Files
OmniRoute/docs/research/UNLIMITED_LLM_ACCESS.md
Diego Rodrigues de Sa e Souza f59f8daa94 Release v3.8.6 (#2804)
* fix(gemini): preserve structured tool calls for antigravity

* fix(gemini): parse prefixed textual tool calls

* fix(antigravity): preserve textual SSE tool calls

* fix(stream): normalize textual passthrough tool calls

* fix(stream): normalize split textual tool calls

* fix(stream): suppress malformed textual tool calls

* fix(stream): suppress compact malformed tool calls

* fix(stream): emit structured textual tool calls

* fix(stream): suppress unknown textual tool calls

* fix(stream): normalize responses textual tool calls

* chore: ignore .claude/settings.local.json (per-user Claude Code permissions)

* fix(opencode-go): route qwen3.x via claude messages + repair fixMissingToolResponses for Claude-shape upstreams (#2791)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix: resolve npm install warnings — remove dead deps, relax engine constraint (#2792)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix: register missing web-cookie validators (claude-web, gemini-web, copilot-web, t3-web) (#2793)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix: Error: Unable to inspect existing database #2771 (#2795)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(oauth): repair Google loopback callback flow (#2796)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* feat(logs): add clean history button (#2799)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* [codex] home: restore settings-driven home layout and quota auto-refresh (#2800)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(gemini): emit signaturelessToolCallMode:text for GEMINI format models (#2801)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* feat(modelSpecs): align opencode-go family with upstream provider limits (#2802)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* chore: apply unit test fixes, polyfills, and environment precedence fixes

* docs(agents): atualiza fluxos de release e triagem

Expande os workflows de release para incluir auditoria de segurança,
CHANGELOG completo por commits, quality gate obrigatório, homologação em
VPS local, publicação oficial, deploy em Akamai e validação de artefatos.

Reorganiza a triagem de features com arquivos permanentes por bucket,
suporte a itens em andamento, regra de reclaim após 15 dias e novo
tratamento para ideias viáveis catalogadas.

Corrige a orientação de revisão de discussões para usar a ordem
cronológica real dos comentários e respostas ao identificar a última
atividade.

* fix(lockout): classify Gemini Antigravity resource exhaustion as quota_exhausted

* fix(reasoning): gate replay by interleaved field

* docs(rule-16): permit human Co-authored-by, restrict only AI/bot trailers

Rule #16 previously banned all `Co-Authored-By` trailers absolutely.
That blocked the upstream-port workflows (`/port-upstream-features` and
`/port-upstream-issues`), which must credit human upstream PR authors
and issue reporters in OmniRoute commits.

Refine the rule to ban only AI/bot-attributed trailers (Claude, GPT,
Copilot, Bot; anthropic.com / openai.com / bot-owned noreply.github.com
emails) while allowing standard human `Co-authored-by: Name <email>`
attribution.

Sync the rule across the source CLAUDE.md, the E2E shakedown doc note,
and 41 i18n translations.

* fix(gitlawb): add specialty validators for connection test — bypass /models probe

GitLawB OpenGateway API (xiaomi-mimo compatible) does not expose a /models
endpoint, causing validateOpenAILikeProvider to 404 on the initial probe
and report 'Provider validation endpoint not supported'.

Add specialty validators for both gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi that follow the
same pattern as the existing xiaomi-mimo validator: skip GET /models,
validate directly via POST /chat/completions with a minimal test message.
Any 401/403 response means an invalid key; all other responses mean auth
is OK.

Fixes test-connection returning 404 for GitLawB providers.

* test(gitlawb): add 12 unit tests for gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi specialty validators

Covers success, auth failure (401/403), non-auth acceptance (400/422/429),
network errors, and custom baseUrl overrides for both providers.

* feat(gitlawb): serve models from static registry without API-unavailable warning

GitLawB's OpenGateway API does not expose a /models endpoint per
provider-path. Previously the models route fell through to the generic
fallback which returned static catalog models with the misleading
'API unavailable — using local catalog' warning.

Now gitlawb and gitlawb-gmi are handled as static model providers
(same pattern as reka and qwen OAuth) — models are served from the
provider registry without any warning, since all registered models
are functional via POST /chat/completions.

* refactor(gitlawb): extract shared opengateway validator factory, fix docs path in test

- Extract gitlawb/gitlawb-gmi validators into buildOpengatewayValidator factory
- Fix dockerignore-docs-coverage test: update stale docs/AUTO-COMBO.md -> docs/routing/AUTO-COMBO.md

* fix(reasoning): guard interleaved capability lookup

* feat(gitlawb): dynamic model fetch with gmi-cloud fallback

Hybrid approach:
- gitlawb (xiaomi-mimo): dynamic /models endpoint → 356 models
- gitlawb-gmi (gmi-cloud): 404 fallback → local catalog gracefully
Mimics Gitlawb/openclaude's model-routing pattern

* i18n(pt-BR): complete missing translations and sync with en.json

* feat(build): nix multi-OS package manager install (#2806)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(i18n): translate 144 new __MISSING__ pt-BR strings (#2816)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* chore(docs): set coverage gate to 40/40/40/40 in CLAUDE.md

Aligns the documented coverage gate with the v3.8.6 release decision
(lowered from 75/75/75/70). Matches the threshold already set in
package.json by the large feature PRs (planos 11-22).

* fix(cli): respect PORT env var in serve command (#2845)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(deepseek-web): return 400 when client sends tools[] - chat.deepseek.com has no tool support (#2854)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(qoder): reject invalid/expired PATs returning Cosy 500 error (#2860)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(cli): register openclaw in tool-detector (#2833) (#2850)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(api): include noAuth providers in /v1/models catalog (#2798) (#2814)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(combo): resolve custom provider targets via combo name (#2778) (#2812)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(translator): strip safety_identifier in openai-responses cleanup (#2770) (#2809)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(quota): honor explicit per-connection preflight opt-out (#2831) (#2844)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(usage): un-invert GitHub Copilot Free/limited quota — limited_user_quotas is remaining (#2876) (#2881)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(nous-research): correct baseUrl to include /chat/completions (#2826) (#2835)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(opencode): qwen3.x max/plus models lack vision support (#2822) (#2836)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(translator): pass-through tool_search built-in tool type (#2766) (#2811)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(github): route claude-opus-4.6 via chat completions (#2821)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* docs(oauth): add Windsurf login fix design (Phase 1 hotfix + Phase 2 Firebase OAuth)

Two-phase plan to fix the broken Windsurf OAuth flow:
- Phase 1: drop the dead app.devin.ai/editor/signin PKCE path, promote
  import-token from windsurf.com/show-auth-token as the primary path
- Phase 2: port Firebase OAuth + RegisterUser flow from
  fendoushaonian/WindSurf-gRPC-API for full browser-based automation

Spec only - no code changes yet.

* docs(plan): Phase 1 windsurf login hotfix implementation plan

10 tasks covering:
- TDD assertions for flowType + 410 Gone responses
- Provider switch to import_token
- Route handler retiring authorize/start-callback-server/poll-callback
- OAuthModal UI override
- i18n sync
- Verification + PR steps

* fix(cli): replace cli-table3 with hand-rolled formatter (#2752) (#2813)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(skills): skip interception for unregistered client-native tools (#2815) (#2817)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* feat(sse): add RTK filters for kubectl, docker-build, composer, gh (#2824)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(geminiHelper): support rec.image content shape + warn on dropped remote URLs (refs #2807) (#2855)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(cli): allow nullable/optional apiKey in cliMitmStartSchema (#2857)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(combo): preserve system messages during context handoff summary generation (#2865)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix: wire CLIProxyAPI fallback settings into chatCore routing engine (#2866)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(usage): add opencode quota fetcher (#2852) (#2867)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* feat(claude): default xhigh support for newer Opus models (#2874)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(cli): restore omniroute logs command stream (#2756) (#2810)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(combo): normalize upstream Headers for Node 24 undici interop (#2751) (#2823)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* Rename proxy log Public IP to Client IP (#2880)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(claude): preserve max effort for supported models (#2875)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6.

* fix(oauth): switch windsurf provider to import_token flow

The PKCE auth URL targeting app.devin.ai/editor/signin returns 404
post-rebrand. Until Phase 2 ports Firebase OAuth + RegisterUser, the
only supported path is import-token via windsurf.com/show-auth-token.

- windsurf.ts: drop buildAuthUrl, set flowType=import_token
- generateAuthData returns supported:false + helpful error for windsurf/devin-cli
- tests: assert flowType + disabled stub

* fix(oauth): return 410 Gone for retired windsurf/devin-cli PKCE actions

start-callback-server, authorize, and poll-callback (GET + POST) now
return 410 Gone with a pointer to /import-token. The 410 short-circuit
runs before auth so the response is honest about the action being
permanently gone, not gated. Codex PKCE flow unchanged.

Tests: 5 new assertions cover GET + POST 410 paths and a Codex
regression check.

* refactor(oauth): annotate retired PKCE fields in WINDSURF_CONFIG

No behaviour change - comment-only update documenting that authorizeUrl,
codeChallengeMethod, callbackPort, callbackPath, apiServerUrl, and
exchangePath are no longer consumed. Active fields (inferenceUrl,
showAuthTokenUrl, firebaseApiKey, ideName) called out separately.

* fix(cli,docs): use requireCliToolsAuth in logs route + document OPENCODE quota env

Post-merge contract fixes for v3.8.6:
- src/app/api/cli-tools/logs/route.ts (#2810) now uses the shared
  requireCliToolsAuth guard (param renamed req->request) to satisfy the
  cli-tools-auth-hardening contract test.
- Document OMNIROUTE_OPENCODE_QUOTA_URL (#2867) in docs/reference/ENVIRONMENT.md
  to satisfy the env/docs sync contract.

* fix(dashboard): force import-token panel for windsurf/devin-cli

Phase 1 hotfix: hide the 'Browser Login' tab and start in Paste API Key
mode. Removes windsurf/devin-cli from PKCE_CALLBACK_SERVER_PROVIDERS so
no callback server is started for them. Codex still uses the PKCE flow.

The 'Get token' link continues to point at windsurf.com/show-auth-token
via the existing supportsTokenPaste form copy.

* fix(oauth): windsurf import-token mapTokens signature mismatch

The route at `src/app/api/oauth/[provider]/[action]/route.ts` invokes
`providerData.mapTokens({ accessToken: token })` (object), matching the
cursor/kiro signature. The windsurf provider was declared with
`mapTokens(token: string)` instead, so the entire object was stored as
`accessToken`. When the connection record reached the SQLite layer it
crashed with:

  SQLite3 can only bind numbers, strings, bigints, buffers, and null

Fix by aligning windsurf's `mapTokens` signature with the route caller
and the cursor/kiro convention. Also dedupe a copy-pasted second
`if (action === "import-token")` block in the route handler — the
second block was unreachable but identical to the first.

Adds two regression tests asserting that
`provider.mapTokens({ accessToken })` returns a string `accessToken` for
both windsurf and devin-cli, so a future signature drift trips the gate
instead of the SQLite bind error in production.

* feat(compression): expand pt-BR pack with troglodita rules (15 → 49) (#2818)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(sse): repair RTK engine defaults so dedup and direct calls work (#2825)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(mcp): redirect console.log/warn to stderr in --mcp stdio mode (#2840)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(gemini-cli): prefer real project IDs over default-project (#2841)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(opencode-go): add provider limits quota fetcher (#2861)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* Audit & add web cookie providers: fix 4 missing registry entries + DuckDuckGo (#2862)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(antigravity): harden signatureless tool history (#2878)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix: provider model sync pruning and dynamic antigravity MITM proxy mappings (#2886)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* feat(usage): per-API-key token limits scoped to model/provider/global (#2888)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* fix(audio): build multipart body manually to preserve Content-Type (#2842)

Integrated into release/v3.8.6

* refactor: remove agent skill documentation files and streamline maintenance workflows

* test(stabilization): resolve unit test failures in blackbox-web, schema-coercion, translator-helper-branches, usage-service-hardening, and audio-transcription

* fix(security): mitigate Socket.dev supply-chain findings + secrets opt-in + minimal build profile (#2863) (#2871)

Two real security gaps closed and four cosmetic Socket.dev fingerprints removed.
See docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md for the per-finding maintainer
attestation.

Real bugs fixed:
- cloudSync: HMAC verification of `X-Cloud-Sig` + opt-in
  `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true` before overwriting `accessToken` /
  `refreshToken` / `providerSpecificData` from a remote response. Closes the
  silent-credential-swap surface (a misconfigured or hostile CLOUD_URL could
  previously replace local tokens unverified).
- Zed import: split into 2-step `/discover` + `/import` flow. `/import` now
  requires `confirmedAccounts: [{ service, account, fingerprint }]` and
  re-reads the keychain server-side to filter by fingerprint, so a tampered
  discover response cannot trick the endpoint into saving an unrelated token.

Cosmetic Socket.dev mitigations:
- runElevatedPowerShell writes the elevated payload to a per-call temp `.ps1`
  file (mode 0o600) and references it via `-File`. Removes the textbook
  `-EncodedCommand <base64utf16le>` pattern flagged as malware by Socket's AI
  classifier.
- Maintainer attestation `SECURITY-AUDITOR-NOTE:` blocks added at every
  flagged call site pointing to `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md`.

Build-time hardening:
- `OMNIROUTE_BUILD_PROFILE=minimal` (`npm run build:secure`) physically
  removes the four sensitive modules from the standalone bundle via webpack
  `NormalModuleReplacementPlugin`. Stubs throw `FeatureDisabledError` at
  runtime. Intended for the `omniroute-secure` artifact.

Tests:
- 24 new unit tests in `tests/unit/security/` covering the wrapper builder,
  HMAC verification (4 cases), credential fingerprint determinism (5 cases),
  confirmedAccounts validation + fingerprint filtering (6 cases), and the
  minimal-build stubs (5 cases).

Docs:
- New `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md` — per-finding attestation.
- New `socket.yml` — Socket.dev v2 config pointing at the attestation.
- Updated `SECURITY.md` — supply-chain scanner section.
- Updated `.env.example` — three new env vars documented.

Backwards compatibility:
- Cloud sync token overwrite is OFF by default. Users who relied on
  it must set `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true`. Breaking change documented
  in CHANGELOG.
- Zed import 2-step is the new default; legacy 1-step preserved behind
  `OMNIROUTE_ZED_IMPORT_LEGACY_ONE_STEP=true` and will be removed in v3.9.

Closes #2863

* fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec; doc SHA-256 cache-key rationale (#2894)

Two security-scanning findings on release/v3.8.6:

- Secret-scanning alert 7 (google_api_key): the windsurf login-fix design spec
  embedded the literal public Firebase Web API key on two lines. Firebase Web
  API keys are non-sensitive by design (they identify the project; access is
  gated by Firebase Security Rules + key restrictions), but the literal trips
  secret scanning. Redacted to a placeholder; the embedded default still goes
  through resolvePublicCred per rule #11.

- Code-scanning alert 261 (js/insufficient-password-hash): tokenCacheKey() uses
  SHA-256 to derive an in-memory cache key from the session token, not for
  password-at-rest storage. Added a comment documenting why CWE-916 KDFs do not
  apply (false positive).

* fix(ci): resolve release/v3.8.6 gate failures (docs-sync, any-budget, pack-artifact) (#2895)

* fix(ci): resolve release/v3.8.6 gate failures (docs-sync, any-budget, pack-artifact)

Three CI gates failed on release/v3.8.6 (run 26630300877):

- docs-sync: CHANGELOG had a spurious "## [3.8.6-patch]" section above
  "## [3.8.6]", so the latest release no longer matched package.json (3.8.6)
  and the 41 i18n CHANGELOG mirrors were flagged as missing that section.
  Fold the lone #2752 entry into [3.8.6] and drop the patch heading.
- any-budget:t11: open-sse/handlers/chatCore.ts regressed to 1 explicit `any`
  (budget 0). Type the persist callback arg as Record<string, unknown>, which
  matches runWithOnPersist's RefreshPersistFn contract exactly.
- pack-artifact: open-sse/utils/setupPolyfill.ts ships via package.json "files"
  (bin/omniroute.mjs imports it at startup) but was missing from the pack
  policy allowlist. Allow it and add a regression test.

* fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec

Redact the literal public Firebase Web API key (secret-scanning #7) to a
placeholder, mirroring the redaction on release/v3.8.6 (PR #2894) and the
windsurf fix branch. Non-sensitive public Web key; trips secret scanning.

* feat(combo): Zero-Latency Combos (Hedging, Proactive Compression, Predictive TTFT) (#2868)

* feat(combo): implement zero-latency combo optimizations (hedging, proactive compression, predictive TTFT)

* fix(combo): fix predictive TTFT skip logic and unhandled promise rejections

---------

Co-authored-by: Automation <automation@omniroute>

* feat: implement automated skill workflows and update system configuration and validation schemas

* test: eliminate dynamic cast warnings in cloud-sync unit test

* test: isolate services-branch-hardening database directory to avoid concurrency issues

* feat(providers): add 7 new web-cookie providers + research catalog + discovery tool

New providers:
- huggingchat: free LLM chat via huggingface.co/chat (no subscription)
- phind: free dev-focused AI chat via phind.com/api/agent
- poe-web: multi-model chat via poe.com GraphQL (p-b cookie)
- venice-web: privacy-focused AI chat via venice.ai (session cookie)
- v0-vercel-web: Vercel v0 code gen via v0.dev (session cookie)
- kimi-web: Moonshot Kimi chat via kimi.moonshot.cn (session cookie)
- doubao-web: ByteDance Doubao chat via doubao.com (session cookie)

Additional:
- Research catalog: docs/research/UNLIMITED_LLM_ACCESS.md
- Discovery tool design + stub: src/lib/discovery/ + migration 073
- Unit tests: 33 tests for all 7 providers
- Shared helpers consolidated in error.ts (slop cleanup)
- All registered in WEB_COOKIE_PROVIDERS + providerRegistry + webSessionCredentials

Closes #2885

* fix(typecheck): resolve typecheck errors in combo spec and compression modules

* feat(api,oauth): add `agy` (Antigravity CLI) standalone provider with CLI token import (#2899)

Add a standalone OAuth provider `agy` (Antigravity CLI) next to gemini-cli/antigravity.
It reuses the antigravity inference backend (identical Google client_id +
daily-cloudcode-pa.googleapis.com endpoint, executor and token-refresh) but ships its own
model catalog — including the Claude models the backend exposes (claude-opus-4-6-thinking,
claude-sonnet-4-6) — its own account pool, and four ways to connect:

- token-file import (paste/upload the agy oauth token JSON)
- auto-detect a local CLI login (~/.gemini/antigravity-cli/antigravity-oauth-token)
- browser OAuth (via the shared OAuthModal Google loopback flow)
- bulk / ZIP import

New routes: POST /api/providers/agy-auth/{import,import-bulk,zip-extract,apply-local}.
Catalog pinned from the live :fetchAvailableModels endpoint. Docs (openapi.yaml,
ENVIRONMENT.md, .env.example, CHANGELOG) updated; new unit tests for registration,
the token parser, and route auth-hardening.

* fix(security): redact public Firebase Web key from windsurf spec (#2896)

Redact the literal public Firebase Web API key (secret-scanning #7) to a
placeholder. Firebase Web API keys are non-sensitive by design but the literal
trips GitHub secret scanning. Mirrors the redaction landed on release/v3.8.6
(PR #2894). Embedded default still flows through resolvePublicCred (rule #11).

* Pr 2871 (#2897)

* fix(security): mitigate Socket.dev supply-chain findings + secrets opt-in + minimal build profile (#2863)

Two real security gaps closed and four cosmetic Socket.dev fingerprints removed.
See docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md for the per-finding maintainer
attestation.

Real bugs fixed:
- cloudSync: HMAC verification of `X-Cloud-Sig` + opt-in
  `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true` before overwriting `accessToken` /
  `refreshToken` / `providerSpecificData` from a remote response. Closes the
  silent-credential-swap surface (a misconfigured or hostile CLOUD_URL could
  previously replace local tokens unverified).
- Zed import: split into 2-step `/discover` + `/import` flow. `/import` now
  requires `confirmedAccounts: [{ service, account, fingerprint }]` and
  re-reads the keychain server-side to filter by fingerprint, so a tampered
  discover response cannot trick the endpoint into saving an unrelated token.

Cosmetic Socket.dev mitigations:
- runElevatedPowerShell writes the elevated payload to a per-call temp `.ps1`
  file (mode 0o600) and references it via `-File`. Removes the textbook
  `-EncodedCommand <base64utf16le>` pattern flagged as malware by Socket's AI
  classifier.
- Maintainer attestation `SECURITY-AUDITOR-NOTE:` blocks added at every
  flagged call site pointing to `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md`.

Build-time hardening:
- `OMNIROUTE_BUILD_PROFILE=minimal` (`npm run build:secure`) physically
  removes the four sensitive modules from the standalone bundle via webpack
  `NormalModuleReplacementPlugin`. Stubs throw `FeatureDisabledError` at
  runtime. Intended for the `omniroute-secure` artifact.

Tests:
- 24 new unit tests in `tests/unit/security/` covering the wrapper builder,
  HMAC verification (4 cases), credential fingerprint determinism (5 cases),
  confirmedAccounts validation + fingerprint filtering (6 cases), and the
  minimal-build stubs (5 cases).

Docs:
- New `docs/security/SOCKET_DEV_FINDINGS.md` — per-finding attestation.
- New `socket.yml` — Socket.dev v2 config pointing at the attestation.
- Updated `SECURITY.md` — supply-chain scanner section.
- Updated `.env.example` — three new env vars documented.

Backwards compatibility:
- Cloud sync token overwrite is OFF by default. Users who relied on
  it must set `OMNIROUTE_CLOUD_SYNC_SECRETS=true`. Breaking change documented
  in CHANGELOG.
- Zed import 2-step is the new default; legacy 1-step preserved behind
  `OMNIROUTE_ZED_IMPORT_LEGACY_ONE_STEP=true` and will be removed in v3.9.

Closes #2863

* feat: implement automated skill workflows and update system configuration and validation schemas

* test: eliminate dynamic cast warnings in cloud-sync unit test

* test: isolate services-branch-hardening database directory to avoid concurrency issues

* chore(docs): refresh generated docs collection index

Update the generated Fumadocs browser collection mapping to keep
documentation imports in sync with the current docs structure.

* docs: update generated browser docs collection manifest

Refresh the generated Fumadocs browser collection mapping so the docs site can resolve the current documentation files correctly.

---------

Co-authored-by: OpenClaw <openclaw@kuzhomesrv.local>
Co-authored-by: Dmitry Kuznetsov <139351986+dmitry@users.noreply.local>
Co-authored-by: KuzyaBot <kuzya@local>
Co-authored-by: JeferssonLemes <jeferssondev@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Paijo <14921983+oyi77@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Markus Hartung <mail@hartmark.se>
Co-authored-by: akarray <akarray@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Apostol Apostolov <theapoapostolov@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Hernan Javier Ardila Sanchez <hjasgr@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Dmitry Kuznetsov <dmitry@kuznetsov.me>
Co-authored-by: Nikolay Alafuzov <alafuzov_nn@rusklimat.ru>
Co-authored-by: oyi77 <oyi77@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Ronaldo Davi <alltomatos@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: levonk <277861+levonk@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Lenine Júnior <lenine@engrene.com.br>
Co-authored-by: Annas Alghoffar <aag.annas@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Tushar Agarwal <76201310+Tushar49@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: GreatLiu <eurasiaxz@qq.com>
Co-authored-by: yuna amelia <230527278+yunaamelia@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Randi <55005611+rdself@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Container <78986709+disonjer@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: nickwizard <35692452+nickwizard@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Rajvardhan Patil <rajvardhanpatil7890@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Raxxoor <manker_lol@hotmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Muhammad Mugni Hadi <mugnimaestra3@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: mi <123757457+soyelmismo@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Automation <automation@omniroute>
2026-05-29 12:44:29 -03:00

16 KiB

Unlimited LLM Access — Research Catalog

Last updated: 2026-05-29 Status: Active research Related: Issue #2885

Overview

This document catalogs every known method for accessing LLMs without paying — through reverse engineering, web cookies, auto-registration, trial exploitation, session pooling, and free-tier maximization. Each method includes feasibility rating, risk assessment, and implementation guidance.

Feasibility Scale: 1 (theoretical) → 5 (proven in production)


Method Categories

How it works: Extract session cookies/tokens from a logged-in browser session and use them to call the provider's internal API directly, bypassing the official API and its billing.

OmniRoute pattern: Already implemented for 16 providers. Uses webCookieAuth.ts helpers for cookie normalization, TLS fingerprint bypass for Cloudflare, and OpenAI format translation.

Provider Cookie/Token API Endpoint Feasibility Risk Complexity Status
ChatGPT Web __Secure-next-auth.session-token chatgpt.com/backend-api/f/conversation 5 Medium High (PoW + TLS) Implemented
Claude Web sessionKey claude.ai/api/organizations/{org}/chat_conversations/{conv}/completion 5 Medium High (Turnstile) Implemented
Gemini Web __Secure-1PSID gemini.google.com (Playwright) 5 Low Medium Implemented
Copilot Web access_token wss://copilot.microsoft.com/c/api/chat 5 Medium Medium (WebSocket) Implemented
DeepSeek Web userToken (localStorage) chat.deepseek.com/api/v0/chat/completion 5 Medium High (PoW) Implemented
Perplexity Web __Secure-next-auth.session-token perplexity.ai/rest/sse/perplexity_ask 5 Medium Medium (TLS) Implemented
Blackbox Web __Secure-authjs.session-token app.blackbox.ai/api/chat 5 Medium Low Implemented
Grok Web sso cookie grok.com/rest/app-chat/conversations/new 5 Medium High (NDJSON) Implemented
Meta AI Web ecto_1_sess meta.ai/api/graphql 5 Medium Medium Implemented
t3.chat Web cookies + convex-session-id t3.chat/api/chat 4 Low Medium Skeleton
Inner.ai token cookie chatapi.innerai.com/chat 5 Low Low Implemented
Adapta Web Clerk JWT agent.adapta.one/api/chat/stream/v1 5 Low Medium Implemented

New candidates (not yet implemented):

Provider Cookie/Token API Endpoint Feasibility Risk Complexity Notes
Poe Web p-b cookie poe.com/api/gql_POST (GraphQL) 4 Medium High (GraphQL) Many models via single subscription
Venice Web session cookie venice.ai/api/... 4 Low Low Privacy-focused, less bot detection
v0 Vercel Web session cookie v0.dev/api/... 3 Low Medium Code gen focused
Kimi Web session cookie kimi.moonshot.cn/api/... 4 Medium Medium Chinese market, may need captcha
Doubao Web session cookie doubao.com/api/... 4 Medium Medium ByteDance, large model catalog
you.com session cookie you.com/api/... 4 Low Medium Issue #2690
HuggingChat CSRF token huggingface.co/chat/conversation 5 Low Low Free, no auth for basic use
Phind session cookie phind.com/api/... 4 Low Low Free tier, dev-focused

Key techniques:

  • Cookie normalization via extractCookieValue() / normalizeSessionCookieHeader()
  • TLS fingerprint bypass (JA3/JA4 matching) for Cloudflare-protected sites
  • Proof-of-work solvers (SHA3-512, DeepSeekHashV1, hashcash)
  • Browser fingerprint spoofing (User-Agent, Sec-Ch-Ua, Origin, Referer)
  • Auto-refresh wrappers for session expiry handling

2. Free-Tier / No-Auth Providers

How it works: Use providers that offer free access without authentication, or with generous free tiers that don't require payment.

Provider Auth Required Rate Limit Models Feasibility Risk Status
OpenCode Free No Yes Kimi, GLM, Qwen, MiMo, MiniMax 5 None Implemented
Qoder AI No Yes Multiple 5 None Implemented
Pollinations No Yes Image/gen models 5 None Implemented
HuggingChat No Yes Multiple open-source 5 None 🔲 Candidate
Phind Free tier Yes Code-focused 5 None 🔲 Candidate
DuckDuckGo AI No Yes GPT-4o-mini, Claude, etc. 5 None 🔲 PR #2862

3. Auto-Registration (Programmatic Account Creation)

How it works: Automate the signup flow to create throwaway accounts, extract session tokens, and use them until they expire or get banned. Then repeat.

Risk level: HIGH — violates ToS of most providers. Research only unless user approves.

3a. Disposable Email + Verification

How it works: Use disposable email services (Guerrilla Mail, TempMail, Mailinator) to create accounts. Most providers send a verification link — click it programmatically to complete signup.

Provider Signup Method Verification Feasibility Risk Notes
ChatGPT Email + password Email link 4 High Rate limits on signup, phone verification may be required
Claude Email + password Email link 3 High Anthropic may require phone
Gemini Google account OAuth 3 Medium Need Google account automation
Perplexity Email + password Email link 4 Medium Less aggressive bot detection
Poe Email + password Email link 4 Medium Quora account system

Implementation complexity: Medium

  • Need: disposable email API, HTTP client for signup flow, email link extractor, session token storage
  • Challenge: CAPTCHAs (most providers use reCAPTCHA/hCaptcha), IP rate limiting, phone verification

3b. OAuth Automation

How it works: Create throwaway Google/GitHub/Apple accounts, then use OAuth to sign up for LLM providers. More reliable than email-based signup because OAuth tokens are harder to invalidate.

OAuth Provider Target LLM Providers Feasibility Risk Notes
Google Gemini, ChatGPT, Claude 3 High Google account creation requires phone
GitHub Copilot, various 4 Medium GitHub free tier is generous
Apple Claude, others 2 High Apple ID creation is heavily gated

Implementation complexity: High

  • Need: Playwright-based browser automation, CAPTCHA solving service, phone verification service
  • Challenge: Google/Apple account creation requires phone number, increasingly aggressive bot detection

3c. SMS Verification

How it works: Use virtual phone number services (SMS-Activate, 5sim, SMSpva) to receive verification codes during signup.

Service Cost per SMS Countries Reliability Notes
SMS-Activate $0.10-0.50 180+ High Most popular
5sim $0.05-0.30 100+ Medium Cheaper but less reliable
SMSpva $0.10-0.50 50+ Medium Limited country selection

Implementation complexity: High

  • Need: virtual number API integration, SMS parsing, retry logic for failed verifications
  • Challenge: cost per attempt, number recycling (may get already-used numbers), provider blacklisting

4. Token Harvesting / Session Pooling

How it works: Extract tokens from existing authenticated sessions (browser extensions, CLI tools, other apps) and pool them for high-throughput access.

4a. CLI Tool Token Extraction

Tool Token Location Token Type Feasibility Notes
gemini-cli ~/.gemini/oauth_creds.json OAuth refresh token 5 Already used by gemini-cli provider
claude-code ~/.claude/credentials OAuth token 5 Already used by claude-code provider
copilot-cli ~/.config/github-copilot/ OAuth token 4 Used by copilot provider
codex-cli ~/.codex/ OAuth token 4 Used by codex provider

4b. Session Pool Architecture

┌─────────────────┐
│  Session Pool    │
│  ┌───┐ ┌───┐    │
│  │ S1│ │ S2│... │  ← Multiple authenticated sessions
│  └───┘ └───┘    │
│  ┌──────────┐   │
│  │ Rotator   │   │  ← Round-robin or health-based rotation
│  └──────────┘   │
│  ┌──────────┐   │
│  │ Health    │   │  ← Detect expired/banned sessions
│  │ Monitor   │   │
│  └──────────┘   │
└─────────────────┘

Key features:

  • Round-robin or least-used rotation across sessions
  • Health checks (periodic validation that sessions are still active)
  • Auto-replace expired sessions
  • Rate limit tracking per session
  • Failover to next session on 401/403

5. Trial / Credit Exploitation

How it works: Exploit free trials, signup credits, and promotional offers from API providers.

Provider Free Credit Expiry Signup Method Feasibility Risk
OpenAI $5-18 credit 3 months Email + phone 4 Medium
Anthropic $5 credit 3 months Email 3 Medium
Google Cloud $300 credit 90 days Google account + credit card 3 Medium
AWS Bedrock Free tier (limited) 12 months AWS account 3 Low
Azure OpenAI $200 credit 30 days Microsoft account + phone 3 Medium
Together AI $5 credit Email 5 Low
Fireworks AI $1 credit Email 5 Low
Cerebras Free tier Email 5 Low
Groq Free tier Email 5 Low

Auto-registration potential: Medium — most require email verification, some require phone or credit card.


6. Leaked / Shared Credential Rotation

How it works: Use API keys or session tokens from public sources (GitHub leaks, shared accounts, public dashboards).

Risk level: CRITICAL — unauthorized access, potential legal consequences.

Source Credential Type Volume Feasibility Risk Notes
GitHub leaks API keys High 4 Critical Search for leaked keys in public repos
Public dashboards Session tokens Low 3 High Some projects expose tokens in configs
Shared accounts Login credentials Medium 3 High Account sharing communities

NOT RECOMMENDED — included for completeness only. This method involves unauthorized access and potential legal liability.


7. Reverse Engineering Official APIs

How it works: Intercept and reverse-engineer the internal APIs used by provider web interfaces, CLI tools, and mobile apps.

Target Protocol Auth Method Complexity Feasibility Status
ChatGPT Web REST + SSE Session token + PoW High 5 Done
Claude Web REST + TLS Session key + Turnstile High 5 Done
Gemini Web Playwright Cookie injection Medium 5 Done
Copilot Web WebSocket Hashcash PoW Medium 5 Done
DeepSeek Web REST + SSE userToken + PoW High 5 Done
Poe Web GraphQL p-b cookie High 4 🔲 Candidate
Kimi Web REST Session cookie Medium 4 🔲 Candidate
Doubao Web REST Session cookie Medium 4 🔲 Candidate

Key techniques:

  • Browser DevTools network tab for API discovery
  • mitmproxy / Charles for HTTPS interception
  • Playwright for automating browser interactions
  • TLS fingerprint matching (JA3/JA4)
  • PoW solver implementation

Top Candidates for Implementation (Ranked)

Rank Provider Method Feasibility Risk Effort Value
1 HuggingChat Free/no-auth 5 None Low High (popular, many models)
2 Phind Free tier 5 None Low Medium (dev-focused)
3 Poe Web Web-cookie 4 Medium High High (many models)
4 Venice Web Web-cookie 4 Low Low Medium (privacy)
5 v0 Vercel Web Web-cookie 3 Low Medium Medium (code gen)
6 Kimi Web Web-cookie 4 Medium Medium Medium (Chinese market)
7 Doubao Web Web-cookie 4 Medium Medium Medium (Chinese market)
8 DuckDuckGo AI Free/no-auth 5 None Low Medium (PR #2862)
9 Together AI Trial credits 5 Low Low Low ($5 credit)
10 Fireworks AI Trial credits 5 Low Low Low ($1 credit)

Auto-Registration Research Summary

Disposable Email Flow

1. Generate temp email (Guerrilla Mail API)
2. Submit signup form (HTTP client)
3. Extract verification link from email (IMAP/API)
4. Click verification link
5. Extract session token from response
6. Store in session pool
7. Repeat when session expires

OAuth Automation Flow

1. Create throwaway Google/GitHub account (Playwright)
2. Solve CAPTCHA (2captcha/anticaptcha API)
3. Complete phone verification (SMS-Activate)
4. Use OAuth to sign up for LLM provider
5. Extract session token
6. Store in session pool

Key Challenges

  • CAPTCHAs: Most providers use reCAPTCHA or hCaptcha. Solving services cost $1-3 per 1000 solves.
  • Phone verification: Virtual numbers cost $0.10-0.50 per SMS. Numbers may be recycled/blacklisted.
  • IP rate limiting: Providers track signup IP. Need proxy rotation.
  • Detection: Providers increasingly use behavioral analysis (mouse movements, typing patterns).
  • Sustainability: Accounts get banned. Need continuous re-registration.

Session Lifecycle Management

Full Automation Pipeline

Register → Verify → Extract Session → Store in Pool → Use → Detect Expiry → Re-register

Health Check Strategy

  • Periodic validation: send lightweight request, check response
  • Expiry detection: track TTL from session creation
  • Ban detection: monitor for 401/403 responses
  • Auto-replace: remove unhealthy sessions, trigger re-registration

Pool Configuration

interface SessionPool {
  providerId: string;
  sessions: Session[];
  rotationStrategy: 'round-robin' | 'least-used' | 'random';
  maxSessions: number;
  healthCheckInterval: number; // ms
  autoReplace: boolean;
}

Risk Assessment Matrix

Method ToS Violation Legal Risk Account Ban IP Ban Cost
Web-cookie (own account) Low Low Low Low Free
Free-tier providers None None None None Free
Auto-registration High Medium High Medium $0.10-0.50/account
Token harvesting Low Low Low Low Free
Trial exploitation Medium Low Medium Low Free
Leaked credentials Critical High High High Free

References

  • OmniRoute provider definitions: src/shared/constants/providers.ts
  • Cookie auth helpers: src/lib/providers/webCookieAuth.ts
  • Existing executors: open-sse/executors/
  • TLS clients: open-sse/executors/chatgptTlsClient.ts, perplexityTlsClient.ts, claudeTlsClient.ts
  • PoW solvers: open-sse/executors/deepseek-pow.ts, claudeTurnstileSolver.ts