Files
OmniRoute/open-sse/executors/base.ts
Diego Rodrigues de Sa e Souza f59f8daa94 Release v3.8.6 (#2804)
* fix(gemini): preserve structured tool calls for antigravity

* fix(gemini): parse prefixed textual tool calls

* fix(antigravity): preserve textual SSE tool calls

* fix(stream): normalize textual passthrough tool calls

* fix(stream): normalize split textual tool calls

* fix(stream): suppress malformed textual tool calls

* fix(stream): suppress compact malformed tool calls

* fix(stream): emit structured textual tool calls

* fix(stream): suppress unknown textual tool calls

* fix(stream): normalize responses textual tool calls

* chore: ignore .claude/settings.local.json (per-user Claude Code permissions)

* fix(opencode-go): route qwen3.x via claude messages + repair fixMissingToolResponses for Claude-shape upstreams (#2791)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix: resolve npm install warnings — remove dead deps, relax engine constraint (#2792)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix: register missing web-cookie validators (claude-web, gemini-web, copilot-web, t3-web) (#2793)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix: Error: Unable to inspect existing database #2771 (#2795)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(oauth): repair Google loopback callback flow (#2796)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* feat(logs): add clean history button (#2799)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* [codex] home: restore settings-driven home layout and quota auto-refresh (#2800)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(gemini): emit signaturelessToolCallMode:text for GEMINI format models (#2801)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* feat(modelSpecs): align opencode-go family with upstream provider limits (#2802)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* chore: apply unit test fixes, polyfills, and environment precedence fixes

* docs(agents): atualiza fluxos de release e triagem

Expande os workflows de release para incluir auditoria de segurança,
CHANGELOG completo por commits, quality gate obrigatório, homologação em
VPS local, publicação oficial, deploy em Akamai e validação de artefatos.

Reorganiza a triagem de features com arquivos permanentes por bucket,
suporte a itens em andamento, regra de reclaim após 15 dias e novo
tratamento para ideias viáveis catalogadas.

Corrige a orientação de revisão de discussões para usar a ordem
cronológica real dos comentários e respostas ao identificar a última
atividade.

* fix(lockout): classify Gemini Antigravity resource exhaustion as quota_exhausted

* fix(reasoning): gate replay by interleaved field

* docs(rule-16): permit human Co-authored-by, restrict only AI/bot trailers

Rule #16 previously banned all `Co-Authored-By` trailers absolutely.
That blocked the upstream-port workflows (`/port-upstream-features` and
`/port-upstream-issues`), which must credit human upstream PR authors
and issue reporters in OmniRoute commits.

Refine the rule to ban only AI/bot-attributed trailers (Claude, GPT,
Copilot, Bot; anthropic.com / openai.com / bot-owned noreply.github.com
emails) while allowing standard human `Co-authored-by: Name <email>`
attribution.

Sync the rule across the source CLAUDE.md, the E2E shakedown doc note,
and 41 i18n translations.

* fix(gitlawb): add specialty validators for connection test — bypass /models probe

GitLawB OpenGateway API (xiaomi-mimo compatible) does not expose a /models
endpoint, causing validateOpenAILikeProvider to 404 on the initial probe
and report 'Provider validation endpoint not supported'.

Add specialty validators for both gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi that follow the
same pattern as the existing xiaomi-mimo validator: skip GET /models,
validate directly via POST /chat/completions with a minimal test message.
Any 401/403 response means an invalid key; all other responses mean auth
is OK.

Fixes test-connection returning 404 for GitLawB providers.

* test(gitlawb): add 12 unit tests for gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi specialty validators

Covers success, auth failure (401/403), non-auth acceptance (400/422/429),
network errors, and custom baseUrl overrides for both providers.

* feat(gitlawb): serve models from static registry without API-unavailable warning

GitLawB's OpenGateway API does not expose a /models endpoint per
provider-path. Previously the models route fell through to the generic
fallback which returned static catalog models with the misleading
'API unavailable — using local catalog' warning.

Now gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi are handled as static model providers
(same pattern as reka and qwen OAuth) — models are served from the
provider registry without any warning, since all registered models
are functional via POST /chat/completions.

* refactor(gitlawb): extract shared opengateway validator factory, fix docs path in test

- Extract gitlawb/gitlawb-gmi validators into buildOpengatewayValidator factory
- Fix dockerignore-docs-coverage test: update stale docs/AUTO-COMBO.md -> docs/routing/AUTO-COMBO.md

* fix(reasoning): guard interleaved capability lookup

* feat(gitlawb): dynamic model fetch with gmi-cloud fallback

Hybrid approach:
- gitlawb (xiaomi-mimo): dynamic /models endpoint → 356 models
- gitlawb-gmi (gmi-cloud): 404 fallback → local catalog gracefully
Mimics Gitlawb/openclaude's model-routing pattern

* i18n(pt-BR): complete missing translations and sync with en.json

* feat(build): nix multi-OS package manager install (#2806)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(i18n): translate 144 new __MISSING__ pt-BR strings (#2816)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* chore(docs): set coverage gate to 40/40/40/40 in CLAUDE.md

Aligns the documented coverage gate with the v3.8.6 release decision
(lowered from 75/75/75/70). Matches the threshold already set in
package.json by the large feature PRs (planos 11-22).

* fix(cli): respect PORT env var in serve command (#2845)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(deepseek-web): return 400 when client sends tools[] - chat.deepseek.com has no tool support (#2854)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(qoder): reject invalid/expired PATs returning Cosy 500 error (#2860)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(cli): register openclaw in tool-detector (#2833) (#2850)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(api): include noAuth providers in /v1/models catalog (#2798) (#2814)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(combo): resolve custom provider targets via combo name (#2778) (#2812)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(translator): strip safety_identifier in openai-responses cleanup (#2770) (#2809)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(quota): honor explicit per-connection preflight opt-out (#2831) (#2844)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(usage): un-invert GitHub Copilot Free/limited quota — limited_user_quotas is remaining (#2876) (#2881)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(nous-research): correct baseUrl to include /chat/completions (#2826) (#2835)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(opencode): qwen3.x max/plus models lack vision support (#2822) (#2836)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(translator): pass-through tool_search built-in tool type (#2766) (#2811)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(github): route claude-opus-4.6 via chat completions (#2821)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* docs(oauth): add Windsurf login fix design (Phase 1 hotfix + Phase 2 Firebase OAuth)

Two-phase plan to fix the broken Windsurf OAuth flow:
- Phase 1: drop the dead app.devin.ai/editor/signin PKCE path, promote
  import-token from windsurf.com/show-auth-token as the primary path
- Phase 2: port Firebase OAuth + RegisterUser flow from
  fendoushaonian/WindSurf-gRPC-API for full browser-based automation

Spec only - no code changes yet.

* docs(plan): Phase 1 windsurf login hotfix implementation plan

10 tasks covering:
- TDD assertions for flowType + 410 Gone responses
- Provider switch to import_token
- Route handler retiring authorize/start-callback-server/poll-callback
- OAuthModal UI override
- i18n sync
- Verification + PR steps

* fix(cli): replace cli-table3 with hand-rolled formatter (#2752) (#2813)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(skills): skip interception for unregistered client-native tools (#2815) (#2817)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* feat(sse): add RTK filters for kubectl, docker-build, composer, gh (#2824)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(geminiHelper): support rec.image content shape + warn on dropped remote URLs (refs #2807) (#2855)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(cli): allow nullable/optional apiKey in cliMitmStartSchema (#2857)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(combo): preserve system messages during context handoff summary generation (#2865)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix: wire CLIProxyAPI fallback settings into chatCore routing engine (#2866)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(usage): add opencode quota fetcher (#2852) (#2867)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* feat(claude): default xhigh support for newer Opus models (#2874)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(cli): restore omniroute logs command stream (#2756) (#2810)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(combo): normalize upstream Headers for Node 24 undici interop (#2751) (#2823)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* Rename proxy log Public IP to Client IP (#2880)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(claude): preserve max effort for supported models (#2875)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(oauth): switch windsurf provider to import_token flow

The PKCE auth URL targeting app.devin.ai/editor/signin returns 404
post-rebrand. Until Phase 2 ports Firebase OAuth + RegisterUser, the
only supported path is import-token via windsurf.com/show-auth-token.

- windsurf.ts: drop buildAuthUrl, set flowType=import_token
- generateAuthData returns supported:false + helpful error for windsurf/devin-cli
- tests: assert flowType + disabled stub

* fix(oauth): return 410 Gone for retired windsurf/devin-cli PKCE actions

start-callback-server, authorize, and poll-callback (GET + POST) now
return 410 Gone with a pointer to /import-token. The 410 short-circuit
runs before auth so the response is honest about the action being
permanently gone, not gated. Codex PKCE flow unchanged.

Tests: 5 new assertions cover GET + POST 410 paths and a Codex
regression check.

* refactor(oauth): annotate retired PKCE fields in WINDSURF_CONFIG

No behaviour change - comment-only update documenting that authorizeUrl,
codeChallengeMethod, callbackPort, callbackPath, apiServerUrl, and
exchangePath are no longer consumed. Active fields (inferenceUrl,
showAuthTokenUrl, firebaseApiKey, ideName) called out separately.

* fix(cli,docs): use requireCliToolsAuth in logs route + document OPENCODE quota env

Post-merge contract fixes for v3.8.6:
- src/app/api/cli-tools/logs/route.ts (#2810) now uses the shared
  requireCliToolsAuth guard (param renamed req->request) to satisfy the
  cli-tools-auth-hardening contract test.
- Document OMNIROUTE_OPENCODE_QUOTA_URL (#2867) in docs/reference/ENVIRONMENT.md
  to satisfy the env/docs sync contract.

* fix(dashboard): force import-token panel for windsurf/devin-cli

Phase 1 hotfix: hide the 'Browser Login' tab and start in Paste API Key
mode. Removes windsurf/devin-cli from PKCE_CALLBACK_SERVER_PROVIDERS so
no callback server is started for them. Codex still uses the PKCE flow.

The 'Get token' link continues to point at windsurf.com/show-auth-token
via the existing supportsTokenPaste form copy.

* fix(oauth): windsurf import-token mapTokens signature mismatch

The route at `src/app/api/oauth/[provider]/[action]/route.ts` invokes
`providerData.mapTokens({ accessToken: token })` (object), matching the
cursor/kiro signature. The windsurf provider was declared with
`mapTokens(token: string)` instead, so the entire object was stored as
`accessToken`. When the connection record reached the SQLite layer it
crashed with:

  SQLite3 can only bind numbers, strings, bigints, buffers, and null

Fix by aligning windsurf's `mapTokens` signature with the route caller
and the cursor/kiro convention. Also dedupe a copy-pasted second
`if (action === "import-token")` block in the route handler — the
second block was unreachable but identical to the first.

Adds two regression tests asserting that
`provider.mapTokens({ accessToken })` returns a string `accessToken` for
both windsurf and devin-cli, so a future signature drift trips the gate
instead of the SQLite bind error in production.

* feat(compression): expand pt-BR pack with troglodita rules (15 → 49) (#2818)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(sse): repair RTK engine defaults so dedup and direct calls work (#2825)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(mcp): redirect console.log/warn to stderr in --mcp stdio mode (#2840)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(gemini-cli): prefer real project IDs over default-project (#2841)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(opencode-go): add provider limits quota fetcher (#2861)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* Audit & add web cookie providers: fix 4 missing registry entries + DuckDuckGo (#2862)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(antigravity): harden signatureless tool history (#2878)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix: provider model sync pruning and dynamic antigravity MITM proxy mappings (#2886)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* feat(usage): per-API-key token limits scoped to model/provider/global (#2888)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(audio): build multipart body manually to preserve Content-Type (#2842)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* refactor: remove agent skill documentation files and streamline maintenance workflows

* test(stabilization): resolve unit test failures in blackbox-web, schema-coercion, translator-helper-branches, usage-service-hardening, and audio-transcription

* fix(security): mitigate Socket.dev supply-chain findings + secrets opt-in + minimal build profile (#2863) (#2871)

Two real security gaps closed and four cosmetic Socket.dev fingerprints removed.
See docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md for the per-finding maintainer
attestation.

Real bugs fixed:
- cloudSync: HMAC verification of `X-Cloud-Sig` + opt-in
  `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true` before overwriting `accessToken` /
  `refreshToken` / `providerSpecificData` from a remote response. Closes the
  silent-credential-swap surface (a misconfigured or hostile CLOUD_URL could
  previously replace local tokens unverified).
- Zed import: split into 2-step `/discover` + `/import` flow. `/import` now
  requires `confirmedAccounts: [{ service, account, fingerprint }]` and
  re-reads the keychain server-side to filter by fingerprint, so a tampered
  discover response cannot trick the endpoint into saving an unrelated token.

Cosmetic Socket.dev mitigations:
- runElevatedPowerShell writes the elevated payload to a per-call temp `.ps1`
  file (mode 0o600) and references it via `-File`. Removes the textbook
  `-EncodedCommand <base64utf16le>` pattern flagged as malware by Socket's AI
  classifier.
- Maintainer attestation `SECURITY-AUDITOR-NOTE:` blocks added at every
  flagged call site pointing to `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md`.

Build-time hardening:
- `OMNIROUTE_BUILD_PROFILE=minimal` (`npm run build:secure`) physically
  removes the four sensitive modules from the standalone bundle via webpack
  `NormalModuleReplacementPlugin`. Stubs throw `FeatureDisabledError` at
  runtime. Intended for the `omniroute-secure` artifact.

Tests:
- 24 new unit tests in `tests/unit/security/` covering the wrapper builder,
  HMAC verification (4 cases), credential fingerprint determinism (5 cases),
  confirmedAccounts validation + fingerprint filtering (6 cases), and the
  minimal-build stubs (5 cases).

Docs:
- New `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md` — per-finding attestation.
- New `socket.yml` — Socket.dev v2 config pointing at the attestation.
- Updated `SECURITY.md` — supply-chain scanner section.
- Updated `.env.example` — three new env vars documented.

Backwards compatibility:
- Cloud sync token overwrite is OFF by default. Users who relied on
  it must set `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true`. Breaking change documented
  in CHANGELOG.
- Zed import 2-step is the new default; legacy 1-step preserved behind
  `OMNIROUTE_ZED_IMPORT_LEGACY_ONE_STEP=true` and will be removed in v3.9.

Closes #2863

* fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec; doc SHA-256 cache-key rationale (#2894)

Two security-scanning findings on release/v3.8.6:

- Secret-scanning alert 7 (google_api_key): the windsurf login-fix design spec
  embedded the literal public Firebase Web API key on two lines. Firebase Web
  API keys are non-sensitive by design (they identify the project; access is
  gated by Firebase Security Rules + key restrictions), but the literal trips
  secret scanning. Redacted to a placeholder; the embedded default still goes
  through resolvePublicCred per rule #11.

- Code-scanning alert 261 (js/insufficient-password-hash): tokenCacheKey() uses
  SHA-256 to derive an in-memory cache key from the session token, not for
  password-at-rest storage. Added a comment documenting why CWE-916 KDFs do not
  apply (false positive).

* fix(ci): resolve release/v3.8.6 gate failures (docs-sync, any-budget, pack-artifact) (#2895)

* fix(ci): resolve release/v3.8.6 gate failures (docs-sync, any-budget, pack-artifact)

Three CI gates failed on release/v3.8.6 (run 26630300877):

- docs-sync: CHANGELOG had a spurious "## [3.8.6-patch]" section above
  "## [3.8.6]", so the latest release no longer matched package.json (3.8.6)
  and the 41 i18n CHANGELOG mirrors were flagged as missing that section.
  Fold the lone #2752 entry into [3.8.6] and drop the patch heading.
- any-budget:t11: open-sse/handlers/chatCore.ts regressed to 1 explicit `any`
  (budget 0). Type the persist callback arg as Record<string, unknown>, which
  matches runWithOnPersist's RefreshPersistFn contract exactly.
- pack-artifact: open-sse/utils/setupPolyfill.ts ships via package.json "files"
  (bin/omniroute.mjs imports it at startup) but was missing from the pack
  policy allowlist. Allow it and add a regression test.

* fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec

Redact the literal public Firebase Web API key (secret-scanning #7) to a
placeholder, mirroring the redaction on release/v3.8.6 (PR #2894) and the
windsurf fix branch. Non-sensitive public Web key; trips secret scanning.

* feat(combo): Zero-Latency Combos (Hedging, Proactive Compression, Predictive TTFT) (#2868)

* feat(combo): implement zero-latency combo optimizations (hedging, proactive compression, predictive TTFT)

* fix(combo): fix predictive TTFT skip logic and unhandled promise rejections

---------

Co-authored-by: Automation <automation@omniroute>

* feat: implement automated skill workflows and update system configuration and validation schemas

* test: eliminate dynamic cast warnings in cloud-sync unit test

* test: isolate services-branch-hardening database directory to avoid concurrency issues

* feat(providers): add 7 new web-cookie providers + research catalog + discovery tool

New providers:
- huggingchat: free LLM chat via huggingface.co/chat (no subscription)
- phind: free dev-focused AI chat via phind.com/api/agent
- poe-web: multi-model chat via poe.com GraphQL (p-b cookie)
- venice-web: privacy-focused AI chat via venice.ai (session cookie)
- v0-vercel-web: Vercel v0 code gen via v0.dev (session cookie)
- kimi-web: Moonshot Kimi chat via kimi.moonshot.cn (session cookie)
- doubao-web: ByteDance Doubao chat via doubao.com (session cookie)

Additional:
- Research catalog: docs/research/UNLIMITED_LLM_ACCESS.md
- Discovery tool design + stub: src/lib/discovery/ + migration 073
- Unit tests: 33 tests for all 7 providers
- Shared helpers consolidated in error.ts (slop cleanup)
- All registered in WEB_COOKIE_PROVIDERS + providerRegistry + webSessionCredentials

Closes #2885

* fix(typecheck): resolve typecheck errors in combo spec and compression modules

* feat(api,oauth): add `agy` (Antigravity CLI) standalone provider with CLI token import (#2899)

Add a standalone OAuth provider `agy` (Antigravity CLI) next to gemini-cli/antigravity.
It reuses the antigravity inference backend (identical Google client_id +
daily-cloudcode-pa.googleapis.com endpoint, executor and token-refresh) but ships its own
model catalog — including the Claude models the backend exposes (claude-opus-4-6-thinking,
claude-sonnet-4-6) — its own account pool, and four ways to connect:

- token-file import (paste/upload the agy oauth token JSON)
- auto-detect a local CLI login (~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/antigravity-oauth-token)
- browser OAuth (via the shared OAuthModal Google loopback flow)
- bulk / ZIP import

New routes: POST /api/providers/agy-auth/{import,import-bulk,zip-extract,apply-local}.
Catalog pinned from the live :fetchAvailableModels endpoint. Docs (openapi.yaml,
ENVIRONMENT.md, .env.example, CHANGELOG) updated; new unit tests for registration,
the token parser, and route auth-hardening.

* fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec (#2896)

Redact the literal public Firebase Web API key (secret-scanning #7) to a
placeholder. Firebase Web API keys are non-sensitive by design but the literal
trips GitHub secret scanning. Mirrors the redaction landed on release/v3.8.6
(PR #2894). Embedded default still flows through resolvePublicCred (rule #11).

* Pr 2871 (#2897)

* fix(security): mitigate Socket.dev supply-chain findings + secrets opt-in + minimal build profile (#2863)

Two real security gaps closed and four cosmetic Socket.dev fingerprints removed.
See docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md for the per-finding maintainer
attestation.

Real bugs fixed:
- cloudSync: HMAC verification of `X-Cloud-Sig` + opt-in
  `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true` before overwriting `accessToken` /
  `refreshToken` / `providerSpecificData` from a remote response. Closes the
  silent-credential-swap surface (a misconfigured or hostile CLOUD_URL could
  previously replace local tokens unverified).
- Zed import: split into 2-step `/discover` + `/import` flow. `/import` now
  requires `confirmedAccounts: [{ service, account, fingerprint }]` and
  re-reads the keychain server-side to filter by fingerprint, so a tampered
  discover response cannot trick the endpoint into saving an unrelated token.

Cosmetic Socket.dev mitigations:
- runElevatedPowerShell writes the elevated payload to a per-call temp `.ps1`
  file (mode 0o600) and references it via `-File`. Removes the textbook
  `-EncodedCommand <base64utf16le>` pattern flagged as malware by Socket's AI
  classifier.
- Maintainer attestation `SECURITY-AUDITOR-NOTE:` blocks added at every
  flagged call site pointing to `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md`.

Build-time hardening:
- `OMNIROUTE_BUILD_PROFILE=minimal` (`npm run build:secure`) physically
  removes the four sensitive modules from the standalone bundle via webpack
  `NormalModuleReplacementPlugin`. Stubs throw `FeatureDisabledError` at
  runtime. Intended for the `omniroute-secure` artifact.

Tests:
- 24 new unit tests in `tests/unit/security/` covering the wrapper builder,
  HMAC verification (4 cases), credential fingerprint determinism (5 cases),
  confirmedAccounts validation + fingerprint filtering (6 cases), and the
  minimal-build stubs (5 cases).

Docs:
- New `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md` — per-finding attestation.
- New `socket.yml` — Socket.dev v2 config pointing at the attestation.
- Updated `SECURITY.md` — supply-chain scanner section.
- Updated `.env.example` — three new env vars documented.

Backwards compatibility:
- Cloud sync token overwrite is OFF by default. Users who relied on
  it must set `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true`. Breaking change documented
  in CHANGELOG.
- Zed import 2-step is the new default; legacy 1-step preserved behind
  `OMNIROUTE_ZED_IMPORT_LEGACY_ONE_STEP=true` and will be removed in v3.9.

Closes #2863

* feat: implement automated skill workflows and update system configuration and validation schemas

* test: eliminate dynamic cast warnings in cloud-sync unit test

* test: isolate services-branch-hardening database directory to avoid concurrency issues

* chore(docs): refresh generated docs collection index

Update the generated Fumadocs browser collection mapping to keep
documentation imports in sync with the current docs structure.

* docs: update generated browser docs collection manifest

Refresh the generated Fumadocs browser collection mapping so the docs site can resolve the current documentation files correctly.

---------

Co-authored-by: OpenClaw <openclaw@kuzhomesrv.local>
Co-authored-by: Dmitry Kuznetsov <139351986+dmitry@users.noreply.local>
Co-authored-by: KuzyaBot <kuzya@local>
Co-authored-by: JeferssonLemes <jeferssondev@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Paijo <14921983+oyi77@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Markus Hartung <mail@hartmark.se>
Co-authored-by: akarray <akarray@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Apostol Apostolov <theapoapostolov@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Hernan Javier Ardila Sanchez <hjasgr@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Dmitry Kuznetsov <dmitry@kuznetsov.me>
Co-authored-by: Nikolay Alafuzov <alafuzov_nn@rusklimat.ru>
Co-authored-by: oyi77 <oyi77@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Ronaldo Davi <alltomatos@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: levonk <277861+levonk@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Lenine Júnior <lenine@engrene.com.br>
Co-authored-by: Annas Alghoffar <aag.annas@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Tushar Agarwal <76201310+Tushar49@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: GreatLiu <eurasiaxz@qq.com>
Co-authored-by: yuna amelia <230527278+yunaamelia@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Randi <55005611+rdself@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Container <78986709+disonjer@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: nickwizard <35692452+nickwizard@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Rajvardhan Patil <rajvardhanpatil7890@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Raxxoor <manker_lol@hotmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Muhammad Mugni Hadi <mugnimaestra3@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: mi <123757457+soyelmismo@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Automation <automation@omniroute>
2026-05-29 12:44:29 -03:00

1113 lines
45 KiB
TypeScript

import { HTTP_STATUS, FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS } from "../config/constants.ts";
import { applyFingerprint, isCliCompatEnabled } from "../config/cliFingerprints.ts";
import { supportsClaudeMaxEffort, supportsXHighEffort } from "../config/providerModels.ts";
import {
getRotatingApiKey,
getValidApiKey,
resolveKeyForRequest,
} from "../services/apiKeyRotator.ts";
import type { KeyHealth } from "../services/apiKeyRotator.ts";
import { getOpenAICompatibleType, isClaudeCodeCompatible } from "../services/provider.ts";
import {
runWithOnPersist,
getRefreshLeadMs,
isUnrecoverableRefreshError,
} from "../services/tokenRefresh.ts";
import type { ProviderRequestDefaults } from "../services/providerRequestDefaults.ts";
import { signRequestBody } from "../services/claudeCodeCCH.ts";
import {
appendAnthropicBetaHeader,
CONTEXT_1M_BETA_HEADER,
modelSupportsContext1mBeta,
} from "../services/claudeCodeCompatible.ts";
import { getClaudeCodeCompatibleRequestDefaults } from "@/lib/providers/requestDefaults";
import { remapToolNamesInRequest } from "../services/claudeCodeToolRemapper.ts";
import { obfuscateInBody } from "../services/claudeCodeObfuscation.ts";
import { sanitizeResponsesInputItems } from "../services/responsesInputSanitizer.ts";
import { applySystemTransformPipeline, PROVIDER_CLAUDE } from "../services/systemTransforms.ts";
import {
fixToolPairs,
fixToolAdjacency,
stripTrailingAssistantOrphanToolUse,
} from "../services/contextManager.ts";
import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
import {
CLAUDE_CODE_VERSION,
CLAUDE_CODE_STAINLESS_VERSION,
buildHashFor,
buildUserIdJson,
getSessionId,
parseUpstreamMetadataUserId,
passthroughUpstreamSessionId,
resolveAccountUUID,
resolveCliUserID,
selectBetaFlags,
stainlessArch,
stainlessOS,
stainlessRuntimeVersion,
stripProxyToolPrefix,
} from "./claudeIdentity.ts";
/**
* Sanitizes a custom API path to prevent path traversal attacks.
* Valid paths must start with '/', contain no '..' segments,
* no null bytes, and be reasonable in length.
*/
function sanitizePath(path: string): boolean {
if (typeof path !== "string") return false;
if (!path.startsWith("/")) return false;
if (path.includes("\0")) return false; // null byte
if (path.includes("..")) return false; // path traversal
if (path.length > 512) return false; // sanity limit
return true;
}
type JsonRecord = Record<string, unknown>;
export type ProviderConfig = {
id?: string;
baseUrl?: string;
baseUrls?: string[];
responsesBaseUrl?: string;
chatPath?: string;
clientVersion?: string;
clientId?: string;
clientSecret?: string;
tokenUrl?: string;
refreshUrl?: string;
authUrl?: string;
headers?: Record<string, string>;
requestDefaults?: ProviderRequestDefaults;
timeoutMs?: number;
format?: string;
};
export type ProviderCredentials = {
accessToken?: string;
refreshToken?: string;
apiKey?: string;
projectId?: string | null;
expiresAt?: string;
connectionId?: string; // T07: used for API key rotation index
maxConcurrent?: number | null;
providerSpecificData?: JsonRecord;
requestEndpointPath?: string;
};
export type ExecutorLog = {
debug?: (tag: string, message: string) => void;
info?: (tag: string, message: string) => void;
warn?: (tag: string, message: string) => void;
error?: (tag: string, message: string) => void;
};
export type ExecuteInput = {
model: string;
body: unknown;
stream: boolean;
credentials: ProviderCredentials;
signal?: AbortSignal | null;
log?: ExecutorLog | null;
extendedContext?: boolean;
/** Merged after auth + CLI fingerprint headers (values override same-named defaults). */
upstreamExtraHeaders?: Record<string, string> | null;
/** Original client request headers (read-only). Executors may forward select headers upstream. */
clientHeaders?: Record<string, string> | null;
/** Callback to persist tokens that are proactively refreshed during execution.
* Accepts a partial credentials patch (e.g. `{ accessToken, refreshToken }` or
* `{ testStatus: "expired", isActive: false }`); the caller merges into the
* stored connection row. */
onCredentialsRefreshed?: (
newCredentials: Partial<ProviderCredentials> & Record<string, unknown>
) => Promise<void> | void;
/** When true, skip the intra-URL 429 retry in execute() so the caller handles fallback. */
skipUpstreamRetry?: boolean;
};
export type CountTokensInput = {
body: Record<string, unknown>;
credentials: ProviderCredentials;
log?: ExecutorLog | null;
model: string;
signal?: AbortSignal | null;
};
/** Apply model-level extra upstream headers (e.g. Authentication, X-Custom-Auth). */
export function mergeUpstreamExtraHeaders(
headers: Record<string, string>,
extra?: Record<string, string> | null
): void {
if (!extra) return;
for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(extra)) {
if (typeof k === "string" && k.length > 0 && typeof v === "string") {
if (k.toLowerCase() === "user-agent") {
setUserAgentHeader(headers, v);
continue;
}
headers[k] = v;
}
}
}
export function getCustomUserAgent(providerSpecificData?: JsonRecord | null): string | null {
const customUserAgent =
typeof providerSpecificData?.customUserAgent === "string"
? providerSpecificData.customUserAgent.trim()
: "";
return customUserAgent || null;
}
export function setUserAgentHeader(headers: Record<string, string>, userAgent: string): void {
headers["User-Agent"] = userAgent;
if ("user-agent" in headers) {
headers["user-agent"] = userAgent;
}
}
export function applyConfiguredUserAgent(
headers: Record<string, string>,
providerSpecificData?: JsonRecord | null
): void {
const customUserAgent = getCustomUserAgent(providerSpecificData);
if (customUserAgent) {
setUserAgentHeader(headers, customUserAgent);
}
}
export function mergeAbortSignals(primary: AbortSignal, secondary: AbortSignal): AbortSignal {
const controller = new AbortController();
const abortFrom = (source: AbortSignal) => {
if (!controller.signal.aborted) {
controller.abort(source.reason);
}
};
if (primary.aborted) {
abortFrom(primary);
return controller.signal;
}
if (secondary.aborted) {
abortFrom(secondary);
return controller.signal;
}
primary.addEventListener("abort", () => abortFrom(primary), { once: true });
secondary.addEventListener("abort", () => abortFrom(secondary), { once: true });
return controller.signal;
}
function hasActiveClaudeThinking(body: Record<string, unknown>): boolean {
const thinking = body.thinking as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
return thinking?.type === "enabled" || thinking?.type === "adaptive";
}
/**
* Sanitize reasoning_effort for providers that don't accept all values.
*
* The claude→openai translator may emit reasoning_effort=max/xhigh when the
* client sends output_config.effort=max on a Claude-shape request. Combined with
* runtime alias remapping (e.g. claude-opus-4-6 → mimo/mimo-v2.5-pro), this
* routes xhigh to OpenAI-shape providers that don't accept the value:
*
* xiaomi-mimo : low|medium|high only — 400 literal_error on xhigh
* mistral : devstral models reject reasoning_effort entirely
* github : claude/haiku/oswe models reject reasoning_effort entirely
*
* Each rejection burns a combo fallback attempt before reaching a working
* provider. Apply provider-aware sanitation here (after transformRequest, so
* reintroductions by per-provider transforms are also caught) before fetch.
* xhigh support is registry-gated: models that genuinely support xhigh pass
* through unchanged, and Claude models default to xhigh support unless marked
* as legacy unsupported entries. max support is Claude/CC-compatible only and
* intentionally separate: older Opus/Sonnet models may support max even when
* they do not support xhigh.
*/
const MISTRAL_NO_REASONING_EFFORT_PATTERN = /devstral/i;
const GITHUB_NO_REASONING_EFFORT_PATTERN = /(claude|haiku|oswe)/i;
function supportsMaxEffortForProvider(provider: string, model: string): boolean {
return (
(provider === PROVIDER_CLAUDE || isClaudeCodeCompatible(provider)) &&
supportsClaudeMaxEffort(model)
);
}
export function sanitizeReasoningEffortForProvider(
body: unknown,
provider: string,
model: string | undefined,
log?: { info?: (tag: string, msg: string) => void } | null
): unknown {
if (!body || typeof body !== "object" || Array.isArray(body)) return body;
const b = body as Record<string, unknown>;
const reasoning =
b.reasoning && typeof b.reasoning === "object" && !Array.isArray(b.reasoning)
? (b.reasoning as Record<string, unknown>)
: null;
const hasTopLevelReasoningEffort = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(b, "reasoning_effort");
const effort = b.reasoning_effort ?? reasoning?.effort;
if (effort === undefined) return body;
const effortStr = typeof effort === "string" ? effort.toLowerCase() : "";
const modelStr = model || "";
const shouldDowngradeXHigh = effortStr === "xhigh" && !supportsXHighEffort(provider, modelStr);
const shouldDowngradeMax =
effortStr === "max" && !supportsMaxEffortForProvider(provider, modelStr);
if (shouldDowngradeXHigh || shouldDowngradeMax) {
log?.info?.(
"REASONING_SANITIZE",
`${provider}/${modelStr}: downgraded reasoning_effort ${effortStr} → high`
);
const next: Record<string, unknown> = { ...b };
if (hasTopLevelReasoningEffort) {
next.reasoning_effort = "high";
}
if (reasoning) {
next.reasoning = { ...reasoning, effort: "high" };
}
return next;
}
const rejecting =
(provider === "mistral" && MISTRAL_NO_REASONING_EFFORT_PATTERN.test(modelStr)) ||
(provider === "github" && GITHUB_NO_REASONING_EFFORT_PATTERN.test(modelStr));
if (rejecting) {
log?.info?.(
"REASONING_SANITIZE",
`${provider}/${modelStr}: removed unsupported reasoning_effort`
);
const next: Record<string, unknown> = { ...b };
delete next.reasoning_effort;
if (reasoning) {
const r = { ...reasoning };
delete r.effort;
if (Object.keys(r).length === 0) delete next.reasoning;
else next.reasoning = r;
}
return next;
}
return body;
}
/**
* BaseExecutor - Base class for provider executors.
* Implements the Strategy pattern: subclasses override specific methods
* (buildUrl, buildHeaders, transformRequest, etc.) for each provider.
*/
export class BaseExecutor {
provider: string;
config: ProviderConfig;
constructor(provider: string, config: ProviderConfig) {
this.provider = provider;
this.config = config;
}
getProvider() {
return this.provider;
}
getBaseUrls() {
return this.config.baseUrls || (this.config.baseUrl ? [this.config.baseUrl] : []);
}
getFallbackCount() {
return this.getBaseUrls().length || 1;
}
getTimeoutMs() {
const configured = this.config?.timeoutMs;
if (typeof configured !== "number" || !Number.isFinite(configured)) {
return FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS;
}
return Math.max(1, Math.floor(configured));
}
getCountTokensTimeoutMs() {
return this.getTimeoutMs();
}
buildUrl(
model: string,
stream: boolean,
urlIndex = 0,
credentials: ProviderCredentials | null = null
) {
void model;
void stream;
if (this.provider?.startsWith?.("openai-compatible-")) {
const psd = credentials?.providerSpecificData;
const baseUrl = typeof psd?.baseUrl === "string" ? psd.baseUrl : "https://api.openai.com/v1";
const normalized = baseUrl.replace(/\/$/, "");
// Sanitize custom path: must start with '/', no path traversal, no null bytes
const rawPath = typeof psd?.chatPath === "string" && psd.chatPath ? psd.chatPath : null;
const customPath = rawPath && sanitizePath(rawPath) ? rawPath : null;
if (customPath) return `${normalized}${customPath}`;
const path =
getOpenAICompatibleType(this.provider, psd) === "responses"
? "/responses"
: "/chat/completions";
return `${normalized}${path}`;
}
const baseUrls = this.getBaseUrls();
return baseUrls[urlIndex] || baseUrls[0] || this.config.baseUrl || "";
}
buildHeaders(
credentials: ProviderCredentials,
stream = true,
clientHeaders?: Record<string, string> | null,
model?: string,
health?: Record<string, KeyHealth>
): Record<string, string> {
void clientHeaders;
void model;
const headers: Record<string, string> = {
"Content-Type": "application/json",
...this.config.headers,
};
// Allow per-provider User-Agent override via environment variable.
// Example: CLAUDE_USER_AGENT="my-agent/2.0" overrides the default for the Claude provider.
const providerId = this.config?.id || this.provider;
if (providerId) {
const envKey = `${providerId.toUpperCase().replace(/[^A-Z0-9]/g, "_")}_USER_AGENT`;
const envUA = process.env[envKey]?.trim();
if (envUA) {
setUserAgentHeader(headers, envUA);
}
}
if (credentials.accessToken) {
headers["Authorization"] = `Bearer ${credentials.accessToken}`;
} else if (credentials.apiKey) {
const extraKeys =
(credentials.providerSpecificData?.extraApiKeys as string[] | undefined) ?? [];
const selectedKeyId = (
credentials.providerSpecificData as Record<string, unknown> | undefined
)?.selectedKeyId as string | undefined;
let effectiveKey = credentials.apiKey;
if (extraKeys.length > 0 && credentials.connectionId) {
const resolved = resolveKeyForRequest(
credentials.connectionId,
credentials.apiKey,
extraKeys,
selectedKeyId ?? null
);
effectiveKey = resolved?.key ?? credentials.apiKey;
if (resolved && credentials.providerSpecificData) {
(credentials.providerSpecificData as Record<string, unknown>).selectedKeyId =
resolved.keyId;
}
}
headers["Authorization"] = `Bearer ${effectiveKey}`;
}
headers["Accept"] = stream ? "text/event-stream" : "application/json";
return headers;
}
// Override in subclass for provider-specific transformations
transformRequest(
model: string,
body: unknown,
stream: boolean,
credentials: ProviderCredentials
): unknown {
void model;
void stream;
void credentials;
// Fix #1674: Remove empty string values from optional parameters
// like tool descriptions to avoid upstream validation failures.
if (body && typeof body === "object" && !Array.isArray(body)) {
const cloned = { ...body } as Record<string, unknown>;
if (Array.isArray(cloned.input)) {
cloned.input = sanitizeResponsesInputItems(cloned.input, false);
}
if (Array.isArray(cloned.tools)) {
cloned.tools = cloned.tools.map((tool: unknown) => {
if (tool && typeof tool === "object" && !Array.isArray(tool)) {
const toolRecord = tool as JsonRecord;
const toolFunction = toolRecord.function;
if (toolFunction && typeof toolFunction === "object" && !Array.isArray(toolFunction)) {
const func = { ...(toolFunction as JsonRecord) };
if (func.description === "") delete func.description;
if (typeof func.name !== "string" || func.name.trim() === "") {
func.name = "unnamed_tool";
}
return { ...toolRecord, function: func };
}
}
return tool;
});
}
// Fix #1884: Cursor sends prompt_cache_retention which breaks strict upstream endpoints
delete cloned.prompt_cache_retention;
// Also clean up top level optional fields that commonly cause issues when empty
const optionalKeys = ["user", "stop", "seed", "response_format"];
for (const key of optionalKeys) {
if (cloned[key] === "") delete cloned[key];
}
return cloned;
}
return body;
}
shouldRetry(status: number, urlIndex: number) {
return status === HTTP_STATUS.RATE_LIMITED && urlIndex + 1 < this.getFallbackCount();
}
// Intra-URL retry config: retry same URL before falling back to next node
static readonly RETRY_CONFIG = { maxAttempts: 2, delayMs: 2000 };
// Timeout for receiving the initial upstream response headers. Once the response
// starts streaming, STREAM_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS / Undici bodyTimeout handle stalls.
static FETCH_START_TIMEOUT_MS = FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS;
// Override in subclass for provider-specific refresh
async refreshCredentials(
credentials: ProviderCredentials,
log: ExecutorLog | null
): Promise<Partial<ProviderCredentials> | null> {
void credentials;
void log;
return null;
}
needsRefresh(credentials?: ProviderCredentials | null) {
if (!credentials?.expiresAt) return false;
const expiresAtMs = new Date(credentials.expiresAt).getTime();
// Use the provider-specific lead time (REFRESH_LEAD_MS) so rotating-token
// providers like Codex refresh proactively far ahead of expiry. Keeping the
// refresh_token "warm" prevents Auth0 from marking it as stale and revoking
// the token family on first use after long idle.
const lead = getRefreshLeadMs(this.provider);
return expiresAtMs - Date.now() < lead;
}
parseError(response: Response, bodyText: string) {
return { status: response.status, message: bodyText || `HTTP ${response.status}` };
}
buildCountTokensUrl(model: string, credentials: ProviderCredentials | null = null) {
void model;
void credentials;
const baseUrl = this.buildUrl(model, false, 0, credentials);
if (typeof baseUrl !== "string" || baseUrl.length === 0) return null;
if (this.config?.format !== "claude" || !baseUrl.includes("/messages")) return null;
const [path, query = ""] = baseUrl.split("?");
const normalizedPath = path.endsWith("/messages")
? `${path}/count_tokens`
: `${path}/count_tokens`;
return query ? `${normalizedPath}?${query}` : normalizedPath;
}
async countTokens({ model, body, credentials, signal, log }: CountTokensInput) {
const url = this.buildCountTokensUrl(model, credentials);
if (!url) return null;
const headers = this.buildHeaders(credentials, false);
const requestBody =
body && typeof body === "object"
? {
...body,
model,
}
: { model };
let timeoutId: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | null = null;
let activeSignal = signal || null;
let controller: AbortController | null = null;
const timeoutMs = this.getCountTokensTimeoutMs();
if (timeoutMs > 0) {
controller = new AbortController();
timeoutId = setTimeout(() => controller?.abort(), timeoutMs);
activeSignal = signal ? mergeAbortSignals(signal, controller.signal) : controller.signal;
}
try {
const response = await fetch(url, {
method: "POST",
headers,
body: JSON.stringify(requestBody),
signal: activeSignal || undefined,
});
const text = await response.text();
if (!response.ok) {
const parsedError = this.parseError(response, text);
throw new Error(parsedError.message);
}
const parsed = text ? JSON.parse(text) : {};
const inputTokens = Number(parsed?.input_tokens);
if (!Number.isFinite(inputTokens)) {
throw new Error("Provider count_tokens response missing input_tokens");
}
return { input_tokens: inputTokens, provider: this.provider, source: "provider" };
} catch (error) {
log?.debug?.(
"COUNT_TOKENS",
`${this.provider}/${model} real count unavailable: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`
);
return null;
} finally {
if (timeoutId) clearTimeout(timeoutId);
}
}
async execute(input: ExecuteInput) {
const {
model,
body,
stream,
credentials,
signal,
log,
extendedContext,
upstreamExtraHeaders,
clientHeaders,
skipUpstreamRetry = false,
onCredentialsRefreshed,
} = input;
const fallbackCount = this.getFallbackCount();
let lastError: unknown = null;
let lastStatus = 0;
let activeCredentials = credentials;
// Track per-URL intra-retry attempts to avoid infinite loops
const retryAttemptsByUrl: Record<number, number> = {};
if (this.needsRefresh(credentials)) {
try {
// Fix A: wire onCredentialsRefreshed through runWithOnPersist so it runs
// INSIDE the per-connection mutex inside getAccessToken. Not every
// executor routes through getAccessToken (e.g. github.ts), so use a flag
// to detect whether the persist callback actually fired and fall back to
// post-refresh mutation when it didn't.
let proactivePersistRan = false;
const proactiveOnPersist = onCredentialsRefreshed
? async (refreshResult: Record<string, unknown>) => {
proactivePersistRan = true;
activeCredentials = {
...credentials,
...(refreshResult as Partial<ProviderCredentials>),
};
await onCredentialsRefreshed(refreshResult as Partial<ProviderCredentials>);
}
: null;
const refreshed = await runWithOnPersist(proactiveOnPersist, () =>
this.refreshCredentials(credentials, log || null)
);
if (refreshed && !proactivePersistRan) {
// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// ⚠️ SOURCE OF TRUTH — do not flip the proactive path back to
// "persist expired+inactive". Ask the operator first.
//
// History (do not repeat past regressions):
// - ad3d4b696 (#2718, 2026-05-25): per-connection mutex + onPersist
// wiring so multi-account Codex (rotating refresh tokens) stops
// hitting refresh_token_reused under concurrent load.
// - 0c94c397d (#2743, 2026-05-26): a multi-agent review added a
// `await onCredentialsRefreshed({ testStatus: "expired",
// isActive: false })` here. That BROKE multi-account Codex —
// transient sentinels (refresh_token_reused recoverable via
// rotation map; generic invalid_request blips) were treated as
// terminal, so the proactive path sequentially disabled
// working accounts in the DB before any upstream call confirmed
// the failure. Reverted intentionally.
//
// Contract for the PROACTIVE refresh path:
// - Classify the sentinel ONLY to avoid spreading it into
// activeCredentials (which would send a non-token upstream).
// - DO NOT persist `{ testStatus: "expired", isActive: false }`
// from here. That decision belongs to the REACTIVE path in
// open-sse/handlers/chatCore.ts:~3912, which runs AFTER the
// upstream confirmed the auth failure. By then the rotation
// map (tokenRefresh.ts:~1541) and the DB-staleness check have
// already had their chance to recover the request.
//
// If a future review/agent thinks the expired-flip is "missing"
// here, STOP — flipping it here re-introduces the multi-account
// Codex regression. Discuss with the operator before touching.
// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
if (isUnrecoverableRefreshError(refreshed)) {
const refreshCode = (refreshed as Record<string, unknown>).code;
log?.warn?.(
"TOKEN",
`${this.provider.toUpperCase()} | proactive refresh returned unrecoverable sentinel (code=${String(refreshCode ?? "unknown")}); keeping stale credentials, deferring to reactive path.`
);
// Intentionally NOT spreading the sentinel and NOT persisting
// expired status. The next upstream call either succeeds (rotation
// map / DB-staleness saved us) or fails — chatCore.ts then marks
// the account expired with confidence.
} else {
activeCredentials = {
...credentials,
...refreshed,
};
if (onCredentialsRefreshed) {
await onCredentialsRefreshed(refreshed);
}
}
}
} catch (error) {
// tokenRefresh.ts:1352 documents that onPersist throws are re-thrown so
// the caller is aware of the persistence failure. Honor that contract:
// log at error level (not warn), with sanitized message — and let the
// request continue with stale credentials so the user-visible error
// surfaces upstream rather than being silently absorbed here.
log?.error?.(
"TOKEN",
`Credential refresh failed for ${this.provider}: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`
);
}
}
for (let urlIndex = 0; urlIndex < fallbackCount; urlIndex++) {
const url = this.buildUrl(model, stream, urlIndex, activeCredentials);
const headers = this.buildHeaders(activeCredentials, stream, clientHeaders, model);
applyConfiguredUserAgent(headers, activeCredentials?.providerSpecificData);
const ccRequestDefaults = isClaudeCodeCompatible(this.provider)
? getClaudeCodeCompatibleRequestDefaults(activeCredentials?.providerSpecificData)
: {};
const shouldForwardExtendedContext =
extendedContext &&
modelSupportsContext1mBeta(model) &&
!isClaudeCodeCompatible(this.provider);
const shouldForwardCcCompatibleContext1m =
isClaudeCodeCompatible(this.provider) && ccRequestDefaults.context1m === true;
if (shouldForwardExtendedContext || shouldForwardCcCompatibleContext1m) {
appendAnthropicBetaHeader(headers, CONTEXT_1M_BETA_HEADER);
}
const rawTransformedBody = await this.transformRequest(
model,
body,
stream,
activeCredentials
);
const transformedBody = sanitizeReasoningEffortForProvider(
rawTransformedBody,
this.provider,
model,
log
);
try {
// Only enforce the timeout while waiting for the initial fetch() response.
// Once headers arrive, active streams must not be cut off by total elapsed time;
// post-start stalls are handled separately by STREAM_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS / bodyTimeout.
const fetchStartTimeoutMs = this.getTimeoutMs();
const timeoutController = fetchStartTimeoutMs > 0 ? new AbortController() : null;
let timeoutId: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | null = null;
if (timeoutController) {
timeoutId = setTimeout(() => {
const timeoutError = new Error(
`Fetch timeout after ${fetchStartTimeoutMs}ms on ${url}`
);
timeoutError.name = "TimeoutError";
timeoutController.abort(timeoutError);
}, fetchStartTimeoutMs);
}
const timeoutSignal = timeoutController?.signal ?? null;
const combinedSignal =
signal && timeoutSignal
? mergeAbortSignals(signal, timeoutSignal)
: signal || timeoutSignal;
const isClaudeCodeClient =
clientHeaders?.["x-app"] === "cli" ||
(clientHeaders?.["user-agent"] &&
clientHeaders["user-agent"].toLowerCase().includes("claude-code")) ||
(clientHeaders?.["user-agent"] &&
clientHeaders["user-agent"].toLowerCase().includes("claude-cli"));
// Anthropic's user:sessions:claude_code OAuth scope expects CLI-shaped
// traffic. Apply the cloak whenever we have an OAuth token, regardless
// of upstream client.
const hasClaudeOAuthToken =
typeof activeCredentials?.accessToken === "string" &&
activeCredentials.accessToken.startsWith("sk-ant-oat") &&
!activeCredentials?.apiKey;
if (
this.provider === "claude" &&
(isClaudeCodeClient || hasClaudeOAuthToken) &&
typeof transformedBody === "object" &&
transformedBody !== null
) {
const tb = transformedBody as Record<string, unknown>;
stripProxyToolPrefix(tb);
remapToolNamesInRequest(tb);
obfuscateInBody(tb);
// NOTE (issue #2260): This is the native `claude` provider OAuth path.
// It is intentionally NOT routed through applyCcBridgeTransformPipeline.
// The native OAuth path already prepends its own billing line + sentinel
// (see lines ~744-773 below, dayStamp-based, cc_entrypoint=cli, cch=00000
// placeholder, signed at body level). The CC bridge transforms DSL is
// wired into buildAndSignClaudeCodeRequest (claudeCodeCompatible.ts step 5b)
// which is the anthropic-compatible-cc-* relay path — a different,
// separately classified surface. Do not double-prepend here.
// Real CLI never sets cache_control on tools.
if (Array.isArray(tb.tools)) {
for (const t of tb.tools as Array<Record<string, unknown>>) {
delete t.cache_control;
}
}
// Per-request behavior overrides via custom client headers.
// x-omniroute-effort: low | medium | high | xhigh | max | off
// x-omniroute-thinking: adaptive | off
// A header value applies only when the corresponding body field is
// not already set; "off" force-strips the field.
const headerEffort = (
clientHeaders?.["x-omniroute-effort"] ?? clientHeaders?.["X-OmniRoute-Effort"]
)
?.trim()
.toLowerCase();
const headerThinking = (
clientHeaders?.["x-omniroute-thinking"] ?? clientHeaders?.["X-OmniRoute-Thinking"]
)
?.trim()
.toLowerCase();
let appliedEffort: string | null = null;
let appliedThinking: string | null = null;
if (headerEffort === "off") {
if (tb.output_config && typeof tb.output_config === "object") {
delete (tb.output_config as Record<string, unknown>).effort;
}
appliedEffort = "off";
} else if (headerEffort && ["low", "medium", "high", "xhigh", "max"].includes(headerEffort)) {
const oc =
tb.output_config && typeof tb.output_config === "object"
? (tb.output_config as Record<string, unknown>)
: {};
if (oc.effort === undefined) {
oc.effort = headerEffort;
tb.output_config = oc;
appliedEffort = headerEffort;
}
}
if (headerThinking === "adaptive") {
if (tb.thinking === undefined) {
tb.thinking = { type: "adaptive" };
appliedThinking = "adaptive";
}
if (tb.context_management === undefined) {
tb.context_management = {
edits: [{ type: "clear_thinking_20251015", keep: "all" }],
};
}
} else if (headerThinking === "off") {
delete tb.thinking;
delete tb.context_management;
appliedThinking = "off";
} else if (!headerThinking && !headerEffort) {
// Default CC logic when no override headers are present
const isHaiku = typeof tb.model === "string" && tb.model.includes("haiku");
if (isHaiku) {
// Keep tb.thinking — real Claude Desktop keeps thinking enabled for Haiku
// (issue #2454). Only strip output_config (effort) which Haiku rejects;
// context_management is re-paired with the preserved thinking below.
delete tb.output_config;
delete tb.context_management;
} else if (tb.thinking === undefined && tb.output_config === undefined) {
tb.thinking = { type: "adaptive" };
tb.context_management = {
edits: [{ type: "clear_thinking_20251015", keep: "all" }],
};
tb.output_config = { effort: "high" };
}
}
// Real CLI always pairs context_management with thinking. Mirror
// that invariant so long sessions don't accumulate thinking blocks
// toward the context cap.
if (hasActiveClaudeThinking(tb) && !tb.context_management) {
tb.context_management = {
edits: [{ type: "clear_thinking_20251015", keep: "all" }],
};
}
const seed = activeCredentials?.accessToken || activeCredentials?.apiKey || "anon";
const psd = activeCredentials?.providerSpecificData as
| Record<string, unknown>
| undefined;
let identitySource:
| "upstream-metadata"
| "upstream-header"
| "synthesized"
| "synthesized-cloaked" = "synthesized";
let sessionId: string;
let deviceId: string;
let accountUUID: string;
// For any Claude OAuth request, ignore client-supplied metadata.user_id /
// X-Claude-Code-Session-Id and synthesize per-account: the CC device_id from
// ~/.claude.json is shared across every account on one machine, which lets
// Anthropic correlate accounts behind one OmniRoute.
const cloakIdentity = isClaudeCodeClient || hasClaudeOAuthToken;
const upstreamUserId = cloakIdentity ? null : parseUpstreamMetadataUserId(tb);
if (upstreamUserId) {
sessionId = upstreamUserId.session_id;
deviceId = upstreamUserId.device_id;
accountUUID = upstreamUserId.account_uuid;
identitySource = "upstream-metadata";
} else {
const headerSid = cloakIdentity
? null
: passthroughUpstreamSessionId(
clientHeaders as Record<string, string | undefined> | undefined
);
sessionId = headerSid ?? getSessionId(seed);
deviceId = resolveCliUserID(psd, seed);
accountUUID = resolveAccountUUID(psd, seed, activeCredentials?.accessToken);
identitySource = headerSid
? "upstream-header"
: cloakIdentity
? "synthesized-cloaked"
: "synthesized";
}
// system[0] (billing) and system[1] (sentinel) must not carry
// cache_control — that belongs on upstream prompt blocks at [2..].
const dayStamp = new Date().toISOString().slice(0, 10);
const buildHash = buildHashFor(CLAUDE_CODE_VERSION, dayStamp);
const billingLine = `x-anthropic-billing-header: cc_version=${CLAUDE_CODE_VERSION}.${buildHash}; cc_entrypoint=cli; cch=00000;`;
const SENTINEL = "You are Claude Code, Anthropic's official CLI for Claude.";
const sysBlocks: Array<Record<string, unknown>> = Array.isArray(tb.system)
? (tb.system as Array<Record<string, unknown>>)
: typeof tb.system === "string"
? [{ type: "text", text: tb.system }]
: [];
// Strip any pre-existing billing/sentinel before re-prepending — keeps
// retries idempotent and avoids stacking that breaks prompt-cache prefix
// matching (see issue #1712).
for (let i = sysBlocks.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
const t = sysBlocks[i]?.text;
if (typeof t === "string" && t.startsWith("x-anthropic-billing-header:")) {
sysBlocks.splice(i, 1);
}
}
for (let i = sysBlocks.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
const t = sysBlocks[i]?.text;
if (typeof t === "string" && t.startsWith(SENTINEL)) {
sysBlocks.splice(i, 1);
}
}
sysBlocks.unshift({ type: "text", text: billingLine }, { type: "text", text: SENTINEL });
tb.system = sysBlocks;
// Run the configurable system-transforms pipeline for the native
// `claude` provider (issue #2260 / comment 4459544580). The default
// claude pipeline runs cosmetic ops only (Open WebUI paragraph
// anchors, identity-prefix paragraph drop, ZWJ obfuscation of
// sensitive words). It deliberately does NOT include
// `inject_billing_header` — billing + sentinel are already
// prepended above. Users can extend the pipeline via Settings UI.
{
const transformResult = applySystemTransformPipeline(PROVIDER_CLAUDE, tb);
if (transformResult.appliedOpKinds.length > 0) {
console.log(
`[SystemTransforms] claude-native: ${transformResult.appliedOpKinds.join(", ")}`
);
}
}
if (!tb.metadata || typeof tb.metadata !== "object") tb.metadata = {};
(tb.metadata as Record<string, unknown>).user_id = buildUserIdJson({
deviceId,
accountUUID,
sessionId,
});
// Headers. Accept stays application/json even on streams (Stainless
// convention; SSE decoding is gated on body.stream). anthropic-beta
// is selected per request shape; the full set on a quota probe is
// itself a fingerprint.
const ccHeaders: Record<string, string> = {
Accept: "application/json",
"anthropic-version": "2023-06-01",
"anthropic-beta": selectBetaFlags(tb),
"anthropic-dangerous-direct-browser-access": "true",
"x-app": "cli",
"User-Agent": `claude-cli/${CLAUDE_CODE_VERSION} (external, cli)`,
"X-Stainless-Package-Version": CLAUDE_CODE_STAINLESS_VERSION,
"X-Stainless-Timeout": "600",
"accept-encoding": "gzip, deflate, br, zstd",
connection: "keep-alive",
"x-client-request-id": randomUUID(),
"X-Claude-Code-Session-Id": sessionId,
};
// Drop case variants of the same header name before merging — undici
// would otherwise concatenate them (issue #1454).
const ccKeysLower = new Set(Object.keys(ccHeaders).map((k) => k.toLowerCase()));
for (const key of Object.keys(headers)) {
if (ccKeysLower.has(key.toLowerCase())) delete headers[key];
}
Object.assign(headers, ccHeaders);
delete headers["X-Stainless-Helper-Method"];
// Stainless OS/Arch/Runtime are host-derived (Stainless SDK does the
// same at runtime). Hardcoding them was a unique-per-deployment tell.
headers["X-Stainless-Arch"] = stainlessArch();
headers["X-Stainless-Lang"] = "js";
headers["X-Stainless-OS"] = stainlessOS();
headers["X-Stainless-Runtime"] = "node";
headers["X-Stainless-Runtime-Version"] = stainlessRuntimeVersion();
headers["X-Stainless-Retry-Count"] = "0";
delete headers["X-Stainless-Os"];
const overrideTag =
appliedEffort || appliedThinking
? ` overrides=effort:${appliedEffort ?? "-"},thinking:${appliedThinking ?? "-"}`
: "";
log?.debug?.(
"CLAUDE",
`identity=${identitySource} sid=${sessionId.slice(0, 8)} dev=${deviceId.slice(0, 8)} acct=${accountUUID.slice(0, 8)}${overrideTag}`
);
}
// CLI fingerprint ordering — always-on for native Claude OAuth, opt-in
// for other providers. Header + body field order is itself a fingerprint.
let finalHeaders = headers;
// Strip internal sentinel fields set by remapToolNamesInRequest before
// serializing — Anthropic rejects unknown top-level fields (issue #2260).
delete (transformedBody as Record<string, unknown>)[
"_claudeCodeRequiresLowercaseToolNames"
];
// Guard against orphan tool_use / tool_result pairs. Clients can ship
// truncated histories mid-tool-call which Anthropic rejects with
// `messages.N: tool_use ids were found without tool_result blocks
// immediately after: toolu_...`. fixToolPairs strips orphans, then
// stripTrailingAssistantOrphanToolUse catches the case where the
// request body itself ends on an unmatched assistant(tool_use) —
// invalid for an upstream-send turn since the body must end on a
// user message. Both are idempotent on clean histories.
{
const tb = transformedBody as Record<string, unknown>;
if (Array.isArray(tb?.messages)) {
const fixed = fixToolPairs(tb.messages as Record<string, unknown>[]);
// fixToolAdjacency enforces Claude's strict adjacency rule
// (tool_result must be in immediately next message).
// Only apply for Claude/Claude-compatible — OpenAI allows results
// spread across multiple subsequent messages.
const isClaude = this.provider === "claude" || isClaudeCodeCompatible(this.provider);
// For Claude, fixToolAdjacency may strip tool_use blocks whose
// tool_result isn't in the next message; re-run fixToolPairs to
// drop any tool_result orphaned by that strip (discussion #2410).
const adjacent = isClaude ? fixToolPairs(fixToolAdjacency(fixed)) : fixed;
tb.messages = stripTrailingAssistantOrphanToolUse(adjacent);
}
}
let bodyString = JSON.stringify(transformedBody);
const shouldFingerprint =
isCliCompatEnabled(this.provider) ||
(this.provider === "claude" && (isClaudeCodeClient || hasClaudeOAuthToken));
if (shouldFingerprint) {
const fingerprinted = applyFingerprint(this.provider, headers, transformedBody);
finalHeaders = fingerprinted.headers;
bodyString = fingerprinted.bodyString;
}
// CCH signing — replaces the cch=00000 placeholder in the billing
// header with an xxHash64 integrity token over the serialized body.
if (isClaudeCodeCompatible(this.provider) || this.provider === "claude") {
bodyString = await signRequestBody(bodyString);
}
mergeUpstreamExtraHeaders(finalHeaders, upstreamExtraHeaders);
const fetchOptions: RequestInit = {
method: "POST",
headers: finalHeaders,
body: bodyString,
};
if (combinedSignal) fetchOptions.signal = combinedSignal;
let response;
try {
response = await fetch(url, fetchOptions);
} finally {
if (timeoutId) {
clearTimeout(timeoutId);
timeoutId = null;
}
}
// Intra-URL retry: if 429 and we haven't exhausted per-URL retries, wait and retry the same URL
if (
!skipUpstreamRetry &&
response.status === HTTP_STATUS.RATE_LIMITED &&
(retryAttemptsByUrl[urlIndex] ?? 0) < BaseExecutor.RETRY_CONFIG.maxAttempts
) {
retryAttemptsByUrl[urlIndex] = (retryAttemptsByUrl[urlIndex] ?? 0) + 1;
const attempt = retryAttemptsByUrl[urlIndex];
log?.debug?.(
"RETRY",
`429 intra-retry ${attempt}/${BaseExecutor.RETRY_CONFIG.maxAttempts} on ${url} — waiting ${BaseExecutor.RETRY_CONFIG.delayMs}ms`
);
await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, BaseExecutor.RETRY_CONFIG.delayMs));
urlIndex--; // re-run this urlIndex on the next loop iteration
continue;
}
// T07: Handle 401 authentication errors — log and continue to fallback
if (response.status === 401 && credentials.connectionId && credentials.apiKey) {
log?.warn?.("AUTH", `401 on ${url} - API key may be invalid`);
}
if (!skipUpstreamRetry && this.shouldRetry(response.status, urlIndex)) {
log?.debug?.("RETRY", `${response.status} on ${url}, trying fallback ${urlIndex + 1}`);
lastStatus = response.status;
continue;
}
return { response, url, headers: finalHeaders, transformedBody };
} catch (error) {
// Distinguish timeout errors from other abort errors
const err = error instanceof Error ? error : new Error(String(error));
if (err.name === "TimeoutError") {
log?.warn?.("TIMEOUT", `Fetch timeout after ${this.getTimeoutMs()}ms on ${url}`);
}
lastError = err;
if (!skipUpstreamRetry && urlIndex + 1 < fallbackCount) {
log?.debug?.("RETRY", `Error on ${url}, trying fallback ${urlIndex + 1}`);
continue;
}
throw err;
}
}
throw lastError || new Error(`All ${fallbackCount} URLs failed with status ${lastStatus}`);
}
}
export default BaseExecutor;