic antigravity MITM proxy mappings (#2886)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* feat(usage): per-API-key token limits scoped to model/provider/global (#2888)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(audio): build multipart body manually to preserve Content-Type (#2842)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* refactor: remove agent skill documentation files and streamline maintenance workflows

* test(stabilization): resolve unit test failures in blackbox-web, schema-coercion, translator-helper-branches, usage-service-hardening, and audio-transcription

* fix(security): mitigate Socket.dev supply-chain findings + secrets opt-in + minimal build profile (#2863) (#2871)

Two real security gaps closed and four cosmetic Socket.dev fingerprints removed.
See docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md for the per-finding maintainer
attestation.

Real bugs fixed:
- cloudSync: HMAC verification of `X-Cloud-Sig` + opt-in
  `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true` before overwriting `accessToken` /
  `refreshToken` / `providerSpecificData` from a remote response. Closes the
  silent-credential-swap surface (a misconfigured or hostile CLOUD_URL could
  previously replace local tokens unverified).
- Zed import: split into 2-step `/discover` + `/import` flow. `/import` now
  requires `confirmedAccounts: [{ service, account, fingerprint }]` and
  re-reads the keychain server-side to filter by fingerprint, so a tampered
  discover response cannot trick the endpoint into saving an unrelated token.

Cosmetic Socket.dev mitigations:
- runElevatedPowerShell writes the elevated payload to a per-call temp `.ps1`
  file (mode 0o600) and references it via `-File`. Removes the textbook
  `-EncodedCommand <base64utf16le>` pattern flagged as malware by Socket's AI
  classifier.
- Maintainer attestation `SECURITY-AUDITOR-NOTE:` blocks added at every
  flagged call site pointing to `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md`.

Build-time hardening:
- `OMNIROUTE_BUILD_PROFILE=minimal` (`npm run build:secure`) physically
  removes the four sensitive modules from the standalone bundle via webpack
  `NormalModuleReplacementPlugin`. Stubs throw `FeatureDisabledError` at
  runtime. Intended for the `omniroute-secure` artifact.

Tests:
- 24 new unit tests in `tests/unit/security/` covering the wrapper builder,
  HMAC verification (4 cases), credential fingerprint determinism (5 cases),
  confirmedAccounts validation + fingerprint filtering (6 cases), and the
  minimal-build stubs (5 cases).

Docs:
- New `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md` — per-finding attestation.
- New `socket.yml` — Socket.dev v2 config pointing at the attestation.
- Updated `SECURITY.md` — supply-chain scanner section.
- Updated `.env.example` — three new env vars documented.

Backwards compatibility:
- Cloud sync token overwrite is OFF by default. Users who relied on
  it must set `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true`. Breaking change documented
  in CHANGELOG.
- Zed import 2-step is the new default; legacy 1-step preserved behind
  `OMNIROUTE_ZED_IMPORT_LEGACY_ONE_STEP=true` and will be removed in v3.9.

Closes #2863

* fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec; doc SHA-256 cache-key rationale (#2894)

Two security-scanning findings on release/v3.8.6:

- Secret-scanning alert 7 (google_api_key): the windsurf login-fix design spec
  embedded the literal public Firebase Web API key on two lines. Firebase Web
  API keys are non-sensitive by design (they identify the project; access is
  gated by Firebase Security Rules + key restrictions), but the literal trips
  secret scanning. Redacted to a placeholder; the embedded default still goes
  through resolvePublicCred per rule #11.

- Code-scanning alert 261 (js/insufficient-password-hash): tokenCacheKey() uses
  SHA-256 to derive an in-memory cache key from the session token, not for
  password-at-rest storage. Added a comment documenting why CWE-916 KDFs do not
  apply (false positive).

* fix(ci): resolve release/v3.8.6 gate failures (docs-sync, any-budget, pack-artifact) (#2895)

* fix(ci): resolve release/v3.8.6 gate failures (docs-sync, any-budget, pack-artifact)

Three CI gates failed on release/v3.8.6 (run 26630300877):

- docs-sync: CHANGELOG had a spurious "## [3.8.6-patch]" section above
  "## [3.8.6]", so the latest release no longer matched package.json (3.8.6)
  and the 41 i18n CHANGELOG mirrors were flagged as missing that section.
  Fold the lone #2752 entry into [3.8.6] and drop the patch heading.
- any-budget:t11: open-sse/handlers/chatCore.ts regressed to 1 explicit `any`
  (budget 0). Type the persist callback arg as Record<string, unknown>, which
  matches runWithOnPersist's RefreshPersistFn contract exactly.
- pack-artifact: open-sse/utils/setupPolyfill.ts ships via package.json "files"
  (bin/omniroute.mjs imports it at startup) but was missing from the pack
  policy allowlist. Allow it and add a regression test.

* fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec

Redact the literal public Firebase Web API key (secret-scanning #7) to a
placeholder, mirroring the redaction on release/v3.8.6 (PR #2894) and the
windsurf fix branch. Non-sensitive public Web key; trips secret scanning.

* feat(combo): Zero-Latency Combos (Hedging, Proactive Compression, Predictive TTFT) (#2868)

* feat(combo): implement zero-latency combo optimizations (hedging, proactive compression, predictive TTFT)

* fix(combo): fix predictive TTFT skip logic and unhandled promise rejections

---------

Co-authored-by: Automation <automation@omniroute>

* feat: implement automated skill workflows and update system configuration and validation schemas

* test: eliminate dynamic cast warnings in cloud-sync unit test

* test: isolate services-branch-hardening database directory to avoid concurrency issues

* feat(providers): add 7 new web-cookie providers + research catalog + discovery tool

New providers:
- huggingchat: free LLM chat via huggingface.co/chat (no subscription)
- phind: free dev-focused AI chat via phind.com/api/agent
- poe-web: multi-model chat via poe.com GraphQL (p-b cookie)
- venice-web: privacy-focused AI chat via venice.ai (session cookie)
- v0-vercel-web: Vercel v0 code gen via v0.dev (session cookie)
- kimi-web: Moonshot Kimi chat via kimi.moonshot.cn (session cookie)
- doubao-web: ByteDance Doubao chat via doubao.com (session cookie)

Additional:
- Research catalog: docs/research/UNLIMITED_LLM_ACCESS.md
- Discovery tool design + stub: src/lib/discovery/ + migration 073
- Unit tests: 33 tests for all 7 providers
- Shared helpers consolidated in error.ts (slop cleanup)
- All registered in WEB_COOKIE_PROVIDERS + providerRegistry + webSessionCredentials

Closes #2885

* fix(typecheck): resolve typecheck errors in combo spec and compression modules

* feat(api,oauth): add `agy` (Antigravity CLI) standalone provider with CLI token import (#2899)

Add a standalone OAuth provider `agy` (Antigravity CLI) next to gemini-cli/antigravity.
It reuses the antigravity inference backend (identical Google client_id +
daily-cloudcode-pa.googleapis.com endpoint, executor and token-refresh) but ships its own
model catalog — including the Claude models the backend exposes (claude-opus-4-6-thinking,
claude-sonnet-4-6) — its own account pool, and four ways to connect:

- token-file import (paste/upload the agy oauth token JSON)
- auto-detect a local CLI login (~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/antigravity-oauth-token)
- browser OAuth (via the shared OAuthModal Google loopback flow)
- bulk / ZIP import

New routes: POST /api/providers/agy-auth/{import,import-bulk,zip-extract,apply-local}.
Catalog pinned from the live :fetchAvailableModels endpoint. Docs (openapi.yaml,
ENVIRONMENT.md, .env.example, CHANGELOG) updated; new unit tests for registration,
the token parser, and route auth-hardening.

* fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec (#2896)

Redact the literal public Firebase Web API key (secret-scanning #7) to a
placeholder. Firebase Web API keys are non-sensitive by design but the literal
trips GitHub secret scanning. Mirrors the redaction landed on release/v3.8.6
(PR #2894). Embedded default still flows through resolvePublicCred (rule #11).

* Pr 2871 (#2897)

* fix(security): mitigate Socket.dev supply-chain findings + secrets opt-in + minimal build profile (#2863)

Two real security gaps closed and four cosmetic Socket.dev fingerprints removed.
See docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md for the per-finding maintainer
attestation.

Real bugs fixed:
- cloudSync: HMAC verification of `X-Cloud-Sig` + opt-in
  `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true` before overwriting `accessToken` /
  `refreshToken` / `providerSpecificData` from a remote response. Closes the
  silent-credential-swap surface (a misconfigured or hostile CLOUD_URL could
  previously replace local tokens unverified).
- Zed import: split into 2-step `/discover` + `/import` flow. `/import` now
  requires `confirmedAccounts: [{ service, account, fingerprint }]` and
  re-reads the keychain server-side to filter by fingerprint, so a tampered
  discover response cannot trick the endpoint into saving an unrelated token.

Cosmetic Socket.dev mitigations:
- runElevatedPowerShell writes the elevated payload to a per-call temp `.ps1`
  file (mode 0o600) and references it via `-File`. Removes the textbook
  `-EncodedCommand <base64utf16le>` pattern flagged as malware by Socket's AI
  classifier.
- Maintainer attestation `SECURITY-AUDITOR-NOTE:` blocks added at every
  flagged call site pointing to `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md`.

Build-time hardening:
- `OMNIROUTE_BUILD_PROFILE=minimal` (`npm run build:secure`) physically
  removes the four sensitive modules from the standalone bundle via webpack
  `NormalModuleReplacementPlugin`. Stubs throw `FeatureDisabledError` at
  runtime. Intended for the `omniroute-secure` artifact.

Tests:
- 24 new unit tests in `tests/unit/security/` covering the wrapper builder,
  HMAC verification (4 cases), credential fingerprint determinism (5 cases),
  confirmedAccounts validation + fingerprint filtering (6 cases), and the
  minimal-build stubs (5 cases).

Docs:
- New `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md` — per-finding attestation.
- New `socket.yml` — Socket.dev v2 config pointing at the attestation.
- Updated `SECURITY.md` — supply-chain scanner section.
- Updated `.env.example` — three new env vars documented.

Backwards compatibility:
- Cloud sync token overwrite is OFF by default. Users who relied on
  it must set `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true`. Breaking change documented
  in CHANGELOG.
- Zed import 2-step is the new default; legacy 1-step preserved behind
  `OMNIROUTE_ZED_IMPORT_LEGACY_ONE_STEP=true` and will be removed in v3.9.

Closes #2863

* feat: implement automated skill workflows and update system configuration and validation schemas

* test: eliminate dynamic cast warnings in cloud-sync unit test

* test: isolate services-branch-hardening database directory to avoid concurrency issues

* chore(docs): refresh generated docs collection index

Update the generated Fumadocs browser collection mapping to keep
documentation imports in sync with the current docs structure.

* docs: update generated browser docs collection manifest

Refresh the generated Fumadocs browser collection mapping so the docs site can resolve the current documentation files correctly.

---------

Co-authored-by: OpenClaw <openclaw@kuzhomesrv.local>
Co-authored-by: Dmitry Kuznetsov <139351986+dmitry@users.noreply.local>
Co-authored-by: KuzyaBot <kuzya@local>
Co-authored-by: JeferssonLemes <jeferssondev@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Paijo <14921983+oyi77@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Markus Hartung <mail@hartmark.se>
Co-authored-by: akarray <akarray@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Apostol Apostolov <theapoapostolov@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Hernan Javier Ardila Sanchez <hjasgr@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Dmitry Kuznetsov <dmitry@kuznetsov.me>
Co-authored-by: Nikolay Alafuzov <alafuzov_nn@rusklimat.ru>
Co-authored-by: oyi77 <oyi77@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Ronaldo Davi <alltomatos@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: levonk <277861+levonk@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Lenine Júnior <lenine@engrene.com.br>
Co-authored-by: Annas Alghoffar <aag.annas@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Tushar Agarwal <76201310+Tushar49@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: GreatLiu <eurasiaxz@qq.com>
Co-authored-by: yuna amelia <230527278+yunaamelia@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Randi <55005611+rdself@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Container <78986709+disonjer@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: nickwizard <35692452+nickwizard@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Rajvardhan Patil <rajvardhanpatil7890@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Raxxoor <manker_lol@hotmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Muhammad Mugni Hadi <mugnimaestra3@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: mi <123757457+soyelmismo@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Automation <automation@omniroute>
2026-05-29 12:44:29 -03:00

498 lines
15 KiB
TypeScript

import { CORS_HEADERS } from "./cors.ts";
import { getDefaultErrorMessage, getErrorInfo } from "../config/errorConfig.ts";
import { normalizePayloadForLog } from "@/lib/logPayloads";
import type { ModelCooldownErrorPayload } from "@/types";
/**
* Sanitize an error message to prevent stack trace exposure in API responses.
* Strips stack traces, file paths, and absolute Windows/POSIX paths from
* error messages before they reach the client.
*/
interface ErrorResponseBody {
error: {
message: string;
type?: string;
code?: string;
};
upstream_details?: Record<string, unknown> | null; // sanitized upstream provider body
}
// Length cap protects against pathological inputs even before tokenization.
const MAX_ERROR_LEN = 4096;
const SOURCE_EXT = ["ts", "tsx", "js", "jsx", "mjs", "cjs"] as const;
function looksLikeAbsolutePath(tok: string): boolean {
// POSIX: "/<...>.ts" (optionally followed by :line[:col]).
// Windows: "C:\<...>.ts" or "C:/<...>.ts".
if (tok.length < 4 || tok.length > 2048) return false;
const isPosix = tok.charCodeAt(0) === 0x2f; // '/'
const isWindows = tok.length > 2 && tok.charCodeAt(1) === 0x3a && /[A-Za-z]/.test(tok[0]);
if (!isPosix && !isWindows) return false;
const dot = tok.lastIndexOf(".");
if (dot <= 0 || dot === tok.length - 1) return false;
const ext = tok
.slice(dot + 1)
.split(":", 1)[0]
.toLowerCase();
return (SOURCE_EXT as readonly string[]).includes(ext);
}
/**
* Strip stack-trace tail and absolute source paths from error messages.
*
* Implemented via simple whitespace tokenization (linear time) instead of a
* single complex regex, so CodeQL `js/polynomial-redos` stays clean even when
* the runtime error message is attacker-controlled.
*/
export function sanitizeErrorMessage(message: unknown): string {
let str = typeof message === "string" ? message : String(message ?? "");
if (str.length > MAX_ERROR_LEN) str = str.slice(0, MAX_ERROR_LEN);
const nl = str.indexOf("\n");
const firstLine = nl >= 0 ? str.slice(0, nl) : str;
// Preserve original whitespace by splitting on captured separator.
const parts = firstLine.split(/(\s+)/);
for (let i = 0; i < parts.length; i++) {
if (looksLikeAbsolutePath(parts[i])) parts[i] = "<path>";
}
return parts.join("");
}
const BLOCKED_KEYS = /stack|trace|path|file|cwd|dir|password|secret|token|key/i;
const MAX_DEPTH = 4;
/**
* Recursively sanitize an arbitrary JSON value from an upstream provider body.
* - Strings: run through sanitizeErrorMessage (strips stacks + absolute paths).
* - Keys matching BLOCKED_KEYS are dropped (credential/path guards).
* - Depth capped at MAX_DEPTH to prevent pathological nesting.
* - Arrays capped at 32 elements.
* - Returns null for null/undefined/non-JSON-serializable values.
*/
export function sanitizeUpstreamDetails(value: unknown, depth = 0): unknown {
if (depth > MAX_DEPTH) return "[truncated]";
if (value === null || value === undefined) return null;
if (typeof value === "string") return sanitizeErrorMessage(value);
if (typeof value === "number" || typeof value === "boolean") return value;
if (Array.isArray(value)) {
return value.slice(0, 32).map((v) => sanitizeUpstreamDetails(v, depth + 1));
}
if (typeof value === "object") {
const out: Record<string, unknown> = {};
for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(value as Record<string, unknown>)) {
if (BLOCKED_KEYS.test(k)) continue;
out[k] = sanitizeUpstreamDetails(v, depth + 1);
}
return out;
}
return null;
}
/**
* Build OpenAI-compatible error response body. Message is always sanitized
* so callers do not need to remember to strip stack traces themselves.
* Optional third argument `upstreamDetails` (raw parsed provider body) is
* sanitized by sanitizeUpstreamDetails before inclusion as `upstream_details`.
*/
export function buildErrorBody(
statusCode: number,
message: string,
upstreamDetails?: unknown
): ErrorResponseBody {
const errorInfo = getErrorInfo(statusCode);
const safeMessage = sanitizeErrorMessage(message) || getDefaultErrorMessage(statusCode);
const body: ErrorResponseBody = {
error: {
message: safeMessage,
type: errorInfo.type,
code: errorInfo.code,
},
};
if (upstreamDetails !== undefined && upstreamDetails !== null) {
const sanitized = sanitizeUpstreamDetails(upstreamDetails);
if (sanitized !== null && typeof sanitized === "object" && !Array.isArray(sanitized)) {
body.upstream_details = sanitized as Record<string, unknown>;
}
}
return body;
}
/**
* Create error Response object (for non-streaming)
* @param {number} statusCode - HTTP status code
* @param {string} message - Error message
* @returns {Response} HTTP Response object
*/
export function errorResponse(statusCode: number, message: string): Response {
return new Response(JSON.stringify(buildErrorBody(statusCode, sanitizeErrorMessage(message))), {
status: statusCode,
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/json",
},
});
}
/**
* Write error to SSE stream (for streaming)
* @param {WritableStreamDefaultWriter} writer - Stream writer
* @param {number} statusCode - HTTP status code
* @param {string} message - Error message
*/
export async function writeStreamError(
writer: WritableStreamDefaultWriter<Uint8Array>,
statusCode: number,
message: string
): Promise<void> {
const errorBody = buildErrorBody(statusCode, sanitizeErrorMessage(message));
const encoder = new TextEncoder();
await writer.write(encoder.encode(`data: ${JSON.stringify(errorBody)}\n\n`));
}
function normalizeRetryAfterSeconds(retryAfter?: string | number | Date | null): number {
if (typeof retryAfter === "number" && Number.isFinite(retryAfter)) {
if (retryAfter > 0 && retryAfter < 1_000_000_000) {
return Math.max(Math.ceil(retryAfter), 1);
}
const retryTimeMs = new Date(retryAfter).getTime();
if (Number.isFinite(retryTimeMs)) {
return Math.max(Math.ceil((retryTimeMs - Date.now()) / 1000), 1);
}
}
if (retryAfter instanceof Date || typeof retryAfter === "string") {
const retryTimeMs = new Date(retryAfter).getTime();
if (Number.isFinite(retryTimeMs)) {
return Math.max(Math.ceil((retryTimeMs - Date.now()) / 1000), 1);
}
}
return 1;
}
/**
* Parse Antigravity error message to extract retry time
* Example: "You have exhausted your capacity on this model. Your quota will reset after 2h7m23s."
* @param {string} message - Error message
* @returns {number|null} Retry time in milliseconds, or null if not found
*/
export function parseAntigravityRetryTime(message: unknown): number | null {
if (typeof message !== "string") return null;
// Match patterns like: 2h7m23s, 5m30s, 45s, 1h20m, etc.
const match = message.match(/reset after (\d+h)?(\d+m)?(\d+s)?/i);
if (!match) return null;
let totalMs = 0;
// Extract hours
if (match[1]) {
const hours = parseInt(match[1]);
totalMs += hours * 60 * 60 * 1000;
}
// Extract minutes
if (match[2]) {
const minutes = parseInt(match[2]);
totalMs += minutes * 60 * 1000;
}
// Extract seconds
if (match[3]) {
const seconds = parseInt(match[3]);
totalMs += seconds * 1000;
}
return totalMs > 0 ? totalMs : null;
}
/**
* Parse upstream provider error response
* @param {Response} response - Fetch response from provider
* @param {string} provider - Provider name (for Antigravity-specific parsing)
* @returns {Promise<{statusCode: number, message: string, retryAfterMs: number|null, responseBody: unknown}>}
*/
export async function parseUpstreamError(response: Response, provider: string | null = null) {
let message: unknown = "";
let retryAfterMs: number | null = null;
let responseBody: unknown = null;
let errorCode: unknown = undefined;
let errorType: unknown = undefined;
try {
const text = await response.text();
responseBody = normalizePayloadForLog(text);
// Try parse as JSON
try {
const json = JSON.parse(text);
message = json.error?.message || json.message || json.error || text;
errorCode = json.error?.code || json.code;
errorType = json.error?.type || json.type;
} catch {
message = text;
}
} catch {
message = `Upstream error: ${response.status}`;
responseBody = { _rawText: message };
}
const messageStr = typeof message === "string" ? message : JSON.stringify(message);
const retryAfterHeader = response.headers?.get?.("retry-after");
if (retryAfterHeader && !retryAfterMs) {
const retryAfterSec = Number.parseInt(retryAfterHeader, 10);
if (Number.isFinite(retryAfterSec) && retryAfterSec > 0) {
retryAfterMs = retryAfterSec * 1000;
} else {
const retryAfterDate = new Date(retryAfterHeader).getTime();
if (Number.isFinite(retryAfterDate) && retryAfterDate > Date.now()) {
retryAfterMs = retryAfterDate - Date.now();
}
}
}
// Parse Antigravity-specific retry time from error message
if (provider === "antigravity" && response.status === 429) {
retryAfterMs = parseAntigravityRetryTime(messageStr);
}
// Also parse retry time for other providers (Qwen, etc.) with "quota will reset after XhYmZs" format
if (response.status === 429 && !retryAfterMs) {
retryAfterMs = parseAntigravityRetryTime(messageStr);
}
// Generic providers: "Please retry after 20s"
if (response.status === 429 && !retryAfterMs) {
const retryMatch = messageStr.match(/retry\s+after\s+(\d+)\s*s/i);
if (retryMatch) {
retryAfterMs = Number.parseInt(retryMatch[1], 10) * 1000;
}
}
// Cap maximum retry time at 24 hours to prevent infinite wait
const MAX_RETRY_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
if (retryAfterMs && retryAfterMs > MAX_RETRY_MS) {
retryAfterMs = MAX_RETRY_MS;
}
const responseHeaders: Record<string, string> | null = response.headers
? Object.fromEntries(response.headers.entries())
: null;
return {
statusCode: response.status,
message: messageStr,
errorCode,
errorType,
retryAfterMs,
responseBody,
responseHeaders,
};
}
/**
* Create error result for chatCore handler
* @param {number} statusCode - HTTP status code
* @param {string} message - Error message
* @param {number|null} retryAfterMs - Optional retry-after time in milliseconds
* @returns {{ success: false, status: number, error: string, response: Response, retryAfterMs?: number }}
*/
export function createErrorResult(
statusCode: number,
message: string,
retryAfterMs: number | null = null,
errorCode?: string,
errorType?: string,
upstreamDetails?: unknown
) {
const body = buildErrorBody(statusCode, message, upstreamDetails);
if (errorCode) {
body.error.code = errorCode;
}
if (errorType) {
body.error.type = errorType;
}
const result: {
success: false;
status: number;
error: string;
errorType?: string;
errorCode?: string;
response: Response;
retryAfterMs?: number;
} = {
success: false,
status: statusCode,
error: body.error.message,
errorType,
errorCode,
response: new Response(JSON.stringify(body), {
status: statusCode,
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
}),
};
// Add retryAfterMs if available (for Antigravity quota errors)
if (retryAfterMs) {
result.retryAfterMs = retryAfterMs;
}
return result;
}
/**
* Create unavailable response when all accounts are rate limited
* @param {number} statusCode - Original error status code
* @param {string} message - Error message (without retry info)
* @param {string} retryAfter - ISO timestamp when earliest account becomes available
* @param {string} retryAfterHuman - Human-readable retry info e.g. "reset after 30s"
* @returns {Response}
*/
export function unavailableResponse(
statusCode: number,
message: string,
retryAfter?: string | number | Date | null,
retryAfterHuman?: string
) {
const retryAfterSec = normalizeRetryAfterSeconds(retryAfter);
const msg = retryAfterHuman ? `${message} (${retryAfterHuman})` : message;
return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: { message: msg } }), {
status: statusCode,
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/json",
"Retry-After": String(retryAfterSec),
},
});
}
export function providerCircuitOpenResponse(
provider: string,
retryAfter?: string | number | Date | null
) {
const retryAfterSec = normalizeRetryAfterSeconds(retryAfter);
return new Response(
JSON.stringify({
error: {
message: `Provider ${provider} circuit breaker is open`,
type: "server_error",
code: "provider_circuit_open",
provider,
retry_after: retryAfterSec,
},
}),
{
status: 503,
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/json",
"Retry-After": String(retryAfterSec),
"X-OmniRoute-Provider-Breaker": "open",
},
}
);
}
export function buildModelCooldownBody({
model,
retryAfterSec,
}: {
model?: string | null;
retryAfterSec: number;
}): ModelCooldownErrorPayload {
const resolvedModel = typeof model === "string" && model.trim().length > 0 ? model.trim() : null;
return {
error: {
message: resolvedModel
? `All credentials for model ${resolvedModel} are cooling down`
: "All credentials for the requested model are cooling down",
type: "rate_limit_error",
code: "model_cooldown",
...(resolvedModel ? { model: resolvedModel } : {}),
reset_seconds: Math.max(Math.ceil(retryAfterSec), 1),
},
};
}
export function modelCooldownResponse({
model,
retryAfter,
}: {
model?: string | null;
retryAfter?: string | number | Date | null;
}) {
const retryAfterSec = normalizeRetryAfterSeconds(retryAfter);
return new Response(
JSON.stringify(
buildModelCooldownBody({
model,
retryAfterSec,
})
),
{
status: 429,
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/json",
"Retry-After": String(retryAfterSec),
},
}
);
}
/**
* Build an executor-style error result (response + url + headers + transformedBody).
* Shared by web-cookie executors that return the `{ response, url, headers, transformedBody }` shape.
*/
export function makeExecutorErrorResult(
status: number,
message: string,
body: unknown,
url: string
) {
return {
response: new Response(
JSON.stringify({
error: {
message: sanitizeErrorMessage(message),
type: "upstream_error",
code: `HTTP_${status}`,
},
}),
{ status, headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" } }
),
url,
headers: {} as Record<string, string>,
transformedBody: body,
};
}
/**
* Normalize a cookie string: strip a leading "Cookie:" prefix if present.
*/
export function normalizeCookie(raw: string): string {
return raw?.startsWith("Cookie:") ? raw.slice(7).trim() : raw || "";
}
/**
* Format provider error with context
* @param {Error} error - Original error
* @param {string} provider - Provider name
* @param {string} model - Model name
* @param {number|string} statusCode - HTTP status code or error code
* @returns {string} Formatted error message
*/
export function formatProviderError(
error: { code?: string | number; message?: string } | Error,
provider: string,
model: string,
statusCode?: string | number | null
): string {
const providerCode = "code" in error ? error.code : undefined;
const code = statusCode || providerCode || "FETCH_FAILED";
const message = error.message || "Unknown error";
return `[${code}]: ${message}`;
}