Files
OmniRoute/src/shared/utils/apiKeyPolicy.ts
Witroch4 70d89d2f68 feat(keys): add per-key USD usage quota controls (#4327)
* feat(keys): add per-key USD usage quotas

Adds daily and weekly API key USD caps with reset-aware weekly windows, exposes quota controls in API key permissions and costs views, and returns Claude Code-safe 400 responses when caps are exceeded.

Validations:

- node --import tsx/esm --test tests/unit/api-key-usage-limits.test.ts tests/unit/internal-usage-command.test.ts

- npm run typecheck:core

- npm run check:file-size

- npm run check:migration-numbering

- npm run lint

- Docker image build/deploy smoke test on 100.64.0.1:20128

* fix(db): renumber api_key_usage_limits migration 100->101 (avoid cli_access_tokens collision)

Migration version 100 is taken by 100_cli_access_tokens.sql on release; the
migrationRunner version-collision guard would otherwise skip one. Renumber to 101.

Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <diegosouza.pw@gmail.com>

* chore(quality): bump apiKeys.ts file-size baseline 1661->1662 (USD quota fields)

Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <diegosouza.pw@gmail.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Wital <wital@example.com>
Co-authored-by: diegosouzapw <diegosouza.pw@gmail.com>
2026-06-19 22:42:54 -03:00

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/**
* API Key Policy Enforcement — Shared middleware for all /v1/* endpoints.
*
* Enforces API key policies: model restrictions and budget limits.
* Should be called after API key authentication in every endpoint that
* accepts a model parameter.
*
* @module shared/utils/apiKeyPolicy
*/
import { extractApiKey } from "@/sse/services/auth";
import {
getApiKeyMetadata,
getComboByName,
isModelAllowedForKey,
getApiKeyById,
} from "@/lib/localDb";
import { isDashboardSessionAuthenticated } from "./apiAuth";
import { resolveComboForModel } from "@/lib/db/modelComboMappings";
import { checkBudget } from "@/domain/costRules";
import { checkTokenLimits } from "@omniroute/open-sse/services/tokenLimitCounter.ts";
import {
errorResponse,
buildErrorBody,
sanitizeErrorMessage,
} from "@omniroute/open-sse/utils/error.ts";
import { HTTP_STATUS } from "@omniroute/open-sse/config/constants.ts";
import * as log from "@/sse/utils/logger";
import { checkRateLimit, RateLimitRule } from "./rateLimiter";
import { resolveEndpointCategory } from "@/shared/constants/endpointCategories";
import { resolveQuotaKeyScope } from "@/lib/quota/quotaKey";
import { isQuotaModelName, parseQuotaModelName } from "@/lib/quota/quotaModelNaming";
import { buildApiKeyUsageLimitPolicyRejection } from "@/lib/usage/apiKeyUsageLimits";
// Default to no per-key request cap. API keys can still opt into explicit
// limits via Settings/API Keys, while provider/account quota controls remain
// responsible for upstream 429 handling and fallback.
// Exported so tests can lock in the "no implicit caps" contract from #2289.
export const DEFAULT_RATE_LIMITS: RateLimitRule[] = [];
const LEGACY_DEFAULT_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY = 1000;
export function buildDefaultRateLimits(rawValue?: string): RateLimitRule[] {
const normalized = rawValue?.trim();
if (normalized === undefined || normalized === "") return [];
const limitPerDay = /^\d+$/.test(normalized)
? Number(normalized)
: LEGACY_DEFAULT_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY;
if (limitPerDay === 0) return [];
return [
{ limit: limitPerDay, window: 86400 },
{ limit: limitPerDay * 5, window: 604800 },
{ limit: limitPerDay * 20, window: 2592000 },
];
}
const ENV_DEFAULT_RATE_LIMITS: RateLimitRule[] = buildDefaultRateLimits(
process.env.DEFAULT_RATE_LIMIT_PER_DAY
);
interface AccessSchedule {
enabled: boolean;
from: string;
until: string;
days: number[];
tz: string;
}
/** Metadata stored for an API key in the local database. */
export interface ApiKeyMetadata {
id: string;
name?: string;
allowedModels?: string[];
allowedCombos?: string[];
allowedConnections?: string[];
allowedQuotas?: string[];
noLog?: boolean;
autoResolve?: boolean;
budget?: number;
usedBudget?: number;
isActive?: boolean;
isBanned?: boolean;
expiresAt?: string | null;
accessSchedule?: AccessSchedule | null;
maxRequestsPerDay?: number | null;
maxRequestsPerMinute?: number | null;
throttleDelayMs?: number | null;
maxSessions?: number | null;
rateLimits?: RateLimitRule[] | null;
allowedEndpoints?: string[];
disableNonPublicModels?: boolean;
allowUsageCommand?: boolean;
usageLimitEnabled?: boolean;
dailyUsageLimitUsd?: number | null;
weeklyUsageLimitUsd?: number | null;
}
/**
* Returns true if the current time (in the schedule's timezone) is within
* the configured window.
* Supports overnight ranges (e.g. 22:00 until 06:00).
*/
function isWithinSchedule(schedule: AccessSchedule): boolean {
if (!schedule.enabled) return true;
const now = new Date();
// Convert current UTC time to the configured timezone
let localTimeStr: string;
try {
localTimeStr = new Intl.DateTimeFormat("en-US", {
timeZone: schedule.tz,
hour: "2-digit",
minute: "2-digit",
hour12: false,
}).format(now);
} catch {
// Invalid timezone — fail open (don't block)
return true;
}
// Intl may return "24:xx" instead of "00:xx" — normalize
const normalizedTime = localTimeStr.replace(/^24:/, "00:");
const [localHour, localMin] = normalizedTime.split(":").map(Number);
const localMinutes = localHour * 60 + localMin;
// Determine current weekday in the configured timezone
let localDayStr: string;
try {
localDayStr = new Intl.DateTimeFormat("en-US", {
timeZone: schedule.tz,
weekday: "short",
}).format(now);
} catch {
return true;
}
const dayMap: Record<string, number> = {
Sun: 0,
Mon: 1,
Tue: 2,
Wed: 3,
Thu: 4,
Fri: 5,
Sat: 6,
};
const localDay = dayMap[localDayStr] ?? now.getDay();
if (!schedule.days.includes(localDay)) return false;
const [fromHour, fromMin] = schedule.from.split(":").map(Number);
const [untilHour, untilMin] = schedule.until.split(":").map(Number);
const fromMinutes = fromHour * 60 + fromMin;
const untilMinutes = untilHour * 60 + untilMin;
// Overnight window (e.g. 22:00 → 06:00)
if (untilMinutes < fromMinutes) {
return localMinutes >= fromMinutes || localMinutes < untilMinutes;
}
return localMinutes >= fromMinutes && localMinutes < untilMinutes;
}
// Legacy in-memory request counter has been replaced by Redis-backed multi-window rate limiter
function delay(ms: number): Promise<void> {
return new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, ms));
}
function normalizeComboAccessName(value: unknown): string | null {
if (typeof value !== "string") return null;
const trimmed = value.trim();
if (!trimmed) return null;
return trimmed.startsWith("combo/") ? trimmed.slice(6).trim() || trimmed : trimmed;
}
function matchesComboAccessRule(comboName: string, requestedModel: string, rule: string): boolean {
const normalizedRule = normalizeComboAccessName(rule);
if (!normalizedRule) return false;
return (
normalizedRule === comboName ||
rule === requestedModel ||
`combo/${normalizedRule}` === requestedModel
);
}
function isAnthropicMessagesRequest(request: Request): boolean {
if (request.headers.has("anthropic-version")) return true;
try {
const url = new URL(request.url);
return url.pathname.endsWith("/v1/messages");
} catch {
return false;
}
}
function policyErrorResponse(
request: Request,
statusCode: number,
message: string,
anthropicMessage = message,
anthropicErrorType = "permission_error",
anthropicStatusCode = statusCode
): Response {
if (!isAnthropicMessagesRequest(request)) {
return errorResponse(statusCode, message);
}
const safeMessage = sanitizeErrorMessage(anthropicMessage);
return new Response(
JSON.stringify({
type: "error",
error: {
type: anthropicErrorType,
message: safeMessage,
},
}),
{
status: anthropicStatusCode,
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
}
);
}
async function resolveRequestedComboName(modelStr: string): Promise<string | null> {
const exact = await getComboByName(modelStr);
if (exact && typeof exact.name === "string") return exact.name;
if (modelStr.startsWith("combo/")) {
const withoutPrefix = modelStr.slice(6);
const prefixed = await getComboByName(withoutPrefix);
if (prefixed && typeof prefixed.name === "string") return prefixed.name;
}
const mapped = await resolveComboForModel(modelStr);
const mappedName = normalizeComboAccessName(mapped?.name);
return mappedName;
}
async function isComboAllowedForKey(
allowedCombos: string[],
modelStr: string
): Promise<{ allowed: boolean; comboName: string | null }> {
const comboName = await resolveRequestedComboName(modelStr);
if (!comboName) return { allowed: true, comboName: null };
const allowed = allowedCombos.some((rule) => matchesComboAccessRule(comboName, modelStr, rule));
return { allowed, comboName };
}
export interface ApiKeyPolicyResult {
/** API key string (null if no key provided) */
apiKey: string | null;
/** Metadata from DB (null if no key or key not found) */
apiKeyInfo: ApiKeyMetadata | null;
/** If set, the request should be rejected with this Response */
rejection: Response | null;
}
/**
* Enforce API key policies for a request.
*
* Checks:
* 1. Model restriction — if the key has `allowedModels`, verify the requested model is permitted
* 2. Budget limit — if the key has a budget configured, verify it hasn't been exceeded
*
* @param request - The incoming HTTP request
* @param modelStr - The model ID from the request body
* @returns ApiKeyPolicyResult with apiKey, metadata, and optional rejection response
*
* @example
* ```ts
* const policy = await enforceApiKeyPolicy(request, body.model);
* if (policy.rejection) return policy.rejection;
* // proceed with request, optionally use policy.apiKeyInfo
* ```
*/
/** Header carrying the id of the API key a dashboard playground request wants to
* test the policy for (never the key secret). */
const PLAYGROUND_KEY_ID_HEADER = "x-omniroute-playground-key-id";
/**
* Dashboard playground support. An authenticated admin session may test a
* specific API key's policy (allowed_models, budget, …) WITHOUT putting the key
* secret on the wire: the browser sends only the key id via
* `x-omniroute-playground-key-id` and we resolve the secret server-side.
*
* Security: honored ONLY for authenticated dashboard sessions, and only as a
* fallback when no bearer key was presented — so it can never bypass auth or
* escalate privileges, it only applies (narrows to) the selected key's policy.
*/
export async function resolvePlaygroundTestKey(request: Request): Promise<string | null> {
const keyId = request.headers.get(PLAYGROUND_KEY_ID_HEADER);
if (!keyId) return null;
if (!(await isDashboardSessionAuthenticated(request))) return null;
try {
const row = await getApiKeyById(keyId);
return typeof row?.key === "string" ? row.key : null;
} catch {
return null;
}
}
export async function enforceApiKeyPolicy(
request: Request,
modelStr: string | null
): Promise<ApiKeyPolicyResult> {
// A real bearer key wins; otherwise an authenticated dashboard playground may
// test a specific key's policy by id (resolved server-side, secret never sent).
const apiKey = extractApiKey(request) || (await resolvePlaygroundTestKey(request));
// No API key = local/session mode, skip policy checks
if (!apiKey) {
return { apiKey: null, apiKeyInfo: null, rejection: null };
}
// Fetch key metadata (includes allowedModels)
let apiKeyInfo: ApiKeyMetadata | null = null;
try {
apiKeyInfo = await getApiKeyMetadata(apiKey);
} catch (error) {
// Fail-closed: if policy backend fails, reject the request
log.error("API_POLICY", "Failed to fetch API key metadata. Request blocked.", { error });
return {
apiKey,
apiKeyInfo: null,
rejection: errorResponse(HTTP_STATUS.SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE, "API key policy unavailable"),
};
}
// Key not found in DB — skip policy (auth layer handles validation)
if (!apiKeyInfo) {
return { apiKey, apiKeyInfo: null, rejection: null };
}
// ── Check 1: is_active / is_banned ──
if (apiKeyInfo.isActive === false) {
return {
apiKey,
apiKeyInfo,
rejection: errorResponse(HTTP_STATUS.FORBIDDEN, "This API key is disabled"),
};
}
if (apiKeyInfo.isBanned === true) {
return {
apiKey,
apiKeyInfo,
rejection: errorResponse(
HTTP_STATUS.FORBIDDEN,
"This API key is banned due to policy violations"
),
};
}
// ── Check 1.5: expires_at ──
if (apiKeyInfo.expiresAt) {
const expiry = new Date(apiKeyInfo.expiresAt).getTime();
if (Date.now() > expiry) {
return {
apiKey,
apiKeyInfo,
rejection: errorResponse(HTTP_STATUS.FORBIDDEN, "This API key has expired"),
};
}
}
// ── Check 2: access_schedule — time-based access window ──
if (apiKeyInfo.accessSchedule && apiKeyInfo.accessSchedule.enabled) {
if (!isWithinSchedule(apiKeyInfo.accessSchedule)) {
const { from, until, tz } = apiKeyInfo.accessSchedule;
return {
apiKey,
apiKeyInfo,
rejection: errorResponse(
HTTP_STATUS.FORBIDDEN,
`Access denied outside allowed hours (${from}${until} ${tz})`
),
};
}
}
// ── Check 2.1: per-key USD fair usage cap ──
if (apiKeyInfo.usageLimitEnabled === true) {
try {
const usageLimitRejection = await buildApiKeyUsageLimitPolicyRejection(request, {
id: apiKeyInfo.id,
usageLimitEnabled: apiKeyInfo.usageLimitEnabled,
dailyUsageLimitUsd: apiKeyInfo.dailyUsageLimitUsd,
weeklyUsageLimitUsd: apiKeyInfo.weeklyUsageLimitUsd,
});
if (usageLimitRejection) {
return { apiKey, apiKeyInfo, rejection: usageLimitRejection };
}
} catch (error) {
log.error("API_POLICY", "API key USD usage limit check failed. Request blocked.", { error });
return {
apiKey,
apiKeyInfo,
rejection: errorResponse(
HTTP_STATUS.SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
"API key usage limit unavailable"
),
};
}
}
// ── Check 2.5: Endpoint restriction ──
if (apiKeyInfo.allowedEndpoints && apiKeyInfo.allowedEndpoints.length > 0) {
try {
const url = new URL(request.url);
const category = resolveEndpointCategory(url.pathname);
if (category && !apiKeyInfo.allowedEndpoints.includes(category)) {
return {
apiKey,
apiKeyInfo,
rejection: errorResponse(
HTTP_STATUS.FORBIDDEN,
`Endpoint category "${category}" is not allowed for this API key`
),
};
}
} catch {
// URL parse failure — fail open, let other checks decide
}
}
// ── Check 2.9: qtSd models require a quota-pool allocation ──
//
// quotaShared-* (qtSd/<group>/<provider>/<model>) virtual models are pool-gated:
// a key that is NOT allocated to any quota pool (empty allowedQuotas) must not be
// able to call them — otherwise an ordinary key could route through someone
// else's shared quota. Only allocated keys (allowedQuotas non-empty, further
// validated against their pool scope in Check 3 below) may use qtSd models.
if (
modelStr &&
isQuotaModelName(modelStr) &&
!(Array.isArray(apiKeyInfo.allowedQuotas) && apiKeyInfo.allowedQuotas.length > 0)
) {
const notAllocatedBody = buildErrorBody(
HTTP_STATUS.FORBIDDEN,
`Model "${modelStr}" requires a quota-pool allocation; this API key is not allocated to any quota pool`
);
notAllocatedBody.error.code = "QUOTA_NOT_ALLOCATED";
return {
apiKey,
apiKeyInfo,
rejection: new Response(JSON.stringify(notAllocatedBody), {
status: HTTP_STATUS.FORBIDDEN,
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
}),
};
}
// ── Check 3: Quota-exclusive enforcement (Phase B4) ──
//
// When a key has allowedQuotas its access is governed exclusively by the
// quotaShared-* virtual models of its pools — raw model names are rejected,
// and quotaShared-* names belonging to OTHER pools are also rejected.
// Normal allowedModels/allowedCombos checks are skipped for these keys.
if (modelStr && apiKeyInfo.allowedQuotas && apiKeyInfo.allowedQuotas.length > 0) {
try {
const scope = await resolveQuotaKeyScope(apiKeyInfo.allowedQuotas);
let quotaRejectionMsg: string | null = null;
if (isQuotaModelName(modelStr)) {
// Virtual quota model — must belong to one of this key's pools AND its provider must be in scope.
const parsed = parseQuotaModelName(modelStr);
const allowed =
parsed !== null &&
scope.poolSlugs.length > 0 &&
scope.poolSlugs.includes(parsed.groupSlug) &&
scope.providers.includes(parsed.provider);
if (!allowed) {
quotaRejectionMsg = `Model "${modelStr}" is not in this key's quota pools`;
}
} else {
// Raw (non-quotaShared) model name — always rejected for quota-exclusive keys.
quotaRejectionMsg = `This quota-exclusive API key may only use quotaShared-* models`;
}
if (quotaRejectionMsg !== null) {
const quotaBody = buildErrorBody(HTTP_STATUS.FORBIDDEN, quotaRejectionMsg);
quotaBody.error.code = "QUOTA_ONLY";
return {
apiKey,
apiKeyInfo,
rejection: new Response(JSON.stringify(quotaBody), {
status: HTTP_STATUS.FORBIDDEN,
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
}),
};
}
// Model is an in-scope quotaShared-* name — skip allowedModels/allowedCombos.
// Continue to budget / rate-limit checks below.
} catch (error) {
log.error("API_POLICY", "Quota scope check failed. Request blocked.", { error });
return {
apiKey,
apiKeyInfo,
rejection: errorResponse(
HTTP_STATUS.SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
"API key quota policy unavailable"
),
};
}
}
// ── Check 4: Model restriction (skipped when allowedQuotas governs access) ──
let requestedComboName: string | null = null;
const isQuotaExclusive =
Boolean(apiKeyInfo.allowedQuotas) && (apiKeyInfo.allowedQuotas as string[]).length > 0;
if (
!isQuotaExclusive &&
modelStr &&
apiKeyInfo.allowedCombos &&
apiKeyInfo.allowedCombos.length > 0
) {
try {
const comboAccess = await isComboAllowedForKey(apiKeyInfo.allowedCombos, modelStr);
requestedComboName = comboAccess.comboName;
if (!comboAccess.allowed) {
return {
apiKey,
apiKeyInfo,
rejection: errorResponse(
HTTP_STATUS.FORBIDDEN,
`Combo "${comboAccess.comboName || modelStr}" is not allowed for this API key`
),
};
}
} catch (error) {
log.error("API_POLICY", "Combo access check failed. Request blocked.", { error });
return {
apiKey,
apiKeyInfo,
rejection: errorResponse(
HTTP_STATUS.SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
"API key combo policy unavailable"
),
};
}
}
const hasModelRestrictions =
!isQuotaExclusive &&
((apiKeyInfo.allowedModels && apiKeyInfo.allowedModels.length > 0) ||
(apiKeyInfo as { disableNonPublicModels?: boolean }).disableNonPublicModels === true);
if (!requestedComboName && modelStr && hasModelRestrictions) {
// Short-circuit: auto/* and qtSd/* are combo-routed (not catalog models).
// They must never be evaluated by the published-model gate.
if (modelStr.startsWith("auto/") || modelStr.startsWith("qtSd/")) {
requestedComboName = modelStr; // non-null sentinel — skips the published-model check
} else {
try {
requestedComboName = await resolveRequestedComboName(modelStr);
} catch {
requestedComboName = null;
}
}
}
if (modelStr && !requestedComboName && hasModelRestrictions) {
const allowed = await isModelAllowedForKey(apiKey, modelStr);
if (!allowed) {
return {
apiKey,
apiKeyInfo,
rejection: policyErrorResponse(
request,
HTTP_STATUS.FORBIDDEN,
`Model "${modelStr}" is not allowed for this API key`,
`Model "${modelStr}" is not enabled or quota is insufficient. Choose another allowed model.`,
"invalid_request_error",
HTTP_STATUS.BAD_REQUEST
),
};
}
}
// ── Check 4: Budget limit ──
if (apiKeyInfo.id) {
try {
const budgetOk = checkBudget(apiKeyInfo.id);
if (!budgetOk.allowed) {
return {
apiKey,
apiKeyInfo,
rejection: errorResponse(
HTTP_STATUS.RATE_LIMITED,
budgetOk.reason || "Budget limit exceeded"
),
};
}
} catch (error) {
// Fail-closed: budget backend error should block request
log.error("API_POLICY", "Budget check failed. Request blocked.", { error });
return {
apiKey,
apiKeyInfo,
rejection: errorResponse(HTTP_STATUS.SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE, "Budget policy unavailable"),
};
}
}
// ── Check 4.5: Per-model / per-provider token limits (Tier 1) ──
if (apiKeyInfo.id) {
try {
const breach = checkTokenLimits(apiKeyInfo.id, undefined, modelStr ?? undefined);
if (breach) {
const scopeLabel =
breach.scopeType === "global" ? "account" : `${breach.scopeType} "${breach.scopeValue}"`;
return {
apiKey,
apiKeyInfo,
rejection: errorResponse(
HTTP_STATUS.RATE_LIMITED,
`Token limit exceeded for ${scopeLabel}: ${breach.tokensUsed}/${breach.limitValue} tokens used in the current window. Please try again later.`
),
};
}
} catch (error) {
// Fail-closed: token-limit backend error should block the request,
// consistent with the budget check above.
log.error("API_POLICY", "Token limit check failed. Request blocked.", { error });
return {
apiKey,
apiKeyInfo,
rejection: errorResponse(HTTP_STATUS.SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE, "Token limit policy unavailable"),
};
}
}
// ── Check 5: Generic Multi-Window Rate Limits ──
if (apiKeyInfo.id) {
const hasCustomRateLimits = Boolean(apiKeyInfo.rateLimits && apiKeyInfo.rateLimits.length > 0);
const rulesToApply = hasCustomRateLimits
? [...(apiKeyInfo.rateLimits as RateLimitRule[])]
: [...DEFAULT_RATE_LIMITS, ...ENV_DEFAULT_RATE_LIMITS];
// Combine with legacy limits if they exist and custom rate limits aren't set
if (!hasCustomRateLimits) {
if (apiKeyInfo.maxRequestsPerDay) {
rulesToApply.push({ limit: apiKeyInfo.maxRequestsPerDay, window: 86400 });
}
if (apiKeyInfo.maxRequestsPerMinute) {
rulesToApply.push({ limit: apiKeyInfo.maxRequestsPerMinute, window: 60 });
}
}
if (rulesToApply.length > 0) {
const rateLimitResult = await checkRateLimit(apiKeyInfo.id, rulesToApply);
if (!rateLimitResult.allowed) {
const failedWindowStr = rateLimitResult.failedWindow
? ` (${rateLimitResult.failedWindow}s window)`
: "";
return {
apiKey,
apiKeyInfo,
rejection: errorResponse(
HTTP_STATUS.RATE_LIMITED,
`Request limit exceeded${failedWindowStr}. Please try again later.`
),
};
}
}
}
// ── Check 6: Soft throttle / slowdown ──
if (apiKeyInfo.throttleDelayMs && apiKeyInfo.throttleDelayMs > 0) {
await delay(Math.min(apiKeyInfo.throttleDelayMs, 300_000));
}
return { apiKey, apiKeyInfo, rejection: null };
}