Files
OmniRoute/tests/unit/ui/add-api-key-modal-validation-error-5088.test.tsx
Diego Rodrigues de Sa e Souza 7d57d9f4a1 fix(providers): retire common ChatGPT Web provider (#11754)
Rebased onto the current release/v3.8.51 tip as part of a combined provider-retirement/provenance merge batch (Designer Web, Felo Web, Runtime, GPL-derived removal, Qwen Web already landed). Large conflict set (this is the biggest PR in the batch — the common ChatGPT Web provider touches chat, images, count-tokens, session leases, and combos). Conflicts resolved:

- `open-sse/config/providers/registry/chatgpt-web/*`, `open-sse/executors/chatgpt-web*`, `open-sse/handlers/imageGeneration/providers/chatgptWeb.ts`, and their tests: kept deleted, matching the PR's stated scope.
- `open-sse/config/providers/registry/minimax/web/index.ts`, `open-sse/handlers/imageGeneration/providers/geminiWeb.ts`, `open-sse/executors/gemini-web.ts`'s stale image-mode branch: base-drift collisions against already-merged sibling retirements (#11691, #11708) — kept deleted / dropped the dead code, since this PR's own branch forked before those merged.
- `src/shared/constants/reservedProviderPrefixes.ts`, `open-sse/executors/index.ts`, `executorProxy.ts`, `virtualFactory.ts`, `autoStrategy.ts`, `src/lib/db/providers.ts`, `src/sse/handlers/chat.ts`: combined the Designer + Runtime (Felo/Qwen) + common-ChatGPT-Web retirement guard calls at each shared chokepoint — compute-once-then-OR pattern, consistent with prior combinations in this batch.
- `src/sse/services/model.ts` / `src/sse/handlers/chatHelpers.ts`: adopted this PR's new `getModelInfoOrRetirementResponse()` central wrapper (a real improvement over ad-hoc try/catch), and extended it to also catch the Designer + Runtime retirement errors it didn't originally cover, so the consolidation doesn't regress the other two mechanisms.
- `src/app/api/v1/images/edits/route.ts`: this PR moved the retirement check earlier (before `enforceApiKeyPolicy`) but left the old later call+catch block in place from base drift — removed the now-redundant duplicate `resolveImageRouteModel()` call and merged the Designer catch into the earlier one.
- `open-sse/config/imageRegistry.ts`, `tests/snapshots/executors/executor-map.json` (`keyCount` recomputed to 133), `tests/snapshots/provider/translate-path.json`: same "both sides inserted a different retired provider at the same slot" pattern — resolved by dropping both.
- `tests/unit/chatcore-executor-proxy.test.ts`, `provider-node-reserved-prefix.test.ts`, `combo-auto-candidate-expansion.test.ts`, `messages-count-tokens-route.test.ts`, `virtual-auto-combo.test.ts`: split into independent per-mechanism test blocks (established pattern); `virtual-auto-combo.test.ts`'s old "includes cookie web-session providers" positive-inclusion test (which used chatgpt-web as its example) was retired along with the provider and replaced by this PR's negative-exclusion test for the same slot.
- `docs/architecture/ARCHITECTURE.md`, `CODEBASE_DOCUMENTATION.md` (+ 4 i18n mirrors), `README.md`, `FREE-TIERS-GUIDE.md`, `docs/diagrams/free-tier-budget.svg`, `docs/screenshots/free-tier-budget-card.svg`, `docs/reference/PROVIDER_REFERENCE.md`: recomputed every stale count from the real merged state — 104 executors (`countFiles` gate logic), 351 providers (regenerated via `gen:provider-reference`), 152/351 `hasFree` entries, 445/438/7 free-tier catalog rows, 13 ToS-avoid providers, budget-card regenerated via its real generator script. One doc conflict (`oauth/` module list) needed picking HEAD's side specifically — theirs still listed the already-removed `raycast` module instead of the real `openference`.
- `config/quality/test-masking-allowlist.json`: additive merge of the PR's 17 `_deletedWithReplacement` entries alongside the batch's existing ones (one real duplicate-key mistake in my first pass, caught and fixed via a `object_pairs_hook` duplicate-key check before finalizing).

Also fixed two real, unrelated-to-my-merge issues surfaced by the focused suite:
- `tests/unit/resolve-web-provider-host.test.ts`: the PR's own test had a typo — it asserted `perplexity-web`'s resolved host as `"perplexity.ai"`, but the provider's registered `website` is `"https://www.perplexity.ai"` and the resolver returns the URL's `host` verbatim (no www-stripping), so the correct value is `"www.perplexity.ai"` (consistent with the same test's own `url` assertion).
- `tests/unit/hard-session-lease-bypass-inventory.test.ts`: this golden call-site inventory was already stale on the pristine post-#11713 tip (confirmed via a throwaway probe worktree) — `src/lib/db/providers.ts`'s 3 connection-fallback sites and a third `src/app/api/providers/route.ts` site were never added to the golden list by the earlier-merged #11698/#11720 PRs. Updated it to the real current inventory (dated inline comments explain each delta and which PR introduced it), plus this PR's own legitimate deltas (image-edits duplicate-call removal, `ChatGptWebExecutor.execute()` site removed).

Focused suite green (433/433 across executor-proxy, reserved-prefix, hard-session-lease-bypass-inventory, resolve-web-provider-host, retirement/runtime-block/source-retirement/management-retirement/image-handler-retirement, migration-168, combo-auto-candidate-expansion, virtual-auto-combo, executor-map-golden and siblings), plus `typecheck:core`, `check-file-size`, and `check-changelog-integrity` clean. Thanks for the thorough provenance-hold retirement work — appreciated.
2026-08-28 06:52:46 -03:00

115 lines
4.1 KiB
TypeScript

// @vitest-environment jsdom
//
// #5088 — When the inline credential "Check" fails, the modal showed only a bare
// "invalid" badge and threw away the detailed reason returned by
// /api/providers/validate. For browser-session providers the real cause is often an
// environment error (e.g. "TLS impersonation client failed to start: EACCES …"),
// which the backend already surfaces in `data.error` — but the UI hid it, so the
// reporter had to dig it out via a separate Provider Test. The detailed message
// must be shown next to the badge.
import React, { act } from "react";
import { createRoot } from "react-dom/client";
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach, afterEach } from "vitest";
vi.mock("next-intl", () => ({
useTranslations: () => (key: string) => key,
}));
const { default: AddApiKeyModal } =
await import("../../../src/app/(dashboard)/dashboard/providers/[id]/components/modals/AddApiKeyModal");
const TLS_EACCES_ERROR =
"TLS impersonation client failed to start: EACCES: permission denied, mkdir " +
"'/usr/lib/node_modules/omniroute/dist/node_modules/tls-client-node/bin'. " +
"Verify tls-client-node is installed and its native binary downloaded. " +
"(claude-web requires this — without it, Cloudflare blocks every request)";
const containers: Array<{ root: ReturnType<typeof createRoot>; el: HTMLDivElement }> = [];
function render(props: Record<string, unknown>) {
const el = document.createElement("div");
document.body.appendChild(el);
const root = createRoot(el);
act(() => {
root.render(
<AddApiKeyModal
isOpen
onSave={async () => undefined}
onClose={() => {}}
{...(props as any)}
/>
);
});
containers.push({ root, el });
return el;
}
function setInputValue(input: HTMLInputElement, value: string) {
const setter = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(window.HTMLInputElement.prototype, "value")!.set!;
act(() => {
setter.call(input, value);
input.dispatchEvent(new Event("input", { bubbles: true }));
});
}
async function waitFor(fn: () => boolean, timeoutMs = 2000) {
const start = Date.now();
while (!fn()) {
if (Date.now() - start > timeoutMs) throw new Error("waitFor timed out");
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 20));
}
}
beforeEach(() => {
vi.clearAllMocks();
// /api/providers/validate fails with the detailed TLS/EACCES reason; any other
// call (e.g. model lookups) succeeds.
vi.stubGlobal(
"fetch",
vi.fn((url: string) => {
if (String(url).includes("/api/providers/validate")) {
return Promise.resolve({
ok: true,
json: () => Promise.resolve({ valid: false, error: TLS_EACCES_ERROR }),
} as Response);
}
return Promise.resolve({
ok: true,
json: () => Promise.resolve({ valid: true }),
} as Response);
})
);
});
afterEach(() => {
for (const { root, el } of containers.splice(0)) {
act(() => root.unmount());
el.remove();
}
vi.unstubAllGlobals();
});
describe("AddApiKeyModal — surfaces the detailed validation error (#5088)", () => {
it("shows the underlying TLS/EACCES reason, not just an 'invalid' badge", async () => {
const el = render({ provider: "claude-web", providerName: "Claude Web" });
const apiKeyInput = el.querySelector<HTMLInputElement>('input[type="password"]')!;
expect(apiKeyInput).toBeTruthy();
setInputValue(apiKeyInput, "sk-ant-sid01-fake-session-key");
// The validate ("check") button is the first button that follows the
// credential input in DOM order (it sits right next to it).
const checkBtn = Array.from(el.querySelectorAll("button")).find(
(b) => (apiKeyInput.compareDocumentPosition(b) & Node.DOCUMENT_POSITION_FOLLOWING) !== 0
)!;
expect(checkBtn).toBeTruthy();
act(() => {
checkBtn.dispatchEvent(new MouseEvent("click", { bubbles: true }));
});
// The full reason must reach the DOM — a bare "invalid" badge is not enough.
await waitFor(() => el.textContent?.includes("EACCES: permission denied") ?? false);
expect(el.textContent).toContain("TLS impersonation client failed to start");
});
});