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* fix(gemini): preserve structured tool calls for antigravity * fix(gemini): parse prefixed textual tool calls * fix(antigravity): preserve textual SSE tool calls * fix(stream): normalize textual passthrough tool calls * fix(stream): normalize split textual tool calls * fix(stream): suppress malformed textual tool calls * fix(stream): suppress compact malformed tool calls * fix(stream): emit structured textual tool calls * fix(stream): suppress unknown textual tool calls * fix(stream): normalize responses textual tool calls * chore: ignore .claude/settings.local.json (per-user Claude Code permissions) * fix(opencode-go): route qwen3.x via claude messages + repair fixMissingToolResponses for Claude-shape upstreams (#2791) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix: resolve npm install warnings — remove dead deps, relax engine constraint (#2792) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix: register missing web-cookie validators (claude-web, gemini-web, copilot-web, t3-web) (#2793) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix: Error: Unable to inspect existing database #2771 (#2795) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(oauth): repair Google loopback callback flow (#2796) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * feat(logs): add clean history button (#2799) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * [codex] home: restore settings-driven home layout and quota auto-refresh (#2800) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(gemini): emit signaturelessToolCallMode:text for GEMINI format models (#2801) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * feat(modelSpecs): align opencode-go family with upstream provider limits (#2802) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * chore: apply unit test fixes, polyfills, and environment precedence fixes * docs(agents): atualiza fluxos de release e triagem Expande os workflows de release para incluir auditoria de segurança, CHANGELOG completo por commits, quality gate obrigatório, homologação em VPS local, publicação oficial, deploy em Akamai e validação de artefatos. Reorganiza a triagem de features com arquivos permanentes por bucket, suporte a itens em andamento, regra de reclaim após 15 dias e novo tratamento para ideias viáveis catalogadas. Corrige a orientação de revisão de discussões para usar a ordem cronológica real dos comentários e respostas ao identificar a última atividade. * fix(lockout): classify Gemini Antigravity resource exhaustion as quota_exhausted * fix(reasoning): gate replay by interleaved field * docs(rule-16): permit human Co-authored-by, restrict only AI/bot trailers Rule #16 previously banned all `Co-Authored-By` trailers absolutely. That blocked the upstream-port workflows (`/port-upstream-features` and `/port-upstream-issues`), which must credit human upstream PR authors and issue reporters in OmniRoute commits. Refine the rule to ban only AI/bot-attributed trailers (Claude, GPT, Copilot, Bot; anthropic.com / openai.com / bot-owned noreply.github.com emails) while allowing standard human `Co-authored-by: Name <email>` attribution. Sync the rule across the source CLAUDE.md, the E2E shakedown doc note, and 41 i18n translations. * fix(gitlawb): add specialty validators for connection test — bypass /models probe GitLawB OpenGateway API (xiaomi-mimo compatible) does not expose a /models endpoint, causing validateOpenAILikeProvider to 404 on the initial probe and report 'Provider validation endpoint not supported'. Add specialty validators for both gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi that follow the same pattern as the existing xiaomi-mimo validator: skip GET /models, validate directly via POST /chat/completions with a minimal test message. Any 401/403 response means an invalid key; all other responses mean auth is OK. Fixes test-connection returning 404 for GitLawB providers. * test(gitlawb): add 12 unit tests for gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi specialty validators Covers success, auth failure (401/403), non-auth acceptance (400/422/429), network errors, and custom baseUrl overrides for both providers. * feat(gitlawb): serve models from static registry without API-unavailable warning GitLawB's OpenGateway API does not expose a /models endpoint per provider-path. Previously the models route fell through to the generic fallback which returned static catalog models with the misleading 'API unavailable — using local catalog' warning. Now gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi are handled as static model providers (same pattern as reka and qwen OAuth) — models are served from the provider registry without any warning, since all registered models are functional via POST /chat/completions. * refactor(gitlawb): extract shared opengateway validator factory, fix docs path in test - Extract gitlawb/gitlawb-gmi validators into buildOpengatewayValidator factory - Fix dockerignore-docs-coverage test: update stale docs/AUTO-COMBO.md -> docs/routing/AUTO-COMBO.md * fix(reasoning): guard interleaved capability lookup * feat(gitlawb): dynamic model fetch with gmi-cloud fallback Hybrid approach: - gitlawb (xiaomi-mimo): dynamic /models endpoint → 356 models - gitlawb-gmi (gmi-cloud): 404 fallback → local catalog gracefully Mimics Gitlawb/openclaude's model-routing pattern * i18n(pt-BR): complete missing translations and sync with en.json * feat(build): nix multi-OS package manager install (#2806) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(i18n): translate 144 new __MISSING__ pt-BR strings (#2816) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * chore(docs): set coverage gate to 40/40/40/40 in CLAUDE.md Aligns the documented coverage gate with the v3.8.6 release decision (lowered from 75/75/75/70). Matches the threshold already set in package.json by the large feature PRs (planos 11-22). * fix(cli): respect PORT env var in serve command (#2845) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(deepseek-web): return 400 when client sends tools[] - chat.deepseek.com has no tool support (#2854) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(qoder): reject invalid/expired PATs returning Cosy 500 error (#2860) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(cli): register openclaw in tool-detector (#2833) (#2850) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(api): include noAuth providers in /v1/models catalog (#2798) (#2814) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(combo): resolve custom provider targets via combo name (#2778) (#2812) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(translator): strip safety_identifier in openai-responses cleanup (#2770) (#2809) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(quota): honor explicit per-connection preflight opt-out (#2831) (#2844) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(usage): un-invert GitHub Copilot Free/limited quota — limited_user_quotas is remaining (#2876) (#2881) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(nous-research): correct baseUrl to include /chat/completions (#2826) (#2835) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(opencode): qwen3.x max/plus models lack vision support (#2822) (#2836) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(translator): pass-through tool_search built-in tool type (#2766) (#2811) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(github): route claude-opus-4.6 via chat completions (#2821) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * docs(oauth): add Windsurf login fix design (Phase 1 hotfix + Phase 2 Firebase OAuth) Two-phase plan to fix the broken Windsurf OAuth flow: - Phase 1: drop the dead app.devin.ai/editor/signin PKCE path, promote import-token from windsurf.com/show-auth-token as the primary path - Phase 2: port Firebase OAuth + RegisterUser flow from fendoushaonian/WindSurf-gRPC-API for full browser-based automation Spec only - no code changes yet. * docs(plan): Phase 1 windsurf login hotfix implementation plan 10 tasks covering: - TDD assertions for flowType + 410 Gone responses - Provider switch to import_token - Route handler retiring authorize/start-callback-server/poll-callback - OAuthModal UI override - i18n sync - Verification + PR steps * fix(cli): replace cli-table3 with hand-rolled formatter (#2752) (#2813) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(skills): skip interception for unregistered client-native tools (#2815) (#2817) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * feat(sse): add RTK filters for kubectl, docker-build, composer, gh (#2824) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(geminiHelper): support rec.image content shape + warn on dropped remote URLs (refs #2807) (#2855) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(cli): allow nullable/optional apiKey in cliMitmStartSchema (#2857) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(combo): preserve system messages during context handoff summary generation (#2865) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix: wire CLIProxyAPI fallback settings into chatCore routing engine (#2866) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(usage): add opencode quota fetcher (#2852) (#2867) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * feat(claude): default xhigh support for newer Opus models (#2874) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(cli): restore omniroute logs command stream (#2756) (#2810) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(combo): normalize upstream Headers for Node 24 undici interop (#2751) (#2823) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * Rename proxy log Public IP to Client IP (#2880) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(claude): preserve max effort for supported models (#2875) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(oauth): switch windsurf provider to import_token flow The PKCE auth URL targeting app.devin.ai/editor/signin returns 404 post-rebrand. Until Phase 2 ports Firebase OAuth + RegisterUser, the only supported path is import-token via windsurf.com/show-auth-token. - windsurf.ts: drop buildAuthUrl, set flowType=import_token - generateAuthData returns supported:false + helpful error for windsurf/devin-cli - tests: assert flowType + disabled stub * fix(oauth): return 410 Gone for retired windsurf/devin-cli PKCE actions start-callback-server, authorize, and poll-callback (GET + POST) now return 410 Gone with a pointer to /import-token. The 410 short-circuit runs before auth so the response is honest about the action being permanently gone, not gated. Codex PKCE flow unchanged. Tests: 5 new assertions cover GET + POST 410 paths and a Codex regression check. * refactor(oauth): annotate retired PKCE fields in WINDSURF_CONFIG No behaviour change - comment-only update documenting that authorizeUrl, codeChallengeMethod, callbackPort, callbackPath, apiServerUrl, and exchangePath are no longer consumed. Active fields (inferenceUrl, showAuthTokenUrl, firebaseApiKey, ideName) called out separately. * fix(cli,docs): use requireCliToolsAuth in logs route + document OPENCODE quota env Post-merge contract fixes for v3.8.6: - src/app/api/cli-tools/logs/route.ts (#2810) now uses the shared requireCliToolsAuth guard (param renamed req->request) to satisfy the cli-tools-auth-hardening contract test. - Document OMNIROUTE_OPENCODE_QUOTA_URL (#2867) in docs/reference/ENVIRONMENT.md to satisfy the env/docs sync contract. * fix(dashboard): force import-token panel for windsurf/devin-cli Phase 1 hotfix: hide the 'Browser Login' tab and start in Paste API Key mode. Removes windsurf/devin-cli from PKCE_CALLBACK_SERVER_PROVIDERS so no callback server is started for them. Codex still uses the PKCE flow. The 'Get token' link continues to point at windsurf.com/show-auth-token via the existing supportsTokenPaste form copy. * fix(oauth): windsurf import-token mapTokens signature mismatch The route at `src/app/api/oauth/[provider]/[action]/route.ts` invokes `providerData.mapTokens({ accessToken: token })` (object), matching the cursor/kiro signature. The windsurf provider was declared with `mapTokens(token: string)` instead, so the entire object was stored as `accessToken`. When the connection record reached the SQLite layer it crashed with: SQLite3 can only bind numbers, strings, bigints, buffers, and null Fix by aligning windsurf's `mapTokens` signature with the route caller and the cursor/kiro convention. Also dedupe a copy-pasted second `if (action === "import-token")` block in the route handler — the second block was unreachable but identical to the first. Adds two regression tests asserting that `provider.mapTokens({ accessToken })` returns a string `accessToken` for both windsurf and devin-cli, so a future signature drift trips the gate instead of the SQLite bind error in production. * feat(compression): expand pt-BR pack with troglodita rules (15 → 49) (#2818) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(sse): repair RTK engine defaults so dedup and direct calls work (#2825) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(mcp): redirect console.log/warn to stderr in --mcp stdio mode (#2840) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(gemini-cli): prefer real project IDs over default-project (#2841) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(opencode-go): add provider limits quota fetcher (#2861) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * Audit & add web cookie providers: fix 4 missing registry entries + DuckDuckGo (#2862) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(antigravity): harden signatureless tool history (#2878) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix: provider model sync pruning and dynamic antigravity MITM proxy mappings (#2886) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * feat(usage): per-API-key token limits scoped to model/provider/global (#2888) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(audio): build multipart body manually to preserve Content-Type (#2842) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * refactor: remove agent skill documentation files and streamline maintenance workflows * test(stabilization): resolve unit test failures in blackbox-web, schema-coercion, translator-helper-branches, usage-service-hardening, and audio-transcription * fix(security): mitigate Socket.dev supply-chain findings + secrets opt-in + minimal build profile (#2863) (#2871) Two real security gaps closed and four cosmetic Socket.dev fingerprints removed. See docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md for the per-finding maintainer attestation. Real bugs fixed: - cloudSync: HMAC verification of `X-Cloud-Sig` + opt-in `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true` before overwriting `accessToken` / `refreshToken` / `providerSpecificData` from a remote response. Closes the silent-credential-swap surface (a misconfigured or hostile CLOUD_URL could previously replace local tokens unverified). - Zed import: split into 2-step `/discover` + `/import` flow. `/import` now requires `confirmedAccounts: [{ service, account, fingerprint }]` and re-reads the keychain server-side to filter by fingerprint, so a tampered discover response cannot trick the endpoint into saving an unrelated token. Cosmetic Socket.dev mitigations: - runElevatedPowerShell writes the elevated payload to a per-call temp `.ps1` file (mode 0o600) and references it via `-File`. Removes the textbook `-EncodedCommand <base64utf16le>` pattern flagged as malware by Socket's AI classifier. - Maintainer attestation `SECURITY-AUDITOR-NOTE:` blocks added at every flagged call site pointing to `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md`. Build-time hardening: - `OMNIROUTE_BUILD_PROFILE=minimal` (`npm run build:secure`) physically removes the four sensitive modules from the standalone bundle via webpack `NormalModuleReplacementPlugin`. Stubs throw `FeatureDisabledError` at runtime. Intended for the `omniroute-secure` artifact. Tests: - 24 new unit tests in `tests/unit/security/` covering the wrapper builder, HMAC verification (4 cases), credential fingerprint determinism (5 cases), confirmedAccounts validation + fingerprint filtering (6 cases), and the minimal-build stubs (5 cases). Docs: - New `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md` — per-finding attestation. - New `socket.yml` — Socket.dev v2 config pointing at the attestation. - Updated `SECURITY.md` — supply-chain scanner section. - Updated `.env.example` — three new env vars documented. Backwards compatibility: - Cloud sync token overwrite is OFF by default. Users who relied on it must set `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true`. Breaking change documented in CHANGELOG. - Zed import 2-step is the new default; legacy 1-step preserved behind `OMNIROUTE_ZED_IMPORT_LEGACY_ONE_STEP=true` and will be removed in v3.9. Closes #2863 * fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec; doc SHA-256 cache-key rationale (#2894) Two security-scanning findings on release/v3.8.6: - Secret-scanning alert 7 (google_api_key): the windsurf login-fix design spec embedded the literal public Firebase Web API key on two lines. Firebase Web API keys are non-sensitive by design (they identify the project; access is gated by Firebase Security Rules + key restrictions), but the literal trips secret scanning. Redacted to a placeholder; the embedded default still goes through resolvePublicCred per rule #11. - Code-scanning alert 261 (js/insufficient-password-hash): tokenCacheKey() uses SHA-256 to derive an in-memory cache key from the session token, not for password-at-rest storage. Added a comment documenting why CWE-916 KDFs do not apply (false positive). * fix(ci): resolve release/v3.8.6 gate failures (docs-sync, any-budget, pack-artifact) (#2895) * fix(ci): resolve release/v3.8.6 gate failures (docs-sync, any-budget, pack-artifact) Three CI gates failed on release/v3.8.6 (run 26630300877): - docs-sync: CHANGELOG had a spurious "## [3.8.6-patch]" section above "## [3.8.6]", so the latest release no longer matched package.json (3.8.6) and the 41 i18n CHANGELOG mirrors were flagged as missing that section. Fold the lone #2752 entry into [3.8.6] and drop the patch heading. - any-budget:t11: open-sse/handlers/chatCore.ts regressed to 1 explicit `any` (budget 0). Type the persist callback arg as Record<string, unknown>, which matches runWithOnPersist's RefreshPersistFn contract exactly. - pack-artifact: open-sse/utils/setupPolyfill.ts ships via package.json "files" (bin/omniroute.mjs imports it at startup) but was missing from the pack policy allowlist. Allow it and add a regression test. * fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec Redact the literal public Firebase Web API key (secret-scanning #7) to a placeholder, mirroring the redaction on release/v3.8.6 (PR #2894) and the windsurf fix branch. Non-sensitive public Web key; trips secret scanning. * feat(combo): Zero-Latency Combos (Hedging, Proactive Compression, Predictive TTFT) (#2868) * feat(combo): implement zero-latency combo optimizations (hedging, proactive compression, predictive TTFT) * fix(combo): fix predictive TTFT skip logic and unhandled promise rejections --------- Co-authored-by: Automation <automation@omniroute> * feat: implement automated skill workflows and update system configuration and validation schemas * test: eliminate dynamic cast warnings in cloud-sync unit test * test: isolate services-branch-hardening database directory to avoid concurrency issues * feat(providers): add 7 new web-cookie providers + research catalog + discovery tool New providers: - huggingchat: free LLM chat via huggingface.co/chat (no subscription) - phind: free dev-focused AI chat via phind.com/api/agent - poe-web: multi-model chat via poe.com GraphQL (p-b cookie) - venice-web: privacy-focused AI chat via venice.ai (session cookie) - v0-vercel-web: Vercel v0 code gen via v0.dev (session cookie) - kimi-web: Moonshot Kimi chat via kimi.moonshot.cn (session cookie) - doubao-web: ByteDance Doubao chat via doubao.com (session cookie) Additional: - Research catalog: docs/research/UNLIMITED_LLM_ACCESS.md - Discovery tool design + stub: src/lib/discovery/ + migration 073 - Unit tests: 33 tests for all 7 providers - Shared helpers consolidated in error.ts (slop cleanup) - All registered in WEB_COOKIE_PROVIDERS + providerRegistry + webSessionCredentials Closes #2885 * fix(typecheck): resolve typecheck errors in combo spec and compression modules * feat(api,oauth): add `agy` (Antigravity CLI) standalone provider with CLI token import (#2899) Add a standalone OAuth provider `agy` (Antigravity CLI) next to gemini-cli/antigravity. It reuses the antigravity inference backend (identical Google client_id + daily-cloudcode-pa.googleapis.com endpoint, executor and token-refresh) but ships its own model catalog — including the Claude models the backend exposes (claude-opus-4-6-thinking, claude-sonnet-4-6) — its own account pool, and four ways to connect: - token-file import (paste/upload the agy oauth token JSON) - auto-detect a local CLI login (~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/antigravity-oauth-token) - browser OAuth (via the shared OAuthModal Google loopback flow) - bulk / ZIP import New routes: POST /api/providers/agy-auth/{import,import-bulk,zip-extract,apply-local}. Catalog pinned from the live :fetchAvailableModels endpoint. Docs (openapi.yaml, ENVIRONMENT.md, .env.example, CHANGELOG) updated; new unit tests for registration, the token parser, and route auth-hardening. * fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec (#2896) Redact the literal public Firebase Web API key (secret-scanning #7) to a placeholder. Firebase Web API keys are non-sensitive by design but the literal trips GitHub secret scanning. Mirrors the redaction landed on release/v3.8.6 (PR #2894). Embedded default still flows through resolvePublicCred (rule #11). * Pr 2871 (#2897) * fix(security): mitigate Socket.dev supply-chain findings + secrets opt-in + minimal build profile (#2863) Two real security gaps closed and four cosmetic Socket.dev fingerprints removed. See docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md for the per-finding maintainer attestation. Real bugs fixed: - cloudSync: HMAC verification of `X-Cloud-Sig` + opt-in `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true` before overwriting `accessToken` / `refreshToken` / `providerSpecificData` from a remote response. Closes the silent-credential-swap surface (a misconfigured or hostile CLOUD_URL could previously replace local tokens unverified). - Zed import: split into 2-step `/discover` + `/import` flow. `/import` now requires `confirmedAccounts: [{ service, account, fingerprint }]` and re-reads the keychain server-side to filter by fingerprint, so a tampered discover response cannot trick the endpoint into saving an unrelated token. Cosmetic Socket.dev mitigations: - runElevatedPowerShell writes the elevated payload to a per-call temp `.ps1` file (mode 0o600) and references it via `-File`. Removes the textbook `-EncodedCommand <base64utf16le>` pattern flagged as malware by Socket's AI classifier. - Maintainer attestation `SECURITY-AUDITOR-NOTE:` blocks added at every flagged call site pointing to `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md`. Build-time hardening: - `OMNIROUTE_BUILD_PROFILE=minimal` (`npm run build:secure`) physically removes the four sensitive modules from the standalone bundle via webpack `NormalModuleReplacementPlugin`. Stubs throw `FeatureDisabledError` at runtime. Intended for the `omniroute-secure` artifact. Tests: - 24 new unit tests in `tests/unit/security/` covering the wrapper builder, HMAC verification (4 cases), credential fingerprint determinism (5 cases), confirmedAccounts validation + fingerprint filtering (6 cases), and the minimal-build stubs (5 cases). Docs: - New `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md` — per-finding attestation. - New `socket.yml` — Socket.dev v2 config pointing at the attestation. - Updated `SECURITY.md` — supply-chain scanner section. - Updated `.env.example` — three new env vars documented. Backwards compatibility: - Cloud sync token overwrite is OFF by default. Users who relied on it must set `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true`. Breaking change documented in CHANGELOG. - Zed import 2-step is the new default; legacy 1-step preserved behind `OMNIROUTE_ZED_IMPORT_LEGACY_ONE_STEP=true` and will be removed in v3.9. Closes #2863 * feat: implement automated skill workflows and update system configuration and validation schemas * test: eliminate dynamic cast warnings in cloud-sync unit test * test: isolate services-branch-hardening database directory to avoid concurrency issues * chore(docs): refresh generated docs collection index Update the generated Fumadocs browser collection mapping to keep documentation imports in sync with the current docs structure. * docs: update generated browser docs collection manifest Refresh the generated Fumadocs browser collection mapping so the docs site can resolve the current documentation files correctly. --------- Co-authored-by: OpenClaw <openclaw@kuzhomesrv.local> Co-authored-by: Dmitry Kuznetsov <139351986+dmitry@users.noreply.local> Co-authored-by: KuzyaBot <kuzya@local> Co-authored-by: JeferssonLemes <jeferssondev@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Paijo <14921983+oyi77@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Markus Hartung <mail@hartmark.se> Co-authored-by: akarray <akarray@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Apostol Apostolov <theapoapostolov@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Hernan Javier Ardila Sanchez <hjasgr@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Dmitry Kuznetsov <dmitry@kuznetsov.me> Co-authored-by: Nikolay Alafuzov <alafuzov_nn@rusklimat.ru> Co-authored-by: oyi77 <oyi77@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Ronaldo Davi <alltomatos@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: levonk <277861+levonk@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Lenine Júnior <lenine@engrene.com.br> Co-authored-by: Annas Alghoffar <aag.annas@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Tushar Agarwal <76201310+Tushar49@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: GreatLiu <eurasiaxz@qq.com> Co-authored-by: yuna amelia <230527278+yunaamelia@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Randi <55005611+rdself@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Container <78986709+disonjer@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: nickwizard <35692452+nickwizard@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Rajvardhan Patil <rajvardhanpatil7890@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Raxxoor <manker_lol@hotmail.com> Co-authored-by: Muhammad Mugni Hadi <mugnimaestra3@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: mi <123757457+soyelmismo@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Automation <automation@omniroute>
1113 lines
45 KiB
TypeScript
1113 lines
45 KiB
TypeScript
import { HTTP_STATUS, FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS } from "../config/constants.ts";
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import { applyFingerprint, isCliCompatEnabled } from "../config/cliFingerprints.ts";
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import { supportsClaudeMaxEffort, supportsXHighEffort } from "../config/providerModels.ts";
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import {
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getRotatingApiKey,
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getValidApiKey,
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resolveKeyForRequest,
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} from "../services/apiKeyRotator.ts";
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import type { KeyHealth } from "../services/apiKeyRotator.ts";
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import { getOpenAICompatibleType, isClaudeCodeCompatible } from "../services/provider.ts";
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import {
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runWithOnPersist,
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getRefreshLeadMs,
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isUnrecoverableRefreshError,
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} from "../services/tokenRefresh.ts";
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import type { ProviderRequestDefaults } from "../services/providerRequestDefaults.ts";
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import { signRequestBody } from "../services/claudeCodeCCH.ts";
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import {
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appendAnthropicBetaHeader,
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CONTEXT_1M_BETA_HEADER,
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modelSupportsContext1mBeta,
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} from "../services/claudeCodeCompatible.ts";
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import { getClaudeCodeCompatibleRequestDefaults } from "@/lib/providers/requestDefaults";
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import { remapToolNamesInRequest } from "../services/claudeCodeToolRemapper.ts";
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import { obfuscateInBody } from "../services/claudeCodeObfuscation.ts";
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import { sanitizeResponsesInputItems } from "../services/responsesInputSanitizer.ts";
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import { applySystemTransformPipeline, PROVIDER_CLAUDE } from "../services/systemTransforms.ts";
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import {
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fixToolPairs,
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fixToolAdjacency,
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stripTrailingAssistantOrphanToolUse,
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} from "../services/contextManager.ts";
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import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
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import {
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CLAUDE_CODE_VERSION,
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CLAUDE_CODE_STAINLESS_VERSION,
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buildHashFor,
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buildUserIdJson,
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getSessionId,
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parseUpstreamMetadataUserId,
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passthroughUpstreamSessionId,
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resolveAccountUUID,
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resolveCliUserID,
|
|
selectBetaFlags,
|
|
stainlessArch,
|
|
stainlessOS,
|
|
stainlessRuntimeVersion,
|
|
stripProxyToolPrefix,
|
|
} from "./claudeIdentity.ts";
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Sanitizes a custom API path to prevent path traversal attacks.
|
|
* Valid paths must start with '/', contain no '..' segments,
|
|
* no null bytes, and be reasonable in length.
|
|
*/
|
|
function sanitizePath(path: string): boolean {
|
|
if (typeof path !== "string") return false;
|
|
if (!path.startsWith("/")) return false;
|
|
if (path.includes("\0")) return false; // null byte
|
|
if (path.includes("..")) return false; // path traversal
|
|
if (path.length > 512) return false; // sanity limit
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type JsonRecord = Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
|
|
export type ProviderConfig = {
|
|
id?: string;
|
|
baseUrl?: string;
|
|
baseUrls?: string[];
|
|
responsesBaseUrl?: string;
|
|
chatPath?: string;
|
|
clientVersion?: string;
|
|
clientId?: string;
|
|
clientSecret?: string;
|
|
tokenUrl?: string;
|
|
refreshUrl?: string;
|
|
authUrl?: string;
|
|
headers?: Record<string, string>;
|
|
requestDefaults?: ProviderRequestDefaults;
|
|
timeoutMs?: number;
|
|
format?: string;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
export type ProviderCredentials = {
|
|
accessToken?: string;
|
|
refreshToken?: string;
|
|
apiKey?: string;
|
|
projectId?: string | null;
|
|
expiresAt?: string;
|
|
connectionId?: string; // T07: used for API key rotation index
|
|
maxConcurrent?: number | null;
|
|
providerSpecificData?: JsonRecord;
|
|
requestEndpointPath?: string;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
export type ExecutorLog = {
|
|
debug?: (tag: string, message: string) => void;
|
|
info?: (tag: string, message: string) => void;
|
|
warn?: (tag: string, message: string) => void;
|
|
error?: (tag: string, message: string) => void;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
export type ExecuteInput = {
|
|
model: string;
|
|
body: unknown;
|
|
stream: boolean;
|
|
credentials: ProviderCredentials;
|
|
signal?: AbortSignal | null;
|
|
log?: ExecutorLog | null;
|
|
extendedContext?: boolean;
|
|
/** Merged after auth + CLI fingerprint headers (values override same-named defaults). */
|
|
upstreamExtraHeaders?: Record<string, string> | null;
|
|
/** Original client request headers (read-only). Executors may forward select headers upstream. */
|
|
clientHeaders?: Record<string, string> | null;
|
|
/** Callback to persist tokens that are proactively refreshed during execution.
|
|
* Accepts a partial credentials patch (e.g. `{ accessToken, refreshToken }` or
|
|
* `{ testStatus: "expired", isActive: false }`); the caller merges into the
|
|
* stored connection row. */
|
|
onCredentialsRefreshed?: (
|
|
newCredentials: Partial<ProviderCredentials> & Record<string, unknown>
|
|
) => Promise<void> | void;
|
|
/** When true, skip the intra-URL 429 retry in execute() so the caller handles fallback. */
|
|
skipUpstreamRetry?: boolean;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
export type CountTokensInput = {
|
|
body: Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
credentials: ProviderCredentials;
|
|
log?: ExecutorLog | null;
|
|
model: string;
|
|
signal?: AbortSignal | null;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/** Apply model-level extra upstream headers (e.g. Authentication, X-Custom-Auth). */
|
|
export function mergeUpstreamExtraHeaders(
|
|
headers: Record<string, string>,
|
|
extra?: Record<string, string> | null
|
|
): void {
|
|
if (!extra) return;
|
|
for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(extra)) {
|
|
if (typeof k === "string" && k.length > 0 && typeof v === "string") {
|
|
if (k.toLowerCase() === "user-agent") {
|
|
setUserAgentHeader(headers, v);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
headers[k] = v;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export function getCustomUserAgent(providerSpecificData?: JsonRecord | null): string | null {
|
|
const customUserAgent =
|
|
typeof providerSpecificData?.customUserAgent === "string"
|
|
? providerSpecificData.customUserAgent.trim()
|
|
: "";
|
|
return customUserAgent || null;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export function setUserAgentHeader(headers: Record<string, string>, userAgent: string): void {
|
|
headers["User-Agent"] = userAgent;
|
|
if ("user-agent" in headers) {
|
|
headers["user-agent"] = userAgent;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export function applyConfiguredUserAgent(
|
|
headers: Record<string, string>,
|
|
providerSpecificData?: JsonRecord | null
|
|
): void {
|
|
const customUserAgent = getCustomUserAgent(providerSpecificData);
|
|
if (customUserAgent) {
|
|
setUserAgentHeader(headers, customUserAgent);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export function mergeAbortSignals(primary: AbortSignal, secondary: AbortSignal): AbortSignal {
|
|
const controller = new AbortController();
|
|
|
|
const abortFrom = (source: AbortSignal) => {
|
|
if (!controller.signal.aborted) {
|
|
controller.abort(source.reason);
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
if (primary.aborted) {
|
|
abortFrom(primary);
|
|
return controller.signal;
|
|
}
|
|
if (secondary.aborted) {
|
|
abortFrom(secondary);
|
|
return controller.signal;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
primary.addEventListener("abort", () => abortFrom(primary), { once: true });
|
|
secondary.addEventListener("abort", () => abortFrom(secondary), { once: true });
|
|
return controller.signal;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function hasActiveClaudeThinking(body: Record<string, unknown>): boolean {
|
|
const thinking = body.thinking as Record<string, unknown> | undefined;
|
|
return thinking?.type === "enabled" || thinking?.type === "adaptive";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Sanitize reasoning_effort for providers that don't accept all values.
|
|
*
|
|
* The claude→openai translator may emit reasoning_effort=max/xhigh when the
|
|
* client sends output_config.effort=max on a Claude-shape request. Combined with
|
|
* runtime alias remapping (e.g. claude-opus-4-6 → mimo/mimo-v2.5-pro), this
|
|
* routes xhigh to OpenAI-shape providers that don't accept the value:
|
|
*
|
|
* xiaomi-mimo : low|medium|high only — 400 literal_error on xhigh
|
|
* mistral : devstral models reject reasoning_effort entirely
|
|
* github : claude/haiku/oswe models reject reasoning_effort entirely
|
|
*
|
|
* Each rejection burns a combo fallback attempt before reaching a working
|
|
* provider. Apply provider-aware sanitation here (after transformRequest, so
|
|
* reintroductions by per-provider transforms are also caught) before fetch.
|
|
* xhigh support is registry-gated: models that genuinely support xhigh pass
|
|
* through unchanged, and Claude models default to xhigh support unless marked
|
|
* as legacy unsupported entries. max support is Claude/CC-compatible only and
|
|
* intentionally separate: older Opus/Sonnet models may support max even when
|
|
* they do not support xhigh.
|
|
*/
|
|
const MISTRAL_NO_REASONING_EFFORT_PATTERN = /devstral/i;
|
|
const GITHUB_NO_REASONING_EFFORT_PATTERN = /(claude|haiku|oswe)/i;
|
|
|
|
function supportsMaxEffortForProvider(provider: string, model: string): boolean {
|
|
return (
|
|
(provider === PROVIDER_CLAUDE || isClaudeCodeCompatible(provider)) &&
|
|
supportsClaudeMaxEffort(model)
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export function sanitizeReasoningEffortForProvider(
|
|
body: unknown,
|
|
provider: string,
|
|
model: string | undefined,
|
|
log?: { info?: (tag: string, msg: string) => void } | null
|
|
): unknown {
|
|
if (!body || typeof body !== "object" || Array.isArray(body)) return body;
|
|
const b = body as Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
const reasoning =
|
|
b.reasoning && typeof b.reasoning === "object" && !Array.isArray(b.reasoning)
|
|
? (b.reasoning as Record<string, unknown>)
|
|
: null;
|
|
const hasTopLevelReasoningEffort = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(b, "reasoning_effort");
|
|
const effort = b.reasoning_effort ?? reasoning?.effort;
|
|
if (effort === undefined) return body;
|
|
const effortStr = typeof effort === "string" ? effort.toLowerCase() : "";
|
|
const modelStr = model || "";
|
|
|
|
const shouldDowngradeXHigh = effortStr === "xhigh" && !supportsXHighEffort(provider, modelStr);
|
|
const shouldDowngradeMax =
|
|
effortStr === "max" && !supportsMaxEffortForProvider(provider, modelStr);
|
|
|
|
if (shouldDowngradeXHigh || shouldDowngradeMax) {
|
|
log?.info?.(
|
|
"REASONING_SANITIZE",
|
|
`${provider}/${modelStr}: downgraded reasoning_effort ${effortStr} → high`
|
|
);
|
|
const next: Record<string, unknown> = { ...b };
|
|
if (hasTopLevelReasoningEffort) {
|
|
next.reasoning_effort = "high";
|
|
}
|
|
if (reasoning) {
|
|
next.reasoning = { ...reasoning, effort: "high" };
|
|
}
|
|
return next;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const rejecting =
|
|
(provider === "mistral" && MISTRAL_NO_REASONING_EFFORT_PATTERN.test(modelStr)) ||
|
|
(provider === "github" && GITHUB_NO_REASONING_EFFORT_PATTERN.test(modelStr));
|
|
if (rejecting) {
|
|
log?.info?.(
|
|
"REASONING_SANITIZE",
|
|
`${provider}/${modelStr}: removed unsupported reasoning_effort`
|
|
);
|
|
const next: Record<string, unknown> = { ...b };
|
|
delete next.reasoning_effort;
|
|
if (reasoning) {
|
|
const r = { ...reasoning };
|
|
delete r.effort;
|
|
if (Object.keys(r).length === 0) delete next.reasoning;
|
|
else next.reasoning = r;
|
|
}
|
|
return next;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return body;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* BaseExecutor - Base class for provider executors.
|
|
* Implements the Strategy pattern: subclasses override specific methods
|
|
* (buildUrl, buildHeaders, transformRequest, etc.) for each provider.
|
|
*/
|
|
export class BaseExecutor {
|
|
provider: string;
|
|
config: ProviderConfig;
|
|
|
|
constructor(provider: string, config: ProviderConfig) {
|
|
this.provider = provider;
|
|
this.config = config;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
getProvider() {
|
|
return this.provider;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
getBaseUrls() {
|
|
return this.config.baseUrls || (this.config.baseUrl ? [this.config.baseUrl] : []);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
getFallbackCount() {
|
|
return this.getBaseUrls().length || 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
getTimeoutMs() {
|
|
const configured = this.config?.timeoutMs;
|
|
if (typeof configured !== "number" || !Number.isFinite(configured)) {
|
|
return FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS;
|
|
}
|
|
return Math.max(1, Math.floor(configured));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
getCountTokensTimeoutMs() {
|
|
return this.getTimeoutMs();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
buildUrl(
|
|
model: string,
|
|
stream: boolean,
|
|
urlIndex = 0,
|
|
credentials: ProviderCredentials | null = null
|
|
) {
|
|
void model;
|
|
void stream;
|
|
if (this.provider?.startsWith?.("openai-compatible-")) {
|
|
const psd = credentials?.providerSpecificData;
|
|
const baseUrl = typeof psd?.baseUrl === "string" ? psd.baseUrl : "https://api.openai.com/v1";
|
|
const normalized = baseUrl.replace(/\/$/, "");
|
|
// Sanitize custom path: must start with '/', no path traversal, no null bytes
|
|
const rawPath = typeof psd?.chatPath === "string" && psd.chatPath ? psd.chatPath : null;
|
|
const customPath = rawPath && sanitizePath(rawPath) ? rawPath : null;
|
|
if (customPath) return `${normalized}${customPath}`;
|
|
const path =
|
|
getOpenAICompatibleType(this.provider, psd) === "responses"
|
|
? "/responses"
|
|
: "/chat/completions";
|
|
return `${normalized}${path}`;
|
|
}
|
|
const baseUrls = this.getBaseUrls();
|
|
return baseUrls[urlIndex] || baseUrls[0] || this.config.baseUrl || "";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
buildHeaders(
|
|
credentials: ProviderCredentials,
|
|
stream = true,
|
|
clientHeaders?: Record<string, string> | null,
|
|
model?: string,
|
|
health?: Record<string, KeyHealth>
|
|
): Record<string, string> {
|
|
void clientHeaders;
|
|
void model;
|
|
const headers: Record<string, string> = {
|
|
"Content-Type": "application/json",
|
|
...this.config.headers,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
// Allow per-provider User-Agent override via environment variable.
|
|
// Example: CLAUDE_USER_AGENT="my-agent/2.0" overrides the default for the Claude provider.
|
|
const providerId = this.config?.id || this.provider;
|
|
if (providerId) {
|
|
const envKey = `${providerId.toUpperCase().replace(/[^A-Z0-9]/g, "_")}_USER_AGENT`;
|
|
const envUA = process.env[envKey]?.trim();
|
|
if (envUA) {
|
|
setUserAgentHeader(headers, envUA);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (credentials.accessToken) {
|
|
headers["Authorization"] = `Bearer ${credentials.accessToken}`;
|
|
} else if (credentials.apiKey) {
|
|
const extraKeys =
|
|
(credentials.providerSpecificData?.extraApiKeys as string[] | undefined) ?? [];
|
|
const selectedKeyId = (
|
|
credentials.providerSpecificData as Record<string, unknown> | undefined
|
|
)?.selectedKeyId as string | undefined;
|
|
let effectiveKey = credentials.apiKey;
|
|
if (extraKeys.length > 0 && credentials.connectionId) {
|
|
const resolved = resolveKeyForRequest(
|
|
credentials.connectionId,
|
|
credentials.apiKey,
|
|
extraKeys,
|
|
selectedKeyId ?? null
|
|
);
|
|
effectiveKey = resolved?.key ?? credentials.apiKey;
|
|
if (resolved && credentials.providerSpecificData) {
|
|
(credentials.providerSpecificData as Record<string, unknown>).selectedKeyId =
|
|
resolved.keyId;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
headers["Authorization"] = `Bearer ${effectiveKey}`;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
headers["Accept"] = stream ? "text/event-stream" : "application/json";
|
|
|
|
return headers;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Override in subclass for provider-specific transformations
|
|
transformRequest(
|
|
model: string,
|
|
body: unknown,
|
|
stream: boolean,
|
|
credentials: ProviderCredentials
|
|
): unknown {
|
|
void model;
|
|
void stream;
|
|
void credentials;
|
|
|
|
// Fix #1674: Remove empty string values from optional parameters
|
|
// like tool descriptions to avoid upstream validation failures.
|
|
if (body && typeof body === "object" && !Array.isArray(body)) {
|
|
const cloned = { ...body } as Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
|
|
if (Array.isArray(cloned.input)) {
|
|
cloned.input = sanitizeResponsesInputItems(cloned.input, false);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (Array.isArray(cloned.tools)) {
|
|
cloned.tools = cloned.tools.map((tool: unknown) => {
|
|
if (tool && typeof tool === "object" && !Array.isArray(tool)) {
|
|
const toolRecord = tool as JsonRecord;
|
|
const toolFunction = toolRecord.function;
|
|
if (toolFunction && typeof toolFunction === "object" && !Array.isArray(toolFunction)) {
|
|
const func = { ...(toolFunction as JsonRecord) };
|
|
if (func.description === "") delete func.description;
|
|
if (typeof func.name !== "string" || func.name.trim() === "") {
|
|
func.name = "unnamed_tool";
|
|
}
|
|
return { ...toolRecord, function: func };
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return tool;
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Fix #1884: Cursor sends prompt_cache_retention which breaks strict upstream endpoints
|
|
delete cloned.prompt_cache_retention;
|
|
|
|
// Also clean up top level optional fields that commonly cause issues when empty
|
|
const optionalKeys = ["user", "stop", "seed", "response_format"];
|
|
for (const key of optionalKeys) {
|
|
if (cloned[key] === "") delete cloned[key];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return cloned;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return body;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
shouldRetry(status: number, urlIndex: number) {
|
|
return status === HTTP_STATUS.RATE_LIMITED && urlIndex + 1 < this.getFallbackCount();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Intra-URL retry config: retry same URL before falling back to next node
|
|
static readonly RETRY_CONFIG = { maxAttempts: 2, delayMs: 2000 };
|
|
// Timeout for receiving the initial upstream response headers. Once the response
|
|
// starts streaming, STREAM_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS / Undici bodyTimeout handle stalls.
|
|
static FETCH_START_TIMEOUT_MS = FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS;
|
|
|
|
// Override in subclass for provider-specific refresh
|
|
async refreshCredentials(
|
|
credentials: ProviderCredentials,
|
|
log: ExecutorLog | null
|
|
): Promise<Partial<ProviderCredentials> | null> {
|
|
void credentials;
|
|
void log;
|
|
return null;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
needsRefresh(credentials?: ProviderCredentials | null) {
|
|
if (!credentials?.expiresAt) return false;
|
|
const expiresAtMs = new Date(credentials.expiresAt).getTime();
|
|
// Use the provider-specific lead time (REFRESH_LEAD_MS) so rotating-token
|
|
// providers like Codex refresh proactively far ahead of expiry. Keeping the
|
|
// refresh_token "warm" prevents Auth0 from marking it as stale and revoking
|
|
// the token family on first use after long idle.
|
|
const lead = getRefreshLeadMs(this.provider);
|
|
return expiresAtMs - Date.now() < lead;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
parseError(response: Response, bodyText: string) {
|
|
return { status: response.status, message: bodyText || `HTTP ${response.status}` };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
buildCountTokensUrl(model: string, credentials: ProviderCredentials | null = null) {
|
|
void model;
|
|
void credentials;
|
|
const baseUrl = this.buildUrl(model, false, 0, credentials);
|
|
if (typeof baseUrl !== "string" || baseUrl.length === 0) return null;
|
|
if (this.config?.format !== "claude" || !baseUrl.includes("/messages")) return null;
|
|
|
|
const [path, query = ""] = baseUrl.split("?");
|
|
const normalizedPath = path.endsWith("/messages")
|
|
? `${path}/count_tokens`
|
|
: `${path}/count_tokens`;
|
|
return query ? `${normalizedPath}?${query}` : normalizedPath;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async countTokens({ model, body, credentials, signal, log }: CountTokensInput) {
|
|
const url = this.buildCountTokensUrl(model, credentials);
|
|
if (!url) return null;
|
|
|
|
const headers = this.buildHeaders(credentials, false);
|
|
const requestBody =
|
|
body && typeof body === "object"
|
|
? {
|
|
...body,
|
|
model,
|
|
}
|
|
: { model };
|
|
|
|
let timeoutId: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | null = null;
|
|
let activeSignal = signal || null;
|
|
let controller: AbortController | null = null;
|
|
const timeoutMs = this.getCountTokensTimeoutMs();
|
|
|
|
if (timeoutMs > 0) {
|
|
controller = new AbortController();
|
|
timeoutId = setTimeout(() => controller?.abort(), timeoutMs);
|
|
activeSignal = signal ? mergeAbortSignals(signal, controller.signal) : controller.signal;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
const response = await fetch(url, {
|
|
method: "POST",
|
|
headers,
|
|
body: JSON.stringify(requestBody),
|
|
signal: activeSignal || undefined,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
const text = await response.text();
|
|
if (!response.ok) {
|
|
const parsedError = this.parseError(response, text);
|
|
throw new Error(parsedError.message);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const parsed = text ? JSON.parse(text) : {};
|
|
const inputTokens = Number(parsed?.input_tokens);
|
|
if (!Number.isFinite(inputTokens)) {
|
|
throw new Error("Provider count_tokens response missing input_tokens");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return { input_tokens: inputTokens, provider: this.provider, source: "provider" };
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
log?.debug?.(
|
|
"COUNT_TOKENS",
|
|
`${this.provider}/${model} real count unavailable: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`
|
|
);
|
|
return null;
|
|
} finally {
|
|
if (timeoutId) clearTimeout(timeoutId);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async execute(input: ExecuteInput) {
|
|
const {
|
|
model,
|
|
body,
|
|
stream,
|
|
credentials,
|
|
signal,
|
|
log,
|
|
extendedContext,
|
|
upstreamExtraHeaders,
|
|
clientHeaders,
|
|
skipUpstreamRetry = false,
|
|
onCredentialsRefreshed,
|
|
} = input;
|
|
const fallbackCount = this.getFallbackCount();
|
|
let lastError: unknown = null;
|
|
let lastStatus = 0;
|
|
let activeCredentials = credentials;
|
|
// Track per-URL intra-retry attempts to avoid infinite loops
|
|
const retryAttemptsByUrl: Record<number, number> = {};
|
|
|
|
if (this.needsRefresh(credentials)) {
|
|
try {
|
|
// Fix A: wire onCredentialsRefreshed through runWithOnPersist so it runs
|
|
// INSIDE the per-connection mutex inside getAccessToken. Not every
|
|
// executor routes through getAccessToken (e.g. github.ts), so use a flag
|
|
// to detect whether the persist callback actually fired and fall back to
|
|
// post-refresh mutation when it didn't.
|
|
let proactivePersistRan = false;
|
|
const proactiveOnPersist = onCredentialsRefreshed
|
|
? async (refreshResult: Record<string, unknown>) => {
|
|
proactivePersistRan = true;
|
|
activeCredentials = {
|
|
...credentials,
|
|
...(refreshResult as Partial<ProviderCredentials>),
|
|
};
|
|
await onCredentialsRefreshed(refreshResult as Partial<ProviderCredentials>);
|
|
}
|
|
: null;
|
|
|
|
const refreshed = await runWithOnPersist(proactiveOnPersist, () =>
|
|
this.refreshCredentials(credentials, log || null)
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
if (refreshed && !proactivePersistRan) {
|
|
// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
// ⚠️ SOURCE OF TRUTH — do not flip the proactive path back to
|
|
// "persist expired+inactive". Ask the operator first.
|
|
//
|
|
// History (do not repeat past regressions):
|
|
// - ad3d4b696 (#2718, 2026-05-25): per-connection mutex + onPersist
|
|
// wiring so multi-account Codex (rotating refresh tokens) stops
|
|
// hitting refresh_token_reused under concurrent load.
|
|
// - 0c94c397d (#2743, 2026-05-26): a multi-agent review added a
|
|
// `await onCredentialsRefreshed({ testStatus: "expired",
|
|
// isActive: false })` here. That BROKE multi-account Codex —
|
|
// transient sentinels (refresh_token_reused recoverable via
|
|
// rotation map; generic invalid_request blips) were treated as
|
|
// terminal, so the proactive path sequentially disabled
|
|
// working accounts in the DB before any upstream call confirmed
|
|
// the failure. Reverted intentionally.
|
|
//
|
|
// Contract for the PROACTIVE refresh path:
|
|
// - Classify the sentinel ONLY to avoid spreading it into
|
|
// activeCredentials (which would send a non-token upstream).
|
|
// - DO NOT persist `{ testStatus: "expired", isActive: false }`
|
|
// from here. That decision belongs to the REACTIVE path in
|
|
// open-sse/handlers/chatCore.ts:~3912, which runs AFTER the
|
|
// upstream confirmed the auth failure. By then the rotation
|
|
// map (tokenRefresh.ts:~1541) and the DB-staleness check have
|
|
// already had their chance to recover the request.
|
|
//
|
|
// If a future review/agent thinks the expired-flip is "missing"
|
|
// here, STOP — flipping it here re-introduces the multi-account
|
|
// Codex regression. Discuss with the operator before touching.
|
|
// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
if (isUnrecoverableRefreshError(refreshed)) {
|
|
const refreshCode = (refreshed as Record<string, unknown>).code;
|
|
log?.warn?.(
|
|
"TOKEN",
|
|
`${this.provider.toUpperCase()} | proactive refresh returned unrecoverable sentinel (code=${String(refreshCode ?? "unknown")}); keeping stale credentials, deferring to reactive path.`
|
|
);
|
|
// Intentionally NOT spreading the sentinel and NOT persisting
|
|
// expired status. The next upstream call either succeeds (rotation
|
|
// map / DB-staleness saved us) or fails — chatCore.ts then marks
|
|
// the account expired with confidence.
|
|
} else {
|
|
activeCredentials = {
|
|
...credentials,
|
|
...refreshed,
|
|
};
|
|
if (onCredentialsRefreshed) {
|
|
await onCredentialsRefreshed(refreshed);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
// tokenRefresh.ts:1352 documents that onPersist throws are re-thrown so
|
|
// the caller is aware of the persistence failure. Honor that contract:
|
|
// log at error level (not warn), with sanitized message — and let the
|
|
// request continue with stale credentials so the user-visible error
|
|
// surfaces upstream rather than being silently absorbed here.
|
|
log?.error?.(
|
|
"TOKEN",
|
|
`Credential refresh failed for ${this.provider}: ${error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error)}`
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (let urlIndex = 0; urlIndex < fallbackCount; urlIndex++) {
|
|
const url = this.buildUrl(model, stream, urlIndex, activeCredentials);
|
|
const headers = this.buildHeaders(activeCredentials, stream, clientHeaders, model);
|
|
applyConfiguredUserAgent(headers, activeCredentials?.providerSpecificData);
|
|
|
|
const ccRequestDefaults = isClaudeCodeCompatible(this.provider)
|
|
? getClaudeCodeCompatibleRequestDefaults(activeCredentials?.providerSpecificData)
|
|
: {};
|
|
const shouldForwardExtendedContext =
|
|
extendedContext &&
|
|
modelSupportsContext1mBeta(model) &&
|
|
!isClaudeCodeCompatible(this.provider);
|
|
const shouldForwardCcCompatibleContext1m =
|
|
isClaudeCodeCompatible(this.provider) && ccRequestDefaults.context1m === true;
|
|
if (shouldForwardExtendedContext || shouldForwardCcCompatibleContext1m) {
|
|
appendAnthropicBetaHeader(headers, CONTEXT_1M_BETA_HEADER);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const rawTransformedBody = await this.transformRequest(
|
|
model,
|
|
body,
|
|
stream,
|
|
activeCredentials
|
|
);
|
|
const transformedBody = sanitizeReasoningEffortForProvider(
|
|
rawTransformedBody,
|
|
this.provider,
|
|
model,
|
|
log
|
|
);
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
// Only enforce the timeout while waiting for the initial fetch() response.
|
|
// Once headers arrive, active streams must not be cut off by total elapsed time;
|
|
// post-start stalls are handled separately by STREAM_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS / bodyTimeout.
|
|
const fetchStartTimeoutMs = this.getTimeoutMs();
|
|
const timeoutController = fetchStartTimeoutMs > 0 ? new AbortController() : null;
|
|
let timeoutId: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | null = null;
|
|
if (timeoutController) {
|
|
timeoutId = setTimeout(() => {
|
|
const timeoutError = new Error(
|
|
`Fetch timeout after ${fetchStartTimeoutMs}ms on ${url}`
|
|
);
|
|
timeoutError.name = "TimeoutError";
|
|
timeoutController.abort(timeoutError);
|
|
}, fetchStartTimeoutMs);
|
|
}
|
|
const timeoutSignal = timeoutController?.signal ?? null;
|
|
const combinedSignal =
|
|
signal && timeoutSignal
|
|
? mergeAbortSignals(signal, timeoutSignal)
|
|
: signal || timeoutSignal;
|
|
|
|
const isClaudeCodeClient =
|
|
clientHeaders?.["x-app"] === "cli" ||
|
|
(clientHeaders?.["user-agent"] &&
|
|
clientHeaders["user-agent"].toLowerCase().includes("claude-code")) ||
|
|
(clientHeaders?.["user-agent"] &&
|
|
clientHeaders["user-agent"].toLowerCase().includes("claude-cli"));
|
|
|
|
// Anthropic's user:sessions:claude_code OAuth scope expects CLI-shaped
|
|
// traffic. Apply the cloak whenever we have an OAuth token, regardless
|
|
// of upstream client.
|
|
const hasClaudeOAuthToken =
|
|
typeof activeCredentials?.accessToken === "string" &&
|
|
activeCredentials.accessToken.startsWith("sk-ant-oat") &&
|
|
!activeCredentials?.apiKey;
|
|
|
|
if (
|
|
this.provider === "claude" &&
|
|
(isClaudeCodeClient || hasClaudeOAuthToken) &&
|
|
typeof transformedBody === "object" &&
|
|
transformedBody !== null
|
|
) {
|
|
const tb = transformedBody as Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
|
|
stripProxyToolPrefix(tb);
|
|
remapToolNamesInRequest(tb);
|
|
obfuscateInBody(tb);
|
|
|
|
// NOTE (issue #2260): This is the native `claude` provider OAuth path.
|
|
// It is intentionally NOT routed through applyCcBridgeTransformPipeline.
|
|
// The native OAuth path already prepends its own billing line + sentinel
|
|
// (see lines ~744-773 below, dayStamp-based, cc_entrypoint=cli, cch=00000
|
|
// placeholder, signed at body level). The CC bridge transforms DSL is
|
|
// wired into buildAndSignClaudeCodeRequest (claudeCodeCompatible.ts step 5b)
|
|
// which is the anthropic-compatible-cc-* relay path — a different,
|
|
// separately classified surface. Do not double-prepend here.
|
|
|
|
// Real CLI never sets cache_control on tools.
|
|
if (Array.isArray(tb.tools)) {
|
|
for (const t of tb.tools as Array<Record<string, unknown>>) {
|
|
delete t.cache_control;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Per-request behavior overrides via custom client headers.
|
|
// x-omniroute-effort: low | medium | high | xhigh | max | off
|
|
// x-omniroute-thinking: adaptive | off
|
|
// A header value applies only when the corresponding body field is
|
|
// not already set; "off" force-strips the field.
|
|
const headerEffort = (
|
|
clientHeaders?.["x-omniroute-effort"] ?? clientHeaders?.["X-OmniRoute-Effort"]
|
|
)
|
|
?.trim()
|
|
.toLowerCase();
|
|
const headerThinking = (
|
|
clientHeaders?.["x-omniroute-thinking"] ?? clientHeaders?.["X-OmniRoute-Thinking"]
|
|
)
|
|
?.trim()
|
|
.toLowerCase();
|
|
let appliedEffort: string | null = null;
|
|
let appliedThinking: string | null = null;
|
|
|
|
if (headerEffort === "off") {
|
|
if (tb.output_config && typeof tb.output_config === "object") {
|
|
delete (tb.output_config as Record<string, unknown>).effort;
|
|
}
|
|
appliedEffort = "off";
|
|
} else if (headerEffort && ["low", "medium", "high", "xhigh", "max"].includes(headerEffort)) {
|
|
const oc =
|
|
tb.output_config && typeof tb.output_config === "object"
|
|
? (tb.output_config as Record<string, unknown>)
|
|
: {};
|
|
if (oc.effort === undefined) {
|
|
oc.effort = headerEffort;
|
|
tb.output_config = oc;
|
|
appliedEffort = headerEffort;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (headerThinking === "adaptive") {
|
|
if (tb.thinking === undefined) {
|
|
tb.thinking = { type: "adaptive" };
|
|
appliedThinking = "adaptive";
|
|
}
|
|
if (tb.context_management === undefined) {
|
|
tb.context_management = {
|
|
edits: [{ type: "clear_thinking_20251015", keep: "all" }],
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (headerThinking === "off") {
|
|
delete tb.thinking;
|
|
delete tb.context_management;
|
|
appliedThinking = "off";
|
|
} else if (!headerThinking && !headerEffort) {
|
|
// Default CC logic when no override headers are present
|
|
const isHaiku = typeof tb.model === "string" && tb.model.includes("haiku");
|
|
if (isHaiku) {
|
|
// Keep tb.thinking — real Claude Desktop keeps thinking enabled for Haiku
|
|
// (issue #2454). Only strip output_config (effort) which Haiku rejects;
|
|
// context_management is re-paired with the preserved thinking below.
|
|
delete tb.output_config;
|
|
delete tb.context_management;
|
|
} else if (tb.thinking === undefined && tb.output_config === undefined) {
|
|
tb.thinking = { type: "adaptive" };
|
|
tb.context_management = {
|
|
edits: [{ type: "clear_thinking_20251015", keep: "all" }],
|
|
};
|
|
tb.output_config = { effort: "high" };
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Real CLI always pairs context_management with thinking. Mirror
|
|
// that invariant so long sessions don't accumulate thinking blocks
|
|
// toward the context cap.
|
|
if (hasActiveClaudeThinking(tb) && !tb.context_management) {
|
|
tb.context_management = {
|
|
edits: [{ type: "clear_thinking_20251015", keep: "all" }],
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const seed = activeCredentials?.accessToken || activeCredentials?.apiKey || "anon";
|
|
const psd = activeCredentials?.providerSpecificData as
|
|
| Record<string, unknown>
|
|
| undefined;
|
|
|
|
let identitySource:
|
|
| "upstream-metadata"
|
|
| "upstream-header"
|
|
| "synthesized"
|
|
| "synthesized-cloaked" = "synthesized";
|
|
let sessionId: string;
|
|
let deviceId: string;
|
|
let accountUUID: string;
|
|
|
|
// For any Claude OAuth request, ignore client-supplied metadata.user_id /
|
|
// X-Claude-Code-Session-Id and synthesize per-account: the CC device_id from
|
|
// ~/.claude.json is shared across every account on one machine, which lets
|
|
// Anthropic correlate accounts behind one OmniRoute.
|
|
const cloakIdentity = isClaudeCodeClient || hasClaudeOAuthToken;
|
|
const upstreamUserId = cloakIdentity ? null : parseUpstreamMetadataUserId(tb);
|
|
if (upstreamUserId) {
|
|
sessionId = upstreamUserId.session_id;
|
|
deviceId = upstreamUserId.device_id;
|
|
accountUUID = upstreamUserId.account_uuid;
|
|
identitySource = "upstream-metadata";
|
|
} else {
|
|
const headerSid = cloakIdentity
|
|
? null
|
|
: passthroughUpstreamSessionId(
|
|
clientHeaders as Record<string, string | undefined> | undefined
|
|
);
|
|
sessionId = headerSid ?? getSessionId(seed);
|
|
deviceId = resolveCliUserID(psd, seed);
|
|
accountUUID = resolveAccountUUID(psd, seed, activeCredentials?.accessToken);
|
|
identitySource = headerSid
|
|
? "upstream-header"
|
|
: cloakIdentity
|
|
? "synthesized-cloaked"
|
|
: "synthesized";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// system[0] (billing) and system[1] (sentinel) must not carry
|
|
// cache_control — that belongs on upstream prompt blocks at [2..].
|
|
const dayStamp = new Date().toISOString().slice(0, 10);
|
|
const buildHash = buildHashFor(CLAUDE_CODE_VERSION, dayStamp);
|
|
const billingLine = `x-anthropic-billing-header: cc_version=${CLAUDE_CODE_VERSION}.${buildHash}; cc_entrypoint=cli; cch=00000;`;
|
|
const SENTINEL = "You are Claude Code, Anthropic's official CLI for Claude.";
|
|
|
|
const sysBlocks: Array<Record<string, unknown>> = Array.isArray(tb.system)
|
|
? (tb.system as Array<Record<string, unknown>>)
|
|
: typeof tb.system === "string"
|
|
? [{ type: "text", text: tb.system }]
|
|
: [];
|
|
|
|
// Strip any pre-existing billing/sentinel before re-prepending — keeps
|
|
// retries idempotent and avoids stacking that breaks prompt-cache prefix
|
|
// matching (see issue #1712).
|
|
for (let i = sysBlocks.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
|
|
const t = sysBlocks[i]?.text;
|
|
if (typeof t === "string" && t.startsWith("x-anthropic-billing-header:")) {
|
|
sysBlocks.splice(i, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
for (let i = sysBlocks.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
|
|
const t = sysBlocks[i]?.text;
|
|
if (typeof t === "string" && t.startsWith(SENTINEL)) {
|
|
sysBlocks.splice(i, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
sysBlocks.unshift({ type: "text", text: billingLine }, { type: "text", text: SENTINEL });
|
|
tb.system = sysBlocks;
|
|
|
|
// Run the configurable system-transforms pipeline for the native
|
|
// `claude` provider (issue #2260 / comment 4459544580). The default
|
|
// claude pipeline runs cosmetic ops only (Open WebUI paragraph
|
|
// anchors, identity-prefix paragraph drop, ZWJ obfuscation of
|
|
// sensitive words). It deliberately does NOT include
|
|
// `inject_billing_header` — billing + sentinel are already
|
|
// prepended above. Users can extend the pipeline via Settings UI.
|
|
{
|
|
const transformResult = applySystemTransformPipeline(PROVIDER_CLAUDE, tb);
|
|
if (transformResult.appliedOpKinds.length > 0) {
|
|
console.log(
|
|
`[SystemTransforms] claude-native: ${transformResult.appliedOpKinds.join(", ")}`
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!tb.metadata || typeof tb.metadata !== "object") tb.metadata = {};
|
|
(tb.metadata as Record<string, unknown>).user_id = buildUserIdJson({
|
|
deviceId,
|
|
accountUUID,
|
|
sessionId,
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
// Headers. Accept stays application/json even on streams (Stainless
|
|
// convention; SSE decoding is gated on body.stream). anthropic-beta
|
|
// is selected per request shape; the full set on a quota probe is
|
|
// itself a fingerprint.
|
|
const ccHeaders: Record<string, string> = {
|
|
Accept: "application/json",
|
|
"anthropic-version": "2023-06-01",
|
|
"anthropic-beta": selectBetaFlags(tb),
|
|
"anthropic-dangerous-direct-browser-access": "true",
|
|
"x-app": "cli",
|
|
"User-Agent": `claude-cli/${CLAUDE_CODE_VERSION} (external, cli)`,
|
|
"X-Stainless-Package-Version": CLAUDE_CODE_STAINLESS_VERSION,
|
|
"X-Stainless-Timeout": "600",
|
|
"accept-encoding": "gzip, deflate, br, zstd",
|
|
connection: "keep-alive",
|
|
"x-client-request-id": randomUUID(),
|
|
"X-Claude-Code-Session-Id": sessionId,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
// Drop case variants of the same header name before merging — undici
|
|
// would otherwise concatenate them (issue #1454).
|
|
const ccKeysLower = new Set(Object.keys(ccHeaders).map((k) => k.toLowerCase()));
|
|
for (const key of Object.keys(headers)) {
|
|
if (ccKeysLower.has(key.toLowerCase())) delete headers[key];
|
|
}
|
|
Object.assign(headers, ccHeaders);
|
|
delete headers["X-Stainless-Helper-Method"];
|
|
|
|
// Stainless OS/Arch/Runtime are host-derived (Stainless SDK does the
|
|
// same at runtime). Hardcoding them was a unique-per-deployment tell.
|
|
headers["X-Stainless-Arch"] = stainlessArch();
|
|
headers["X-Stainless-Lang"] = "js";
|
|
headers["X-Stainless-OS"] = stainlessOS();
|
|
headers["X-Stainless-Runtime"] = "node";
|
|
headers["X-Stainless-Runtime-Version"] = stainlessRuntimeVersion();
|
|
headers["X-Stainless-Retry-Count"] = "0";
|
|
delete headers["X-Stainless-Os"];
|
|
|
|
const overrideTag =
|
|
appliedEffort || appliedThinking
|
|
? ` overrides=effort:${appliedEffort ?? "-"},thinking:${appliedThinking ?? "-"}`
|
|
: "";
|
|
log?.debug?.(
|
|
"CLAUDE",
|
|
`identity=${identitySource} sid=${sessionId.slice(0, 8)} dev=${deviceId.slice(0, 8)} acct=${accountUUID.slice(0, 8)}${overrideTag}`
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// CLI fingerprint ordering — always-on for native Claude OAuth, opt-in
|
|
// for other providers. Header + body field order is itself a fingerprint.
|
|
let finalHeaders = headers;
|
|
// Strip internal sentinel fields set by remapToolNamesInRequest before
|
|
// serializing — Anthropic rejects unknown top-level fields (issue #2260).
|
|
delete (transformedBody as Record<string, unknown>)[
|
|
"_claudeCodeRequiresLowercaseToolNames"
|
|
];
|
|
// Guard against orphan tool_use / tool_result pairs. Clients can ship
|
|
// truncated histories mid-tool-call which Anthropic rejects with
|
|
// `messages.N: tool_use ids were found without tool_result blocks
|
|
// immediately after: toolu_...`. fixToolPairs strips orphans, then
|
|
// stripTrailingAssistantOrphanToolUse catches the case where the
|
|
// request body itself ends on an unmatched assistant(tool_use) —
|
|
// invalid for an upstream-send turn since the body must end on a
|
|
// user message. Both are idempotent on clean histories.
|
|
{
|
|
const tb = transformedBody as Record<string, unknown>;
|
|
if (Array.isArray(tb?.messages)) {
|
|
const fixed = fixToolPairs(tb.messages as Record<string, unknown>[]);
|
|
// fixToolAdjacency enforces Claude's strict adjacency rule
|
|
// (tool_result must be in immediately next message).
|
|
// Only apply for Claude/Claude-compatible — OpenAI allows results
|
|
// spread across multiple subsequent messages.
|
|
const isClaude = this.provider === "claude" || isClaudeCodeCompatible(this.provider);
|
|
// For Claude, fixToolAdjacency may strip tool_use blocks whose
|
|
// tool_result isn't in the next message; re-run fixToolPairs to
|
|
// drop any tool_result orphaned by that strip (discussion #2410).
|
|
const adjacent = isClaude ? fixToolPairs(fixToolAdjacency(fixed)) : fixed;
|
|
tb.messages = stripTrailingAssistantOrphanToolUse(adjacent);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
let bodyString = JSON.stringify(transformedBody);
|
|
|
|
const shouldFingerprint =
|
|
isCliCompatEnabled(this.provider) ||
|
|
(this.provider === "claude" && (isClaudeCodeClient || hasClaudeOAuthToken));
|
|
if (shouldFingerprint) {
|
|
const fingerprinted = applyFingerprint(this.provider, headers, transformedBody);
|
|
finalHeaders = fingerprinted.headers;
|
|
bodyString = fingerprinted.bodyString;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// CCH signing — replaces the cch=00000 placeholder in the billing
|
|
// header with an xxHash64 integrity token over the serialized body.
|
|
if (isClaudeCodeCompatible(this.provider) || this.provider === "claude") {
|
|
bodyString = await signRequestBody(bodyString);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mergeUpstreamExtraHeaders(finalHeaders, upstreamExtraHeaders);
|
|
|
|
const fetchOptions: RequestInit = {
|
|
method: "POST",
|
|
headers: finalHeaders,
|
|
body: bodyString,
|
|
};
|
|
if (combinedSignal) fetchOptions.signal = combinedSignal;
|
|
|
|
let response;
|
|
try {
|
|
response = await fetch(url, fetchOptions);
|
|
} finally {
|
|
if (timeoutId) {
|
|
clearTimeout(timeoutId);
|
|
timeoutId = null;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Intra-URL retry: if 429 and we haven't exhausted per-URL retries, wait and retry the same URL
|
|
if (
|
|
!skipUpstreamRetry &&
|
|
response.status === HTTP_STATUS.RATE_LIMITED &&
|
|
(retryAttemptsByUrl[urlIndex] ?? 0) < BaseExecutor.RETRY_CONFIG.maxAttempts
|
|
) {
|
|
retryAttemptsByUrl[urlIndex] = (retryAttemptsByUrl[urlIndex] ?? 0) + 1;
|
|
const attempt = retryAttemptsByUrl[urlIndex];
|
|
log?.debug?.(
|
|
"RETRY",
|
|
`429 intra-retry ${attempt}/${BaseExecutor.RETRY_CONFIG.maxAttempts} on ${url} — waiting ${BaseExecutor.RETRY_CONFIG.delayMs}ms`
|
|
);
|
|
await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, BaseExecutor.RETRY_CONFIG.delayMs));
|
|
urlIndex--; // re-run this urlIndex on the next loop iteration
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// T07: Handle 401 authentication errors — log and continue to fallback
|
|
if (response.status === 401 && credentials.connectionId && credentials.apiKey) {
|
|
log?.warn?.("AUTH", `401 on ${url} - API key may be invalid`);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!skipUpstreamRetry && this.shouldRetry(response.status, urlIndex)) {
|
|
log?.debug?.("RETRY", `${response.status} on ${url}, trying fallback ${urlIndex + 1}`);
|
|
lastStatus = response.status;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return { response, url, headers: finalHeaders, transformedBody };
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
// Distinguish timeout errors from other abort errors
|
|
const err = error instanceof Error ? error : new Error(String(error));
|
|
if (err.name === "TimeoutError") {
|
|
log?.warn?.("TIMEOUT", `Fetch timeout after ${this.getTimeoutMs()}ms on ${url}`);
|
|
}
|
|
lastError = err;
|
|
if (!skipUpstreamRetry && urlIndex + 1 < fallbackCount) {
|
|
log?.debug?.("RETRY", `Error on ${url}, trying fallback ${urlIndex + 1}`);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
throw err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
throw lastError || new Error(`All ${fallbackCount} URLs failed with status ${lastStatus}`);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export default BaseExecutor;
|