mirror of
https://github.com/diegosouzapw/OmniRoute.git
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3d4f3e4960
* test(infra): retry recursive temp-dir removal instead of failing a shard on ENOTEMPTY (#11966) Two shards on release/v3.8.51 went red in one day with the same signature — "ENOTEMPTY, Directory not empty: /tmp/omniroute-<test>-XXXXXX" — from combo-same-provider-cascade (Unit Tests fast-path 4/4, on a PR that touches only .github/) and auth-policy-embeddings-webfetch-7785 (the 20k-test TIA step). Both pass alone and on re-run: the cleanup races something still writing into the directory (SQLite WAL/-shm checkpoint, a worker, the backup) and under a loaded hosted runner the window opens. 1154 test files do their own cleanup with fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }); 57 already asked for retries. One-shot codemod (scripts/ad-hoc/codemod-rm-maxretries.mjs, kept for the record): every rm / rmSync / rmdirSync option object with `recursive: true` and no `maxRetries` gains `maxRetries: 5, retryDelay: 100` — Node itself then retries ENOTEMPTY/EBUSY/EPERM for up to ~0.5 s before giving up. 2243 call sites in 1292 files under tests/, the shared tests/_setup/isolateDataDir.ts exit hook included. Only the option object changes: no call site, assertion or import is touched. Validation: prettier and ESLint (with the frozen suppressions) clean on all 1292 files; a random 20-file sample runs green (quota-redis-store hangs identically on the untouched tree — it needs a Redis on localhost, an environment matter). The four unit shards on this PR are the full run. * fix(quality): let check-forgotten-sibling-tests read a 1,000-file diff The gate shells out to `git diff` through execFileSync with Node's default 1 MB maxBuffer; the 1,292-file codemod in this PR is the first diff large enough to overflow it, and the gate died with `spawnSync git ENOBUFS` before comparing anything. 64 MB is far above any real PR and costs nothing when unused.
84 lines
2.7 KiB
TypeScript
84 lines
2.7 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Security hardening for #3269: even when private webhook targets are opted in via
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* OMNIROUTE_ALLOW_PRIVATE_PROVIDER_URLS, cloud-metadata / link-local endpoints
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* (169.254.169.254, metadata.google.internal, 100.100.100.200, 169.254.0.0/16) must be
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* blocked UNCONDITIONALLY — they are the classic SSRF→IAM-credential pivot and have no
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* legitimate webhook use case.
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*/
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import { describe, it, after } from "node:test";
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import assert from "node:assert/strict";
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import fs from "node:fs";
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import os from "node:os";
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import path from "node:path";
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process.env.DATA_DIR = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "omni-wh-meta-3269-"));
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const { isCloudMetadataHost, OutboundUrlGuardError } =
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await import("../../src/shared/network/outboundUrlGuard.ts");
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const { parseAndValidateWebhookUrl } =
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await import("../../src/shared/network/outboundUrlGuardPolicy.ts");
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const { resetDbInstance } = await import("../../src/lib/db/core.ts");
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const FLAG = "OMNIROUTE_ALLOW_PRIVATE_PROVIDER_URLS";
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const METADATA_TARGETS = [
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"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/",
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"http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/",
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"http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/",
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"http://169.254.1.2/anything",
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];
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describe("webhook guard blocks cloud-metadata unconditionally (#3269 hardening)", () => {
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it("isCloudMetadataHost flags the known metadata + link-local hosts", () => {
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assert.equal(isCloudMetadataHost("169.254.169.254"), true);
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assert.equal(isCloudMetadataHost("metadata.google.internal"), true);
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assert.equal(isCloudMetadataHost("100.100.100.200"), true);
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assert.equal(isCloudMetadataHost("169.254.55.66"), true);
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assert.equal(isCloudMetadataHost("10.0.0.5"), false);
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assert.equal(isCloudMetadataHost("hooks.example.com"), false);
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});
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it("blocks metadata targets even when the private opt-in is ON", () => {
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process.env[FLAG] = "true";
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try {
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for (const target of METADATA_TARGETS) {
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assert.throws(
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() => parseAndValidateWebhookUrl(target),
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OutboundUrlGuardError,
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`expected ${target} to be blocked`
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);
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}
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} finally {
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delete process.env[FLAG];
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}
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});
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it("still allows a normal private LAN host when opted in (not metadata)", () => {
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process.env[FLAG] = "true";
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try {
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const url = parseAndValidateWebhookUrl("http://192.168.0.10/hook");
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assert.equal(url.hostname, "192.168.0.10");
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} finally {
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delete process.env[FLAG];
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}
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});
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});
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after(() => {
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try {
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resetDbInstance();
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} catch {
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/* ignore */
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}
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try {
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fs.rmSync(process.env.DATA_DIR as string, {
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recursive: true,
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force: true,
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maxRetries: 5,
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retryDelay: 100,
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});
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} catch {
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/* ignore */
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}
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});
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