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* fix(gemini): preserve structured tool calls for antigravity * fix(gemini): parse prefixed textual tool calls * fix(antigravity): preserve textual SSE tool calls * fix(stream): normalize textual passthrough tool calls * fix(stream): normalize split textual tool calls * fix(stream): suppress malformed textual tool calls * fix(stream): suppress compact malformed tool calls * fix(stream): emit structured textual tool calls * fix(stream): suppress unknown textual tool calls * fix(stream): normalize responses textual tool calls * chore: ignore .claude/settings.local.json (per-user Claude Code permissions) * fix(opencode-go): route qwen3.x via claude messages + repair fixMissingToolResponses for Claude-shape upstreams (#2791) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix: resolve npm install warnings — remove dead deps, relax engine constraint (#2792) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix: register missing web-cookie validators (claude-web, gemini-web, copilot-web, t3-web) (#2793) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix: Error: Unable to inspect existing database #2771 (#2795) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(oauth): repair Google loopback callback flow (#2796) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * feat(logs): add clean history button (#2799) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * [codex] home: restore settings-driven home layout and quota auto-refresh (#2800) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(gemini): emit signaturelessToolCallMode:text for GEMINI format models (#2801) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * feat(modelSpecs): align opencode-go family with upstream provider limits (#2802) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * chore: apply unit test fixes, polyfills, and environment precedence fixes * docs(agents): atualiza fluxos de release e triagem Expande os workflows de release para incluir auditoria de segurança, CHANGELOG completo por commits, quality gate obrigatório, homologação em VPS local, publicação oficial, deploy em Akamai e validação de artefatos. Reorganiza a triagem de features com arquivos permanentes por bucket, suporte a itens em andamento, regra de reclaim após 15 dias e novo tratamento para ideias viáveis catalogadas. Corrige a orientação de revisão de discussões para usar a ordem cronológica real dos comentários e respostas ao identificar a última atividade. * fix(lockout): classify Gemini Antigravity resource exhaustion as quota_exhausted * fix(reasoning): gate replay by interleaved field * docs(rule-16): permit human Co-authored-by, restrict only AI/bot trailers Rule #16 previously banned all `Co-Authored-By` trailers absolutely. That blocked the upstream-port workflows (`/port-upstream-features` and `/port-upstream-issues`), which must credit human upstream PR authors and issue reporters in OmniRoute commits. Refine the rule to ban only AI/bot-attributed trailers (Claude, GPT, Copilot, Bot; anthropic.com / openai.com / bot-owned noreply.github.com emails) while allowing standard human `Co-authored-by: Name <email>` attribution. Sync the rule across the source CLAUDE.md, the E2E shakedown doc note, and 41 i18n translations. * fix(gitlawb): add specialty validators for connection test — bypass /models probe GitLawB OpenGateway API (xiaomi-mimo compatible) does not expose a /models endpoint, causing validateOpenAILikeProvider to 404 on the initial probe and report 'Provider validation endpoint not supported'. Add specialty validators for both gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi that follow the same pattern as the existing xiaomi-mimo validator: skip GET /models, validate directly via POST /chat/completions with a minimal test message. Any 401/403 response means an invalid key; all other responses mean auth is OK. Fixes test-connection returning 404 for GitLawB providers. * test(gitlawb): add 12 unit tests for gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi specialty validators Covers success, auth failure (401/403), non-auth acceptance (400/422/429), network errors, and custom baseUrl overrides for both providers. * feat(gitlawb): serve models from static registry without API-unavailable warning GitLawB's OpenGateway API does not expose a /models endpoint per provider-path. Previously the models route fell through to the generic fallback which returned static catalog models with the misleading 'API unavailable — using local catalog' warning. Now gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi are handled as static model providers (same pattern as reka and qwen OAuth) — models are served from the provider registry without any warning, since all registered models are functional via POST /chat/completions. * refactor(gitlawb): extract shared opengateway validator factory, fix docs path in test - Extract gitlawb/gitlawb-gmi validators into buildOpengatewayValidator factory - Fix dockerignore-docs-coverage test: update stale docs/AUTO-COMBO.md -> docs/routing/AUTO-COMBO.md * fix(reasoning): guard interleaved capability lookup * feat(gitlawb): dynamic model fetch with gmi-cloud fallback Hybrid approach: - gitlawb (xiaomi-mimo): dynamic /models endpoint → 356 models - gitlawb-gmi (gmi-cloud): 404 fallback → local catalog gracefully Mimics Gitlawb/openclaude's model-routing pattern * i18n(pt-BR): complete missing translations and sync with en.json * feat(build): nix multi-OS package manager install (#2806) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(i18n): translate 144 new __MISSING__ pt-BR strings (#2816) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * chore(docs): set coverage gate to 40/40/40/40 in CLAUDE.md Aligns the documented coverage gate with the v3.8.6 release decision (lowered from 75/75/75/70). Matches the threshold already set in package.json by the large feature PRs (planos 11-22). * fix(cli): respect PORT env var in serve command (#2845) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(deepseek-web): return 400 when client sends tools[] - chat.deepseek.com has no tool support (#2854) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(qoder): reject invalid/expired PATs returning Cosy 500 error (#2860) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(cli): register openclaw in tool-detector (#2833) (#2850) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(api): include noAuth providers in /v1/models catalog (#2798) (#2814) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(combo): resolve custom provider targets via combo name (#2778) (#2812) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(translator): strip safety_identifier in openai-responses cleanup (#2770) (#2809) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(quota): honor explicit per-connection preflight opt-out (#2831) (#2844) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(usage): un-invert GitHub Copilot Free/limited quota — limited_user_quotas is remaining (#2876) (#2881) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(nous-research): correct baseUrl to include /chat/completions (#2826) (#2835) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(opencode): qwen3.x max/plus models lack vision support (#2822) (#2836) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(translator): pass-through tool_search built-in tool type (#2766) (#2811) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(github): route claude-opus-4.6 via chat completions (#2821) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * docs(oauth): add Windsurf login fix design (Phase 1 hotfix + Phase 2 Firebase OAuth) Two-phase plan to fix the broken Windsurf OAuth flow: - Phase 1: drop the dead app.devin.ai/editor/signin PKCE path, promote import-token from windsurf.com/show-auth-token as the primary path - Phase 2: port Firebase OAuth + RegisterUser flow from fendoushaonian/WindSurf-gRPC-API for full browser-based automation Spec only - no code changes yet. * docs(plan): Phase 1 windsurf login hotfix implementation plan 10 tasks covering: - TDD assertions for flowType + 410 Gone responses - Provider switch to import_token - Route handler retiring authorize/start-callback-server/poll-callback - OAuthModal UI override - i18n sync - Verification + PR steps * fix(cli): replace cli-table3 with hand-rolled formatter (#2752) (#2813) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(skills): skip interception for unregistered client-native tools (#2815) (#2817) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * feat(sse): add RTK filters for kubectl, docker-build, composer, gh (#2824) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(geminiHelper): support rec.image content shape + warn on dropped remote URLs (refs #2807) (#2855) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(cli): allow nullable/optional apiKey in cliMitmStartSchema (#2857) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(combo): preserve system messages during context handoff summary generation (#2865) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix: wire CLIProxyAPI fallback settings into chatCore routing engine (#2866) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(usage): add opencode quota fetcher (#2852) (#2867) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * feat(claude): default xhigh support for newer Opus models (#2874) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(cli): restore omniroute logs command stream (#2756) (#2810) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(combo): normalize upstream Headers for Node 24 undici interop (#2751) (#2823) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * Rename proxy log Public IP to Client IP (#2880) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(claude): preserve max effort for supported models (#2875) Integrated into release/v3.8.6. * fix(oauth): switch windsurf provider to import_token flow The PKCE auth URL targeting app.devin.ai/editor/signin returns 404 post-rebrand. Until Phase 2 ports Firebase OAuth + RegisterUser, the only supported path is import-token via windsurf.com/show-auth-token. - windsurf.ts: drop buildAuthUrl, set flowType=import_token - generateAuthData returns supported:false + helpful error for windsurf/devin-cli - tests: assert flowType + disabled stub * fix(oauth): return 410 Gone for retired windsurf/devin-cli PKCE actions start-callback-server, authorize, and poll-callback (GET + POST) now return 410 Gone with a pointer to /import-token. The 410 short-circuit runs before auth so the response is honest about the action being permanently gone, not gated. Codex PKCE flow unchanged. Tests: 5 new assertions cover GET + POST 410 paths and a Codex regression check. * refactor(oauth): annotate retired PKCE fields in WINDSURF_CONFIG No behaviour change - comment-only update documenting that authorizeUrl, codeChallengeMethod, callbackPort, callbackPath, apiServerUrl, and exchangePath are no longer consumed. Active fields (inferenceUrl, showAuthTokenUrl, firebaseApiKey, ideName) called out separately. * fix(cli,docs): use requireCliToolsAuth in logs route + document OPENCODE quota env Post-merge contract fixes for v3.8.6: - src/app/api/cli-tools/logs/route.ts (#2810) now uses the shared requireCliToolsAuth guard (param renamed req->request) to satisfy the cli-tools-auth-hardening contract test. - Document OMNIROUTE_OPENCODE_QUOTA_URL (#2867) in docs/reference/ENVIRONMENT.md to satisfy the env/docs sync contract. * fix(dashboard): force import-token panel for windsurf/devin-cli Phase 1 hotfix: hide the 'Browser Login' tab and start in Paste API Key mode. Removes windsurf/devin-cli from PKCE_CALLBACK_SERVER_PROVIDERS so no callback server is started for them. Codex still uses the PKCE flow. The 'Get token' link continues to point at windsurf.com/show-auth-token via the existing supportsTokenPaste form copy. * fix(oauth): windsurf import-token mapTokens signature mismatch The route at `src/app/api/oauth/[provider]/[action]/route.ts` invokes `providerData.mapTokens({ accessToken: token })` (object), matching the cursor/kiro signature. The windsurf provider was declared with `mapTokens(token: string)` instead, so the entire object was stored as `accessToken`. When the connection record reached the SQLite layer it crashed with: SQLite3 can only bind numbers, strings, bigints, buffers, and null Fix by aligning windsurf's `mapTokens` signature with the route caller and the cursor/kiro convention. Also dedupe a copy-pasted second `if (action === "import-token")` block in the route handler — the second block was unreachable but identical to the first. Adds two regression tests asserting that `provider.mapTokens({ accessToken })` returns a string `accessToken` for both windsurf and devin-cli, so a future signature drift trips the gate instead of the SQLite bind error in production. * feat(compression): expand pt-BR pack with troglodita rules (15 → 49) (#2818) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(sse): repair RTK engine defaults so dedup and direct calls work (#2825) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(mcp): redirect console.log/warn to stderr in --mcp stdio mode (#2840) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(gemini-cli): prefer real project IDs over default-project (#2841) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(opencode-go): add provider limits quota fetcher (#2861) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * Audit & add web cookie providers: fix 4 missing registry entries + DuckDuckGo (#2862) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(antigravity): harden signatureless tool history (#2878) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix: provider model sync pruning and dynamic antigravity MITM proxy mappings (#2886) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * feat(usage): per-API-key token limits scoped to model/provider/global (#2888) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * fix(audio): build multipart body manually to preserve Content-Type (#2842) Integrated into release/v3.8.6 * refactor: remove agent skill documentation files and streamline maintenance workflows * test(stabilization): resolve unit test failures in blackbox-web, schema-coercion, translator-helper-branches, usage-service-hardening, and audio-transcription * fix(security): mitigate Socket.dev supply-chain findings + secrets opt-in + minimal build profile (#2863) (#2871) Two real security gaps closed and four cosmetic Socket.dev fingerprints removed. See docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md for the per-finding maintainer attestation. Real bugs fixed: - cloudSync: HMAC verification of `X-Cloud-Sig` + opt-in `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true` before overwriting `accessToken` / `refreshToken` / `providerSpecificData` from a remote response. Closes the silent-credential-swap surface (a misconfigured or hostile CLOUD_URL could previously replace local tokens unverified). - Zed import: split into 2-step `/discover` + `/import` flow. `/import` now requires `confirmedAccounts: [{ service, account, fingerprint }]` and re-reads the keychain server-side to filter by fingerprint, so a tampered discover response cannot trick the endpoint into saving an unrelated token. Cosmetic Socket.dev mitigations: - runElevatedPowerShell writes the elevated payload to a per-call temp `.ps1` file (mode 0o600) and references it via `-File`. Removes the textbook `-EncodedCommand <base64utf16le>` pattern flagged as malware by Socket's AI classifier. - Maintainer attestation `SECURITY-AUDITOR-NOTE:` blocks added at every flagged call site pointing to `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md`. Build-time hardening: - `OMNIROUTE_BUILD_PROFILE=minimal` (`npm run build:secure`) physically removes the four sensitive modules from the standalone bundle via webpack `NormalModuleReplacementPlugin`. Stubs throw `FeatureDisabledError` at runtime. Intended for the `omniroute-secure` artifact. Tests: - 24 new unit tests in `tests/unit/security/` covering the wrapper builder, HMAC verification (4 cases), credential fingerprint determinism (5 cases), confirmedAccounts validation + fingerprint filtering (6 cases), and the minimal-build stubs (5 cases). Docs: - New `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md` — per-finding attestation. - New `socket.yml` — Socket.dev v2 config pointing at the attestation. - Updated `SECURITY.md` — supply-chain scanner section. - Updated `.env.example` — three new env vars documented. Backwards compatibility: - Cloud sync token overwrite is OFF by default. Users who relied on it must set `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true`. Breaking change documented in CHANGELOG. - Zed import 2-step is the new default; legacy 1-step preserved behind `OMNIROUTE_ZED_IMPORT_LEGACY_ONE_STEP=true` and will be removed in v3.9. Closes #2863 * fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec; doc SHA-256 cache-key rationale (#2894) Two security-scanning findings on release/v3.8.6: - Secret-scanning alert 7 (google_api_key): the windsurf login-fix design spec embedded the literal public Firebase Web API key on two lines. Firebase Web API keys are non-sensitive by design (they identify the project; access is gated by Firebase Security Rules + key restrictions), but the literal trips secret scanning. Redacted to a placeholder; the embedded default still goes through resolvePublicCred per rule #11. - Code-scanning alert 261 (js/insufficient-password-hash): tokenCacheKey() uses SHA-256 to derive an in-memory cache key from the session token, not for password-at-rest storage. Added a comment documenting why CWE-916 KDFs do not apply (false positive). * fix(ci): resolve release/v3.8.6 gate failures (docs-sync, any-budget, pack-artifact) (#2895) * fix(ci): resolve release/v3.8.6 gate failures (docs-sync, any-budget, pack-artifact) Three CI gates failed on release/v3.8.6 (run 26630300877): - docs-sync: CHANGELOG had a spurious "## [3.8.6-patch]" section above "## [3.8.6]", so the latest release no longer matched package.json (3.8.6) and the 41 i18n CHANGELOG mirrors were flagged as missing that section. Fold the lone #2752 entry into [3.8.6] and drop the patch heading. - any-budget:t11: open-sse/handlers/chatCore.ts regressed to 1 explicit `any` (budget 0). Type the persist callback arg as Record<string, unknown>, which matches runWithOnPersist's RefreshPersistFn contract exactly. - pack-artifact: open-sse/utils/setupPolyfill.ts ships via package.json "files" (bin/omniroute.mjs imports it at startup) but was missing from the pack policy allowlist. Allow it and add a regression test. * fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec Redact the literal public Firebase Web API key (secret-scanning #7) to a placeholder, mirroring the redaction on release/v3.8.6 (PR #2894) and the windsurf fix branch. Non-sensitive public Web key; trips secret scanning. * feat(combo): Zero-Latency Combos (Hedging, Proactive Compression, Predictive TTFT) (#2868) * feat(combo): implement zero-latency combo optimizations (hedging, proactive compression, predictive TTFT) * fix(combo): fix predictive TTFT skip logic and unhandled promise rejections --------- Co-authored-by: Automation <automation@omniroute> * feat: implement automated skill workflows and update system configuration and validation schemas * test: eliminate dynamic cast warnings in cloud-sync unit test * test: isolate services-branch-hardening database directory to avoid concurrency issues * feat(providers): add 7 new web-cookie providers + research catalog + discovery tool New providers: - huggingchat: free LLM chat via huggingface.co/chat (no subscription) - phind: free dev-focused AI chat via phind.com/api/agent - poe-web: multi-model chat via poe.com GraphQL (p-b cookie) - venice-web: privacy-focused AI chat via venice.ai (session cookie) - v0-vercel-web: Vercel v0 code gen via v0.dev (session cookie) - kimi-web: Moonshot Kimi chat via kimi.moonshot.cn (session cookie) - doubao-web: ByteDance Doubao chat via doubao.com (session cookie) Additional: - Research catalog: docs/research/UNLIMITED_LLM_ACCESS.md - Discovery tool design + stub: src/lib/discovery/ + migration 073 - Unit tests: 33 tests for all 7 providers - Shared helpers consolidated in error.ts (slop cleanup) - All registered in WEB_COOKIE_PROVIDERS + providerRegistry + webSessionCredentials Closes #2885 * fix(typecheck): resolve typecheck errors in combo spec and compression modules * feat(api,oauth): add `agy` (Antigravity CLI) standalone provider with CLI token import (#2899) Add a standalone OAuth provider `agy` (Antigravity CLI) next to gemini-cli/antigravity. It reuses the antigravity inference backend (identical Google client_id + daily-cloudcode-pa.googleapis.com endpoint, executor and token-refresh) but ships its own model catalog — including the Claude models the backend exposes (claude-opus-4-6-thinking, claude-sonnet-4-6) — its own account pool, and four ways to connect: - token-file import (paste/upload the agy oauth token JSON) - auto-detect a local CLI login (~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/antigravity-oauth-token) - browser OAuth (via the shared OAuthModal Google loopback flow) - bulk / ZIP import New routes: POST /api/providers/agy-auth/{import,import-bulk,zip-extract,apply-local}. Catalog pinned from the live :fetchAvailableModels endpoint. Docs (openapi.yaml, ENVIRONMENT.md, .env.example, CHANGELOG) updated; new unit tests for registration, the token parser, and route auth-hardening. * fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec (#2896) Redact the literal public Firebase Web API key (secret-scanning #7) to a placeholder. Firebase Web API keys are non-sensitive by design but the literal trips GitHub secret scanning. Mirrors the redaction landed on release/v3.8.6 (PR #2894). Embedded default still flows through resolvePublicCred (rule #11). * Pr 2871 (#2897) * fix(security): mitigate Socket.dev supply-chain findings + secrets opt-in + minimal build profile (#2863) Two real security gaps closed and four cosmetic Socket.dev fingerprints removed. See docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md for the per-finding maintainer attestation. Real bugs fixed: - cloudSync: HMAC verification of `X-Cloud-Sig` + opt-in `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true` before overwriting `accessToken` / `refreshToken` / `providerSpecificData` from a remote response. Closes the silent-credential-swap surface (a misconfigured or hostile CLOUD_URL could previously replace local tokens unverified). - Zed import: split into 2-step `/discover` + `/import` flow. `/import` now requires `confirmedAccounts: [{ service, account, fingerprint }]` and re-reads the keychain server-side to filter by fingerprint, so a tampered discover response cannot trick the endpoint into saving an unrelated token. Cosmetic Socket.dev mitigations: - runElevatedPowerShell writes the elevated payload to a per-call temp `.ps1` file (mode 0o600) and references it via `-File`. Removes the textbook `-EncodedCommand <base64utf16le>` pattern flagged as malware by Socket's AI classifier. - Maintainer attestation `SECURITY-AUDITOR-NOTE:` blocks added at every flagged call site pointing to `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md`. Build-time hardening: - `OMNIROUTE_BUILD_PROFILE=minimal` (`npm run build:secure`) physically removes the four sensitive modules from the standalone bundle via webpack `NormalModuleReplacementPlugin`. Stubs throw `FeatureDisabledError` at runtime. Intended for the `omniroute-secure` artifact. Tests: - 24 new unit tests in `tests/unit/security/` covering the wrapper builder, HMAC verification (4 cases), credential fingerprint determinism (5 cases), confirmedAccounts validation + fingerprint filtering (6 cases), and the minimal-build stubs (5 cases). Docs: - New `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md` — per-finding attestation. - New `socket.yml` — Socket.dev v2 config pointing at the attestation. - Updated `SECURITY.md` — supply-chain scanner section. - Updated `.env.example` — three new env vars documented. Backwards compatibility: - Cloud sync token overwrite is OFF by default. Users who relied on it must set `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true`. Breaking change documented in CHANGELOG. - Zed import 2-step is the new default; legacy 1-step preserved behind `OMNIROUTE_ZED_IMPORT_LEGACY_ONE_STEP=true` and will be removed in v3.9. Closes #2863 * feat: implement automated skill workflows and update system configuration and validation schemas * test: eliminate dynamic cast warnings in cloud-sync unit test * test: isolate services-branch-hardening database directory to avoid concurrency issues * chore(docs): refresh generated docs collection index Update the generated Fumadocs browser collection mapping to keep documentation imports in sync with the current docs structure. * docs: update generated browser docs collection manifest Refresh the generated Fumadocs browser collection mapping so the docs site can resolve the current documentation files correctly. --------- Co-authored-by: OpenClaw <openclaw@kuzhomesrv.local> Co-authored-by: Dmitry Kuznetsov <139351986+dmitry@users.noreply.local> Co-authored-by: KuzyaBot <kuzya@local> Co-authored-by: JeferssonLemes <jeferssondev@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Paijo <14921983+oyi77@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Markus Hartung <mail@hartmark.se> Co-authored-by: akarray <akarray@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Apostol Apostolov <theapoapostolov@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Hernan Javier Ardila Sanchez <hjasgr@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Dmitry Kuznetsov <dmitry@kuznetsov.me> Co-authored-by: Nikolay Alafuzov <alafuzov_nn@rusklimat.ru> Co-authored-by: oyi77 <oyi77@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Ronaldo Davi <alltomatos@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: levonk <277861+levonk@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Lenine Júnior <lenine@engrene.com.br> Co-authored-by: Annas Alghoffar <aag.annas@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Tushar Agarwal <76201310+Tushar49@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: GreatLiu <eurasiaxz@qq.com> Co-authored-by: yuna amelia <230527278+yunaamelia@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Randi <55005611+rdself@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Container <78986709+disonjer@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: nickwizard <35692452+nickwizard@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Rajvardhan Patil <rajvardhanpatil7890@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Raxxoor <manker_lol@hotmail.com> Co-authored-by: Muhammad Mugni Hadi <mugnimaestra3@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: mi <123757457+soyelmismo@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Automation <automation@omniroute>
424 lines
15 KiB
TypeScript
424 lines
15 KiB
TypeScript
// @ts-nocheck
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import "./setupPolyfill.ts";
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import { AsyncLocalStorage } from "node:async_hooks";
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import { fetch as undiciFetch } from "undici";
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import {
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buildVercelRelayHeaders,
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createProxyDispatcher,
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getDefaultDispatcher,
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normalizeProxyUrl,
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proxyConfigToUrl,
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proxyUrlForLogs,
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} from "./proxyDispatcher.ts";
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import tlsClient from "./tlsClient.ts";
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import { isProxyReachable } from "@/lib/proxyHealth";
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function isTlsFingerprintEnabled() {
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return process.env.ENABLE_TLS_FINGERPRINT === "true";
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}
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/** Per-request tracking of whether TLS fingerprint was used */
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type TlsFingerprintStore = { used: boolean };
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const tlsFingerprintContext = new AsyncLocalStorage<TlsFingerprintStore>();
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type FetchWithDispatcherOptions = RequestInit & { dispatcher?: unknown };
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type FetchWithDispatcher = (
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input: RequestInfo | URL,
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init?: FetchWithDispatcherOptions
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) => Promise<Response>;
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/** Injectable dependencies for testability (Approach B DI). */
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export type ProxyFetchDeps = {
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undiciFetch?: FetchWithDispatcher;
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nativeFetch?: (input: RequestInfo | URL, init?: RequestInit) => Promise<Response>;
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};
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type PatchState = {
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originalFetch: typeof globalThis.fetch;
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proxyContext: AsyncLocalStorage<unknown>;
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isPatched: boolean;
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};
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const isCloud = typeof caches !== "undefined" && typeof caches === "object";
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const PATCH_STATE_KEY = Symbol.for("omniroute.proxyFetch.state");
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function getPatchState(): PatchState {
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const scopedGlobal = globalThis as typeof globalThis & {
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[PATCH_STATE_KEY]?: PatchState;
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};
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if (!scopedGlobal[PATCH_STATE_KEY]) {
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scopedGlobal[PATCH_STATE_KEY] = {
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originalFetch: globalThis.fetch,
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proxyContext: new AsyncLocalStorage(),
|
|
isPatched: false,
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
return scopedGlobal[PATCH_STATE_KEY];
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const patchState = getPatchState();
|
|
const originalFetch = patchState.originalFetch;
|
|
const originalFetchWithDispatcher = originalFetch as FetchWithDispatcher;
|
|
const proxyContext = patchState.proxyContext;
|
|
|
|
function noProxyMatch(targetUrl) {
|
|
const noProxy = process.env.NO_PROXY || process.env.no_proxy;
|
|
if (!noProxy) return false;
|
|
|
|
let target;
|
|
try {
|
|
target = new URL(targetUrl);
|
|
} catch {
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const hostname = target.hostname.toLowerCase();
|
|
const port = target.port || (target.protocol === "https:" ? "443" : "80");
|
|
const patterns = noProxy
|
|
.split(",")
|
|
.map((p) => p.trim().toLowerCase())
|
|
.filter(Boolean);
|
|
|
|
return patterns.some((pattern) => {
|
|
if (pattern === "*") return true;
|
|
|
|
const [patternHost, patternPort] = pattern.split(":");
|
|
if (patternPort && patternPort !== port) return false;
|
|
|
|
if (!patternHost) return false;
|
|
|
|
// Support wildcard matching (e.g. 192.168.* or *.local).
|
|
// Uses a linear glob scan instead of dynamic RegExp to avoid ReDoS.
|
|
if (patternHost.includes("*")) {
|
|
const parts = patternHost.split("*");
|
|
let pos = 0;
|
|
let ok = hostname.startsWith(parts[0]);
|
|
if (ok) {
|
|
pos = parts[0].length;
|
|
for (let i = 1; i < parts.length && ok; i++) {
|
|
const seg = parts[i];
|
|
if (i === parts.length - 1) {
|
|
ok = seg === "" || (hostname.endsWith(seg) && hostname.length - seg.length >= pos);
|
|
} else {
|
|
const idx = seg ? hostname.indexOf(seg, pos) : pos;
|
|
if (idx === -1) {
|
|
ok = false;
|
|
} else {
|
|
pos = idx + seg.length;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (ok) return true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (patternHost.startsWith(".")) {
|
|
return hostname.endsWith(patternHost) || hostname === patternHost.slice(1);
|
|
}
|
|
return hostname === patternHost || hostname.endsWith(`.${patternHost}`);
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function isLocalAddress(hostname: string): boolean {
|
|
if (hostname === "localhost" || hostname === "127.0.0.1" || hostname === "::1") return true;
|
|
if (hostname.startsWith("192.168.")) return true;
|
|
if (hostname.startsWith("10.")) return true;
|
|
if (hostname.match(/^172\.(1[6-9]|2\d|3[0-1])\./)) return true;
|
|
if (hostname.endsWith(".local") || hostname.endsWith(".lan")) return true;
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function resolveEnvProxyUrl(targetUrl) {
|
|
if (noProxyMatch(targetUrl)) return null;
|
|
|
|
let protocol;
|
|
try {
|
|
protocol = new URL(targetUrl).protocol;
|
|
} catch {
|
|
return null;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const proxyUrl =
|
|
protocol === "https:"
|
|
? process.env.HTTPS_PROXY ||
|
|
process.env.https_proxy ||
|
|
process.env.ALL_PROXY ||
|
|
process.env.all_proxy
|
|
: process.env.HTTP_PROXY ||
|
|
process.env.http_proxy ||
|
|
process.env.ALL_PROXY ||
|
|
process.env.all_proxy;
|
|
|
|
if (!proxyUrl) return null;
|
|
return normalizeProxyUrl(proxyUrl, "environment proxy");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export function resolveProxyForRequest(targetUrl) {
|
|
let target;
|
|
try {
|
|
target = new URL(targetUrl);
|
|
} catch {
|
|
target = null;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Always bypass proxy for local/LAN addresses
|
|
if (target && isLocalAddress(target.hostname.toLowerCase())) {
|
|
return { source: "direct", proxyUrl: null };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const contextProxy = proxyContext.getStore();
|
|
if (contextProxy) {
|
|
return { source: "context", proxyUrl: proxyConfigToUrl(contextProxy) };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const envProxyUrl = resolveEnvProxyUrl(targetUrl);
|
|
if (envProxyUrl) {
|
|
return { source: "env", proxyUrl: envProxyUrl };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return { source: "direct", proxyUrl: null };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function getTargetUrl(input) {
|
|
if (typeof input === "string") return input;
|
|
if (input && typeof input.url === "string") return input.url;
|
|
return String(input);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export async function runWithProxyContext(proxyConfig, fn) {
|
|
if (typeof fn !== "function") {
|
|
throw new TypeError("runWithProxyContext requires a callback function");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Inherit existing context if no specific proxyConfig is provided
|
|
const currentContext = proxyContext.getStore();
|
|
const effectiveProxyConfig = proxyConfig || currentContext || null;
|
|
|
|
const resolvedProxyUrl = effectiveProxyConfig ? proxyConfigToUrl(effectiveProxyConfig) : null;
|
|
|
|
// T14: Proxy Fast-Fail
|
|
// Perform a short TCP reachability check before issuing upstream requests.
|
|
// Skip for vercel-relay type: proxyConfigToUrl returns "https://<host>" which is the
|
|
// relay endpoint itself, not a proxy — the actual routing is handled via relay headers.
|
|
const isVercelRelay = (effectiveProxyConfig as { type?: string })?.type === "vercel";
|
|
if (resolvedProxyUrl && !isVercelRelay) {
|
|
const reachable = await isProxyReachable(resolvedProxyUrl);
|
|
if (!reachable) {
|
|
const proxyLabel = proxyUrlForLogs(resolvedProxyUrl);
|
|
const err = new Error(`[Proxy Fast-Fail] Proxy unreachable: ${proxyLabel}`) as Error & {
|
|
code?: string;
|
|
statusCode?: number;
|
|
};
|
|
err.code = "PROXY_UNREACHABLE";
|
|
err.statusCode = 503;
|
|
throw err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return proxyContext.run(effectiveProxyConfig, async () => {
|
|
if (resolvedProxyUrl && effectiveProxyConfig !== currentContext) {
|
|
console.log(
|
|
`[ProxyFetch] Applied request proxy context: ${proxyUrlForLogs(resolvedProxyUrl)}`
|
|
);
|
|
}
|
|
return fn();
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
async function patchedFetch(
|
|
input: RequestInfo | URL,
|
|
options: FetchWithDispatcherOptions = {},
|
|
deps: ProxyFetchDeps = {}
|
|
) {
|
|
if (options?.dispatcher) {
|
|
// When a dispatcher is present, we MUST use the undici library fetch
|
|
// to ensure version compatibility. Node 22 built-in fetch (undici v6)
|
|
// is incompatible with undici v8 dispatchers (missing onRequestStart, etc.)
|
|
const _undiciDispatcher =
|
|
deps.undiciFetch ?? (undiciFetch as unknown as (...args: unknown[]) => Promise<Response>);
|
|
return _undiciDispatcher(input, options);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const targetUrl = getTargetUrl(input);
|
|
let resolved;
|
|
try {
|
|
resolved = resolveProxyForRequest(targetUrl);
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
|
|
console.error(`[ProxyFetch] Proxy configuration error: ${message}`);
|
|
throw error;
|
|
}
|
|
const { source, proxyUrl } = resolved;
|
|
|
|
if (!proxyUrl) {
|
|
// TLS fingerprint spoofing for direct connections (no proxy configured)
|
|
if (isTlsFingerprintEnabled() && tlsClient.available) {
|
|
try {
|
|
const store = tlsFingerprintContext.getStore();
|
|
if (store) store.used = true;
|
|
return await tlsClient.fetch(targetUrl, {
|
|
...options,
|
|
headers: options.headers,
|
|
signal: options.signal ?? undefined,
|
|
});
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
|
|
console.warn(
|
|
`[ProxyFetch] TLS fingerprint failed, falling back to native fetch: ${message}`
|
|
);
|
|
const store = tlsFingerprintContext.getStore();
|
|
if (store) store.used = false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// Direct connection (no proxy) — use undici with custom dispatcher for timeout control.
|
|
// Falls back to original native fetch if dispatcher initialization fails (#1054).
|
|
// Retries once on transient dispatcher errors before falling back (fix: proxyfetch-undici-retry).
|
|
//
|
|
// ReadableStream/Blob body guard: if the body is non-replayable, skip the retry because
|
|
// the first attempt drains the stream; a second attempt would silently send an empty body.
|
|
// ReadableStream check: cast through unknown to avoid explicit-any budget (T11).
|
|
const _bodyUnknown = options.body as unknown;
|
|
const bodyIsStream =
|
|
_bodyUnknown !== null &&
|
|
_bodyUnknown !== undefined &&
|
|
typeof _bodyUnknown === "object" &&
|
|
(typeof (_bodyUnknown as Record<string, unknown>).getReader === "function" || // ReadableStream
|
|
typeof (_bodyUnknown as Record<string, unknown>).stream === "function"); // Blob
|
|
const maxAttempts = bodyIsStream ? 1 : 2;
|
|
const _undiciDirect =
|
|
deps.undiciFetch ?? (undiciFetch as unknown as (...args: unknown[]) => Promise<Response>);
|
|
const _nativeFallback =
|
|
(deps.nativeFetch as FetchWithDispatcher | undefined) ?? originalFetchWithDispatcher;
|
|
let lastDispatcherError: unknown = null;
|
|
for (let attempt = 0; attempt < maxAttempts; attempt++) {
|
|
try {
|
|
return await _undiciDirect(input, {
|
|
...options,
|
|
dispatcher: getDefaultDispatcher(),
|
|
});
|
|
} catch (dispatcherError) {
|
|
const msg =
|
|
dispatcherError instanceof Error ? dispatcherError.message : String(dispatcherError);
|
|
// CAUTION: Do NOT fallback to native fetch if the error is a version mismatch (invalid onRequestStart)
|
|
// because the native fetch will definitely fail with the undici v8 dispatcher.
|
|
if (msg.includes("onRequestStart")) {
|
|
console.error(
|
|
`[ProxyFetch] Fatal version mismatch: Dispatcher (v8) vs Fetch (v6/native). Hardware upgrade or SOCKS5 config isolation required. Error: ${msg}`
|
|
);
|
|
throw dispatcherError;
|
|
}
|
|
// Only retry/fallback for connection/dispatcher errors, not HTTP errors.
|
|
// Prefer the .code property when available (more stable across undici
|
|
// versions than message-string matching); fall back to substring match
|
|
// for errors that lack a structured code.
|
|
const errCode = (dispatcherError as { code?: string })?.code;
|
|
if (
|
|
msg.includes("fetch failed") ||
|
|
errCode === "ECONNREFUSED" ||
|
|
msg.includes("ECONNREFUSED") ||
|
|
(errCode !== undefined && errCode.startsWith("UND_ERR")) ||
|
|
msg.includes("UND_ERR")
|
|
) {
|
|
if (attempt === 0 && maxAttempts > 1) {
|
|
// First failure — retry once with a short jittered delay before giving up.
|
|
lastDispatcherError = dispatcherError;
|
|
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 25 + Math.random() * 50));
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
// All attempts exhausted — fall back to native fetch.
|
|
// Preserve original phrase intact for monitoring: "Undici dispatcher failed, falling back to native fetch"
|
|
console.warn(
|
|
`[ProxyFetch] Undici dispatcher failed, falling back to native fetch (after retry): ${msg}`
|
|
);
|
|
return _nativeFallback(input, options);
|
|
}
|
|
throw dispatcherError;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// Should not be reached, but satisfy TypeScript control-flow.
|
|
throw lastDispatcherError;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Vercel Relay: instead of routing through an HTTP proxy dispatcher, we send
|
|
// relay headers to the Vercel edge function which forwards the request upstream.
|
|
const contextProxy = proxyContext.getStore();
|
|
if (
|
|
contextProxy &&
|
|
typeof contextProxy === "object" &&
|
|
(contextProxy as { type?: string }).type === "vercel"
|
|
) {
|
|
const vc = contextProxy as { host?: string; relayAuth?: string };
|
|
if (!vc.relayAuth) {
|
|
// Generic message without internal labels — this throw can bubble up to
|
|
// catch blocks that put error.message in response bodies (combo per-model
|
|
// timeout, executor catch-all). Don't leak "[ProxyFetch]" diagnostics.
|
|
throw new Error("Vercel relay configuration error: missing relayAuth");
|
|
}
|
|
const targetUrl = getTargetUrl(input);
|
|
const relayHeaders = buildVercelRelayHeaders(targetUrl, vc.relayAuth);
|
|
const mergedHeaders = new Headers(options?.headers);
|
|
for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(relayHeaders)) mergedHeaders.set(k, v);
|
|
// Pass host through proxyUrlForLogs so the same redaction policy applies
|
|
// to relay routing logs (the rest of this module already follows that rule).
|
|
const hostForLogs = proxyUrlForLogs(vc.host ? `https://${vc.host}` : "");
|
|
if (process.env.OMNIROUTE_PROXY_FETCH_DEBUG === "true") {
|
|
console.debug(`[ProxyFetch] Routing via Vercel relay: ${hostForLogs}`);
|
|
}
|
|
return await originalFetch(`https://${vc.host}`, {
|
|
...options,
|
|
headers: mergedHeaders,
|
|
duplex: "half",
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
try {
|
|
const dispatcher = createProxyDispatcher(proxyUrl);
|
|
const _undiciProxy =
|
|
deps.undiciFetch ?? (undiciFetch as unknown as (...args: unknown[]) => Promise<Response>);
|
|
return await _undiciProxy(input, {
|
|
...options,
|
|
dispatcher,
|
|
});
|
|
} catch (error) {
|
|
const message = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
|
|
console.error(`[ProxyFetch] Proxy request failed (${source}, fail-closed): ${message}`);
|
|
throw error;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Named export for proxyFetch — identical to the patched globalThis.fetch but
|
|
* accepts an optional ProxyFetchDeps for unit test dependency injection.
|
|
* Production code should use globalThis.fetch (or the default export) instead.
|
|
*/
|
|
export async function proxyFetch(
|
|
input: RequestInfo | URL,
|
|
options: RequestInit = {},
|
|
deps: ProxyFetchDeps = {}
|
|
): Promise<Response> {
|
|
return patchedFetch(input, options as FetchWithDispatcherOptions, deps);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!isCloud && !patchState.isPatched) {
|
|
globalThis.fetch = patchedFetch;
|
|
patchState.isPatched = true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Run a function with TLS fingerprint tracking context.
|
|
* After fn completes, returns { result, tlsFingerprintUsed }.
|
|
*/
|
|
export async function runWithTlsTracking(fn) {
|
|
const store = { used: false };
|
|
const result = await tlsFingerprintContext.run(store, fn);
|
|
return { result, tlsFingerprintUsed: store.used };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Check if TLS fingerprint is enabled and available */
|
|
export function isTlsFingerprintActive() {
|
|
return isTlsFingerprintEnabled() && tlsClient.available;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
export default isCloud ? originalFetch : patchedFetch;
|