mirror of
https://github.com/diegosouzapw/OmniRoute.git
synced 2026-07-26 09:52:11 +03:00
* chore(release): open v3.8.19 development cycle * chore(release): sync electron lockfile to 3.8.19 * feat(quality): quality-gate ratchet + anti-hallucination/rule-enforcement guardrails (Phases 0-6) (#3471) * feat(quality): generic ratchet comparator (multi-metric, regression-only) * chore(ci): Fase 0 quality-gate fixes — reconcile coverage gate (40->60), tier npm audit, wire orphaned contract gates, re-enable cheap husky pre-commit * feat(quality): ratchet engine (collector + frozen baseline + CI job) and provider-consistency gate - collect-metrics.mjs: emits quality-metrics.json (ESLint warnings + coverage when present) - quality-baseline.json: frozen baseline (eslintWarnings=3482, regression-only) - ci.yml: quality-gate job (ratchet + step summary + artifact) and check:provider-consistency in lint job - check-provider-consistency.ts: every REGISTRY id must be a canonical provider (found krutrim half-registered → allowlisted as known pre-existing, blocks any NEW orphan) - TDD: 9 tests (5 ratchet + 4 provider-consistency) * feat(quality): Fase 2 anti-hallucination gates — fetch-targets, openapi-routes, deps allowlist - check-fetch-targets: every dashboard fetch(/api/...) resolves to a real route.ts; found 7 pre-existing dashboard->route mismatches frozen as KNOWN_MISSING for triage - check-openapi-routes: every openapi.yaml path resolves to a real route; found 1 stale spec entry (agent-bridge agents/{id}/state) frozen as KNOWN_STALE_SPEC - check-deps: anti-slopsquatting allowlist (105 deps); new deps need explicit human-reviewed entry - all wired into CI lint/docs jobs; TDD +12 tests (21 total across 5 gates) * docs(quality): add quality-gates report + implementation plan to repo root * feat(quality): Fase 3a — file-size ratchet (freeze 91 files >800 LOC, cap 800 for new) - check-file-size.mjs: frozen files can only shrink; new files must be <= cap (kills the next 12k-line god-component) - file-size-baseline.json: 91 files frozen at current LOC (largest 12883) - wired into CI lint job; TDD 5 tests; --update ratchets the baseline down on shrink * feat(quality): Fase 3b — duplication ratchet (jscpd@4, baseline 5.72%) - check-duplication.mjs: runs jscpd@4 (pinned; v5 is an incompatible Rust rewrite) over src+open-sse, fails if duplication % rises vs frozen baseline (5.72%, measured: 1358 clones / 22967 dup lines). Targets the executor copy-paste (48/50 override execute() wholesale) - wired into the parallel quality-gate CI job (off the lint critical path); TDD 4 tests; --update ratchets down - snapshot now complete: coverage ~82.6%, eslint 3482 (98.5% no-explicit-any), duplication 5.72%, 91 files >800 LOC * feat(quality): Fase 4a — anti test-masking gate - check-test-masking.mjs: for each MODIFIED test file in a PR, flags net assert removal + new assert.ok(true) tautologies (base...HEAD diff). Directly enforces CLAUDE.md 'never weaken asserts to go green' - wired into pr-test-policy CI job (reuses base fetch); no-op outside PR; TDD 5 tests * feat(quality): Fase 4b — coverage ratchet (conservative floors, CI consumes merged coverage) - quality-baseline.json: coverage.{statements,lines,functions,branches} floors (80/80/82/73, real ~82.58/82.58/84.23/75.22 with margin; tighten via --update after a green main run) - check-quality-ratchet.mjs: --allow-missing (local quality:gate skips coverage.* without a coverage run; CI runs strict) - ci.yml quality-gate job: needs test-coverage + downloads merged coverage-report so the ratchet enforces 'coverage cannot drop' - TDD +1 test (6 total) * feat(quality): Fase 6 — 8 new gates (Rule #11/#12, migrations, known-symbols, route-guard, complexity, docs-symbols, db-rules) Deterministic gates, each freezing pre-existing violations in a documented allowlist (ratchet) so they pass now and block only NEW regressions: - check-error-helper (Rule #12): 7 executors/handlers forwarding raw err.message frozen - check-public-creds (Rule #11): 5 literal client_ids (Claude/Codex/Qwen/Kimi/Copilot) frozen - check-migration-numbering: gaps 026/055 + dup 041 frozen (prevents the git-rm-deleted-migration incident) - check-known-symbols: 93 executors conformance + 15 combo strategies + 18 translator pairs - check-route-guard-membership (#15/#17): all 25 spawn-capable routes verified local-only (0 gaps) - check-complexity: cyclomatic>15 / fn-length>80 ratchet (baseline 1739) - check-docs-symbols: 30 stale doc /api refs frozen (docs hallucination) - check-db-rules (#2/#5): 25 unexported db modules + 15 raw-SQL routes frozen Wired into CI (lint / docs-sync-strict / quality-gate jobs). 115 TDD tests, all green. ESLint ratchet held at 3482. * docs(quality): Phase 7 plan (security/dead-code/mutation/community tooling) — GATED to 2026-06-16 Stored, not active. 7 suggested gates + all discussed OSS/Community tools (SonarQube Community + osv-scanner + CodeQL + knip + sonarjs + type-coverage + lockfile-lint + Stryker + size-limit + axe-core + semcheck + agent-lsp + Qlty). Activation gate: do not start before 2026-06-16 (use Phases 0-6 in production for 1 week, validate in practice, then evolve). * docs(quality): Phase 6A critical-audit plan + Phase 7 additions — gated to 2026-06-16 (#3530) PLANO-QUALITY-GATES-FASE6A.md (12-task audit of Phases 0-6: orphan tests, stale-allowlist enforcement, scope gaps) + Phase 7 additions (gitleaks, actionlint+zizmor, license compliance). Both stored, activation gated to 2026-06-16. Tasks 6A.1/6A.2 were fast-tracked separately (#3536). * feat(quality): 6A.1+6A.2 — test-discovery gate, 135 orphan tests re-wired, 2 production bug fixes, vitest in CI (#3536) check-test-discovery gate (TDD; 195 orphans found, 135 re-wired into the node runner, 60 frozen+annotated). Triage fixed 2 real production bugs: missing BYPASS_PREFIX_NOT_ALLOWED zod refine (spawn-capable prefixes accepted into the bypass list, Hard Rules #15/#17) and resetDbInstance not firing stateReset resetters (stale schema memo → 503 instead of 403; also hit backup-restore). New test-vitest CI job: test:vitest blocking (146/146), test:vitest:ui informational (14 pre-existing fails, triage 2026-06-16). * chore: ignore generated yt-downloader artifact files Add dated yt-downloader output files to .gitignore to prevent local automation artifacts from being accidentally committed. * chore(quality): green-light the quality-gate — conscious file-size + eslintWarnings re-baselines (#3538) file-size: 9 files frozen at current sizes (v3.8.18-era growth + core.ts +7 from #3536 fix). eslintWarnings 3482→3501: the published v3.8.18 tag already measures 3501 (delta predates the quality-gate job); v3.8.19 cycle is neutral. Reduction + --require-tighten = Phase 6A (2026-06-16). * fix(check): exclude internal planning docs (docs/superpowers/) from the docs-symbols gate docs/superpowers/plans/*.md are historical implementation-plan snapshots that may cite planned/abandoned routes — not claims about the current code. Three such refs entered during the v3.8.18 cycle, before this gate was on the pipeline, and would have blocked the v3.8.19 release merge. * chore(release): v3.8.19 — 2026-06-09 CHANGELOG section for the quality-infrastructure release (7 commits, 1:1 coverage), [3.8.18] label corrected to its real release date, local prompt artifacts ignored. * test: hermetic auth context for 2 re-wired suites + real headroom on the breaker reset-timeout flake CI shards exposed what the dev DATA_DIR was masking locally: detect.test.ts and managementCliToken.test.ts asserted 401/403/reject outcomes that only exist when login protection is configured — on a fresh CI DB isAuthRequired() is false and the policy anonymous-allows. Both now create an isolated DATA_DIR with requireLogin+password (the established pattern). observability-fase04: the breaker reset-timeout test ran with a 5ms margin (resetTimeout 10 / sleep 15) — lazy HALF_OPEN refresh under shard contention flipped the first OPEN assert. Now 250/300ms. * test: align bypass-prefix schema test to the restored layer-1 contract + real waitFor headroom appearance-widget-settings-schema asserted that /api/cli-tools/runtime/ was ACCEPTED into the bypass list — written against the buggy schema (missing BYPASS_PREFIX_NOT_ALLOWED refine, restored in #3536) and consecrating the bug the AC-8 orphan test guards against. Split into accept-safe + reject-spawn-capable cases. chatcore waitFor ceiling 1500→10000ms (green runs return immediately; observed 1580ms expiry on 2-core CI runners). * test(chatcore): fix structurally-broken pending-detail predicate (flatten before find) pendingRequests.details[connectionId] is Record<modelKey, PendingRequestDetail[]> — the upstream-timeout test's waitFor tested each ARRAY's .providerRequest (always undefined), so it could never resolve and expired (failed on 3 CI jobs; reproduced deterministically isolated, including at the published v3.8.18 tag). Flatten to the actual details + declare the call_log_pipeline_enabled dependency explicitly + waitFor ceiling with real CI headroom. * chore(quality): re-baseline coverage floors to the honest post-re-wire denominator + changelog coverage for the stabilization commits The 135 re-wired tests import modules that were never loaded before, so the c8 denominator grew: the old ~82.5% was inflated by never-imported modules being invisible. CI merged coverage now measures 78.4/78.4/83.84/75.73 — floors set ~2pt below (76.5/76.5; functions/branches floors already hold). Tightening via --require-tighten is Phase 6A work (2026-06-16).
289 lines
13 KiB
JavaScript
289 lines
13 KiB
JavaScript
#!/usr/bin/env node
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// scripts/check/check-error-helper.mjs
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// Gate Hard Rule #12 (error sanitization): error responses/results built in
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// open-sse/executors/ and open-sse/handlers/ MUST route through the helpers in
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// open-sse/utils/error.ts (buildErrorBody / errorResponse / sanitizeErrorMessage /
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// sanitizeUpstreamDetails / makeExecutorErrorResult / formatProviderError / …) so
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// raw err.stack / err.message / upstream body.error.message never reach a client.
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//
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// The risk: a file that builds its own `new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: {
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// message: err.message } }))` (or a result object with `error: <raw msg>`) and does
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// NOT import the sanitizer leaks stack traces / absolute paths / upstream internals.
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// CodeQL's js/stack-trace-exposure does not understand the custom sanitizer, so this
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// static gate is the canonical enforcement. See docs/security/ERROR_SANITIZATION.md.
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//
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// Conservative by design: a file is flagged ONLY when it both (a) appears to forward
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// a RAW error value into a response/result body AND (b) imports nothing from a
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// utils/error path. Files that import the helper are trusted (the `body.error.message`
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// they reference is the sanitized output of buildErrorBody, not raw upstream).
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import fs from "node:fs";
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import path from "node:path";
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import { pathToFileURL } from "node:url";
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const cwd = process.cwd();
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const SCAN_DIRS = [
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path.join(cwd, "open-sse/executors"),
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path.join(cwd, "open-sse/handlers"),
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];
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// Pre-existing violators frozen so the gate is green NOW and blocks only NEW leaks.
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// Each entry is a real Rule #12 gap (raw err.message forwarded into a response body
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// with no utils/error import) and should become a tracked cleanup issue: route the
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// message through sanitizeErrorMessage()/buildErrorBody()/makeExecutorErrorResult().
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// Do NOT add new entries without a justification — that defeats the gate.
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export const KNOWN_MISSING_ERROR_HELPER = new Set([
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// adapta-web: local makeErrorResponse() + `Adapta auth failed: ${msg}` where
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// msg = err.message — raw auth/upstream error string in the JSON error body,
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// no open-sse/utils/error import. Fix: sanitizeErrorMessage(msg) before forwarding.
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"open-sse/executors/adapta-web.ts",
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// deepseek-web: local errorResponse() shadow that puts `message` raw into the body,
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// fed `DeepSeek error: ${msg}` where msg = err.message — bypasses the canonical
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// sanitizer. Fix: route through buildErrorBody()/sanitizeErrorMessage().
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"open-sse/executors/deepseek-web.ts",
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// perplexity-web: `new Response({ error: { message: `Perplexity connection failed:
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// ${err.message}` }})` (multi-line envelope) for TLS/connection failures — raw
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// err.message in the client error body, no sanitizer import.
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"open-sse/executors/perplexity-web.ts",
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// qoder: `response: new Response({ error: { message: `Qoder fetch error:
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// ${error.message}` }})` — raw error.message in the returned response body,
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// no sanitizer import.
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"open-sse/executors/qoder.ts",
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// veoaifree-web: local errResp(msg) on nonce-fetch failure where msg = err.message —
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// raw error string in the response body, no sanitizer import.
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"open-sse/executors/veoaifree-web.ts",
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// embeddings handler: `return { success: false, status: 502, error: `Embedding
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// provider error: ${err.message}` }` — raw err.message in the result error field,
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// no sanitizer import. (The saveCallLog `error: err.message` rows are internal and
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// correctly NOT what is frozen here.)
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"open-sse/handlers/embeddings.ts",
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// search handler: `return { …, error: `Search provider …: ${err.message}` }` — raw
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// err.message in the result error field, no sanitizer import.
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"open-sse/handlers/search.ts",
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]);
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// Import specifiers that count as "uses the error helper" (path ends in utils/error).
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const ERROR_HELPER_IMPORT =
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/\bfrom\s*["'](?:\.{1,2}\/)*(?:open-sse\/)?utils\/error(?:\.[tj]s)?["']|@omniroute\/open-sse\/utils\/error/;
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// A caught-error identifier whose .message/.stack is RAW (not sanitized): the leading
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// token must be exactly `err` / `error` / `e` (optionally `(err as Error)` cast), and
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// NOT preceded by a member access — so `event.error.message` (an upstream-event read)
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// does not match, only our own caught `err.message` / `error.stack` / `(err as …).msg`.
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// The `(?<![.\w])` lookbehind is non-consuming so it works mid-template (e.g. `${err…`).
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const RAW_ERR = String.raw`(?:\((?:err|error|e)\s+as\s+[^)]+\)|(?<![.\w])(?:err|error|e))\.(?:message|stack)\b`;
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// Lines that are internal sinks (never reach the client) — excluded so the gate does
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// not false-positive on logging, DB audit rows, thrown Errors, or rejected promises.
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const INTERNAL_SINK =
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/\b(?:log\??\.\w+\??\.?\(|console\.\w+\(|saveCallLog\s*\(|reqLogger\.|throw\s+new\s+\w*Error|reject\s*\(|\.error\??\.\(|finish\s*\()/;
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// Internal-sink CALL openers — when a raw-error field sits inside one of these calls'
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// argument object (e.g. `saveCallLog({ … error: err.message … })`), it is a DB audit
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// row / log entry, not a client response. Matched against the line that opens the
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// nearest still-unclosed call enclosing the flagged line.
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const INTERNAL_SINK_CALL =
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/\b(?:saveCallLog|log\??\.\w+|console\.\w+|reqLogger\.\w+)\s*\(\s*\{?\s*$/;
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// A line that is constructing a client-facing response/result body.
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const RESPONSE_LINE =
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/new\s+Response\s*\(|\bresponse\s*:|\berrResp\s*\(|\bmakeErrorResponse\s*\(|\berrorResponse\s*\(/;
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function walk(dir, acc = []) {
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if (!fs.existsSync(dir)) return acc;
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for (const e of fs.readdirSync(dir, { withFileTypes: true })) {
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const p = path.join(dir, e.name);
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if (e.isDirectory()) walk(p, acc);
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else if (/\.tsx?$/.test(e.name) && !/\.test\.tsx?$/.test(e.name)) acc.push(p);
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}
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return acc;
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}
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// A raw caught-error value assigned to / interpolated into a `message:`/`error:` field.
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const RAW_ERR_FIELD = new RegExp(String.raw`\b(?:message|error)\s*:\s*` + RAW_ERR);
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const RAW_ERR_FIELD_INTERP = new RegExp(
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String.raw`\b(?:message|error)\s*:\s*[\`"'][^\n]*\$\{[^}]*` + RAW_ERR
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);
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// A raw caught-error value interpolated anywhere on a line that also builds a Response.
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const RAW_ERR_INTERP = new RegExp(String.raw`\$\{[^}]*` + RAW_ERR);
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// Upstream `body.error.message` forwarded into a field without a sanitize call.
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const RAW_BODY_ERR = /\b(?:message|error)\s*:\s*[^,}\n]*\bbody\.error\.message\b/;
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// A response-builder CALL that takes a message argument (client-facing). A tainted
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// local variable (assigned from a raw error) passed here is a leak.
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const RESPONSE_BUILDER_CALL =
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/\b(?:errResp|makeErrorResponse|errorResponse)\s*\(|\bresponse\s*:\s*(?:errResp|makeErrorResponse|errorResponse|new\s+Response)\s*\(/;
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// `const|let <id> = <expr containing a raw caught-error>` — a tainted local holding a
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// raw, unsanitized error string. Captures the variable name for downstream tracking.
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const TAINT_DECL = new RegExp(
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String.raw`\b(?:const|let|var)\s+([A-Za-z_$][\w$]*)\s*=\s*[^;\n]*` + RAW_ERR
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);
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/**
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* Does this source forward a RAW error value into a CLIENT-FACING response/result body?
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*
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* Line-anchored + sink-aware so it does not false-positive on logging, DB audit rows
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* (saveCallLog), thrown Errors, rejected promises, or parsed upstream-event reads.
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*
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* A line is a violation when, after skipping internal-sink lines, it either:
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* - assigns/interpolates a raw caught-error into a `message:`/`error:` field, or
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* - interpolates a raw caught-error AND is itself a Response/result-builder line, or
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* - forwards upstream `body.error.message` into a field without sanitizing, or
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* - passes a TAINTED local (a var assigned from a raw error, never sanitized) into a
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* response-builder call (errResp / makeErrorResponse / errorResponse / new Response).
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*/
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function forwardsRawError(source) {
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const lines = source.split("\n").map((l) => l.replace(/\/\/.*$/, ""));
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// Pass 1: collect tainted local variables (raw error, no sanitize on the line).
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const tainted = new Set();
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for (const line of lines) {
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if (INTERNAL_SINK.test(line)) continue;
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const m = line.match(TAINT_DECL);
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if (m && !/sanitize/i.test(line)) tainted.add(m[1]);
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}
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const taintedUse =
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tainted.size > 0
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? new RegExp(String.raw`\b(?:${[...tainted].join("|")})\b`)
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: null;
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// Pass 2: scan for leak lines.
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for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
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const line = lines[i];
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if (!line.trim()) continue;
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if (INTERNAL_SINK.test(line)) continue; // log / audit / throw / reject
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if (TAINT_DECL.test(line)) continue; // the assignment itself is not the leak
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const directLeak =
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RAW_ERR_FIELD.test(line) ||
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RAW_ERR_FIELD_INTERP.test(line) ||
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(RAW_ERR_INTERP.test(line) && RESPONSE_LINE.test(line)) ||
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// Multi-line OpenAI error envelope: a raw-error interpolation that sits inside
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// an enclosing `error: {` / `message:` field of a `new Response(` body.
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(RAW_ERR_INTERP.test(line) && enclosedByErrorResponseBody(lines, i)) ||
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(RAW_BODY_ERR.test(line) && !/sanitize/i.test(line));
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const taintedLeak =
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taintedUse !== null && RESPONSE_BUILDER_CALL.test(line) && taintedUse.test(line);
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// The raw error reaches a client body unless it lives inside an internal-sink
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// call's argument object (saveCallLog / log / console / reqLogger).
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if ((directLeak || taintedLeak) && !enclosedByInternalSinkCall(lines, i)) return true;
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}
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return false;
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}
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/**
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* Walk back from `idx`, tracking net brace/paren depth, to find the line that opens
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* the call enclosing `idx`. Returns true if that opener is an internal-sink call.
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* Bounded lookback (sink-call argument objects are small) keeps this cheap.
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*/
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function enclosedByInternalSinkCall(lines, idx) {
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let depth = 0;
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for (let j = idx; j >= 0 && idx - j < 80; j--) {
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const l = lines[j].replace(/\/\/.*$/, "");
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for (let k = l.length - 1; k >= 0; k--) {
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const ch = l[k];
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if (ch === ")" || ch === "}") depth++;
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else if (ch === "(" || ch === "{") {
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if (depth === 0) {
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// Unbalanced opener at this position — the enclosing construct starts here.
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return INTERNAL_SINK_CALL.test(l.slice(0, k + 1));
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}
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depth--;
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}
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}
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}
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return false;
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}
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// Field opener that is part of an OpenAI-style error envelope (`error: {` / `message:`).
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const ERROR_FIELD_OPENER = /\b(?:error|message)\s*:\s*[`{]?\s*$/;
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/**
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* Walk back from `idx` to the nearest enclosing `{`/`(` opener; if it opens an error
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* envelope field (`error: {` / `message:`) AND a `new Response(` / `response:` builder
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* appears just above it, the raw error reaches a client error body. Conservative: only
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* the canonical error-envelope shape qualifies (not `content:` / data fields).
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*/
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function enclosedByErrorResponseBody(lines, idx) {
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let depth = 0;
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for (let j = idx; j >= 0 && idx - j < 80; j--) {
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const l = lines[j].replace(/\/\/.*$/, "");
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for (let k = l.length - 1; k >= 0; k--) {
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const ch = l[k];
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if (ch === ")" || ch === "}") depth++;
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else if (ch === "(" || ch === "{") {
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if (depth === 0) {
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if (!ERROR_FIELD_OPENER.test(l.slice(0, k + 1))) return false;
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// Confirm a Response builder sits in the few lines above the envelope.
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const window = lines.slice(Math.max(0, j - 8), j + 1).join("\n");
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return /new\s+Response\s*\(|\bresponse\s*:/.test(window);
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}
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depth--;
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}
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}
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}
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return false;
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}
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export function findErrorHelperViolations(files, allowlist) {
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const violations = [];
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for (const { path: rel, source } of files) {
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if (allowlist.has(rel)) continue;
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if (ERROR_HELPER_IMPORT.test(source)) continue; // trusts the helper
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if (forwardsRawError(source)) violations.push(rel);
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}
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return violations;
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}
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function collectFiles() {
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const files = [];
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for (const dir of SCAN_DIRS) {
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for (const p of walk(dir)) {
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files.push({
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path: path.relative(cwd, p).replace(/\\/g, "/"),
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source: fs.readFileSync(p, "utf8"),
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});
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}
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}
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return files;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function main() {
|
|
const files = collectFiles();
|
|
const violations = findErrorHelperViolations(files, KNOWN_MISSING_ERROR_HELPER);
|
|
|
|
// Surface allowlist drift: entries that no longer match a real file (cleaned up or
|
|
// renamed) so the allowlist does not rot. This is a warning, not a failure.
|
|
const present = new Set(files.map((f) => f.path));
|
|
const stale = [...KNOWN_MISSING_ERROR_HELPER].filter((p) => !present.has(p));
|
|
if (stale.length) {
|
|
console.warn(
|
|
`[check-error-helper] WARN: ${stale.length} allowlist entr${
|
|
stale.length === 1 ? "y" : "ies"
|
|
} no longer match a file (remove from KNOWN_MISSING_ERROR_HELPER):\n` +
|
|
stale.map((p) => " - " + p).join("\n")
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (violations.length) {
|
|
console.error(
|
|
`[check-error-helper] ${violations.length} file(s) build an error response/result with a ` +
|
|
`raw err.message/err.stack/body.error.message but do NOT import open-sse/utils/error:\n` +
|
|
violations.map((v) => " ✗ " + v).join("\n") +
|
|
`\n → route the message through buildErrorBody()/sanitizeErrorMessage()/` +
|
|
`makeExecutorErrorResult() (see docs/security/ERROR_SANITIZATION.md), or — if it is a ` +
|
|
`false positive — add it to KNOWN_MISSING_ERROR_HELPER with a justification.`
|
|
);
|
|
process.exit(1);
|
|
}
|
|
console.log(
|
|
`[check-error-helper] OK (${files.length} files scanned, ${KNOWN_MISSING_ERROR_HELPER.size} known-missing frozen)`
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (import.meta.url === pathToFileURL(process.argv[1] || "").href) main();
|